The Military History Thread

[scoundrel]

The Hanovarians did succeed where the Stuarts failed, in winning deep rooted loyalty and acceptance from various sections of English (and Welsh) society. Funnily enough, the ones who seriously wooed Scotland and started to win her people round were King George IV and King William IV, who were arguably the least popular of the Hanovarians in England and Wales. Queen Victoria, who was our first really constitutional monarch, sealed the deal by showing herself in royal visits all over the British Isles; even in Ireland, many people who still detested being ruled by the British thought the Queen herself was OK.

George I was a good king. His lack of English probably actually helped, because he didn't meddle and interfere very much; as long as shit was running well, he left it alone. In his later years, the archives show that he wrote in several languages, including English, so he did take the trouble to learn. I also learned on my first visit to Rye in West Sussex that he had the necessary common touch. His ship was embayed there in 1726 during a January blizzard and storm. The mayor of Rye had the best house (Lamb House, its still there) and put the King up while he waited out the storm. The mayor's young wife was bearing her first child but insisted on having herself removed so the king could have the best room. To his credit, the king was mortified when he found this out and apologised to the couple profusely. He also stayed on for a week so he could stand godfather to the mayor's new son, as a personal thank you to the couple for their kindness.

On the other hand, George I was known for his work ethic. He never stopped except on Sundays, and he worked late except two or three eveninga a week when he went to the opera or played cards with some English friends, mostly commoners, for low stakes, so as not to cost them too much money if he won. He always went to the opera or to play cards incognito, to avoid inconveniencing people. The only real break he got was for a few weeks every 2-3 years when he was travelling between England and Hanover and no one could email him or contact him on his mobile phone. So; being embayed in Rye wasn't all bad news. Every day, he went fishing on the dock; he had his midday meal in the tavern where the local people were asked to feel free to carry on normally and ignore him, like they would any traveller, and he explored the town and nearby country, which is very attractive. In fact, everyone treated him just like Royalty, because...well...you know...So I think he was on holiday, for the only real holiday he experienced in his reign.

I've got to say he could be pretty ruthless if need be, but I find the Rye story rather appealing and it suggests to me a nicer, more human side to him. No Stuart would have been concerned because a woman in childbirth changed rooms for their convenience. That is a clue as to the difference.

[Ennath]

April 17, 1863
Grierson’s Raid

By spring 1863, Ulysses Grant was operating against the Confederate stronghold of Vicksburg. Seizing the town was a vital step towards securing the Mississippi River for the Union and cutting the Confederacy in two. To support this effort, Grant ordered a cavalry raid through central Mississippi. The goal of the raid was to tie down enemy forces while also hampering the Confederate's ability to reinforce Vicksburg by destroying railroads and bridges.

Early in 1863, Major General Charles Hamilton, the commander of the Corinth section of Grant's division, suggested what would eventually become this raid. Subsequently, due to Hamilton's insistence on procuring a command that would garner him more glory, Hamilton offered his resignation. Grant quickly accepted.

Up until this time in the war, Confederate cavalry commanders such as Nathan Bedford Forrest, John Hunt Morgan, and J.E.B. Stuart had ridden circles around the Union troopers (literally, in Stuart's case), and it was time to match the Confederates in cavalry expeditions. The task fell to Colonel Benjamin Grierson, a former music teacher who, oddly, hated horses after being kicked in the head by one as a child. Grierson's cavalry brigade consisted of the 6th and 7th Illinois and 2nd Iowa Cavalry regiments. There were 1700 men, some in Confederate uniforms, serving as scouts for the main force.

Departing La Grange, TN on April 17, Grierson's command crossed the Tallahatchie River the next day, the Union troops enduring heavy rains but met little resistance. Eager to maintain a fast pace, Grierson sent 175 of his slowest, least effective men back to La Grange on April 20. Learning of the Union raiders, the commander at Vicksburg, Lieutenant General John Pemberton, ordered local cavalry forces to intercept them and directed part of his command to guard the railroads.

Over the next several days, Grierson used a variety of ruses to throw off his pursuers as his men began disrupting the railroads of central Mississippi. Attacking Confederate installations and burning bridges and rolling stock, Grierson's men created havoc and kept the enemy off balance, making feints confusing the Confederates as to his actual whereabouts and intent. Storehouses were burned and slaves freed. Repeatedly skirmishing with the enemy, Grierson led his men south towards Union-held Baton Rouge, LA, inflicting ten times the casualties he took.

