The Military History Thread

[Ennath]

April 5, 1799
Battle of Magnano

After the Treaty of Campo Formio (1797), only Great Britain remained at war with the First French Republic. Austria had gained all of the Veneto east of the Adige River, while the French occupied much of the rest of northern Italy. However, Austria and Russia soon joined Britain in a Second Coalition.

In Switzerland, hostilities between France and Austria began in early March 1799. The next day, fighting occurred along the Adige River between the opposing forces of Gen. Barthélemy Schérer and Feldmarschall-Leutnant Paul Kray Freiherr von Krajova. Each had just under 60,000 men facing each other across the Adige, while a large Russian army under Field Marshal Alexander Suvorov was on its way to Italy.

The French Directory ordered Schérer to go onto the offensive and to push the Austrians out of the Veneto before the Russians could arrive. In the Battle of Verona (March 26), the French scored a success at Pastrengo and fought a drawn battle near Austrian-held Verona, but the Austrians managed to get across the Adige at Legnago. To defend Verona, Kray concentrated his army in its vicinity. Schérer’s army faced north toward Verona, with the French-held fortress of Mantua to his southwest. The French general considered crossing the Adige below Verona to flank Kray out of the city, but heavy rains thwarted his plan. Schérer then discovered that the Austrians had come out of Verona and decided to alter his plan. Rather than cross the river, the French turned north. By April 5, the two armies confronted each other on a rain-sodden field near the hamlet of Magnano, south of Verona.

The French advanced in 3 columns. On the left were 20,000 men in 3 divisions, two under General Moreau and one under Gen. Sérurier. In the center was a single division of 7000 men under Gen. Delmas, and on the right were 14,000 men in 2 divisions under Gens. Victor and Grenier. The French total included 6800 cavalry attached to the divisions.

Kray had indeed come out of Verona, intending to attack the French as they crossed the river. He now reorganized his force into 3 small columns of 7000 each and 2 reserve columns, each 10,000 strong. The left and right Austrian columns were thus much weaker than the French forces opposing them, but one of the Austrian reserve columns, under Prince Friedrich of Hohenzollern, was posted just behind the Austrian right (west).

Schérer sent Victor and Grenier to attack on the right flank. Jean Victor Marie Moreau attacked in the center. Serurier’s division on the left flank struck northwest to Villafranca to protect Moreau’s flank. Delmas, with the reserve, marched forward to fill the gap that opened between the French right flank and Moreau as the latter moved north. Kray advanced at the same time as the French, resulting in a meeting engagement. The Austrian commander appointed Mercandin to lead the left column, Kaim to direct the center column, and Zoph to command his right column. Hohenzollern led the reserve division on the right, while Kray held back a second reserve division under Franz Joseph, Marquis de Lusignan.

At first the French were successful. On the east flank at Pozzo, southeast of Verona, Victor and Grenier encountered the outnumbered Mercandin. After an inconclusive clash between the infantry a French cavalry attack forced Mercandin to retreat. They pressed north toward Verona. Kray committed Hohenzollern's reserve to assist Zoph's right flank division. Serurier engaged in a back-and-forth struggle all day but he finally seized his objective.

In the center General Kaim advanced through Magnano and ran into Delmas a little further south at Buttapietra. This was the only clash between equal forces, but Delmas was soon joined by part of Moreau's force and Kaim was also forced to retreat. On the French left Moreau's remaining men were strong enough to stop General Zoph's column, while Sérurier's division clashed with Hohenzollern's reserve force around Isolalta.

At this point honors were about even, but Schérer's divergent attacks had spread his troops across a wide front. The French were now completely committed while Kray still had the 10,000 men of his central reserve. Part of this reserve was used to reinforce Mercandin, who then made a new attack on Grenier’s division while another part attacked Grenier from the west, hitting his left flank. The French right wing was forced to retreat in some confusion. Kray sent troops against the exposed right flank of Delmas and drove him back also.

Elsewhere the French held their ground or pushed the Austrians back, but by the end of the day the French had suffered 3700 casualties and lost another 4500 prisoners. The Austrians suffered about 4000 casualties (including Gen. Mercandin killed), plus 2000 captured, but on the day after the battle it was the French who retreated, pulling back across the Oglio River, leaving garrisons in Mantua and Peschiera, but abandoning several defensible river lines.

After the battle Schérer resigned and was replaced by Moreau, while Kray was rewarded with promotion to Field Marshal. In mid April Suvorov and the Russians arrived, and the Allied army advanced west towards Milan. At the end of April Moreau was defeated at Cassano and the Allied entered Milan. In one month Napoleon’s conquests of 1796 had been undone.

[Ennath]

425 BC
Battle of Solygia

In the summer of 425 BC, the Athenians sent an expedition to raid the eastern shores of the Isthmus of Corinth. The expedition consisted of 2000 hoplites and 200 cavalry carried on 80 ships, and commanded by Nicias son of Niceratus. The Athenians were also supported by a number of allied contingents.

The Corinthians had received advanced warning of the Athenian plans, and had been able to gather most of their army in the Isthmus and were on guard. Despite this the Athenians managed to catch the defenders out by sailing at night and were able to land on a beach overlooked by the hill of Solygia. The Athenian right landed close to Chersonese, the left near to Rheitus. Although the exact location of these last two places is unclear, the overall picture is clearer. Ancient Corinth was inland, with two ports, one on each side of the Isthmus. The eastern port of Cenchriae was located at the western end of a bay. The coast then ran south, before turning east to run around a headland (possibly the Chersonese in question). The hill of Solygia was in the middle of this headland. The Athenians thus landed with their left wing threatening Solygia and their right wing somewhere on the coast nearer to Cenchriae.

The Corinthians split their army into three. Half of the army stayed at Cenchriae to guard against any Athenian movement in that direction. One company of troops from the other half of the army, under the command of Battus, occupied Solygia. The main part of this half of the army, under Lycophron, attacked the Athenians.

The first Corinthian assault hit the Athenian right, but the fighting soon spread along the entire line. Thucydides gives most details for the fighting on the Athenian right. The Athenian and Carystian troops on this wing must have been close to their ships when they were first attacked. The Corinthians were pushed back, and retired up a slope. They charged the Athenian line again but without success, until a fresh contingent of Corinthian troops arrived. The Athenians were then pushed back to their vessels for a second time, but the Corinthians were unable to break through.

On their left the Athenians were the ones attacking, advancing towards Lycophron at Solygia. The Corinthians held their ground against the Athenian infantry, but according to Thucydides, the Athenians were the only ones to have cavalry. In some unexplained way the Athenian cavalry was decisive, and the Corinthians on their right retreated in some disorder onto the hill of Solygia. Lycophron was killed during this near rout. Along the rest of the line the Corinthians were pushed back, but in good order, and were able to take up a defensive position on higher ground.

This ended the fighting. The Athenians gathered the bodies of their dead, stripped the Corinthian dead, and built a trophy to celebrate the victory. The Athenians lost just under 50 men in the battle, the Corinthians 112. Meanwhile the other half of the Corinthian army was approaching from the north, and reinforcements from Corinth were approaching from the west. The Athenians saw these new troops and believing them to be reinforcements from the Peloponnese took to their ships and retired to some nearby islands.

In the aftermath of this victory the Athenians sailed along the coast, raiding Crommyon before moving south-east to capture and fortify the peninsula of Methana. A garrison was left in Methana, and the rest of the fleet then returned to Athens.

[Ennath]

April 6, 402
Battle of Pollentia

Theodosius I, the last emperor of both eastern and western halves of the Roman Empire, died in 395, leaving his sons Arcadius and Honorius emperors of the East and West, respectively. Both new emperors were only boys at their ascension to the thrones, making it necessary for older and more experienced men to step in as consuls.

Flavius Stilicho, son of a Vandal father, though he identified with his maternal Roman heritage, was the magister utriusque militae when Honorius came to power and was able to act as consul and commander-in-chief because of his close relationship to the imperial family. Theodosius I had great trust in Stilicho and their families became formally linked when Stilicho’s daughter was married to Honorius. Zosimus described the concurrent situation: “The empire now devolved upon Arcadius and Honorius, who, although apparently the rulers, were so in name only: complete control was exercised by Rufinus in the east and Stilicho in the west.” Even as Honorius grew older (he was 10 at his ascension and 17 at the Battle of Pollentia) “[he] was a feeble nonentity.”

