The Military History Thread

[Ennath]

June 18, 1815
Battle of Wavre

Following defeat at the Battle of Ligny (see posting), the Prussian army retreated north in some disorder, exposing the eastern flank of Wellington’s Anglo-allied army at Quatre Bras, who also retreated northwards, to a defensive position at Waterloo. Napoleon moved the bulk of his army off in pursuit of Wellington, and sent Marshal Emmanuel Grouchy in pursuit of the retreating Prussians with the right wing of the Army of the North, a force of 33,000 men and 80 guns. This included III Corps (Dominique Vandamme), IV Corps (Étienne Maurice Gérard), II Cavalry Corps (Remy Exelmans), 4th (Hussars) Cavalry Division (Pierre Soult) and 5000 cavalry from the Reserve Army

Grouchy was slow in taking up the pursuit, which allowed Prince Blücher to fall back largely unmolested to Wavre, regroup his army, and then execute a flank march with 3 of his 4 corps to join up with Wellington at Waterloo. The remaining corps, the III (Johann von Thielmann) of 17,000 men and 48 guns, was to follow leaving a small rearguard in Wavre, unless the French appeared in force in which case he was to oppose any French attempt to close on the main body of the Prussian army.

At around 0600 on June 18, Grouchy reported to Napoleon that he was moving on Wavre with all haste. At 1000 Grouchy reported that 3 Prussian Corps were marching in the direction of Brussels, and that Prussian officers were talking of joining Wellington to offer battle to the French army. He noted that by attacking at Wavre, he could block the Prussians from intervening against the rest of the French army. At 11:30, Grouchy and his corps commanders heard in the distance the noise from the Grand Battery as the Battle of Waterloo began. Grouchy’s corps commanders, especially Gérard, suggested that they should march to the sound of the guns. Grouchy, however, had written orders to march on Wavre and to engage the Prussians there, and knew that Marshal Ney had been taken to task by Napoleon 2 days earlier for not following orders at the Battle of Quatre Bras. He therefore declined, pointing out that Napoleon had more than enough force to deal with Wellington. Minutes later, Exelmans reported strong Prussian positions 3 miles from Wavre. At 1300, elements of Exelmans’ cavalry were in contact with the Prussian rear guard. Further argument was ended by the arrival at 1600 of another order from Napoleon, repeating the instruction to Grouchy to attack the Prussians before him.

Thielmann was on the point of leaving Wavre to march towards Waterloo, when French III Corps arrived in front of that position, at about 1600, and the French artillery immediately opened up on the Prussians. When Gen. Borcke, commanding 9th Brigade, fell back on Wavre, for the purpose of carrying out his instructions, he found the bridge already barricaded, and proceeded with his brigade to Basse-Wavre (a short distance east and downstream of Wavre): and having crossed the Dyle at this point, left a detachment there, whom he directed to destroy the bridge immediately. He then continued his march. In the mean time, French Tirailleurs were observed extending along the opposite heights and, in their rear, considerable masses of French troops appeared. It soon became manifest to the Prussians that they contemplated forcing the passage of the river.

Thielmann, judging by the want of vigor displayed in the French pursuit, and by the French not having attempted to secure the passage of the Dyle, that it was only a weak detachment advancing upon Wavre, confining itself to creating some little uneasiness, had hitherto been of opinion that the occupation of Wavre by a few battalions, as directed by Blücher, would be quite sufficient, but he now saw that the moment had arrived which required him to maintain the position at Wavre; he accordingly ordered the halt of his whole corps.

The town of Wavre is situated on the left (north) bank of the Dyle, having a suburb on the opposite side of the river, with which it was then connected by 2 stone bridges, the principal one leading towards the middle, and a small one towards the upper end of the town. Higher upstream, at the Mill of Bierges, at Limale, and at Limelette; there were also wooden bridges at Basse-Wavre. The Dyle is not deep, but because of the very heavy rain over the previous 24 hours it was swollen. The low range of heights on either side of the valley was covered in many places with woods. The heights on the right bank are generally more elevated, but those on the left are steeper, and offer a greater command of the river passages. The great number of hollow ways forms a prominent feature in the vicinity and these, being in a miry state from the rain, were unfavorable to the progress of troops.

12th Brigade (Stülpagel) was posted on the height in the rear of Bierge. The bridge in front of this village was barricaded, and the Mill occupied for the defense of the bridge. 10th Brigade (Kämpfen) stood upon the heights in rear of Wavre, its right resting on a wood which lay between it and 12th Brigade. 11th Brigade (Luce) was formed across the Brussels road. The reserve cavalry was drawn up, near La Bawette in columns of squadrons. The great bridge was barricaded as well as time would admit The houses adjoining the left bank were hastily loopholed. The smaller bridge was left open.

Thielmann intended that 9th Brigade should be posted in reserve, but through some misunderstanding in the transmission of the order, Gen. Borcke was induced, after having moved along the Brussels road, to turn off to his left, and continue his march, according to his original instructions, being under the impression that the whole corps had already commenced this march. The departure of the brigade was not immediately discovered and thus Thielmann’s force suffered an unexpected reduction and consisted of only 15,200 men. Nevertheless, it was a strong position.

Vandamme opened the battle at 1600 with Habert’s division in an attempt to take the bridges by quick assault. Grouchy ordered Exelmans’ cavalry with an infantry battalion against the bridge at Bas-Wavre while Lefol’s division moved against the bridge at Bierges. The fusilier battalion of 1st Kurmark Landwehr Regiment defended the Bierge bridge by removing timbers from it and counter-charging any attempt to repair it. The Kurmarkers held the right bank of the stone bridge at Wavre for some time, forcing Vandamme’s troops to waste precious time taking it. Once this was done the French rushed across and straight into a vicious street fight. A battalion of the 2nd Kurmark Landwehr Regiment moved to support the 1st and threw the French back across the bridge. A renewed French assault penetrated further down the same street, only to be ambushed from side streets by the 1st Kurmark and 30th Line Regiments. A bayonet charge sent the French scrambling across the bridge again. This see-saw battle would continue throughout the night. Later attacks by the French on Wavre met with no more success. The Prussians assigned another battalion to the bridge. The bridge at Bas-Wavre had been destroyed by the Prussians. The attacks by Lefol upon the bridge of Bierges had no more success, being hampered by muddy ground and the tough defense of Prussian 31st Line Regiment. Three small battalions and three squadrons of cavalry under Stengel were to guard a bridge to the west at Limal.