The premier Confederate cavalry commander, Nathan Bedford Forrest, was off chasing another Union raider, Col. Abel Streight, in Alabama and thus had no opportunity to stop Grierson. While Streight's Raid failed, occupying Forrest probably ensured the success of Grierson's Raid. Although many Confederate cavalry units pursued Grierson vigorously across the state, they were unsuccessful in stopping the raid. Grierson and his exhausted troopers ultimately rode in to Baton Rouge on May 2, after riding 600 miles through enemy territory. The raid had been a stunning success and saw his command only lose three killed, seven wounded, and nine missing. Five sick and wounded men were left behind along the route, too ill to continue.

With an entire division of Pemberton's soldiers tied up defending the vital Vicksburg-Jackson railroad from the evasive Grierson, combined with Maj. Gen. William Sherman's feint northeast of Vicksburg (the Battle of Snyder's Bluff), the beleaguered Confederates were unable to muster the forces necessary to oppose Grant's eventual landing on below Vicksburg the east side of the Mississippi at Bruinsburg. Grierson received a promotion to brigadier general.

[scoundrel]

Colonel Grierson's exploit was the original historic event which later inspired the script for The Horse Soldiers, a really good US Civil War film which is one of my personal favourites. Grierson's raid contrasted sharply with the mismanagement of Colonel Streight's raid. I was staggered when I first read that Colonel Streight had mules instead of horses; it was like sending me to run in the Olympic 100 metres. Also, Colonel Streight was unlucky to be up against Nathan Bedford Forrest, not yet widely known in 1863, but already a high class operator; of course he benefitted from excellent intelligence supplied by the populations past whom Streight was advancing, whereas Streight received nil assistance from the Confederate civilians in his line of march and quite a bit of passive resistance. On the day before he was finally made to surrender, Streight fired the bridge over Black Creek at Gadsden, Alabama; the river was in spate (it was May 2, 1863 and the spring rains were on). Streight was hoping to delay Bedford Forrest and steal a march while Forrest detoured to the next county for a suitable bridge. But a local teenaged girl came forward and showed a place a mile downstream where she had seen cattle crossing the day before; she guessed, and Forrest agreed, that if a cow could cross, so could a horse.

For having been known to have assisted the CSA forces, the girl could potentially have been singled out for punishment, if not execution, when Union forces captured the area a year later. She wasn't; the Union didn't play that way as a rule. But even though I personally consider that she was emphatically on the wrong side, she did a brave thing by making herself visible for possible Union retribution and she deserves respect for knowing which side she was on and standing up for her chosen side.

Next day, thanks to the intervention of the 15 year old girl, Bedford Forrest got in front of Streight's force, and forced a confrontation. He then sent his own men in a continuous column, circling out of sight of Streight's men, and made it look like he had a much longer column of cavalry than he really had. Faced with so many cavalry in front and nowhere to retreat, having fired the Gadsden Bridge, Colonel Streight felt obliged to surrender to save his men from dying uselessly. He was convulsed with rage and shame when he found out that Forrest only had about the same force he did, and demanded that he receive his weapons back so he and his men could fight a fair fight. But Forrest quite correctly would have no such nonsense as that and showed no sympathy at all; Colonel Streight would have to bear all the consequences of failing to do his utmost in the face of the enemy.

Later, Streight redeemed his honour somewhat by helping to organise and lead a mass tunnel escape from Libby Prison, near Richmond, Virginia, a hell-hole second only to Andersonville, and so bad that even the Confederate press regularly denounced it. 107 men escaped, for which Colonel Streight deserves a considerable share of the credit, and when he got back to the Union lines, he was at least exonerated of mere cowardice. No one patted him on the head; but no one shot him either. He was immediately returned to duty in his existing rank. The senior Union brass may have reflected that Streight was sent on a very hazardous operation, partly to be the decoy so that Grierson would be less strenuously opposed, and in this task Streight had been entirely successful, paying a high personal price for that success. It wasn't quite the fiasco it seemed to be. Streight went on to do rather well in more conventional operations and ended the war as a brevet brigadier general and a full colonel.

