The Military History Thread

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January 17, 1746
Battle of Falkirk

After turning back from Derby (see posting), the Jacobite Army returned to Scotland and moved to besiege Stirling Castle. The Jacobite army left Glasgow on January 3, 1746 in 2 columns. One column, led by Lord George Murray marched towards Falkirk, via Cumbernauld, to make it appear as if they were heading towards Edinburgh. Instead he turned north before reaching Falkirk and moved just outside Stirling in Bannockburn. Murray stationed Lord Elcho at Linlithgow with a detachment of cavalry to patrol the road to Edinburgh. Charles Edward Stuart moved another column to Bannockburn via Kilsyth, where he set his headquarters. Lord John Drummond set forth from Perth with the heavy artillery.

Now boasting a force of 8000 men, the largest force they would assemble during the rising, the Jacobites sent a drummer to Stirling on January 5, demanding the surrender of the town. A garrison of 500 militia responded by shooting at the drummer, who ran for his life. Three days later the town council agreed to surrender. Yet, Stirling Castle itself was held by a small garrison of trained militia and troops under the command of Maj. Gen. William Blakeney, who politely declined to surrender. Thereupon Charles Stuart ordered the castle to be besieged. He entrusted this task to a French artillery “expert” of Scottish descent, Mirabel de Gordon. Gordon chose a poor location in digging trenches for the Jacobite guns, lower and completely in range of the castle’s own guns. Because of the man’s demonstrated incapacity, the Scots afterward referred to Mirabel as “Mr. Admirable”. At the same time, dissension arose as the Highland chiefs resented Charles Stuart’s decision to not hold councils, relying only on the advice of his Irish “Men of Moidart”. Also causing concern was Charles’ heavy drinking.

As this went on, Lt. Gen. Henry Hawley brought an army of 13,000 from Newcastle upon Tyne to Edinburgh, sending an advance unit to Linlithgow on January 13. Lord Elcho fell back to Falkirk where he met Lord George Murray. Hawley advanced with a force of 6000 on January 15, intending to relieve Stirling Castle, whereupon Murray and Elcho withdrew to Bannockburn. The Jacobites planned for battle on January 15 at Plean Muir, just southeast of Bannockburn. They were expecting an attack from Hawley’s forces, but it never came.

Hawley was encamped at Falkirk, and showed no signs of moving. Thus, on the morning of January 17, the Jacobites planned an attack of their own. The army moved cautiously, avoiding the main road and heading for the Hill of Falkirk which overlooked Hawley’s encampment. With Hawley established at nearby Callendar House, 2000 yards from camp, the government army was taken by surprise. At 1:00 PM an officer informed Hawley of the Jacobite approach. Hawley refused to believe it and did not verify the information for himself , only sending instructions for his troops to put on their equipment as a precaution. By 2:00, the Jacobite attack was imminent and a second messenger from Maj. Gen. John Huske was sent. Finally aware of the seriousness of the situation, Hawley arrived at his camp hatless and at the gallop.

Led by the dragoons, the Hanoverian army rapidly filed south on Maggie Wood’s Lane and up the slope of the Falkirk ridge. As the leading elements reached the summit, they could see the Jacobite army bearing down on them from the northwest. Marching across the front of the Highlanders, the dragoon regiments reached a bog on the far side of the rise and faced to their right. The infantry began to form to the right of the dragoons, facing west. About this time a storm struck the area with very heavy rain and wind, hindering deployment and wetting the black powder cartridges. In the subsequent action one out of four muskets misfired. Two cannon became stuck in a bog. When the battle began, the gun crews were still trying to free them.

The Jacobite army marched up and deployed in 3 lines, facing east. Most were highland clansmen, but the third line also contained small units of horsemen, plus a unit of French regulars (pickets from the Irish Brigade). The Prince failed to appoint a left wing commander, though Lord George Murray took charge of the right wing.

Because Hawley’s army formed up so hurriedly, its dispositions were unusual. The dragoons on the left wing were directly opposed to the Highland right flank foot soldiers. The left of the British infantry faced the Highland army’s center. Three foot regiments on the Hanoverian right completely overlapped the Jacobite left, but there was a ravine separating the two sides; this prevented the British units from flanking the Stewarts of Appin, but it also protected Hawley’s right.

At 4:00, Col. Francis Ligonier received orders to charge the Jacobite right with the British dragoons. The Jacobites waited until the dragoons trotted into pistol range then let loose with a crushing volley. A handful of horsemen closed with the Highlanders, but most fled. One company of Glasgow militia was ridden over and scattered by fleeing dragoons. Those horsemen who continued to fight fell victim to an unusual tactic. The Highlanders dropped their muskets and crouched on the ground, using their dirks to kill the horses and stabbing the riders as they fell. Another Highlander tactic when confronted with cavalry was to aim their swords at the horse's head rather than the rider. A horse wounded this way will tend to circle and render the rider an easy target.

The complete rout of the cavalry compromised the entire loyalist position. Murray tried to restrain the MacDonalds, but they spontaneously rushed after the fleeing horsemen. The Highland right and center fired one volley, flung down their muskets and dashed toward the government infantry, claymores in hand. Attacked in front and flank, with rain now beating in their faces, Hawley’s left-wing infantry fired an ineffective volley and ran for the rear, carrying away the second line as well.

Shielded by the ravine, only the government right flank regiments held firm. Price’s and Ligonier’s regiments were joined by Barrel’s from the second line. Gen. Huske marched them a short distance uphill where they fired into the flank of the Highlanders who were in pursuit of the panicked loyalist left and center. Soon they were joined by Cobham’s rallied dragoons, who tried to attack the Jacobite rear. This attack was foiled by the Irish Pickets (French regulars) who had been held in reserve.