Marshal Soult’s letter ordering Grouchy to move quickly to join Napoleon and to attack Bülow arrived after 1800, 5 hours after being sent. Grouchy at once began gathering additional divisions and headed to Limal, arriving at 2300, where he found that Pajol’s cavalry had forced the bridge there. Prussian scouting cavalry noticed the strong French columns moving to Limal and Prussian 12th Brigade moved covering forces to the area. The Prussians made a bayonet charge in an attempt to retake Limal but without success. Night closed the major actions, although outposts fired on each other all night.

At approximately 2000 the French attack at Waterloo was lost. Grouchy was across the Dyle, but meanwhile the Empire by this time had been irrevocably lost, and the remnants of the Armėe du Nord were streaming south towards the safety of French territory.

Fighting renewed in the early hours. The forest south of Limal was forced by 0900 Thielmann elected to retreat as the campaign had been decided elsewhere. The definitive report of the victory at Waterloo reached him at 1000 as the retreat started. Both sides had lost about 2500 men. Grouchy, watching the retreat, was beginning his planned move on Brussels when the news reached him at 1030 that Napoleon had been defeated. Though in shock, Grouchy realized he was in danger of being trapped and his entire command destroyed. He at once had Exelmans move his cavalry to secure the bridges and began a retreat by forced marches that would take him back to Paris.

While the battle ended in a French victory, with the Prussians in retreat and Grouchy firmly athwart Prussian lines of communication, this situation lasted a total of 30 minutes and thus proved hollow. The Prussians held their ground long enough to allow Blücher’s transfer of 72,000 troops to Waterloo. Thus to the Prussians, the battle was a strategic success, as it contributed to a decisive victory at Waterloo. In addition, the Prussian rearguard of 17,000 troops tied down 33,000 French troops that could have otherwise taken part at Waterloo.

[Ennath]

June 19, 1940
Defense of Saumur

In the first week of June 1940, in accordance with instructions by Gen. Weygand to delay the Germans, Col. Michon, Superintendent of the Cavalry School at Saumur, issued orders for the cadets to take up defensive positions along the southern bank of the Loire. On June 14, the Germans marched into Paris as the French government left for Bordeaux. On June 15, Premier Paul Reynaud resigned and Philippe Pétain formed a new government. Next morning, through the Spanish ambassador, Pétain asked Germany for a cease fire and announced this fact over the radio.

The Germans advancing south across France to Saumur were from the 1st Cavalry Division. The battle therefore set graduates of the German cavalry school against the cadets from the French cavalry school. The Germans had 10,000 troops, some motorized, armored cars, artillery and the usual divisional equipment, whereas the French troops comprised 800 of the younger cadets who had joined the school 3 months earlier, older cadets having been assigned as junior officers of regiments, those teachers who had not already joined their normal units, and any retreating men that could be collected to add to the defense.

French army doctrine required 80,000 men and several divisional artillery units to cover a 25 mile front, the students comprised just 780, although they had acquired rifles, 10 old 25mm AT guns, 35 machine guns, three WWI armored cars, four 81mm mortars, seven 60mm mortars and two 75mm guns. By gathering retreating soldiers and some additional units, including 200 Algerian riflemen, 450 men from an armored warfare training center, 210 men from a groupe franc private army who arrived with five H39 tanks and three Panhard 178 armored cars, Michon had 2190 men lined up to face the 10,000 German troops.

The front comprised, to the west, the town of Gennes on the south bank, with double suspension bridges connecting the north via an island. The north bank comprised a Levee, which extended east for the whole of the front, behind which is a lower flood plain. Small villages built into the southern bank cliffs, overlooking the river and a number of islands in the river, filled the 12 miles to Saumur, which had another double bridge of stone via the Offard island, covered in buildings and overlooked by the ancient Chateau de Saumur. A rail line over a bridge just to the east of Saumur entered a tunnel into the cliffs on the south bank. Another 12 miles further east, along which there were a number of small villages, also built into the cliffs overlooking the river and more small islands is the town of Montsoreau with a truss road bridge across the river.

Preparations were made to destroy the bridges, over which refugees were streaming south. Barricades were set up and fighting pits dug. The students and troops were allocated into groups of around 20 students called brigades; 4-5 made a Troop. Communications were established using the civilian telephone system and some old radios. Sadly, the river level had recently fallen revealing multiple sand banks and small islands.

Men and materials not required for the defense were evacuated south, as were 800 horses. Refugees were also sent further south. The Mayor of Saumur was not sure he wanted to be defended; all towns of over 20,000 had been declared open; Saumur now full of refugees possibly qualified. Petain had not received a reply from the Germans and sent a message contradicting a previous message, saying that France had not abandoned the struggle nor laid down arms. Saumur therefore prepared for battle.

The motorized lead elements of German 1st Cavalry Division, the only horsed cavalry division in the German army, arrived at the river at Saumur just before midnight on June 18. A 25mm gun scored the first hit on an armored car. The French blew the Pont Napoleon at Saumur just after midnight, the Montsoreau bridge at 1:15 the railway bridge to the east of Saumur at 3:00.