[Ennath]

April 18, 1536
Revolt of Manco Inca

In 1532, the Inca Empire was picking up the pieces after a long civil war between brothers Atahualpa and Huascar. Just as Atahualpa had triumphed, 160 Spanish conquistadors under Francisco Pizarro captured Atahualpa and held him for ransom. Atahualpa paid, but the Spanish killed him anyway in 1533. The Spaniards installed a puppet Emperor, Tupac Huallpa, upon Atahualpa's death, but he died shortly thereafter of smallpox. The Spanish selected Manco, a brother of Atahualpa and Huascar, to be the next Inca: he was only about 19 years old. A supporter of the defeated Huascar, Manco was lucky to have survived the civil war and was thrilled to be offered the position of Emperor.

Manco soon found that serving as puppet emperor did not suit him. Although nominally in charge, he had little real power and mostly performed traditional ceremonial and religious duties. In private, the Spanish forced him reveal the location of more gold and silver. His worst tormentors were Juan and Gonzalo Pizarro: Gonzalo even forcibly stole Manco's noble Inca wife. Manco tried to escape in October of 1535, but was recaptured and jailed. After his release in January 1536, he managed to leave Cuzco on April 18 promising the Spanish commander, Hernando Pizarro, to bring back a large gold statue when in fact he was already preparing a rebellion. Manco escaped and summoned his generals and called for his people to take up arms.

On the 21st, news of the plot reached Cuzco and Hernando Pizarro led an expedition against Manco Inca's troops, which had gathered in the nearby Yucay Valley, however, the attack failed as the Spaniards had severely underestimated the size of the Inca army. The Inca emperor did not attack Cuzco at once; instead he waited to assemble his full army estimated at 100,000 men strong around the city; against them there were 190 Spaniards, 80 of them horsemen, and several thousand Indian auxiliaries. The siege started on May 6, with a full-scale attack towards the main square of the city; the Inca army succeeded in capturing most of the city while the Spaniards took refuge in two large buildings near the main plaza. The conquistadors managed to fend off attacks from these strongholds and mounted frequent raids against their besiegers.

To relieve their position, the Spaniards decided to assault the walled complex of Sachsayhuaman, which served as the main base for the Inca army. Fifty horsemen, led by Juan Pizarro, accompanied by Indian auxiliaries broke through the Inca lines, turned around and attacked Sachsayhuaman from outside the city. They gained a lodgment in heavy fighting, though Pizarro was mortally wounded. Inca reinforcements were sent, but by the time they arrived, the fort had fallen. Several days of attacks failed to recapture the position and the Inca withdraw at the end of May. The capture of Sachsayhuaman eased the pressure on the garrison at Cuzco; the fighting now turned in a series of daily skirmishes interrupted only by the Inca religious tradition of halting attacks during the new moon.

Meanwhile, Francisco Pizarro in his new coastal capital of Lima dispatched several columns to try and break through to besieged Cuzco, but all were defeated. Encouraged by this success, a large Inca army descended from the mountains in August to take Pizarro’s capital. After six days of pressing around the perimeter, the Inca launched a full-scale assault, but frequent Spanish cavalry raids killed most of the army’s leaders, shattering its morale and the Inca soon began to melt away.

Encouraged by their successes, Hernando Pizarro, in late August, led an attack against Manco Inca's headquarters which were now at Ollantaytambo, further away from Cuzco, but as defeated. The Spanish garrison had more success with several raids to gather food from nearby regions; these incursions allowed them to replenish their almost exhausted provisions. Meanwhile, Manco tried to capitalize on his success at Ollantaytambo with a renewed assault on Cuzco; however, a Spanish cavalry patrol had a chance encounter with the Inca army thus ruining any hope of surprise. That same night the Spaniards mounted a full scale surprise counterattack which inflicted severe casualties on Manco's troops.

On November 8, 1536, Alonso de Alvarado left Lima at the head of 100 cavalry and 250 infantry, skirmishing with Inca garrisons. Reinforced by another 200 men in mid-January, he overcame major opposition at Rumichaca, a stone bridge over the Pampas River.

In early April 1537, Diego de Almagro returned with a significant force from an unsuccessful expedition to Chile, sending a peace embassy to Manco at Ollantaytambo to here his grievances. The Inca emperor at first seemed to make peace with Pizarro’s rival conquistador, but changed his mind when Almagro entered Calca, 25 miles away, with a vanguard of 200 cavalry. Paucar, the young Inca commander in the area, launched a surprise attack with 5500 warriors, but was repulsed and Almagro soon fought his way into Cuzco. He imprisoned the Pizarro brothers and assumed control of the town.