A subordinate of Theodosius and a Roman foederatus who had served with distinction under Stilicho, Alaric was a powerful leader from a high-ranking Visigothic family known as the Balthi or “Good Men”. The Visigoths had established themselves in Thrace and ended their service to the empire as foederati on the charge that they were not being compensated as promised. They then raided extensively throughout Macedonia, Greece and Epirus, until the eastern Roman emperor sought to buy peace by naming Alaric the master-general of Eastern Illyricum. Using his new authority, Alaric reequipped the Visigoths from the imperial armories at Margus, Ratiaria, Naissus and Thessalonica. His success prompted the Visigothic chieftains to raise him on their shields and declare him the King of the Visigoths. Having exhausted the spoils of that region, the new King turned his people westward.

Alaric set his sights on Gaul (historians are not sure why he chose this region) and began marching, invading northern Italy in late 401 on his way across the western empire. Stilicho was occupied in Raetia (modern Switzerland) and Noricum (Austria) in the north dealing with Vandal and Alan raids. These had forced Rome to strip Italy of its veteran soldiers. With no Imperial army to protect them, the timid Emperor Honorius in Milan, and the Romans of the Eternal City contemplated the approach of Alaric’s horde with dismay. The Visigoths moved through Pannonia (Hungary) and passed the Julian Alps in late 401 to lay siege to Aquileia and occupy the provinces of Istria and Venetia. Stilicho appeared before the Emperor, urging him to remain within the fortifications of Milan, while he recruited an army beyond the Alps. Stilicho then crossed the Alps in the dead of winter, quieting the Alemanni in Rhaetia and regrouping the Imperial troops, as well as enlisting the aid of King Saul of the Alans. Calls for reinforcements were sent out to the Roman garrisons on the Rhine and the Danube. A summons was even sent to far Britain, where the veteran Sixth Victrix, one of two garrison legions, set out for Italy.

With the new year, Alaric was closing in on Milan, easily crossing the unseasonably low rivers that Stilicho had hoped would slow the Visigothic advance. Honorius panicked, and fled toward Gaul, intending to relocate the imperial court at Arelate (Arles), but was intercepted by Gothic patrols and forced to take shelter within the town of Hasta (Asti) on the banks of the River Tanarus in eastern Liguria. A Roman emperor was too great a prize to ignore, so Alaric shifted his host from Milan and laid seige to Hasta in February 402. His encampment was several miles to the south near Pollentia (modern Pollenzo), on the west bank of the Tanarus near the junction of the road linking Hasta with Augusta Taurinorum and the coast. By rapid marches, Stilicho and his small vanguard were able to cut their way through the Visigothic encirclement, raising the spirits of the Emperor and bolstering the resistance of the defenders.

Alaric continued the siege of Hasta while the Roman forces gradually concentrated and invested the Visigothic army, building strongpoints at key spots and linking fortifications to restrict Alaric’s field of operations. As the noose slowly tightened, the change of fortunes prompted the Visigothic chieftains to hold a council to discuss their options. Rejecting a call to retreat, Alaric rallied his chieftains, recounting their past successes against the Romans, and telling them that a voice from a Sacred Grove had whispered to him that the Visigoths would capture the great city of Rome. He ended the conference with the boast that he would find either a kingdom or a grave in Italy. Thus they resolved to continue the siege and to wait for an opportunity to give battle against Stilicho on favorable terms.

Cautious of Visigothic numbers and prowess and recognizing that his army represented the last reserves of the western Empire, Stilicho resorted to a stratagem. Knowing that the Visigoths were devout (Arian) Christians, he resolved to attack them on Easter morning (April 6), guessing correctly that they would be engaged in prayer and not expecting an attack. The job of launching the surprise attack was entrusted to the pagan King Saul and his Alans, who formed the right wing of Stilicho’s army.

Little is known of the details of the battle. In his De Bello Gallico, Claudian recounts that the Alans’ initial charge took the Goths by surprise, but Alaric’s forceful leadership prevented a panic. It took some time for the Goths to deploy, hampered as they were by the Easter festival and by the presence of large numbers of dependents and camp followers. But Alaric was unshaken, and the Visigoths joined the fray with their spirits enflamed by the Easter sacrilege. Saul and his Alans charged again and again, until the Alan king was cut down in his saddle. This demoralized the Alans, who sought to leave the field, only to find their way to the rear barred. Stilicho had repositioned a Roman legion from his reserve to bolster the Alans and prevent the Visigoths from falling on his now exposed flank.

Before the Gothic horse could press their advantage against the regrouping Alans, Stilicho committed his Roman and foederati foot to a heavy frontal attack. The Visigoths were forced back into their camp. After bitter fighting at the barricades, the Romans and their allies cut their way in, driving the Visigothic defenders before them. To their credit, Stilicho’s troops did not pause for loot, but pressed the fight. After heavy loss on both sides, Alaric rallied his surviving foot under the protection of his horsemen in the fields beyond and retired south toward the Ligurian coast under cover of night. In flight, the Visigoths were forced to abandon their dependants, including Alaric’s own wife and children, as well as the great piles of loot that had been collected in Greece, Illyricum, Pannonia and northern Italy.

News of the victory was met throughout the western Empire with great relief and celebration. Serena, wife of Stilicho, paid for a mosaic floor in the basilica of the Apostles in Milan as a votive offering for Stilicho's victory.

Meanwhile, Alaric moved along the Ligurian coast eastward into Etruria to regroup his battered Visigoths. His escape, and Stilicho’s apparent willingness to let him go, fueled rumors about the Roman general’s friendship with Alaric that would later contribute to Stilicho’s undoing. Stilicho offered to return his prisoners in exchange for the Visigoths returning to Illyricum, but upon reaching Verona in early 403, Alaric stopped his retreat and besieged the city. Stilicho and local forces surrounded the Visigoths and defeated them again. With many of his generals deserting him and swearing allegiance to Stilicho, Alaric was forced to leave Italy. He would be back.

[Ennath]

April 7, 1761
Belle-Isle Expedition

In 1756 Britain and France had formally gone to war after initial clashes in North America. The French began the war successfully by capturing Minorca. After this Britain had begun a series of naval incursions on the French coast, such as the raid on Rochefort (1757) and on Cherbourg (1758), pioneered by William Pitt. While the practical success of these was limited, they caused serious alarm throughout France and forced the French government to retain large numbers of troops to guard coastal areas against further raids. Pitt suspended the campaign in late 1758 following an unsuccessful landing at Saint Cast, while remaining open to the idea of further operations against the vulnerable French coast.

In 1759 France suffered major naval defeats at Lagos and Quiberon Bay (see posting) and a near continuous British blockade of French ports, and for much of the remainder of the war the French navy remained at anchor. From 1757 the British launched a series of attacks on French colonies around the globe, leading many of them being captured. Pitt had planned to send an expedition to capture Mauritius, a major French naval base in the Indian Ocean. However, with the likelihood of a peace congress fast approaching Pitt wanted something more immediate and tangible which could be exchanged for captured British or German territory, rather than Mauritius which would take a long time to capture and news of which would take months to reach Europe. He was also aware of Spain’s potential entry into the war, which would also make it prudent to keep ships closer to home.

Pitt now decided to switch the focus of an expedition to the French coast. The island of Belle Ile was located close to Lorient, a major naval center in Brittany and offered command of the Bay of Biscay. He now advocated that it should be seized and turned into a British base which could then be used as a staging point for further attacks on the French mainland. Pitt had originally proposed an attack in October 1760, but it was strongly opposed by the Duke of Newcastle and vetoed by King George II on the grounds that more focus should be given to the ongoing campaign in Germany. Pitt now revived the project, helped by the fact that the old King had died and been succeeded by his grandson.