At dawn on the 19th, a German staff car approached the destroyed Saumur bridge under a white flag. The French opened fire, it is unknown why; the car was destroyed and the two killed. The Germans brought up artillery to bombard the town. A number of ancient buildings were destroyed, the civil population suffered casualties and hid in the cellars and wine caves. Telephone lines to HQ were cut and it was too exposed to shellfire, so that evening it relocated 2 miles west to Auberge de Marsoleau, near the airfield. Fighting in the center continued throughout the day with cadets on the island firing at any targets offered. The 25mm gun on the island scored 9 more hits on armored vehicles. The morning of the 20th was strangely quiet, some students crossed from the island to the north bank and found it deserted, the Germans were presumed to have gone east or west to effect crossings elsewhere.

At Gennes, west of Saumur, there was no sign of troops until the 19th when scouts arrived in the afternoon; the suspension bridge to the north of the island was then blown. The 11th century church of St Eusèbe, on the high ground overlooking the bridge was an excellent view point and a good location for another of the 25mm guns, however at 8 PM, 50 German troop carriers arrived on the north bank packed with assault troops. Artillery began to bombard the island and Gennes, destroying the tower of St Eusèbe and setting the town on fire. The Germans then assaulted the island in the river using rubber boats but were repelled by the cadets and Algerians by midnight. An engineer, worried that his charges might be damaged by another bombardment, without orders, blew the southern bridge, isolating the troops on the island. The wounded had to be evacuated by boat. Early next morning, having been reinforced and with more artillery, the Germans used rafts and boats to overwhelm the few defenders on the island when their ammunition had run out, but they were unable to cross to the south bank, which was still strongly defended.

Moving westward downriver, the Germans looked for an alternative crossing point, identifying a gap that was only lightly held, where despite students arriving and inflicting casualties, the Germans managed to establish a small bridgehead on the south shore. Whilst reinforcements were approaching Gennes to repel the bridgehead, yet another was established between Gennes and Saumur, threatening to take the town from the rear. The reinforcements were diverted to this new threat. The cadets at Gennes, supported by two tanks were ordered to take back the bridgehead west of them. By 3:00, the Gennes commander was able to report that they had been successful and the left bank of the Loire was in French hands, but casualties had been high.

East of Saumur, after the bridge of Montsoreau was blown, it was quiet until dawn on the 20th, when the Germans tried a 5 AM crossing and despite losses, managed to obtain a foothold on the south bank at Le Petit-Puy but were held from advancing on Saumur by the cadets around the railway viaduct. Three armored cars patrolled the river road east of Saumur trying to keep the area clear of reinforcements rowing across the river and driving them back to stop them assaulting Saumur.

Aunis Farm just inland of the Loire and cliffs was the HQ of troop leader Captain de St-Blanquat and the brigades ordered to protect the gap between the railway bridge at Saumur and Montsoreau. When the Germans landed on the south bank, the unit realized it was in a good position to block a German breakout and trenches were quickly dug. The position was equally important to the Germans who opened up with artillery from north of the river. French infantry officer students from St Maixent had arrived early that day and were diverted to the eastern sector and sent into a counterattack to relieve the pressure on Aunis, with the backing of the 5 H39s of the reserve. After several unsuccessful German assaults on the farm, the counterattack went in at 1:00. 2 tanks were knocked out and the others withdrew, but the students reached the farm to reinforce the cavalry cadets. However, losses were mounting and the French decided to pull back south before they were surrounded. The farm fell in the late afternoon.

Further east, the Wehrmacht had also managed to cross the river towards Tours and were advancing south and circling behind Saumur. A bridge at Port-Boulet which had failed to collapse when explosives went off was well defended until captured at midnight of June 20-21. The German commander gave an order to disengage from the Saumur fight, as it was easier to bypass the town rather than continue against the stiff resistance and incur more heavy losses.

Meanwhile, at 9:00 PM, with Tours to the east and Angers to the west in German hands and with orders to pull back, Col. Michon decided the cadets could no longer hold Saumur and withdrew them south, with many burying their weapons before they were captured. The Germans entered the town the next day. The German commander, Gen. Kurt Feldt, praised the resistance of the students in his after action report. Of the 560 student officers from Saumur, 79 were killed and 47 wounded. In total 250 French and Algerians were killed or wounded and 2 tanks destroyed. The Germans lost 132 killed, several hundred wounded and 7 armored vehicles destroyed. The 218 students captured by the Germans were released in the following days instead of being interned.

To the French public, the cadets’ resistance formed a seed for the rebuilding of French honor. Since the battle occurred after the request for an armistice, Charles de Gaulle considered the action to be the first act of resistance.

[Ernesto75]

I found this telling by Ennath of the defense of Saumur most moving.

Thank you Ennath.

My father was there but since he is not here anymore I never will know exactly what he saw and what he felt.

He did not like to talk about this war, partly because he was shy and did not see himself like a hero (although I heard my mother tell he saved his captain).

One of the rare things I heard him say was how incompetent was Marechal Petain.

[Ennath]

For more on the battle, there is a full book (in English fortunately - there are probably a lot more in French)
For Honor Alone by Roy Macnab, 1988.

[TCrout]

Been reading about the Siege of Kut (1915) what a shambles...

[Ennath]

June 20, 1419
Invasion of Tsushima

From about 1400, despite its incorporation into the Japanese political order (this was however limited, to the point that Japanese authorities were unable throughout most of Japanese history to control and limit pirate activity originating in this area) Tsushima was located on the front lines that defended Japanese territory. Historically, a large part of Tsushima’s economy was sustained by trade with Korea; it was used as a “frontier territory” and a diplomatic meeting place between Korea and Japan, but was considered by Koreans as a vassal or dependent state of Korea, and despite a variety of changes in terminology over the ages designed to indicate its status as being in the Japanese sphere of influence, it was considered by many Koreans to be Korean land under foreign occupation.