Almagro sent his lieutenant Rodrigo Orgoñez with a strong force to subdue Alvarado’s force approaching from the coast. The two forces met near the Abancay River on July 13 and Alvarado was overwhelmed almost without bloodshed.

Morale in Manco’s army was now low and, late in July, he abandoned the siege of Cuzco and also abandoned Ollantaytambo. His dwindling force made for the interior. Orgoñez pursued and defeated the Inca rearguard at Amaibamba. The emperor himself escaped on foot toward Vitcos. Orgoñez reached the town soon after, but paused to loot it, allowing Manco to escape to Vilcabamba.

Shortly thereafter, Almagro opened negotiations with Francisco Pizarro in Lima over ownership of Cuzco. Hernando Pizarro was exchanged and , shortly thereafter, Gonzalo escaped. Civil war broke out between the rival conquistadors.

Taking advantage, Manco decided it was time to strike again. Instead of leading a massive army in the field, he decided to try new tactics. He sent out word to local chieftains to attack and wipe out isolated Spanish garrisons or expeditions. Some Spanish individuals and small groups were killed and travel through Peru became unsafe. The Spanish responded by sending another expedition after Manco and traveling in larger groups. The natives did not succeed, however, in securing an important military victory or driving the Spanish out. By 1541 Manco was once again in hiding in the Vilcabamba Valley.

Seven of Almagro's defeated faction, knowing they would be executed for treason if captured, showed up in Vilcabamba. Manco granted them entrance and he put them to work training his soldiers in horsemanship and the use of Spanish armor and weapons. These men murdered Manco sometime in mid-1544. They were hoping to gain a pardon for their support of Almagro, but instead they were quickly tracked down and killed by some of Manco's soldiers.

[Ennath]

April 19, 1775
Lexington & Concord, Part 1

Following several years of rising tensions and the occupation of Boston by British troops, the military governor of Massachusetts, General Thomas Gage, began moving to secure the colony's military supplies to keep them from the Patriot militias. His actions received official sanction on April 14, 1775, when orders arrived from the Secretary of State, the Earl of Dartmouth, commanding him to disarm the rebellious militias and to arrest key colonial leaders. Believing the militias to be hoarding supplies at Concord, Gage made plans for part of his force to march and occupy the town.

On April 16, Gage sent a scouting party out of the city towards Concord. While this patrol gathered intelligence, it also alerted the colonials that the British were planning to move against them. Aware of Gage's orders from Dartmouth, many key colonial figures, such as John Hancock and Samuel Adams, left Boston to seek safety in the country. Two days after sending out the patrol, Gage ordered Lieutenant Colonel Francis Smith to prepare a 700-man force (drawn from 11 of the 13 regiments in Boston) to sortie from the city. On the morning of the 18th, Gage ordered a mounted patrol of about 20 men into the surrounding country to intercept messengers. This patrol behaved differently from patrols sent out in the past, staying out after dark and asking travelers about the location of Adams and Hancock. This had the unintended effect of alarming many residents and increasing preparedness. The Lexington militia in particular began to muster early that evening, hours before receiving any word from Boston.

As a result, many of the supplies at Concord had been removed to other towns. Around 9:00-10:00 that night, Patriot leader Dr. Joseph Warren informed Paul Revere and William Dawes that the British would be embarking that night for Cambridge and the road to Lexington and Concord. Slipping out of the city by different routes, Revere and Dawes made their famous ride west to warn that the British were approaching. In Lexington, Captain John Parker mustered the town's militia and had them fall into ranks on the town green with orders not to fire unless fired upon.

The British assembled at the water's edge on the western end of Boston Common by 10 PM on the 18th. The British march to and from Concord was a disorganized mess from start to finish. Colonel Smith was late in arriving, and there was no organized boat-loading operation, resulting in confusion at the staging area. The boats used were packed so tightly that there was no room to sit down. When they disembarked in Cambridge, it was into waist-deep water at midnight. After a lengthy halt to unload their gear, the regulars began their 17 mile march to Concord at about 2 AM. As they marched through Menotomy, sounds of alarms throughout the countryside caused the few officers who were aware of their mission to realize they had lost the element of surprise. At about 3 AM, Smith sent Major John Pitcairn ahead with six companies of light infantry under orders to quick march to Concord. At about 4, Smith made the wise but belated decision to send a messenger back to Boston asking for reinforcements.