Admirals Lord Anson and Sir Edward Hawke were both opposed to such an expedition, but Pitt was not put off. On March 25, 1761, George III signed secret orders now making Belle Ile the target. Command of the army was to be given to Gen. Studholme Hodgson while Adm. Augustus Keppel, already experienced in amphibious operations, was to command the naval elements.

The expedition was assembled at Plymouth and arrived off Belle Ile, delayed by bad weather, on April 6. After an initial reconnaissance of the southern end of the island it was decided to try the area around Port Andro on the south of Belle Ile. The next day, a force under Gen. John Crauford attempted to make a landing. A feint was made to the north with 2 battalions of infantry and a contingent of marines. Crauford’s force encountered much heavier opposition than had been expected. The French were well-entrenched and their fire took a heavy toll. A company of grenadiers managed to scale the nearby cliffs, but they were not supported and many were killed and captured. Realizing that they had lost any chance of surprise, Crauford’s troops abandoned the attempt and withdrew back to the ships. A violent storm then blew up wrecking many of the landing craft vital for the operation. The expedition commanders believed a further attempt was not practicable, and after further reconnaissance they wrote home to Pitt suggesting that no assault was now possible, raising the likelihood that the force should sail for home.

The results of the attack resulted in dismay in both Paris and London. The French court was infuriated by the fact that Pitt had pressed ahead with the operation in spite of the ongoing peace talks, which they regarded as an act of bad faith. In Britain the failure was met with a mixture of resigned acceptance by opponents of the expedition, but Pitt pressed ahead with a second attempt. Troop transports carrying forces to take part in an attack on Martinique were diverted to join Keppel along with significant reinforcements. Pitt was determined to secure the island as a principal objective in the global war.

Now reinforced to a strength of about 9000, a second landing was planned by Keppel and Hodgson. After lengthy examination of the island's defenses it was decided that the best chance of success was another attack at Port Andro. This time 2 diversionary attacks were planned, one in the west against Sauzon and one in the north against St Foy.

On 22 April the main attack, again led by John Crauford, met opposition as heavy it had last time and soon stalled. Meanwhile, the diversionary attack to the north led by Brig. Hamilton Lambart discovered an undefended stretch of coast around St Foy as the French had believed that the high cliffs were a strong enough defense against any attack. Lambart decided that they could be scaled, and his troops successfully gained a position on top of the ridge. They beat off a counterattack from nearby French troops, receiving support from nearby Royal Navy ships.

Realizing what had happened, Crauford abandoned his attack and took his troops via boat around to assist Lambart. The British poured further reinforcements in to secure the beachhead. By nightfall the whole British force was ashore. According to a pre-arranged signal the French forces and inhabitants withdrew into the main fortification at Le Palais leaving the rest of the island to the invaders.

The British now occupied the island’s ports allowing them to ship in fresh supplies, and began to besiege Le Palais. The French commander on the island, the Chevalier Ste Croix, hoped that he and his 3000 men would be able to resist long enough for some relief to reach him from the mainland. The Governor of Brittany, the Duc d'Aiguillon had gathered a force at Vannes with the intention of coming to the aid of Belle Ile, but British frigates kept a vigilant watch of the coast, and the British dominance of the surrounding seas made any chance of a crossing unlikely. The French government moved fresh reinforcements to mainland Brittany, fearing that this would be the next British target.

A French attempt to ready a small fleet by activating 7 ships-of-the-line at Rochefort and 8 at Brest was encountered by an even more vigorous blockade mounted by Keppel. On June 8, after more than a month’s siege of Le Palais, Ste Croix acknowledged he was unlikely to receive any help and he agreed to capitulate. He was allowed to march his men out through the breach with the honors of war and his force was then repatriated to nearby Lorient.

The initial French reaction to the island’s fall was to tell the British they could keep it if they wanted, but could expect no compensation if they handed it back. It was soon realized that this was not a plausible stance, as the island could be used as a base for privateers and the Royal Navy. Ultimately, after 2 years of occupation, the island was handed back to France in the wake of the Treaty of Paris (1763), in exchange for the return of Minorca to Britain. Belle Ile was then partially settled by French-speaking Acadians from Canada following the 1755 capture of the remaining portions of Acadia. They were unhappy with conditions there, and by 1785 most of them had emigrated to Louisiana.

[Ennath]

April 8, 1952
Bolivian National Revolution

After the Chaco War, a group of middle-class professionals, writers, and young officers questioned Bolivia’s traditional leadership. This group, which came to be known as the Chaco Generation, searched for new ways to deal with the nation’s problems. It resented service on behalf of the tin-mining entrepreneurs and criticized Standard Oil, which had delivered oil to Paraguay clandestinely through Argentine intermediaries during the war. The Chaco Generation was convinced of the need for social change. The military, which came to power in 1936, tried to bring about change with popular support.

On May 17, 1936 Colonel David Toro Ruilova overthrew President Tejada in a military coup. The main backers were a group of younger officers who wanted to bring change to Bolivia. Toro, the leader of this group, hoped to reform the country from the top down. His program of “military socialism” included government control over natural resources. He attempted to get civilian support with far-reaching social legislation and also nationalized the holdings of Standard Oil without compensation and called for the convening of a constitutional congress.

Toro was unable to secure lasting popular support. A group of more radical officers supported a coup by Colonel German Busch Becerra in 1937. A new constitution was promulgated in 1938, favoring government intervention in social and economic relations. It also legalized the Indian communities and included a labor code. In 1939 Busch challenged the interests of the mine owners with a decree that would prevent them from removing capital from the country. None of his policies, however, resulted in significant support, and completely alienated the conservatives. A frustrated Busch committed suicide in 1939.

Gen. Enrique Peñaranda Castillo was elected president in the spring of 1940. His support came from the traditional parties, who had formed a concordancia to stem the growth of the movement toward further reforms. The trend toward reform, however, could not be halted, and a number of new groups gained control of the Congress during Peñaranda’s presidency. These groups, although different in their ideological outlooks, agreed on the need to change the status quo. The most important opposition came from the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR). The party's program included nationalization of all of Bolivia’s natural resources and far-reaching social reforms. Its anti-Semitic statements resulted not only in the imprisonment of MNR leaders but also in charges by the US government that MNR was under the influence of Nazis.

As leader of the congressional opposition, the MNR denounced Peñaranda’s close cooperation with the United States and was especially critical of his agreement to compensate Standard Oil. The MNR had contacts with reformist officers, who were organized in a secret lodge named the Fatherland’s Cause (Radepa), founded in 1934 by prisoners of war in Paraguay. It sought mass support, backed military intervention in politics, and hoped to prevent excessive foreign control over Bolivia's natural resources.

In December 1943 the Radepa-MNR alliance overthrew Peñaranda. Major Gualberto Villarroel Lopez became president, and 3 MNR members, including Paz Estenssoro, joined his cabinet. The MNR ministers resigned, however, when the United States refused to grant recognition, repeating its charge of ties between the MNR and Nazi Germany (the involvement of the German embassy in Buenos Aires lent some weight to these charges). The ministers returned to their posts in 1944, after the party had won a majority in the election and the United States had recognized the government. There was a continuation of reform, but this not enough to prevent growing ties between the MNR and miners.

Villarroel was overthrown in 1946. He had been unable to organize popular support and faced opposition from conservative groups. Mobs of students, teachers, and workers seized arms from the arsenal and moved to the presidential palace. They captured and shot Villarroel and suspended his body from a lamppost in the main square, while the army remained aloof in the barracks. Some 250 died in the 4-day rampage. Paz Estenssoro and 5000 others fled to Argentina.

The military purged itself of the Radepa and supported the old elite. Unrest continued and the economy worsened as demand for tin fell after World War II. The labor sector became more radical and the government more oppressive. In August 1949, the MNR seized control of the department of Santa Cruz and part of Cochabamba, east of La Paz. The bloodiest fighting occurred in Catavi as government aircraft bombed rebel positions. After 2 months of fighting, the army overwhelmed the MNR. Some 1200 people were killed; few were government troops.