From the end of the Koryo (1392) through the early Choson, the coastal regions of Korea, their populations, and their resources were often the objective of Wokou raids. Wokou were the pirates of the China and Korean coasts. A mixture of nationalities, mostly Chinese, they often pretended to be Japanese to hide their identities and sometimes assembled quite large fleets to plunder the rich cities of China or, less commonly, Korea. When operating with Japanese pirate allies, Chinese pirate leaders would allegedly persuade the Japanese to do the serious fighting, while using their own local knowledge to secure most of the loot.

In 1389, Gen. Pak Wi of Koryo cleared the island of Wokou pirates, burnt 300 ships and rescued more than 100 Korean captives. The Choson Dynasty ordered a strengthening of Korean naval defenses, a response to the constant threat posed by the pirates. In 1396, Korean official Kim Sa-hyeong led a campaign to Tsushima.

Choson subsequently asked the Ashikaga Shogunate in Japan and its deputy in Kyushu to suppress pirate activity, favoring legitimate traders. In exchange for certain privileges, it gave authority to So Sadashige (the de facto ruler of Tsushima Province) over ships sailing from Japan to Korea. When So Sadashige died in 1418, power was seized from his infant son Sadamori by Soda Saemontaro, a powerful pirate leader. Suffering from famine, pirates on Tsushima invaded Ming China in 1419. On the way to China, they invaded Korea’s Bi-in and Haeju provinces after their requests for food were rejected.

After receiving reports of these incidents, the Korean court approved an expedition to Tsushima. King Taejong, who had abdicated his throne in 1418 but was still a military adviser of King Sejong, soon to be “the Great”, favored a more offensive approach. On June 9, 1419, Taejong declared war against Tsushima, citing that it belonged to Korea, and Yi Jong-mu was chosen to conduct the expedition.

The Koreans waited until a large fleet had left the island for a raid. Yi Jong-mu’s fleet of 227 ships and 17,285 soldiers set off from Geoje Island toward Tsushima on June 19. The following day the fleet landed in Aso Bay.

Gen. Yi first sent captured pirates as emissaries to ask for surrender. When he received no reply, he sent out expeditionary columns, and the soldiers proceeded to raid the islanders and pirates and plunder pirate settlements. He found and rescued 131 Chinese captives and 21 slaves, burned 129 ships and 1939 houses, and killed or captured 135 pirates. Eventually, however, the Korean army was ambushed by a Japanese force at Nii, and suffered 150 casualties. In the weeks that followed, a truce was negotiated with the So clan. The Korean expeditionary force withdrew and sailed back to the Korean Peninsula on July 3. and Korea gave up occupation of Tsushima.

A treaty was negotiated between Korea and the So clan in January 1420. The Korean government agreed to grant the So limited trading privileges and access to three coastal Korean ports, under the condition that the So control and stop coastal pirate raids. In 1422, an emissary from the So clan requested freedom for Japanese prisoners captured by the Koreans during the expedition. He offered tributes of copper and sulfur in return. The prisoners were released. Eventually, the So clan monopolized the trade with Korea.

[Ennath]

June 21, 1813
Battle of Vitoria

Allied fortunes on the Peninsula in 1812 were subject to great fluctuation. In July 1812, after the Battle of Salamanca (see posting), the French had evacuated Madrid, which Wellington's army entered on August 12. Wellington marched north to lay siege to the fortress of Burgos, 140 miles away, but he had underestimated the enemy's strength and on October 21, he had to abandon the siege and retreat. By October 31 he had abandoned Madrid too, and retreated first to Salamanca then to Ciudad Rodrigo, near the Portuguese frontier, to avoid encirclement by French armies.

Wellington, now a marquess, spent the winter reorganizing and strengthening his forces, planning to resume the offensive in 1813. By contrast, Napoleon withdrew many veteran soldiers to rebuild his main army after his disastrous invasion of Russia.

On May 20, 1813 Wellington marched 121,000 troops (53,000 British, 40,000 Spanish and 28,000 Portuguese) from northern Portugal across the mountains of northern Spain and the Esla River to outflank Marshal Jean-Baptiste Jourdan’s army of 68,000, accompanied by King Joseph Bonaparte, strung out between the Douro and the Tagus. Wellington intended to move through the mountains of northern Portugal and Spain with the goal of cutting off the enemy's line of retreat back to France. The French retreated to Burgos, with Wellington’s forces marching hard to cut them off from the road to France. Wellington himself commanded the small central force in a strategic feint, while Sir Thomas Graham conducted the bulk of the army around the French right flank over terrain considered impassable.

Reaching Vitoria, Jourdan halted to await further reinforcements. Ill with fever, he took few actions on June 20 as he attempted to recover. With their commander sick, French forces deployed to defensive positions north and west of the town while a massive baggage train, consisting of siege artillery and loot taken from Spain, stood idle. A convoy left during the night, but it had to leave siege artillery behind as there were not enough draft animals to pull the cannons.

Vitoria was located to the south of the Zadorra River and was a major crossroads town with roads leading in all directions. West of the town, the Zadorra made a hairpin turn to the southwest, leaving the area through a narrow defile. To the south of the bend were the Heights of Puebla, while the rugged terrain of Monte Arrato rose across the river to the northwest. To hold the area around Vitoria, Honoré Gazan’s Army of the South was positioned north of the heights facing east, with Jean-Pierre Maransin’s division in an advanced position at Subijana. They were supported to the east by Jean-Baptiste Drouet D'Erlon’s Army of the Center. While Honoré Reille’s Army of Portugal initially formed a 3rd line, it was shifted to guard the river crossings north of Vitoria. The French force totaled 49,000 infantry, 11,000 cavalry and 151 guns.