Around sunrise on April 19, Pitcairn’s advance force arrived in Lexington. Some 80 militiamen stood in ranks on the village common watching them, and between 40 and 100 spectators watched from along the side of the road. Riding forward, Pitcairn demanded the militia disperse and lay down their arms. Parker partially complied and ordered his men to go home, but to retain their muskets. As the militia began to move, a shot rang out from an unknown source. This led to an exchange of fire which saw Pitcairn's horse hit twice. Charging with bayonets, the British drove the militia from the green. When the smoke cleared, 8 of the militia were dead and another 10 wounded. One British soldier was injured in the exchange.

Departing Lexington, the British pushed on towards Concord. Outside of the town, the Concord militia under Colonel James Barrett, only about 250 strong at this point and unsure of what had transpired at Lexington, fell back through the town and took up a position on a hill across the North Bridge. This step proved fortuitous, as the ranks of the militia continued to grow as minuteman companies arriving from the western towns joined them there.

When the troops arrived in Concord, Smith divided them to carry out Gage's orders. A company of grenadiers secured South Bridge, while 7 companies of light infantry, numbering about 100, secured the North Bridge near Barrett's force. Captain Parsons took 4 companies up the road 2 miles beyond the North Bridge to search Barrett's Farm, where intelligence indicated supplies would be found. Two companies were stationed to guard their return route, and one remained guarding the bridge itself. These companies, under the relatively inexperienced command of Captain Walter Laurie, were aware that they were significantly outnumbered by the now 400-plus militia that were only a few hundred yards away. The concerned Captain Laurie sent a messenger to Smith requesting reinforcements.

While Smith's men found little in the way of munitions, they did locate and disable three cannon and burned several gun carriages. Nearly a hundred barrels of flour and salted food were thrown into the millpond, as were 550 pounds of musket balls. Of the damage done, only that done to the cannon was significant. All of the shot and much of the food was recovered after the British left. During the search, the regulars were generally scrupulous in their treatment of the locals, including paying for food and drink consumed. The search at Barrett's Farm was fruitless; it had been an arsenal weeks before but few weapons remained now, and these were, according to family legend, quickly buried to look like a crop had been planted. The troops sent there did not find any supplies of consequence.

Seeing the smoke from the fire, Barrett and his men moved closer to the bridge and saw around 90-95 British troops fall back across the river. Advancing with 400 men, they were engaged by the British. Barrett told the men to load their weapons but not to fire unless fired upon, and then ordered them to advance. Laurie ordered the British companies guarding the bridge to retreat across it. One officer then tried to pull up the loose planks of the bridge to impede the colonial advance, but Major Buttrick began to yell at the regulars to stop harming the bridge. The Minutemen and militia advanced in column on the light infantry, keeping to the road, since it was surrounded by the spring floodwaters of the Concord River.

Captain Laurie then made a poor decision. Since his request for help had not produced any results, he ordered his men to form position for "street firing" behind the bridge in a column running perpendicular to the river. This formation was appropriate for sending a large volume of fire into a narrow alley between the buildings of a city, but not for an open path behind a bridge. Confusion reigned as regulars retreating over the bridge tried to form up in the street-firing position of the other troops. Lieutenant Sutherland, who was in the rear of the formation, saw Laurie's mistake and ordered flankers to be sent out. But as he was from a company different from the men under his command, only three soldiers obeyed him. The remainder tried as best they could in the confusion to follow the orders.

A shot rang out, and this time there is certainty that it came from the Army's ranks. It was likely a warning shot fired by a panicked, exhausted British soldier from the 43rd. Two other regulars then fired immediately after that, shots splashing in the river, and then the narrow group up front, possibly thinking the order to fire had been given, fired a ragged volley before Laurie could stop them. Two Minutemen were hit and killed instantly, but the militia only halted when Major Buttrick yelled "Fire, for God's sake, fellow soldiers, fire!" At this point the lines were separated by the Concord River and the bridge, and were only 50 yards apart. The front rows of colonists, bound by the road and blocked from forming line, managed to fire over each other's heads and shoulders at the regulars massed across the bridge. Four of the eight British officers and sergeants were wounded. The regulars found themselves trapped in a situation where they were both outnumbered and outmaneuvered. Lacking effective leadership and terrified at the superior numbers of the enemy, and likely not having experienced combat before, they abandoned their wounded, and fled to the safety of the approaching grenadiers coming from the town center, isolating the companies searching for arms at Barrett's Farm.

