The Military History Thread

[scoundrel]

Verdun was for France a victory in name only, gaining nothing and losing the flower of her youth and strength. The scale of the losses makes the Battle of the Somme seem minor. France alone suffered 379,000 caualties of whom 163,000 died. Germany lost 143,000 men killed and at least 336,000 total casualties. It was staggering and as pointless and pointless could be. This tragedy fed forward into 1940 and was a key driver in the French defeat in WW2.

Verdun is associated with the rallying cry:

Ons ne passeront pas!

~ They shall not pass!" While no doubt extremely brave, it is not good military science to trade lives for meaningless dirt. Marshal Putnik shortened his lines against Austrian forces in Serbia by pulling out of Belgrade, in spite of ferocious and emotional outrage from the politicians, because he needed to keep his army intact until he could be re-supplied. He re-captured Belgrade a week later and chased the Austrians all the way out of Serbia less than two weeks later. Had he refused to retreat, and insisted on defending Belgrade to the death, those same two weeks would have seen the end of Serbian resistance in WW1. Verdun is an icon of military stupidity and callous indifference to unsustainable loss of life; Marshal Putnik would have executed Petain and Robert Nivelle for imposing anything like this on Serbian forces.

[rupertramjet]

My reference comes from the http://www.archives-nationales.culture.gouv.fr/

I translated the word 'demence' as dementia. My access is perhaps higher than normal as I was using the company system!!!

[Mal Hombre]

Originally Posted by scoundrel

Verdun is associated with the rallying cry:
~ They shall not pass!"

During The Russian Civil War,The city of Tsaritsyn became "The Red Verdun" and Comrade Stalin was falsely given the credit for it's successful defence.The city became even more famous twenty or so years later under a new name : Stalingrad

[Ernesto75]

Originally Posted by scoundrel

Verdun was for France a victory in name only, gaining nothing and losing the flower of her youth and strength. The scale of the losses makes the Battle of the Somme seem minor. France alone suffered 379,000 caualties of whom 163,000 died. Germany lost 143,000 men killed and at least 336,000 total casualties. It was staggering and as pointless and pointless could be. This tragedy fed forward into 1940 and was a key driver in the French defeat in WW2.

Verdun is associated with the rallying cry:
~ They shall not pass!" While no doubt extremely brave, it is not good military science to trade lives for meaningless dirt. Marshal Putnik shortened his lines against Austrian forces in Serbia by pulling out of Belgrade, in spite of ferocious and emotional outrage from the politicians, because he needed to keep his army intact until he could be re-supplied. He re-captured Belgrade a week later and chased the Austrians all the way out of Serbia less than two weeks later. Had he refused to retreat, and insisted on defending Belgrade to the death, those same two weeks would have seen the end of Serbian resistance in WW1. Verdun is an icon of military stupidity and callous indifference to unsustainable loss of life; Marshal Putnik would have executed Petain and Robert Nivelle for imposing anything like this on Serbian forces.

I agree with you.

Verdun is an icon of military stupidity and callous indifference to unsustainable loss of life.

Clémenceau was perfectly aware of that.
This is why he refused to prolong the war when the Germans sued for peace.

It left traces in the minds of people and when WW II came, people were still like parallysed.

People were thinking : here it goes again.

Nowadays chiefs who are responsible are much more econom with their men lives and they are more cautious at least in principle.

[rupertramjet]

Nowadays chiefs who are responsible are much more econom with their men lives and they are more cautious at least in principle.

I think there are several reasons for this, firstly Armies are far smaller, more professional, and as officers we have served with the men we command for years, so there is a personal relationship, we often know their families, and that alone causes us to work harder for a 'cleaner' solution. We also have far better and more effective equipment available to us.