On May 6, 1951, Paz Estenssoro apparently won the presidential election from exile. However, President Mamerto Urriolagoitia refused to accept the results and would not turn the matter over to Congress as required by the constitution. He encouraged the military to take control in what became known as the Mamertazo. A military junta assumed power on May 16 and Gen. Hugo Ballivian Rojas became president. Senior officers, believing the new chief to be inept, began jockeying to become the next president.

In late 1951, Silas Zuazo, an MNR leader, quietly returned from exile to organize a rebellion, choosing late March 1952 as a target date, as the president would be traveling in the south and many of the military would be on leave. At this point, Gen. Antonio Seleme, in charge of internal affairs (controlling the 3000 carabineros - national police), offered to participate, in return for becoming the next president. Zuaza mistrusted him, but was not sufficiently sure of his own prospects as so accepted. Seleme was required to join the MNR. The revolt was rescheduled for April 9, Easter weekend.

With the president leaving the capital, command there was entrusted to Gen. Humberto Torres; he had opposed military rule and so was felt to have no designs on the government himself. Seleme convinced Ballivian that Torres was unreliable and that his troops should be posted outside La Paz. He suggested that his carabineros and the Presidential Guard would be adequate to maintain control. Ballivian consented and moved the 2 regiments present to the altiplano. The MNR, without revealing its intentions, contacted Torres and urged him to support early elections and others attempted to recruit army officers.

At about 11 PM on April 8, members of the MNR began assembling to receive arms from Gen. Seleme. These did not arrive and one group of 140 was arrested by the carabineros. Some MNR leaders assumed that Seleme had betrayed them, but, in fact, the general was just playing it “close to the vest” and had not informed subordinates in the plot that civilians would be participating. He ordered the civilians released and provided the weapons.

At 5 AM on the 9th, carabineros and MNR members seized government buildings and the radio station. The confused Presidential Guard offered little resistance. Arms were then distributed to MNR members, who soon grew to 1000 or more. It appeared that the coup might be bloodless. Then at 3:00, Gen. Torres ordered his troops to fight. Army reinforcements were rushed from the countryside and, along with the cadets from the military academy, they fought their way almost to the center of the city. As night fell, the rebel position became increasingly difficult. Gen. Seleme fled to the Chilean embassy.

By the afternoon of the 10th, miners began pouring into La Paz from Oruro, 146 miles southeast of La Paz, and prevented additional troops from entering the capital. Women from the Indian markets, MNR supporters, went up to Indian soldiers and grabbed their weapons. Serious defections from the government ranks also began to occur. The air force refused to bomb the capital and the troops in Viacha (26 miles away) refused to fight. During the early evening, government troops began using mortars and artillery against rebel positions, but some 40 miners attacked and silenced the guns. By the afternoon of April 11, Good Friday, the fighting was over and the MNR had won. Paz Estenssoro became president on April 16. Between 300 and 3000 people were killed in the fighting.

The new regime introduced a number of reforms, including universal suffrage and nationalizing, with compensation, of the mines. Land was granted to the peasants. The army was initially abolished, but was reformed in 1953; however officers connected to the old elite were purged and those remaining had to swear allegiance to the MNR. The military budget was slashed and a party militia was established, along with a political police. The MNR would split in 1962, but the major political, economic and social changes have never been reversed.

[Ennath]

358 BC
Battle of ErigonValley

Bardylis was an ambitious ruler of the Dardanian Kingdom of Illyria, who embarked on a series of military victories which allowed him to extend Illyrian rule over the Molossians and other regional tribes, as far as the frontiers of Macedon. He invaded Macedon in 393 BC, winning a decisive battle against King Amyntas III, expelling him, and ruling Macedon through a puppet king. In 392 BC, Amyntas III allied himself with the Thessalians and was able to bring Macedon back under his rule. However, the Illyrians were constantly raiding the northern frontiers of Macedon. After continuous invasions, Bardylis was able to force Macedon to pay him an annual tribute in 372 BC.

In 370 BC, Amyntas III died, having restored the fortunes of his kingdom. His marriage to Eurydice, daughter of the Illyrian prince Sirras produced 3 sons and a daughter. His eldest son was Alexander II. In 369 BC, Bardylis prevented Alexander II from eliminating the Dardanians from Macedonia. After the battle, Bardylis was said to have briefly held Philip II, the youngest brother of Alexander, as a hostage. In 368 BC, Alexander II was succeeded by his brother Perdiccas III.

The Paeonians, who dwelt east of Dardania, began a series of raids against the Macedonians in support of a Dardanian invasion from the north. Perdiccas III, humiliated by the indignity of having to pay tribute to the Dardanians, marched north in the spring of 359 BC with the Macedonian army to resolve the issue by battle. This was not the first occasion in which he had fought against Bardylis, but the Macedonians lost the battle. The king himself was among the 4000 Macedonian dead. The remainder lost heart for continuing the war, now thoroughly intimidated by Bardylis. The Dardanians followed up their victory by expanding their control southward to Lake Lychnitis (Lake Ohrid) and westward into upper Macedonia. The Dardanians had brought Macedon close to collapse. When Philip II, the youngest of the 3 brothers assumed the throne, he was determined to subdue Bardylis once and for all, and destroy the Illyrian menace.

When Philip II assumed the Macedonian throne, substantial areas of upper Macedonia remained under Bardyllis. In order to concentrate on the internal struggle necessary to secure his crown, Philip reaffirmed the treaty the Dardanians had imposed on Macedonia and sealed the alliance by his marriage to Audata, probably a niece or daughter of Bardyllis. This action undoubtedly deterred a full-scale Dardanian invasion of Macedonia at a time when the country was most vulnerable. As well as neutralizing political opposition and arranging a peace with the Paeonians, Philip began a reform of the Macedonian military system, ditching the old system of tribal levies in favor of a professional army centered around the pike-armed phalanx and small shock force of heavy cavalry. Debate remains about how quickly the reforms were completed, but there were doubtless some results to show by the following year.

By the spring of 358 BC, Philip had at last secured his throne and was now able to address the occupation of northwest Macedonia by Bardyllis. When word of the mobilization of the Macedonian army came to Bardyllis’ attention, he proposed to Philip that they sign a treaty to maintain the status quo, with both parties maintaining the cities already in their possession. This was, of course, unacceptable to Philip, who was not prepared to accept any terms other than a full Dardanian withdrawal from northwest Macedonia. Bardyllis, however, was not inclined to give up his winnings without a fight. Philip mobilized every able-bodied soldier in Macedonia for the battle. Bardyllis, as was his practice, was not likely to take any prisoners, so any Macedonian defeat would result in crippling casualties.

With his northern frontier safe for the time being, Philip turned westward that summer to regain the territory lost by his brother. The Illyrians presented a daunting challenge, able to match Philip's manpower with 10,000 infantry and 500 cavalry of their own against Philip’s 10,000 infantry and 600 cavalry. Moreover, Bardyllis’ infantry had a strong component of shock fighters, possibly making up 7000 of the total. The Illyrian warriors used a heavy-headed spear and bossed shield. They were also unusual in taking their slaves into battle with them. Philip had to have known that they would put his as yet untried hypaspists and phalangites to a stern test of hand-to-hand combat. The Macedonians weren't facing a new king like Philip, but rather a grizzled veteran of many wars, as Bardyllis might have been 90 years old, yet was still sturdy enough to take the field on horseback.

The Illyrians moved to offer battle on open ground. This was probably just west of Kirli Dirven pass on the plain of Lyncus. Philip arrived and deployed his phalanx in the left and centre, hired hoplites and hypaspists on the right and cavalry and light infantry on both wings. As for Bardyllis’ arrangements, Diodorus’ claim of a square formation is confused even in context of his own battle description and, since such tactics are unattested elsewhere for either Illyrians or Greeks in this area, the version of Frontinus is to be preferred. This indicates that Bardyllis set up in a linear fashion, his heavy infantry matching the phalanx's width with even deeper files and having the best men fronting in the middle with cavalry and skirmishers outboard.