Lieutenant Colonel Smith heard the exchange of fire from his position in town moments after he received the request for reinforcements from Laurie. He quickly assembled two companies of grenadiers to lead toward the North Bridge himself. As these troops marched, they met the shattered remnants of the three light infantry companies running towards them. Smith was concerned about the four companies at Barrett's, since their route to town was now unprotected. When he saw the Minutemen in the distance behind their wall, he halted his two companies and moved forward with only his officers to take a closer look. One of the Minutemen behind that wall observed, "If we had fired, I believe we could have killed almost every officer there was in the front, but we had no orders to fire and there wasn't a gun fired." During a tense standoff lasting about 10 minutes, a mentally ill local man named Elias Brown wandered through both sides selling hard cider.

At this point, the detachment of regulars sent to Barrett's farm marched back from their fruitless search of that area. They crossed the bridge and returned to the town by 11:30, under the watchful eyes of the colonists, who continued to maintain defensive positions. Among the British dead at the bridge were some who had allegedly been scalped. The regulars continued to search for and destroy colonial military supplies in the town, ate lunch, reassembled for marching, and left Concord after noon. This delay in departure gave colonial militiamen from outlying towns additional time to reach the road back to Boston.

[Ennath]

April 19, 1775
Lexington & Concord, Part 2

Lieutenant Colonel Smith, aware that his situation was deteriorating, sent flankers to follow a ridge and protect his forces from the roughly 1000 colonials now in the field as they marched east out of Concord. This ridge ended at Meriam’s Corner, a crossroads and a small bridge about a mile outside Concord. To cross the narrow bridge, the column had to stop, dress its line, and close to a mere three soldiers abreast. Militia companies arriving from the north and east had converged at this point and, as the last of the column marched over the bridge, opened fire. Smith sent out his flanking troops again after crossing the small bridge.

Nearly 500 militiamen from Chelmsford had assembled in the woods on Brooks Hill about 1 mile further on. Smith's leading forces charged up the hill to drive them off, but the colonists did not withdraw, inflicting significant casualties. The bulk of Smith's force proceeded along the road until it reached Brooks Tavern, where they engaged a militia company from Framingham. Smith withdrew his men from Brooks Hill and moved across another small bridge into Lincoln.

The regulars reached a point in the road where there was a rise and a curve through a wooded area. At this point, now known as the "Bloody Angle", 200 militiamen had positioned themselves behind trees and walls for an ambush. Additional militia joined in from the other side of the road, catching the British in a crossfire in the wooded swamp, while the Concord militia closed from behind to attack. Thirty soldiers and four militia were killed. The soldiers escaped by breaking into a trot, a pace that the colonials could not maintain through the woods and swamps. Colonial forces on the road itself behind the British were too densely packed and disorganized to mount an attack.

Militia forces had risen to about 2000, and Smith sent out flankers again. When three companies of militia ambushed the head of his main force near either Ephraim Hartwell's Farm, the flankers closed in and trapped the militia from behind. Flankers also trapped the Bedford militia after a successful ambush near the Lincoln–Lexington border, but British casualties were mounting from these engagements and from persistent long-range fire, and the exhausted British were running out of ammunition.

During this part of the march, the colonists fought where possible in large ordered formations (using short-range, smoothbore muskets) at least eight times. This is contrary to the widely held myth of scattered individuals firing with rifles from behind walls and fences. Although scattered fire had also occurred on this march, these long-range tactics proved useful later in the war. Nobody at Lexington or Concord had a rifle, according to the historical records.

The light infantry cleared two additional hills beyond Lexington and more took casualties from ambushes. Pitcairn fell from his wounded horse. A few surrendered; most now broke formation and ran forward in a mob. Their organized, planned withdrawal had turned into a rout. A few uninjured officers turned and supposedly threatened their own men with their swords if they would not reform in good order. Only one British officer remained uninjured in the leading three companies. He was considering surrender when he heard cheering further ahead. A full brigade, about 1000 men with artillery under the command of Earl Percy, had arrived to rescue them. It was about 2:30.