Wellington had 57,000 British, 16,000 Portuguese and 8000 Spanish troops, a total of 82,000 men and 96 guns. His plan was to envelop the French position. To achieve this, he sent Rowland Hill’s Right Column across the Zadorra to the south with orders to drive the French from the defile and move onto the Heights of Puebla. While the French were occupied with Hill, he intended to cross the river at the hairpin to get behind the enemy’s right flank. While fighting was developing west of the town, Sir Thomas Graham’s Left Column was to move behind the Monte Arrato and attack Vitoria from the north along the Bilbao Road.

To support Graham’s operation and connect his advance to Wellington’s fight, the Left Center Column, under the Earl of Dalhousie, was to move over the Monte Arrato and attack the river west of Vitoria. Key to the coming fight was the fact that D’Erlon had failed to destroy key bridges over the Zadorra. Advancing up the Burgos Road on June 21, Hill sent Pablo Morillo’s Spanish Division to occupy part of the heights while William Stewart’s 2nd Division's deployed closer to the river. Seeing the threat, Gazan ordered Maransin to advance to block Morillo.

As the fighting grew in intensity, both sides reinforced, with Hill sending in a brigade and Gazan committing Eugene-Casimir Villatte’s reserve division. With the battle raging, the French began to notice Wellington’s movement along the west bank of the river. Understandably concerned about his right flank, Gazan requested aid from the recovering Jourdan. More concerned about the fight on the heights, Jourdan refused this request. Meeting little resistance, Wellington pushed a brigade of the Light Division, under James Kempt, across the river near the hairpin.

As Kempt’s men were crossing, Hill was making progress as Stewart’s men succeeded in taking Subijana. Though Stewart and Morillo were repeatedly counterattacked by Gazan’s divisions, they succeeded in holding their positions in the village and on the heights. Aware of Graham’s approach, Wellington paused in his advance. Rolling down the Bilbao Road, Graham succeeded in driving the Army of Portugal’s 4th Division back across the river. Intense French resistance blocked Graham from crossing. To the east, Francisco Longa defeated the Spanish Royal Guards and severed the road north to Bayonne.

Finally grasping the severity of the situation, Jourdan issued orders for Gazan to fall back towards Vitoria. Arriving on the field, Dalhousie began pushing Thomas Picton’s 3rd Division across the Zadorra with aid from Kempt. Coming under heavy French counterattack and bombardment, Picton’s men were able to hold their ground as Lowry Cole’s 4th Division crossed to the west. Retreating, Gazan attempted to make a stand with D’Erlon at the village of Arinez. Uniting, the Allied forces south of the river succeeded in driving the French back from this position to one on Zuazo Ridge. Attacking again, Wellington’s forces were able to take the ridge despite the efforts of the French artillery.

Their line shattered, Gazan and D’Erlon's men began fleeing. Only the determined efforts of Reille’s men prevented a complete rout as they held off Graham and allowed their comrades to escape. Retreating from the field, they departed to the southeast on the Salvatierra Road. Entering Vitoria, discipline among the Allied troops broke down as the men began plundering the abandoned French baggage train, enraging Wellington. These actions along with the fatigue of his men prevented him from mounting a determined pursuit of Jourdan’s wrecked army.

The Battle of Vitoria cost Wellington 5158 casualties (3675 British, 921 Portuguese and 562 Spanish) while the French lost around 8000 (5200 killed and wounded and 2800 captured) as well as the majority of their artillery. The defeat effectively broke the back of French power in Spain and forced Joseph and Jourdan to continue retreating towards France. Advancing in pursuit, Wellington captured San Sebastián and defeated the French during the Battle of the Pyrenees (July 25-August 2, 1813). Pushing on, Wellington advanced into France that fall.

[Ennath]

429 BC
Siege of Plataea

The city of Plataea was located on the southern edge of Boiotia, the area northeast of the Gulf of Corinth. It was the only Boiotian city that was not a member of the Boiotian League (dominated by Thebes), and was instead an ally of Athens. This was not an entirely popular policy in the city, and 2 years before the start of the siege these disputes inside the city led to the incident that triggered the Great Peloponnesian War.

In the spring of 431 BC, with war looming, the Thebans decided to try and seize control of Plataea. They had the support of one of the political factions in the city, led by Nauclides, and decided to try and take advantage of this to take the city without a struggle. Two forces were sent towards Plataea. The first consisted of 300 men, who were to be let into the city at night to take immediate control. The second, much larger force, would follow some way behind in order to avoid detection, arrive later that night and secure Theban control. The first part of the plan worked perfectly. The advance party of 300 men was let into the city and took up a position in the market place. At first the Plataeans were so shocked that they agreed to Theban demands, but when it became clear how small the invading force actually was, the Plataeans, including women and slaves, turned against the invaders. In a vicious night fight 120 of the Thebans were killed or escaped from the city, and 180 were taken prisoner. The larger Theban force didn’t arrive until the following morning. They then agreed to withdraw in return for the release of the prisoners, but as soon as the Theban army was gone the Plataeans executed the captives.

This incident ended the last lingering hopes of peace between Athens and Sparta, and triggered the Great Peloponnesian War. In the first 2 years of the war, the main Spartan efforts were 2 invasions of Attica, but in the 3rd year of the war, Sparta and her allies decided to attack Plataea instead. The Plataeans were clearly expecting an attack, for by the time the Spartans arrived, the women and children had left the city and had taken refuge at Athens. When the siege began the city was defended by 400 Plataeans and 80 Athenian volunteers, supported by 110 women who cooked for the garrison.

The Spartan army, under the command of King Archidamus, camped outside Plataea while negotiations went on. Both sides tried to use the memory of the Persian War, when Plataea had been the site of the decisive land battle (see posting), with the Plataeans calling on the Spartans to honor an earlier oath to guarantee Plataea’s independence, while Archidamus called on the Plataeans to either join the Boiotian league or remain neutral. The Plataeans replied that they would have to consult the Athenians, and that they were worried that the Thebans would use the proposed neutrality in a second attempt to seize the city. Archidamus then came up with a dramatic counter-offer, suggesting that the Plataeans evacuate their city and let the Spartans occupy it for the duration of the war. They would then be allowed to return once the war was over. Rather surprisingly, the Plataean assembly agreed to these terms, but only if Athens approved.