The formations closed, the Illyrians at quick pace and Macedonians slowly as to keep good order. When they finally met, a vicious melee began from one end of the field to the other. All the elements of the phalanx at this point moved in chorus and held firm, their long weapons keeping Illyrian spear points out of range as they wounded at least a few among those leading the Illyrian effort. At the same time, Philip and his spearmen on the right made progress, pushed ahead by their rear ranks. The Illyrian front-fighters opposing them got much less help from behind and were powerless to resist the intense, file-length pressure coming at them. In the end, the Illyrians had no choice but to yield ground. As the Illyrians left began edging back, it was the Companion cavalry and their skirmishers that now excelled, easing the way for the hoplites and hypaspists by clearing all Illyrian cavalry and light infantry from that flank. Exposed and put beyond endurance, the Illyrian left now gave way completely and sent the rest of their formation into a frantic flight under fierce pursuit.

Diodorus’ tally of 7000 slain among the Illyrians is clearly an exaggeration. It might be better seen as a reckoning of the heavy infantry defeated than as an actual toll of the dead. At the same time Dardanian casualties must have been very high, with a likely 20-30% killed. Philip’s loss would have been quite a bit lower, perhaps some 3-5% in the fight or dying shortly thereafter. Bardyllis appreciated the scope of his defeat and lost no time in suing for peace. The Illyrians soon sent representatives and settled terms for peace, releasing all the Macedonian cities. The troubling issue of Lynkestia was solved, changing the situation on the western borders in favor of Macedonia. Philip secured his northwest frontier by annexing Dardanian territory as far as Lake Lynkesta. This would form a defensive buffer against any future Illyrian raids attempted through the Drilon Valley. Just as importantly, Philip’s new army had passed its first test, and would develop into the force he would pass to his son Alexander.

[Ennath]

April 9, 1917
Battle of Vimy Ridge, Part 1

Vimy Ridge is an escarpment 5 miles northeast of Arras on the western edge of the Douai Plains. At approximately 4.3 miles long and culminating at an elevation of 200 feet, the ridge provides a natural unobstructed view for miles in all directions. The ridge fell under German control in October 1914. French 10th Army attempted to dislodge the Germans during the 2nd Battle of Artois in spring 1915; 1st Moroccan Division managed to briefly capture the height but was unable to hold it owing to a lack of reinforcements. The French made another attempt during the 3rd Battle of Artois in September, but only captured the town of Souchez at the western base of the ridge. The sector calmed following this. In all, the French suffered approximately 150,000 casualties in their attempts to gain control of Vimy Ridge and surrounding territory.

Formal discussions for a spring offensive near Arras began following a conference of corps commanders held at British 1st Army Headquarters on November 21, 1916. In March 1917, 1st Army formally presented Sir Julian Byng with orders outlining Vimy Ridge as the objective of his Canadian Corps for the Arras Offensive. For the first time all 4 Canadian divisions were assembled to participate in a battle. The nature and size of the planned Canadian Corps assault necessitated support and resources beyond its normal operational capabilities. Consequently, the British 5th Infantry Division and supplementary artillery, engineer and labor units reinforced the Canadian divisions. This brought the nominal strength of the Canadian Corps to about 170,000 men, of whom 97,000 were Canadian.

Corps staff officers produced a tactical analysis of the Verdun battles and delivered a series of corps and divisional-level lectures to promote the primacy of artillery and stress the importance of harassing fire and company and platoon flexibility. The final plan for the assault on Vimy Ridge drew heavily on the experience and tactical analysis of the officers who attended the lectures. 1st Army commander Henry Horne approved the plan on March 5.

The plan divided the corps advance into four colored objective lines. The attack would be made on a front of 7000 yards, with its center opposite the village of Vimy, east of the ridge. The first objective, the Black Line, was the German forward defensive line. The final objective of the northern flank was the Red Line, the highest point on the ridge, the fortified knoll known as the Pimple, the Folie Farm, the Zwischen-Stellung trench and the hamlet of Les Tilleuls. The southern 2 divisions were to achieve additional objectives: the Blue Line encompassing the town of Thélus and the woods outside Vimy, and the Brown Line, the Zwölfer-Graben trench and the German second line. The infantry would proceed close behind a creeping barrage, advancing in timed 100 yard increments. The plan called for units to leapfrog over one another, as the advance progressed, to maintain momentum during the attack. Conducted properly, the plan would leave the German forces little time to exit the security of their deep dugouts and defend against the infantry advance.

The experience of the Battle of the Somme led the German command to conclude that the policy of rigidly defending a trench line was no longer effective against the firepower of the Entente armies. Ludendorff published a new defensive doctrine in December 1916, in which deeper defenses were to be built, within which the garrison would have room to maneuver, rather than rigidly holding successive trench lines. Along Vimy Ridge, the Germans spent 2 years constructing fortifications designed for rigid defense. Little reconstruction based upon the new doctrine had been accomplished by April 1917 because the terrain made it impractical. The topography of Vimy made defense-in-depth difficult. The ridge was 2300 feet wide at its narrowest, with a steep drop on the eastern side, all but eliminating the possibility of counterattacks if the ridge was captured. The German defensive scheme was to maintain a front line defense of sufficient strength to defend against an initial assault and move operational reserves forward before the enemy could consolidate their gains or overrun remaining German positions. As a result, the German defense relied largely on machine guns.

German 6th Army commander Ludwig von Falkenhausen was responsible for the Cambrai–Lille sector. Vimy Ridge itself was principally defended by the ad hoc Gruppe Vimy formation under I Bavarian Reserve Corps (Karl von Fasbender). However, a division of Gruppe Souchez, under VIII Reserve Corps (Georg Karl Wichura), was involved in the frontline defense along the northernmost portion of the ridge. 3 divisions, with 7 infantry regiments between them, were responsible for the immediate defense of the ridge. 16th Bavarian was located opposite the town of Souchez and responsible for the defense of the northernmost section. 79th Reserve was responsible for the vast central section including the highest point of the ridge, Hill 145. 1st Bavarian Reserve was holding the towns of Thélus, Bailleul and the southern slope of the ridge. The paper strength of each division was approximately 15,000 men but their actual strengths was significantly fewer. When the Canadians attacked, each German company faced two or more battalions of approximately 1000 men each. Reserve divisions were kept approximately 15 miles back instead of assembling close behind the second line according the defense-in-depth theory.

The assault was carefully planned. Recognizing that leaders were likely to be wounded or killed, soldiers learned the jobs of those beside and above them. A full-scale replica of the battle area was laid out with reams of colored tape and flags behind the Canadian lines to show officers and NCOs the features of the battlefield and details of the German trench system. Canadian units carried out repeated exercises, rehearsing exactly what they would do throughout the day of the attack. Maps were given out to guide the smallest units. The troops were fully informed about their objectives and their routes.

Mining had long been a feature of war on Vimy Ridge. Working at night, tunneling companies used existing tunnels to build a new underground network for the Vimy assault. As well, they dug 12 deep subways, totaling more than 3 miles in length, through which assault troops could move to their jump-off points. The subways protected them from shelling and permitted the wounded to be brought back from the battlefield. They also housed telephone lines. Into the walls were cut chambers for brigade and battalion HQs, ammunition stores, communications centers and dressing stations. The largest, the Zivy Cave could hold a whole battalion.

Byng commanded 4 attacking divisions, 1 of reserves and numerous support units. He was supported to the north by the 24th British Division of I Corps, which advanced north of the Souchez river and by the XVII Corps to the south. 4th Canadian Division was responsible for the northern portion of the advance that included the highest point of the ridge followed by the heavily defended Pimple. 3rd Canadian Division was responsible for the narrow central section of the ridge, including the capture of La Folie Farm. 2nd Canadian Division, which later included an additional brigade from 5th British Division, was directly south and entrusted with the capture of the town of Thélus. 1st Canadian Division was responsible for the broad southern sector of the advance and expected to make the greatest advance in terms of distance. Byng planned for a healthy reserve for contingencies that included the relief of forward troops, help in consolidating positions and aiding with the capture of the Pimple. As a result, the 9th Canadian Brigade, 15th British Brigade and 95th British Brigade were kept in corps-level reserve.