General Gage had left orders for reinforcements to assemble in Boston at 4 AM, but in his obsession for secrecy, he had sent only one copy of the orders to the adjutant of the 1st Brigade, whose servant left the envelope on a table. At about 5, Smith's request for reinforcements was finally received, and orders were sent for 1st Brigade to assemble. Unfortunately, once again only one copy of the orders were sent to each commander, and the order for the Marines was delivered to the desk of Major Pitcairn, who was on Lexington Common at the time. After these delays, Percy's brigade, about 1000 strong, left Boston at about 8:45. They arrived in Lexington at about 2:00 PM. They could hear gunfire in the distance as they set up their cannon and lines of regulars on high ground with commanding views of the town. Colonel Smith's men approached like a fleeing mob with the full complement of colonial militia in close formation pursuing them. Percy ordered his artillery to open fire at extreme range, dispersing the militiamen. Smith's men collapsed with exhaustion once they reached the safety of Percy's lines.

Percy had left Boston without spare ammunition, thinking the extra wagons would slow him down. After he had left the city, Gage directed two ammunition wagons guarded by 14 men to follow. This convoy was intercepted by a small party of older, former militiamen, who could not join their companies because they were over 60. These men rose up in ambush and demanded the surrender of the wagons, but the regulars ignored them and drove their horses on. The old men opened fire, shot the lead horses, killed 2 sergeants, and wounded the officer. The survivors ran, and 6 of them surrendered.

Percy assumed control of the combined forces of about 1700 men and let them rest and have their wounds tended) before resuming the march. They set out from Lexington at about 3:30 in a formation that emphasized defense along the sides and rear of the column. Percy's men were often surrounded, but they had the tactical advantage of interior lines. Flanking companies were sent to both sides of the road, and a powerful force of Marines acted as the vanguard to clear the road ahead.

During the respite, Brigadier General William Heath arrived and took command of the militia. He reacted to Percy's artillery and flankers by ordering the militias to avoid close formations. Instead, they surrounded Percy's marching square with a moving ring of skirmishers at a distance to inflict maximum casualties at minimum risk.

The fighting grew more intense as Percy's forces crossed from Lexington into Menotomy. Fresh militia poured fire into the British ranks from a distance, and individual homeowners began to fight from their own property. A militia unit that attempted an ambush from Russell's orchard was caught by flankers, and 11 men were killed, some allegedly after they had surrendered. Percy lost control of his men, and British soldiers began to commit atrocities to repay for the supposed scalping at the North Bridge and for their own casualties. Many of the junior officers in the flank parties had difficulty stopping their exhausted, enraged men from killing everyone they found. Although many of the accounts of ransacking and burnings were exaggerated later by the colonists for propaganda value, it is certainly true that taverns along the road were ransacked and the liquor stolen by the troops, who in some cases became drunk themselves. All told, far more blood was shed in Menotomy and Cambridge than elsewhere that day.

The British troops crossed the Menotomy River into Cambridge, and the fight grew more intense. Fresh militia arrived and Percy used his two artillery and flankers to inflict heavy damage. Percy directed his troops down a narrow track and onto the road to Charlestown. The militia (now numbering about 4000) were unprepared for this move, and the circle of fire was broken. An American force moved to occupy Prospect Hill, which dominated the road, but Percy moved his cannon to the front and dispersed them with his last rounds of ammunition.

It was nearly dark when Pitcairn's Marines defended a final attack on Percy's rear as they entered Charlestown. The regulars took up strong positions on the hills. Some of them had been without sleep for two days and had marched 40 miles in 21 hours, 8 hours of which had been spent under fire. But now they held high ground protected by guns from the HMS Somerset. Gage quickly sent over two fresh regiments to occupy the high ground in Charlestown and build fortifications. Although they were begun, the fortifications were never completed and would later be a starting point for the militia works built two months later in June. General Heath studied the position of the British Army and decided to withdraw the militia to Cambridge.

In the day's fighting, the colonials lost 50 killed, 39 wounded, and 5 missing. For the British, the long march cost them 73 killed, 173 wounded, and 26 missing. The day after the battle, John Adams rode along the battlefields. He became convinced that "the Die was cast, the Rubicon crossed." The Massachusetts militia was soon joined by troops from other colonies ultimately forming a force of around 20,000, which laid siege to Boston.