As a modern commander at Verdun, as soon as the German artillery opened fire, I would call an airstrike and most of it would be obliterated, huge holes would appear in the infantry ranks, and I would then call in either Hercules Gun ships, which would be accompanied by attack helicopters, as well as ground attack aircraft. Simply put, the reason that WWII did not see the horror battles of the first war, and why the 'Blirzkreig' succeeded. Although in cruder form, it also was the start of the more fluid type of operation we see today, allied to the effects of a little Vietnamese called Giap, these battles will never be fought again!

I agree that Verdun paralysed France and her military thinking, despite the horrific death toll, Verdun gave the French high command an unshakeable faith in fortified positions, nothing would change their view, thus the Maginot Line and the early defeat in 1940.

Another point, and perhaps I harp on it a bit, the ancients in command of the French Armies of 1940, lived in the past, modern commanders do not, we are always open to new ideas and equipment, we are also forced to retire before we get to bloody old, we also do not have, as is the case of most modern armies five star rank, ie Marshalls, because they never retire, so technically a man of 100+ could end up in command! That last line was tongue in cheek, they do not make them up because it is too expensive!

[Ernesto75]

If we had the time for establishing a list of military stupidity this list would be very very long indeed.

To take an example there was Dien-Bien-Phu.

And, more recently there was the Algerian war which some generals wanted to pursue doggedly.
Luckily De Gaulle was more lucid than them and he put an end to that, albeit a trifle too generously.

In France only we had a constant history of military mistakes.
This cost many lives alas.

[Ennath]

May 5, 1821
Death of Napoleon

After abdicating the French throne in June 1815, Napoleon gave himself up to the British. He apparently believed initially that he was to be banished to America, but the Allies would not let him out of their grasp again; the British decided to imprison him on the remote South Atlantic island of St. Helena. On August 8, 1815, Napoleon left Plymouth Harbor on the Royal Navy ship Northumberland. St. Helena came into view over two months later, on October 14. The following day, Northumberland dropped anchor off the island’s main settlement of Jamestown.

Rear Adm. George Cockburn, commanding Northumberland, and Brig. Gen. George Bingham, commander of the troops sent to guard the emperor, went ashore to look for a dwelling large enough to temporarily accommodate Napoleon and his 26 companions. They settled on a house belonging to Henry Porteous, superintendent of the East India Company gardens. The emperor went ashore on the 17th.

Napoleon did not like the Porteous house, in which the Duke of Wellington had stayed on an earlier voyage from India (the building was destroyed by a fire in 1862). It was not practical, because of its smallness and its position, and did not allow him to move about inside without being seen by passersby, nor to go out without finding himself suddenly in contact with the inhabitants of the few nearby houses.

On October 18, Napoleon went with Adm. Cockburn to examine Longwood House, which had been selected as his long-term residence. He was not particularly enchanted with it, as it was said to have been particularly cold, damp exposed to the wind, and infested with rats. It had the advantages of being isolated and clear of large vegetation, and thus easy to keep an eye on. It was also near a plain called Deadwood, where the regiment guarding Napoleon could live.

In any case, the house needed to be renovated and enlarged before it could accommodate Napoleon and his retinue. On the way there, he noticed a small house that struck him as charming. This was the Briars, home of Betsy Balcombe and her family. Napoleon stopped there on his return, and asked if he could stay there instead of returning to Jamestown. The Balcombes graciously agreed, so Napoleon lived in a pavilion at the Briars until December 10, 1815, when he moved to Longwood.

Napoleon and his suite soon became unhappy with their new quarters. Conditions at Longwood became a constant source of irritation between Napoleon and St. Helena’s new governor, Gen. Hudson Lowe, who arrived in April 1816. Napoleon thought he should have been offered the governor’s residence, Plantation House, an elegant, well-furbished mansion set in a beautiful park, like an English country house.

With a small cadre of followers, Napoleon dictated his memoirs and grumbled about conditions. Lowe cut Napoleon's expenditure, ruled that no gifts were allowed if they mentioned his imperial status, and made his supporters sign a guarantee they would stay with the prisoner indefinitely. There were rumors of plots and even of his escape, but in reality no serious attempts were made.