German foreign intelligence gathering, large-scale Allied trench raids and observed troop concentrations west of Arras made it clear to the Germans that a spring offensive near Arras was being planned. The Germans quickly developed plans to launch a preemptive operation, following the adage that the best defense is a good offence, intent on capturing the northern section of the Zouave Valley along the northernmost portion of the Canadian front. Heavy Canadian Corps artillery fire ultimately prevented the Germans from executing this attack.

The infantry assault was preceded by a massive artillery barrage, which began on March 20. On April 2, the bombardment was stepped up, massing 1 heavy gun and 2 field guns per 20 yards of front. By the Germans’ own account, their trenches and defensive works were almost completely demolished. Furthermore, their health and morale suffered from the stress of remaining at the ready for 11 days under heavy artillery bombardment.

[Ennath]

April 9, 1917
Battle of Vimy Ridge, Part 2

The attack was to begin at 5:30 AM on Easter Monday, April 9, 1917. During the night, the men of the leading and supporting waves were moved into their forward assembly positions. The weather was cold and later changed to sleet and snow. Although physically discomforting, the northwesterly storm provided some advantage to the assault troops by blowing snow in the faces of the defenders. Light artillery bombardments continued throughout the night but stopped in the few minutes before the attack, as the artillery recalibrated their guns in preparation for the synchronized barrage. At exactly 5:30 AM, every piece at the disposal of the Canadian Corps opened up. 30 seconds later, engineers detonated mine charges laid under no man’s land and the German trench line, destroying a number of strong points and creating secure communication trenches directly across no man’s land. Light guns laid down a barrage that advanced in predetermined increments, while howitzers established a series of standing barrages further ahead, against known defensive systems. During the early fighting the German divisional batteries, despite heavy losses, were able to maintain their fire. As the Canadian assault advanced, it overran many of the German guns because there was no means of moving them to the rear on account of many of the horses being killed in the initial gas attack.

1st, 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions reported reaching and capturing their first objective, the Black Line, by 6:25 AM. 4th Canadian Division encountered more trouble and was unable to reach its first objective until some hours later. After a planned pause to consolidate, the advance resumed. Shortly after 7:00 AM, 1st Canadian Division captured the left half of its second objective, the Red Line, and moved 1st Canadian Brigade forward to mount an attack on the remainder. 2nd Canadian Division reported reaching the Red Line and capturing the town of Les Tilleuls at approximately the same time. A mine explosion that killed many German troops of Reserve Regiment 262 manning the front line preceded the advance of 3rd Canadian Division. The remaining German troops could do no more than man temporary lines of resistance until later manning a full defense at the German third line. As a result, the southern section of 3rd Canadian Division was able to reach the Red Line at the western edge of the Bois de la Folie at around 7:30 AM. At 9:00 the division learned of its exposed left flank, as 4th Canadian Division had not yet captured Hill 145. 3rd Division was thus called upon to establish a divisional defensive flank to its north. Although the German commanders were able to maintain open lines of communication and issue operating orders, even with swift staff work, the tempo of the assault was such that German decision cycle was unable to react decisively.

The only portion of the Canadian assault that did not go as planned was the advance of 4th Division, collapsing almost immediately after exiting their trenches. The commanding officer of one of the assault battalions requested that the artillery leave a portion of German trench undamaged. Machine-gun nests in these sections of the German line pinned down much of the 4th Division’s right flank. Progress on the left flank was eventually impeded by harassing fire from the Pimple that was made worse when the creeping barrage got too far ahead of the advancing troops. 4th Division did not attempt a further frontal assault throughout the afternoon. Divisional reserves came forward and once again attacked the German positions on the top of the ridge. Persistent attacks eventually forced the Germans holding the southwestern portion of Hill 145 to withdraw, but only after they had run out of ammunition.

Towards midday, 79th Reserve Division was ordered to recapture the portions of its third line lost during the attack. However, it was not until 6:00 PM that the force was able to organize and counterattack, clearing the Canadians out of the ruined village of Vimy, but not recapturing the third line south of the village. By night, the Germans holding the top of the ridge believed they had overcome the immediate crisis for the meantime. Additional German reinforcements began arriving and by late evening portions of the 111th Infantry Division occupied the third line near Acheville and Arleux, with the remainder of the division arriving the following day.

The British moved 3 fresh brigades up to the Red Line by 9:30 AM on April 10 to support the advance of 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions, whereupon they were to leapfrog existing units occupying the Red line and advance to the Blue Line. Fresh units including 2 sections of tanks and 13th British Brigade were called up from reserve to support the advance of 2nd Division. By 11:00, the Blue Line, including Hill 135 and the town of Thélus, had been captured. To permit the troops time to consolidate the Blue Line, the advance halted and the barrage remained stationary for 90 minutes while machine guns were brought forward. Shortly before 1:00 PM, the advance recommenced with both the 1st and 2nd reaching their final objective. The tank-supported advance via Farbus, directed at the rear of 79th Reserve Division, was eventually halted by concentrated German fire short of the village. Canadian 1st and 2nd Divisions were nonetheless able to secure the Brown Line by 2:00 pm.

4th Canadian Division had made an attempt to capture the northern half of Hill 145 at 3:15 PM, briefly capturing the peak before a German counterattack retook the position. The Germans occupying the small salient on ridge soon found themselves being attacked along their flanks by continuously reinforced Canadians. When it became obvious that the position was completely outflanked and there was no prospect of reinforcement, the Germans pulled back. The Germans were evacuated off the ridge with artillery batteries moved west of the Vimy–Bailleul railway embankment or to the Oppy–Méricourt line. By nightfall of April 10, the only Canadian objective not yet achieved was the capture of the Pimple.

4th Canadian Division faced difficulties that forced it to delay its assault on the Pimple until April 12. The Pimple was initially defended by the 16th Bavarian Division, but the Canadian preliminary artillery bombardment on April 9 caused heavy casualties. On April 11, the 4th Guards Division first reinforced and then relieved 16th Bavarian. The night before the attack, artillery harassed German positions while a gas section of Royal Engineers, employing Livens Projectors, fired more than 40 drums of gas directly into the town of Givenchy-en-Gohelle to cause confusion. The defending Germans managed to drive back the initial Canadian assaults at around 4:00 AM. 10th Canadian Brigade attacked once again at 5:00, this time supported by a significant amount of artillery and the 24th British Division of I Corps to the north. German defensive artillery fire was late and too light to cause the assault troops great difficulty, allowing the Canadians to exploit wide gaps and break into the German positions. 10th Brigade, assisted by snow and a westerly wind, fought hastily entrained German troops to capture the entire Pimple by 6:00 PM.

By nightfall on April 12, the Canadian Corps was in firm control of the ridge. The corps lost 3598 killed and 7004 wounded. German 6th Army suffered an unknown number of casualties with approximately 4000 men being captured. 4 Victoria Crosses were awarded.

Following the defeat, the Germans held an inquiry. Falkenhausen was found to have disregarded intelligence reports, kept his reserves too far to the rear and having failed to apply the new defensive doctrine. As a result of the inquiry, Hindenburg removed Falkenhausen from his command and transferred him to Belgium where he served the remainder of the war as that country’s Governor General. Nevertheless, the Germans did not see Vimy Ridge as a loss. German sources viewed the action, at worst, as a draw, given that no full-scale breakthrough occurred. The Germans did not attempt to recapture the ridge and it remained under Allied control until the end of the war.

The Battle of Vimy Ridge had considerable significance for Canada. It was the first instance in which the Canadian Corps, made up of troops drawn from all parts of the country, fought as a cohesive formation. The image of national unity and achievement is what, according to one of many recent patriotic narratives, initially gave the battle importance for Canada, The idea that Canada's national identity and nationhood were born out of the battle is an opinion that in the late twentieth century became widely held in military and general histories of Canada.

[Ennath]

April 10, 1811
Siege of Figueras

On January 2, 1811, Gen. Louis Gabriel Suchet successfully wrapped up the Siege of Tortosa. Afterward, Suchet left Pierre-Joseph Habert and a French garrison in Tortosa and marched his prisoners back to Zaragosa. Freed from his responsibility to cover the siege, Marshal Jacques MacDonald moved his force toward Valls where he bumped into the Spanish. In the Battle of Pla on January 15, MacDonald's vanguard received a drubbing from Pedro Sarsfield’s division; rather than avenge this setback, MacDonald elected to force-march his 12,000-man corps to Montblanc and Lérida.