The Plataean envoys returned from Athens with a reassurance that Athens would never abandon them, and a promise that they would provide as much help as possible. This encouraged the Plataeans to turn down the Spartan terms, and the siege finally began.

Archidamus began by constructing a wooden palisade around the city. The Spartans then began to build a mound leading up to the walls, with the intention of mounting an assault. The defenders responded by increasing the height of their own walls opposite the mound. They also dug a tunnel from inside the city to a position under the mound and began to excavate material from inside it, both delaying the construction of the mound and providing themselves with material for their own fortifications. Finally they began work on an inner wall, curving around the area that the mound was heading for so that if the Spartans did manage to cross the outer walls they would be faced with a new line of fortifications.

The Spartans also used more conventional siege engines, but these were ineffective. After this effort had been going on for some time the Spartans decided that they couldn’t take the city in this manner. Their next step was to wait for a suitable wind and then drop burning bundles into the city from the end of their mound. A large part of the city was destroyed by fire, but the defenses remained intact. After this failure the Spartans decided to simply blockade the city. A wall of circumvallation was built around Plataea, most of the besieging army was dismissed, and the blockade began. The Spartan walls were fairly elaborate. Two walls were built, one facing the besieged city (circumvallation), the other facing outwards to guard against any relief effort (contravallation)), 16 feet apart. The garrison lived in huts built between the walls. The walls were linked by regularly spaced towers, with gates in the center of each tower.

By the winter of 428-427 BC supplies were beginning to run out in the city. The defenders decided to try and break out. At first this was to be a mass breakout, but half of the garrison then decided that it was too risky, and only 220 men took part. They used ladders to climb over the inner wall, captured 2 of the towers, and managed to get across the outer wall before strong reinforcements could arrive. When a mobile force of 300 Peloponnesians did arrive it was too late. The Plataeans then moved up the road leading to Thebes, deceiving the besiegers, who attempted to find them on the road to Athens. Eventually 212 of the escapees managed to reach Athens.

Their efforts were in vain. The Athenians didn’t send a relief force to Plataea, as this might have involved them in the formal battle they were trying to avoid. By the summer of 427 the defenders were so weakened by starvation that they were unable to resist a Spartan attack. At this point the Spartan commander decided to try and negotiate the surrender of the city. The Plataeans agreed to surrender and face the judgment of Sparta, in a fair trial. Instead they were faced with a mock trial, before the Spartans, under pressure from their Theban allies, executed all 200 Plataeans and 25 Athenians who had survived the siege. The women who had remained in the city to cook for the garrison were sold into slavery. Plataea itself was demolished, and the building materials used to build a large two-story hotel and a temple to Hera. The land was then leased out to Thebans. Thebes was allowed to keep Plataea in the Peace of Nikias of 421 BC.

[Ennath]

June 22, 207 BC
Battle of the Metaurus

While Hannibal Barca had been winning his great victories in Italy, his brother, Hasdrubal, had been left to hold Spain, whose vast mineral wealth continued to replenish the Punic coffers. He was given the leftovers, and none too many at that - perhaps 15,000 men in total. Carthage also sent him inferior commanders who cost him dearly. But, with the little he had, he accomplished his goal. He held Spain. Now, Hasdrubal at last received the summons he had awaited for 10 years. Hannibal was calling him to Italy with the bulk of his now-veteran army. Rome had never been able to defeat Hannibal, and now a second Barca was about to bring a second Punic army onto the Italian Peninsula.

After adeptly escaping Publius Scipio in Spain and making his way into Gaul during the winter, Hasdrubal waited until the spring of 207 BC to make his way through the Alps and into Northern Italy. Hasdrubal made much faster progress than his brother had during his crossing, partly due to the constructions left behind by Hannibal’s army a decade earlier, but also due to the removal of the Gallic threat that had plagued Hannibal during that expedition. The Gauls now feared and respected the Carthaginians, and not only was Hasdrubal allowed to pass through the Alps unmolested, his ranks were swelled by many enthusiastic Gauls. Hasdrubal, unlike his brother, succeeded in bringing his war elephants over the Alps.

Rome was in a panic. Every general who had fought Hannibal was either dead or in disgrace. And now Rome needed 2 generals, one to face Hannibal and one to check Hasdrubal. Their most veteran soldiers were dead; Rome was scraping up armies. Her wealth was almost exhausted; her coinage had been debased by the cost of the war and contained only 1/6 the silver it had at the start.

It was the custom in Rome - by now hardened into what amounted to law - that of the 2 consuls picked each year, one would be a patrician and one a plebian. For the patrician, the Senate selected Gaius Claudius Nero. Nero had served in the field against both Hannibal and Hasdrubal, with no remaining record chronicling any particular success. Nero and Marcus Livius Salinator, his plebian colleague, were dispatched to face Hannibal and Hasdrubal respectively.

Neither consul engaged his intended target initially. Claudius Nero’s force of over 40,000 was too formidable for Hannibal to engage openly, and so the two played an unproductive game of cat and mouse in Bruttium; meanwhile, Marcus Livius yielded cautiously to Hasdrubal and allowed him to push beyond the Metaurus as far south as the town of Sena. It was not until Hasdrubal sent messengers to Hannibal that decisive measures were finally taken. Hasdrubal wished to meet with his brother in South Umbria. However, Hasdrubal’s messengers were captured, and his plans fell into the hands of Claudius Nero. Nero quickly marched north with 7000 men, 1000 of them cavalry, to join up with Marcus Livius. Nero, recognizing the urgency of the situation and the enormous threat that a merging of the Carthaginian armies would present, circumvented the authority of the Senate, advising them to organize levies for their own protection. Horsemen were sent forward along the line of march with orders for country people to prepare supplies for his soldiers, who took only weapons from the camp. Nero’s troops were joined by both young and veteran volunteers during the march.