[Oswald]

As Britain fought its rebel American colonists during the American Revolutionary War, it struggled to provide troops for all the theatres it was engaged in. Pressures from France and Spain stretched the small and under strength British army, and as recruits took time to try, this forced the government to explore different sources of men. It was common in the eighteenth century for ‘auxiliary’ forces from one state to fight for another in return for payment, and the British had made heavy use of such arrangements in the past. After trying, but failing, to secure 20,000 Russian troops, an alternative option was using Germans Auxiliaries.

Britain had experience in using troops from the many different German states, especially in creating the Anglo-Hanoverian army during the Seven Years War. Initially troops from Hanover – connected to Britain by the bloodline of their king – were placed on duty in the Mediterranean islands so their garrisons of regular troops could go to America. By the end of 1776 Britain had agreements in place with six German states to provide auxiliaries, and as most came from Hesse-Cassel they were often referred to en masse as Hessians, although they were recruited from all across Germany. Nearly 30,000 Germans served in this way during the span of the war, which included both normal line regiments and the elite, and often in demand, Jägers. Between 33 – 37% of the British manpower in the US during the war was German. In his analysis of the military side of the war, Middlekauff described the possibility of Britain fighting the war without Germans as “unthinkable”.

The German troops ranged greatly in effectiveness and ability. One British commander said the troops from Hesse-Hanau were basically unprepared for the war, while the Jägers were feared by the rebels and praised by the British. However, the actions of some Germans in plundering – allowing the rebels, who also plundered, a major propaganda coup which caused exaggeration for centuries – further reinforced the considerable numbers of Britons and Americans angry that mercenaries were being used. American anger at the British for bringing in mercenaries was reflected in Jefferson’s first draft of the Declaration of Independence: “At this very time too they are permitting their chief magistrate to send over not only soldiers of our common blood, but Scotch and foreign mercenaries to invade and destroy us.” Despite this, rebels tried frequently to persuade the Germans to defect, even offering them land.

The campaign of 1776, the year the Germans arrived, encapsulates the German experience: successful in battles around New York, but made infamous as failures for their loss at the Battle of Trenton, when Washington won a victory vital for rebel morale after the German commander had neglected to build defences. Indeed, the Germans fought in many places across the US during the war, although there was a tendency later on to sideline them as garrisons or just raiding troops. They are chiefly remembered, unfairly, for both Trenton and the assault on the fort at Redbank in 1777 which failed due to a mixture of ambition and faulty intelligence. Indeed, Atwood has identified Redwood as the point at which German enthusiasm for the war began to fade. Germans were present in the early campaigns at New York, and they were also present at the end in Yorktown. Intriguingly, at one point Lord Barrington advised the British king to offer Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, the commander of the Anglo-Hanoverian army of the Seven Years War, the post of commander in chief. This was tactfully rejected.

There were Germans on the rebel’s side among many other nationalities. Some of these were foreign nationals who had volunteered as individuals or small groups. One notable figure was a buccaneering mercenary and Prussian drill master – Prussia was regarded as having one of the premier European armies – who worked with the continental forces. He was (American) Major-General von Steuben. In addition, the French army which landed under Rochambeau included a unit of Germans, the Royal Deux-Ponts regiment, sent to try and attract deserters from the British mercenaries.

The American colonists included large numbers of Germans, many of whom had initially been encouraged by William Penn to settle Pennsylvania, as he deliberately tried to attract Europeans who felt persecuted. By 1775, at least 100,000 Germans had entered the colonies, making up a third of Pennsylvania. This stat is cited from Middlekauff, who believed in their abilities so much he called them “the best farmers in the colonies.” However, many of the Germans tried to avoid service in the war - some even supported the loyalist caused – but Hibbert is able to refer to a unit of German immigrants who fought for the US forces at Trenton – while Atwood records that “the troops of Steuben and Muhlenberg in the American army” at Yorktown were German.

[Mal Hombre]

The most famous German mercenary in The Revolutionary War is probably fictional,Washington Irving's Headless Horseman..

[haroldeye]

The British Army are taking part in a major French Exercise this year. Diplomatically the French have called it ROCHAMBEAU.

[Mal Hombre]

Originally Posted by haroldeye

The British Army are taking part in a major French Exercise this year. Diplomatically the French have called it ROCHAMBEAU.

That's fair enough,I'm sure They'd be happy to take part in Operation WOLFE next time.