Annoyed with MacDonald’s lackluster performance, Napoleon confined his sphere of operations to northern Catalonia and assigned the territories southwest of Barcelona to Suchet. In addition, Napoleon ordered that MacDonald hand over 17,000 troops to his colleague and ordered Suchet to capture Tarragona, promising promotion to marshal if successful. Accordingly, Suchet completed the reorganization of his army and moved toward Tarragona in April 1811. But on April 21, Suchet received the shocking news that the fortress of Figueras had been seized by Catalan partisans. Both MacDonald and the governor of Barcelona, Gen. Maurice Mathieu begged Suchet to send help but were turned down. Suchet calculated that by the time he sent any help, a month would have passed. He predicted that Napoleon could more quickly send reinforcements from France, only 20 away. When the emperor heard of Suchet’s action, he heartily approved.

The powerful fortress stood on a hill overlooking Figueras and the highway from Barcelona to Perpignan. To reach the front gate, an attacker had to march up a steep slope on a road with several switchbacks. In April 1811 the key fort was held by a provisional battalion made up of replacements from the French-allied Kingdoms of Italy and Naples, under the careless Gen. Francois Guillot. The small size of the garrison and the governor’s slackness inspired the fighting priest Francesco Rovira i Sala and the leaders of the Catalan miquelets to attempt to seize the fort in a coup de main. Rovira was in contact with 3 young Spaniards who had access and posed as pro-French. One managed to make copies of the keys to one postern gate and the storerooms. Rovira requested help from the commander of the Army of Catalonia, Luis Gonzalez Torres de Navarra, Marquess of Campoverde and the general promised support.

On April 7, Rovira and his lieutenants assembled 2000 miquelets in the Pyrenees and launched a feint toward France; on the 9th, they changed course and headed for Figueras. At 1:00 AM on April 10, a body of 700 men crept up to the postern gate where their spies waited. Rovira’s feint had alerted the garrison and a large portion of it had been marching in the hills all day in a futile effort to catch the partisans. After unlocking the postern gate, the miquelets entered the fort. The Neapolitans who made up the guard were attacked from behind and overpowered. Guillot was captured in bed while his sleepy troops were defeated in detail as they stumbled from the barracks. Within an hour, the fortress was in the hands of the Catalans and they opened the gates to admit their compatriots. By the next day, 2000 guerillas occupied the citadel. Guillot and about 900 Italians were captured and 35 killed or wounded. Rovira and his men also seized hundreds of cannons, 16,000 muskets, huge stocks of shoes and clothing, 4 months provisions for 2000 men, and 400,000 francs. The partisans lost about 25 men. Napoleon was infuriated and ordered 14,000 men to be assembled for its recapture. Rovira appointed Juan Antonio Martínez to command the fortress, soon manned by 3000 men.

Gen. Luigi Gaspare Peyri with an Italian reinforcement battalion had arrived in the town of Figueras on the 9th. He was on the way to take over command of Domenico Pino’s division. After a few soldiers escaped to warn him that the fort was taken, Peyri took his 650 men and retreated south to Bascara. Notified of the disaster, Gen. Louis Baraguey d’Hilliers sent Peyri an infantry battalion and a cavalry squadron, telling Peyri to return to Figueras and keep an eye on the fortress while he gathered reinforcements. Peyri and his 1300 men occupied the town, but were too weak to do more. D’'Hilliers had to call in several small garrisons. In a week, he managed to scrape up 2000 men and brought them to Figueras. Francois Quesnel arrived from France with 3 regular battalions and 2 National Guard battalions. With 6500 infantry and 500 cavalry available, d'Hilliers imposed a blockade on April 17.

Meanwhile, Joaquín Ibáñez Cuevas y de Valonga, Baron de Eroles marched a portion of his division to Figueres. Along the way he wiped out French garrisons at Olot and Castellfollit de la Roca, taking 548 prisoners. Eroles brought his regulars into Sant Ferran on the 16th. At the same time, the guerillas became very active throughout Catalonia and caused d’Hilliers much worry. Louis Plauzonne’s division began to arrive in late April. On April 16, MacDonald appealed to Suchet for help.

Campoverde was slow to take advantage of his opportunity to cause mischief. He learned of Rovira’s coup on April 12, but did not put his army in motion until the 20th. He marched with 6000 foot and 800 cavalry. His force only approached Figueres at the beginning of May. With those miquelets that remained outside the fortress, Rovira maneuvered to join Campoverde’s regulars. In addition to the garrison, Campoverde's 6800 men, Rovira's 2000 and Eroles’ 2000 soldiers were available to break the French blockade. D’Hilliers blockaded Sant Ferran with 2 divisions, Quesnel’s and Plauzonne’s, about 7000 men.

On May 3, seeking to cover a supply convoy to the fortress, the Spanish under Sarsfield and Eroles sortied and attacked Figueras. After a struggle, the French agreed to parley, but stalled for time while d’Hilliers gathered most of his troops. Approaching through an area screened by olive trees, the French burst upon Sarsfield from the rear and threw his command into confusion. A cavalry charge dispersed 2 of Sarsfield's regiments and he was forced to retreat. Eroles withdrew inside Figueras. Campoverde did not intervene. Most of the convoy was captured by the French, including a large flock of sheep. The French lost 400 men, the Spanish over 1000.

Soon afterward, Campoverde heard that Suchet was closing on Tarragona. Since the important port was held by only 1 division, the Spanish commander immediately withdrew from Figueras. He ordered Sarsfield with 2000 foot and the cavalry to menace Suchet’s supply road. Taking 4000 infantry, Campoverde marched to Mataro, loaded the men aboard ships, and sailed to Tarragona. Before d’Hilliers could reimpose the blockade, Eroles left the fortress with several hundred soldiers. This left Martínez to defend with 3000 miquelets and 1500 regulars. Meanwhile, the French reinforced.. By the end of May over 15,000 French and allied troops were assembled before Figueras. MacDonald began to construct siege works.

At the end of June, Tarragona fell and Suchet followed up by destroying a major guerrilla base. Meanwhile, Martínez maintained a stout defense of Figueras through July, putting his garrison on half-rations. Rovira had gone to Cadiz to beg help from the Supreme Central and Governing Junta of the Kingdom, but they were unable to offer any. MacDonald completed his lines of investment, pushing his artillery within 500 yards of the fortress. However, he never attempted to breach the walls. Rather, he waited for hunger to force the defenders to give up. Meanwhile, his own troops were ravaged by malaria and dysentery in their unhealthy camps during the summer months.

On July 17, Martínez sent 850 prisoners out of the fortress without insisting on an exchange. The starved men reported to the besiegers that they had received almost no food in the last few days before their release. The Spanish, however, kept Guillot and his officers as hostages. MacDonald took this as a sign that the Spanish might soon surrender, but Martínez held out until mid-August. The Spanish commander knew about the Tarragona catastrophe and realized relief was hopeless but he determined to hang on until the last moment. By mid-August, the defenders had eaten every horse, dog, and rat and had only 3 days of food left.

Martínez planned a breakout on the night of August 16. Rovira, who had come back from Cadiz, menaced the north side of MacDonald’s works with 2000 guerillas. However, a French force chased him away. As soon as night fell, Martínez launched a massed column of his fittest troops at the southwestern siege lines. The Spanish overran the pickets and the outpost line, but were brought to a halt by a dense abatis. While they were caught in this awkward position, 2 French batteries opened fire. After suffering 400 casualties, the survivors fled back into the fortress. The following day d’Hilliers sent an officer under a flag of truce into the fort and Martínez agreed to surrender after issuing his last rations. On August 19, the Spanish garrison marched out and laid down its weapons. During the siege 4000 French soldiers died, mostly from disease. In the Spanish garrison, 1500 died, 1000 were sick in the hospital, and 2000 marched into captivity.