Claudius Nero quickly reached Marcus Livius, camped at Sena along with the praetor Lucius Porcius Licinius. Hasdrubal was camped approximately a half-mile to the north. However, since Claudius Nero had conveniently arrived at night, his presence was not detected until the next day, when the Romans drew up for battle. Hasdrubal drew his army up as well, but upon closer observation of the forces before him, noticed that Marcus Livius’ army seemed to have grown considerably over the course of the night, and that he had a much larger contingent of cavalry. Hasdrubal remembered hearing a trumpet in the Roman camp heralding the arrival of an important figure the night before and correctly concluded that he was now facing two Roman armies. Fearing defeat, he retreated.

The rest of the day passed without event, as the Romans prudently did not advance on Hasdrubal’s fortifications. When night came, Hasdrubal quietly led his army out of camp with the intent of retreating into Gaul, where he could safely establish communications with Hannibal. Early in the march, however, Hasdrubal’s guides betrayed him, and left him lost and confused along the banks of the Metaurus, searching futilely for a ford at which to cross. The night passed with no change in Hasdrubal’s misfortunes, and the morning found his army disarrayed, trapped against the banks of the Metaurus, and a great many of his Gallic troops drunk. With the Roman cavalry fast approaching and the legions under the two consuls not far behind, Hasdrubal reluctantly prepared for battle.

The battle was fought at the banks of the Metaurus River; the exact site is uncertain. The exact numbers of troops on both sides are not known. Modern estimates suggest Hasdrubal’s army was about 30,000 men, and Marcus Livius’ army roughly equal. Porcius commanded 2 legions, as many men as the consul. This means that Livius and Porcius had between them 4 legions - 32-40,000 men, including allies. However, the numbers of the allied contingents could have been less than usual due to the refusal of some clients to provide auxiliaries. The Roman force was probably further diminished by earlier fighting with Hasdrubal, the evidence of which is the presence of several thousand prisoners in Hasdrubal's camp. About 7000 troops accompanied Claudius Nero. Therefore, it is certain that Carthaginians were significantly outnumbered. The Carthaginians lacked much cavalry, of which the Romans had a substantial number.

Like most Carthaginian armies, Hasdrubal’s was a mix of many different cultures and ethnicities, including Iberians, Ligures, and Gauls; few were African. Hasdrubal’s right flank was on the Metaurus and his left at an inaccessible hilly area. He placed his cavalry on his right to guard against the superior Roman cavalry that could flank him here. Hasdrubal’s best troops were Iberians, along with the few African troops that he did have, and these formed his right.. The center was composed of Ligures and on the left, he placed the Gauls, who he hoped would be shielded by the deep ravine in front of them. Hasdrubal also had 10 elephants in his army. The Roman left wing was commanded by Marcus Livius, right wing was under Gaius Claudius Nero, facing the inaccessible Gauls and center was under the command of Porcius Licinus. The Roman cavalry was placed on left wing in facing the Carthaginian cavalry.

The battle started with the Roman left charging the Carthaginian right, followed a little later by the center. The outnumbered Carthaginian cavalry crumbled. The Carthaginian right wing and center held their ground and the war elephants, before being overcome, initially succeeded in breaking Roman lines and spreading confusion, making the initial combat favorable to Hasdrubal.

Claudius Nero, on the Roman right, struggled to overcome the poor terrain that blocked his path to the Gauls on Hasdrubal’s left. Seeing the futility in wasting further time in this, he instead took half of his men and led them behind the engaged Roman lines to the extreme Roman left, swinging his troops around and suddenly crashing into the Carthaginian right. The Iberians could not withstand this 2-pronged attack of Marcus Livius from the front and Claudius Nero on their flank. They soon panicked and fled, collapsing onto the Carthaginian center and creating mass confusion. The disordered Carthaginian center now faced a 3-pronged attack: Porcius from the front, Marcus Livius from their right flank, and Claudius Nero from the rear. By now the Roman cavalry had completely defeated their Carthaginian opposites and with the collapse of the center a general retreat of Hasdrubal’s army began. The Romans pursued and met almost no resistance from the Gauls. Most of the Carthaginian casualties occurred during this disordered retreat. Hasdrubal, seeing that there was nothing more he could do, and presumably doubtful of his own prospects of escape or simply unwilling to be taken captive, charged into the thick of the nearly concluded battle and met a glorious, if pointless, death.

Claudius Nero had Hasdrubal’s head severed from his body, taken south, and thrown into Hannibal’s camp as a token of the brother’s defeat. With his brother dead and his soldiers routed or killed, and no hope of help from Carthage, Hannibal’s hopes of mustering a force sufficient in size and strength for the achievement of his war aims were dashed. He remained in Italy for several more years and attempted to maintain the loyalty of the Italian allies whom he had won early on in his campaign. It was not until Scipio led a campaign directly against Carthage that Hannibal left Italy.

[Ennath]

June 23, 1941
Battle of Brody

At the start of Barbarossa, 1st Panzer Group (Paul Ewald von Kleist), was ordered to secure the Bug River crossings and advance to Rovno and Korosten with the strategic objective of Kiev. It deployed 2 corps forward and advanced between Lviv and Rovno in an attempt to cut the Lviv–Kiev rail line, thus driving a wedge along junction point between Soviet 5th and 6th Armies.

Southwestern Front (Mikhail Kirponos) had received incomplete intelligence on the size and direction of the German attack. They were surprised when Stavka ordered a general counterattack under the title of Directive No. 3 on the authority of Chief of General Staff Georgy Zhukov. Most of the headquarters staff were convinced that the strategy would be to remain in a defensive posture until the situation clarified. By the end of June 22, Zhukov was on his way to Southwestern Front HQ at Ternopil along with Nikita Khrushchev, former head of the Organizational Department of the Ukrainian Communist Party’s Central Committee, to ensure these orders were carried out.