Lowe’s main duty was to prevent escape but also to provide supplies for Napoleon and his entourage. While they only met 6 times, their relationship is well documented as being tense and acrimonious. Their main point of contention was that Lowe refused to address Napoleon as Emperor of the French. However, 5 years later Napoleon finally won Lowe over, and persuaded him to build a new Longwood House. However he died just before it was completed.

His personal physician, Barry O'Meara, warned London that his declining state of health was mainly caused by the harsh treatment. Napoleon confined himself for months on end in his damp and wretched habitation. In February 1821, Napoleon's health began to deteriorate rapidly, and he reconciled with the Catholic Church. He died on May 5, 1821. His last words were, "France, army, head of the army, Josephine". In his will, he had asked to be buried on the banks of the Seine, but the British governor said he should be buried on Saint Helena, in the Valley of the Willows.

The cause of his death has been debated. Napoleon's physician, Francois Carlo Antommarchi, led the autopsy, which found the cause of death to be stomach cancer. Antommarchi did not sign the official report. Napoleon's father had died of stomach cancer, although this was seemingly unknown at the time of the autopsy. Antommarchi found evidence of a stomach ulcer; this was the most convenient explanation for the British, who wanted to avoid criticism over their care of Napoleon.

In 1955, the diaries of Napoleon's valet, Louis Marchand, were published. His description of Napoleon in the months before his death led Sten Forshufvud in a 1961 paper in Nature to put forward other causes for his death, including deliberate arsenic poisoning. Forshufvud, in a 1978 book with Ben Weider, noted that Napoleon's body was found to be well preserved when moved in 1840. Arsenic is a strong preservative, and therefore this supported the poisoning hypothesis. Forshufvud and Weider observed that Napoleon had attempted to quench abnormal thirst by drinking large amounts of orgeat syrup that contained cyanide compounds in the almonds used for flavoring. According to a 2007 article, the type of arsenic found in Napoleon's hair shafts was mineral, the most toxic, and according to toxicologist Patrick Kintz, this supported the conclusion that he was murdered.

There have been modern studies that have supported the original autopsy finding. In a 2008 study, researchers analyzed samples of Napoleon's hair from throughout his life, as well as samples from his family and other contemporaries. All samples had high levels of arsenic, approximately 100 times higher than the current average. According to these researchers, Napoleon's body was already heavily contaminated with arsenic as a boy, and the high arsenic concentration in his hair was not caused by intentional poisoning; people were constantly exposed to arsenic from glues and dyes throughout their lives. Studies published in 2007 and 2008 dismissed evidence of arsenic poisoning, and confirmed evidence of peptic ulcer and gastric cancer as the cause of death.

In 1840, King Louis Philippe obtained permission from the British to return Napoleon's remains to France. On December 15, 1840, a state funeral was held. The hearse proceeded from the Arc de Triomphe down the Champs-Élysées, across the Place de la Concorde to the Esplanade des Invalides and then to the cupola in St Jerome's Chapel, where it remained until the tomb designed by Louis Visconti was completed. In 1861, Napoleon's remains were entombed in a stone sarcophagus in the crypt under the dome at Les Invalides.

[Ennath]

410 BC
Battle of Cyzicus

In the wake of the Athenian victory at Abydos in November 411 BC, the Spartan admiral Mindarus sent to Sparta for reinforcements and began working with the Persian satrap Pharnabazus to plan for a new offensive. The Athenians, meanwhile, were unable to follow through on their victory, since the depletion of the Athenian treasury precluded any major operations. Thus, by the spring of 410 BC, Mindarus had built a fleet of 80 ships, and with the support of Pharnabazus' troops, besieged and took the city of Cyzicus. The Athenian fleet in the Hellespont withdrew from its base at Sestos to Cardia to avoid the superior Spartan force, and ships under Alcibiades, Theramenes, and Thrasybulus that had been dispatched to raise money combined with this force, creating a fleet of 86 ships. This fleet, along with a force of land troops under Chaereas, set out to the Hellespont to challenge Mindarus, passing Abydos at night to hide their numbers, and approached Cyzicus.