Campoverde was replaced as Captain General in Catalonia by Luis Roberto de Lacy. MacDonald was recalled on October 28 and replaced by Charles Decaen. The marshal's reputation had been sullied by his disappointing performance in Spain.

[Ennath]

April 11, 1951
Relief of MacArthur

On June 25, 1950, the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) invaded South Korea. In the absence of the Soviet representative, who had walked out of the UN Security Council earlier in the year, the Council condemned the invasion and called for member nations to assist South Korea. Fearing that Communist China, and possibly the Soviet Union, had encouraged the attack (Kim Il Sung had, in fact, persuaded both Stalin and Mao to support the invasion), President Harry Truman quickly committed American forces to the UN effort and named Gen. Douglas MacArthur to be Commander in Chief of UN Forces. Although 15 other UN nations contributed to the war effort, the United States took the lead both in strategy and firepower.

MacArthur came to his Korean post a popular war hero for his victories in World War II. After the war, MacArthur became Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan and Commander in Chief of US forces in the Far East. He oversaw the occupation of Japan as proconsul, behaving much like a head of state. One biographer, William Manchester, described him as “flamboyant, imperious, and apocalyptic, he ... could not acknowledge errors, and tried to cover up his mistakes with sly, childish tricks. Yet he was also endowed with great personal charm, a will of iron, and a soaring intellect.”

As in World War II, the general proved to be an effective commander in Korea. His UN troops held the southeast corner of the Korean peninsula as American pilots attacked North Korean supply lines. In September, a UN counteroffensive began with an amphibious assault on the coastal city of Inchon (see posting), and continued with the retaking of Seoul, prompting the collapse and retreat of NKPA troops threatening Pusan. By October 1, UN forces had regained control of South Korea.

UN troops then crossed the 38th parallel and approached the Yalu River, the border between China and the Korean peninsula. Buoyed by the success of the Inchon operation, Truman and his advisors decided that the unification of Korea under the ROK was possible, and perhaps necessary to end the war. Unification would also inflict a symbolic victory over Communism. However, Truman’s decision was predicated on the assumption that neither China nor the Soviet Union would enter the war. MacArthur did not worry about such intervention and assured Truman that it would not happen. When, to the contrary, intelligence reports indicated that Chinese forces had already infiltrated North Korea, MacArthur refused to believe them.

In their first face-to-face meeting on Wake Island in October 1950, MacArthur assured Truman that the UN advance would not provoke Chinese intervention and that the war would soon be over. MacArthur was wrong on both counts. In late November, Chinese troops launched a major attack and drove MacArthur’s forces back across the 38th parallel and seemed on the verge of driving the UN troops out of Korea entirely. MacArthur, suddenly pessimistic, sent repeated messages to Washington claiming that UN forces could not hold out long and that nuclear weapons should be employed against China. At this point, the Truman administration dropped the idea of unifying Korea and sought instead to maintain the anticommunist government in the South. MacArthur, however, would not accept this change in strategy.

The general became increasingly belligerent toward Truman as he sought to overturn the President’s limited war aims. In fact, MacArthur’s conflicts with Truman had begun early in his command. He had criticized Truman’s policy toward Nationalist China (Taiwan) in a well-publicized letter to the Veterans of Foreign Wars in August 1950. His support for the Republican Party also did not endear the general to the President. Nor did his personality. The imperious MacArthur showed little respect for Truman’s ability to wage war effectively. Yet his initial successes in Korea had been greeted with public praise from the administration. The Inchon landing earned him a Distinguished Service Medal, presented to him during the Wake Island meeting by Truman, who cited the general for his “indomitable will and unshakable faith.”

MacArthur now began to challenge openly the administration’s authority over the waging of the war. He exceeded his authority by giving orders without clearing them with Washington. He ordered the Air Force to bomb the Chinese border and to “drive forward with all speed and with full utilization” of all forces - actions not authorized by the President. MacArthur explained in communiqués to Washington that he intended to secure all of North Korea, arguing that to do less would be a “psychological disaster for the troops.” At the heart of MacArthur’s strategy was the idea that total victory in North Korea was the only acceptable response to China’s invasion. Truman’s more limited objectives would not suffice. MacArthur’s statements were an explicit rebuke to the concept of limited war.

Although America’s European allies were alarmed at the prospect of MacArthur’s initiating a wider war in Asia, the President allowed MacArthur to retain his command. MacArthur’s attempt to unify Korea failed, but rather than modify his position, he made even more vociferous demands for expansion of the war, blaming the administration and its European allies for being shortsighted. MacArthur wanted to blockade the Chinese coast, destroy China’s industry with air power, and employ Chinese Nationalist forces against the mainland. Moreover, he sent cables to various news organizations informing them of his views. Truman considered firing MacArthur, but held off, hoping to avoid a major political controversy in the midst of the conflict.

Although Truman issued a directive in December 1950 forbidding direct statements to the press by commanders on issues of strategy, MacArthur kept making public statements. In early March 1951, he wrote “Assuming no diminution of the enemy’s flow of ground forces and materiel to the Korean battle area, a continuation of the existing limitations upon our freedom of counter-offensive action, and no major additions to our organizational strength, the battle lines cannot fail in time to reach a point of theoretical military stalemate.” As the media seized upon MacArthur’s statements, particularly the mention of a stalemate, public opinion polls showed decreasing support for the war and for the Truman administration. Truman found himself in a bind. Unwilling to risk all-out war with China, which he believed would draw in the Soviet Union as well, he had to take the brunt of public and political criticism for keeping the war in Korea limited. As the President saw it, total war in Korea could mean war with the Soviet Union. But limited war aims left him open to the charge that he had no real solution for ending the war. Truman’s ratings in the polls took a nosedive.

MacArthur finally went too far. Hearing of a proposal drafted by Truman for a cease-fire agreement, MacArthur declared publicly on the morning of March 24, 1951, that if the United States would only choose to expand the war, it “would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse.” On April 5, House Minority Leader Joe Martin (R-IN) read a letter from MacArthur in the House chamber declaring, “There is no substitute for victory.” This letter torpedoed Truman’s cease-fire proposal, and the president was furious. As Truman later recalled the event, MacArthur had “prevented a cease-fire proposition right there. I was ready to kick him into the North China Sea at that time. I was never so put out in my life.”

Truman gave the order to replace MacArthur with the head of 8th Army, Lt. Gen. Matthew Ridgway, on April 11, 1951. “With deep regret,” he announced, “I have concluded that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties.” The intention was that MacArthur would be personally notified of his relief by Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, who was touring the front in Korea, at 2000 DC time, which was 1000 on April 12 Tokyo time. However, Pace did not receive the message due to a signals failure in Korea. Meanwhile, reporters began asking if rumors of MacArthur's relief were true. Truman then “decided that we could not afford the courtesy of Secretary Pace’s personal delivery of the order,” and called a press conference at which he issued his statement to the press. In Tokyo, MacArthur and his wife were at a luncheon at the American embassy, when Col. Sidney Huff, MacArthur’s aide, heard about the relief from commercial radio. Huff promptly informed Mrs. MacArthur, who in turn told the general. Japanese radio stations soon picked up the story, but the official notice would not arrive for another half hour.

At first, the firing of MacArthur looked like a political disaster for Truman. The general returned to a hero’s welcome in the United States, including a ticker-tape parade in New York City larger than that for Charles Lindbergh in 1927. Soon after he arrived home, MacArthur addressed a joint session of Congress, reminding his audience of the saying, “old soldiers never die, they just fade away.” But MacArthur was not ready to fade away just yet. The general’s continuing criticism of Truman did much harm to the President’s popularity and public support for the war. Across the country, the president was burned in effigy, and state legislatures passed resolutions condemning his action. Some congressional Republicans even called for his impeachment. However, when a series of congressional hearings into MacArthur’s recall ended without proving that he had been wronged, public support for the general waned. MacArthur’s return from Korea proved to be his last hurrah.

Truman’s firing of MacArthur reaffirmed the constitutional principle that civilian, and not military, commanders wield ultimate power over war policy in the United States. As Truman later recalled the firing, MacArthur had “asked for it and I had to give it to him.”