Six Soviet mechanized corps, with over 2500 tanks, were massed to take part in a concentric counterattack through the flanks of 1st Panzer Group. The intention was to attempt a pincer movement from the north (5th Army) and south (6th Army) that met west of Dubno in order to trap units of the 6th and 17th German Armies, on the northern flank of Army Group South. To achieve this, 8th Mechanized Corps was positioned to the south of the 6th Army, and placed under the command of N. I. Muzychenko’s 6th Army. This essentially brought all the mobile assets of Southwestern Front to bear against the base of Kleist’s thrust toward Kiev. The primary German infantry formation on this sector of the front, IV Corps (von Schwedler) of 17th Army (Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel) was advancing southeast with the objective of cutting Lviv-Kiev railway line.

German armor was composed of a mix of Czech and German tanks, as well as captured French vehicles. Nearly 50% were the virtually obsolete Panzer I and Panzer II light tanks. Of the 4000 armored vehicles available to the Wehrmacht, only 1400 were the new Panzer III and Panzer IV. In the first few hours of the invasion, German commanders were shocked to find that some Soviet tanks were immune to all AT weapons in use by the Wehrmacht.

At the beginning of June, the Red Army included over 19,000 tanks, most of them light tanks such as the T-26 or BT-7, with virtually no protection against any AT weapon at any range. Furthermore, the poor design of Soviet shells meant that most shattered on contact, rather than detonating. More modern tanks, such as the KV-1 and T-34, were only beginning to roll off production lines and were not available in anywhere near the numbers needed. The 717 committed to this battle comprised almost half the total production. Many tanks were still dispersed among infantry divisions on the eve of the invasion. This ensured that even if the Red Army had a unified command, many of its armored units would be committed piecemeal.

The attack combined six mechanized corps under 5th Army to the north and the 6th Army to the south, under the general direction of Kirponos. Under the 5th Army command, 9th and N. V. Feklenko's 19th Mechanized Corps were to be deployed north-west of Rovno, while the 22nd Mechanized Corps was to assemble Conditions were difficult for the Soviet commanders: loss of communications, constant harassment by the Luftwaffe, lack of transport, and the movement of large numbers of refugees and retreating soldiers on the roads made it difficult for the forces to assemble at their jump-off points. While communication between the Front headquarters and the individual army commands was generally good, communication to the front-line units was seriously deficient. Many Soviet front-line commanders were left to their own devices, and this disrupted Soviet command and control. Another endemic problem was the lack of transport for the infantry component of the Mechanized Corps. Motorized in name only, many of these divisions had only part of their full transportation establishment. Individual corps commanders had to improvise solutions to bring their full complement of soldiers to their assembly points. These complications were compounded by the apparent inability of Soviet commanders to assess an appropriate axis of attack in the context of the rapidly developing German salient. Between June 22 and 24, 8th Mechanized Corps received 3 different locations for its assembly point.

Despite air attacks which destroyed many tanks before even reaching their start points, the attacks went in on June 23-24, in an uncoordinated fashion, leading to one of the largest tank battles of the war. Despite the poor control, the initial attacks had some success, reaching Dubno by the evening of June 26, though with very heavy losses. The fall of the city cut off the German spearheads, but the hesitation and confusion in the Soviet command now came to the fore.

When the Soviet forces took Dubno, Kirponos thought that German attacks threatened to outflank and encircle the Soviet forces attacking from the south. This led him to order a halt to the offensive and a general retreat in order shorten his front, “so as to prevent the enemy tank groups from penetrating into the rear of the 6th and 26th Armies”. After a debate with the Front commander and his staff, Zhukov quickly had these orders countermanded; orders for a renewed attack were issued 2 hours later. This led to even more of the confusion that was symptomatic of the Soviet command in the battle. Rokossovsky, commanding 9th Mechanized Corps attacking from the north, simply balked at these new orders, stating that “we had once again received an order to counterattack. However, the enemy outnumbered us to such a degree, that I took on the personal responsibility of ordering a halt to the counteroffensive and to meet the enemy in prepared defenses”. Meanwhile, Ryabyshev commanding 8th Mechanized Corps to the south, complied with the order and remounted the attack.

Ryabyshev took the position held by Zhukov at the time, which is that if the attack had continued aggressively and without delay, the Soviets might have been successful. However, subsequent events seem to vindicate Kirponos’ view that the attack was premature and would destabilize the integrity of the entire front. Shortly after the Soviet counter-attack was routed, Marshal Semyon Budyonny was given overall command of the combined Southwestern and Southern Fronts. Disaster unfolded at the Battle of Uman; 26th, 12th and 18th army were encircled after Army Group South renewed its attack by pivoting south from the positions it had achieved during the Battle of Brody - an outcome that Kirponos had predicted in his arguments with Zhukov about the wisdom of the counterattack.

The confrontation between Kirponos and Zhukov led Zhukov to tell Southwestern Front’s political officer, Nikita Khrushchev, “I am afraid your commander (Kirponos) here is pretty weak”, a charge that Kirponos would never be able to answer, since he died in the battle of Kiev.

The Germans lost some 200 tanks, the Soviets 800. 8th Mechanized Corps was wrecked; Stavka disbanded its headquarters and parceled out its remaining assets to other formations of Southwestern Front. The defensive success enabled the Germans to continue their offensive, even if it had been delayed by the tenacity of the Soviet counterattack.

The Red Army corps were mishandled while being concentrated into large powerful groups. The German troops sought to isolate individual units and destroy them one at a time. Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe was able to separate the supporting infantry and deny them resupply of fuel and ammunition. Ultimately due to lack of adequate planning and overall coordination, the Soviet counterattack failed.