Our two sources, Xenophon and Diodorus Siculus, give very different accounts of the resulting battle.

According to Xenophon the Athenian fleet approached Cyzicus under the cover of heavy rain. As the Athenians approached the city the rain cleared, and the Athenians sighted the Peloponnesian fleet of 60 ships exercising at some distance from the harbor. The Peloponnesians immediately realized that the Athenians had been reinforced, and pulled back close to shore, where they prepared to fight a naval battle. Alcibiades sailed past the Peloponnesians with 20 ships and landed. Mindarus followed him, and a land battle followed. Mindarus was killed and his men fled. The Syracusans in the Peloponnesian fleet burnt their ships, but the rest of the fleet was captured. Cyzicus itself fell to the Athenians on the following day.

According to Diodorus the Athenians decided to ambush the Peloponnesians. The Athenian fleet was split into 3. Alcibiades was given 20 ships, and was to sail towards Cyzicus, hoping to trick the Peloponnesians in coming out to attack him. He was then to retreat in an attempt to drawn the Peloponnesians further away from safety. The rest of the fleet was divided between Theramenes and Thrasybulus. Their squadrons were to remain out of sight until Alcibiades signaled for them, and they were then to emerge and cut the Peloponnesians off from the shore.

The plan didn’t work entirely as planned. Mindarus came out to chase Alcibiades, and the ambush was triggered, but instead of being trapped at sea, the Peloponnesians fled to the shore near Cleri, where they joined up with a Persian army under Pharnabazus. A number of Peloponnesian ships were lost during the pursuit, and the Athenians then attempted to capture the beached ships, using grappling hooks to pull them off the land. A costly land battle then developed around the ships. Alcibiades was facing Mindarus around the ships, while Thrasybulus also landed his troops and was soon engaged in a battle with Peloponnesians and Persians. Thrasybulus was surrounded and in great danger when Theramenes arrived on the scene. Even after this the battle continued for some time, until the Persian mercenaries began to withdraw. The Peloponnesians were soon forced to follow, and Theramenes was free to come to the aid of Alcibiades. Mindarus was killed during this phase of the battle, and the entire Peloponnesian fleet was captured.

Whichever account of the battle is accurate the result was a crushing Athenian victory. In the wake of this dramatic victory, the Athenians had full control of the waters of the Hellespont. The next day, Cyzicus surrendered without a fight. Xenophon quoted a Spartan dispatch home, in which they stated 'the ships are gone. Mindarus has disappeared. The men are hungry. We don't know what to do'. Athenian control of the Hellespontine region had been restored, the corn supply to Athens from the Black Sea had been secured, and morale in the city began to recover from the setbacks of recent years.

Indeed morale in the city recovered to such an extent that a Spartan offer of peace was turned down. This would prove to be a great mistake, for Persian support now meant that the Peloponnesians had the greater resources, and despite a number of further successes the war would end in defeat for Athens.

[Ennath]

A comment on Petain's slow advancement before World War I. I'd always believed that this was largely due to his opposition to the army's offensive doctrine. Joffre was the embodiment of this. Petain's slogan was "Fire kills." He was right.

[Ernesto75]

Originally Posted by Ennath

A comment on Petain's slow advancement before World War I. I'd always believed that this was largely due to his opposition to the army's offensive doctrine. Joffre was the embodiment of this. Petain's slogan was "Fire kills." He was right.

You are right, Joffre did not like him, like other colleagues like Foch.
I think Petain's slogan as "Fire kills" was essentially when he was teaching.

But Petain's pessimistic nature was also visible since he graduated and this did not help in an officer's career.

Clémenceau did not like him either.
He found him much too pessimistic for a general.