Most of Hawley’s army was routed while most of the Jacobite army was scattered in pursuit or pillaging the dead. The Atholl Brigade remained intact and Murray took charge of it and some MacDonalds. Huske soon withdrew with his 3 regiments, leaving the field to the Jacobites.

It was now dark and the storm was growing fiercer; confusion ensued and Murray lost sight of the enemy. The survivors retreated east towards Linlithgow, with Grenadiers pulling Hawley’s remaining cannon as the artillery horses had been lost. Murray had won a huge victory but did not realize it until the next morning.

The Jacobites emerged victorious, but failed to take advantage of the encounter. Around 350 Royal troops were killed, wounded or missing, and some 300 captured. Jacobite losses were around 50 dead and 80 wounded. The Jacobites seized some tents, ammunition, wagons, and 3 guns, but they remained in or around Falkirk for most of the month and lost any initiative they may have gained from the victory. Instead of pursuing Hawley, Charles Stuart chose to stay in Bannockburn House, where he developed a feverish cold and was taken care of by Clementina Walkinshaw. This gave Hawley the opportunity to reorganize and strengthen his army in Edinburgh. The Jacobite siege of Stirling Castle was abandoned on February 1.

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1831
Siamese-Vietnamese War

The fall of Angkor to the Siamese in 1431 marked the final end of Cambodia’s era of greatness, which had begun as far back as the 9th century and had been on the wane since the 13th. Cambodia was thereafter little more than the battleground on which Siam and Vietnam attempted to settle the issue of dominance in Indochina, a struggle still undecided as the 19th century opened. Its history became one of alternating invasions punctuated by occasional insurrections against one of the foreign powers. Though shorn of considerable swathes of territory by both ambitious neighbors (including the entire Mekong Delta, lost to Vietnam by 1749), and reduced to tributary status by each in turn, Cambodia nevertheless managed to retain its sovereignty, if only because the interests of the warring parties were better served by its survival as a defensible buffer zone rather than as occupied territory.

As the end of the 18th century, it was Siam’s turn to have the upper hand, having provided the military support by which Cambodia’s exiled King Ang Eng (1779-96) was restored to the throne in 1794, the Siamese being rewarded - or more accurately, rewarding themselves - by the annexation of northwestern Cambodia, including Angkor, Battambang, Siemreap and Sisophon. However, the early years of the 19th century saw a resurgence of Vietnamese intervention, provoked by Siam’s increased involvement in Cambodia’s affairs. In 1807, Ang Eng’s son and eventual successor Ang Chan (1806-34), despite being reared in Bangkok, sought to either appease both sides or play them off against each other by acknowledging himself a vassal of Vietnam as well as Siam. However, this only served to enrage Siamese King Rama II, who in 1812 provided the necessary military assistance to enable Ang Sugnon, one of Ang Chan’s younger brothers, to depose him. Predictably, Ang Chan fled straight to Saigon and the following year was provided with a sizeable Vietnamese army with which to drive out his brother and recover the throne. Seriously outnumbered, the Siamese withdrew without a fight, but the following year returned to annex Cambodia’s northeastern provinces of Melu Prey, Stung Treng and Tonlé Repu. There was no opposition, the permanent garrison the Vietnamese had established in Phnom Penh being to far away to help. Despite this, and despite an anti-Vietnamese rebellion in 1820-21 (the Vietnamese being universally loathed by common Cambodians), Vietnamese influence predominated for the next few decades.

The Siamese began military actions again in early 1831, mounting several minor forays into western Cambodia in 1831-32. They stepped up the pressure in early in 1833, taking advantage of political discord amongst the Vietnamese (caused by the death of their viceroy in Cambodia) to launch a major offensive in November, aimed not just at the expulsion of the Vietnamese garrison, but also at outright conquest of Cambodia. Consisting of over 40,000 men marching by land and another 10,000 sent by sea, the Siamese expedition, under Phaya Bo Din, initially swept all before it, defeating the Cambodians at the Battle of Kompong Chong before driving the Vietnamese from Phnom Penh, capturing the Cambodian capital at Udong, and then pushing their way across southern Vietnam as far as Vinh Long in the Mekong Delta.

By January 1834, however, the Vietnamese had recovered from the initial shock and the Siamese supply lines were becoming stretched. Mustering an army of 15,000, the Vietnamese went on the offensive. Serious reverses were inflicted on the Siamese at Vinh Long, where land and sea actions cost the invaders 2000 men and 9 warships, and then near Sadek ant the end of the month. After this, the Vietnamese marched on Udong and restored Ang Chan to his throne for a second time. The Siamese army drew back behind its own frontiers, and a much-strengthened Vietnamese garrison took up permanent residence in Cambodia.

Its near defeat having demonstrated the dangers posed to its own security by Cambodia’s weakness, Vietnam’s attitude toward its satellite changed dramatically. Instead of being looked upon as a privileged protectorate, Cambodia was now regarded more like occupied territory. Self-serving Vietnamese patronage was abruptly replaced by tight political control, and military aid by an almost 12,000-strong army of occupation, installed in 50 forts across the country. At Ang Chan’s sudden death in late 1834, the Vietnamese governor coerced Cambodian palace officials into passing over the late king’s pro-Siamese elder daughter Ang Baen in favor of his younger daughter Ang Mey - who was also, conveniently, the governor’s mistress. Inevitably, the new queen served as little more than a puppet, preserving a mere fiction of independence. A wide-ranging series of “reforms” was introduced, aimed at “Vietnamizing” the country. These ambitious and ill-judged measures inevitably provoked widespread unrest and sporadic rebellions, culminating in a concerted uprising at the end of 1840, following the governor’s decision to arrest and deport Queen Ang Mey, who had become uncooperative, and take direct control himself. This sparked another war with Siam, which sought to profit from the opportunity.

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January 18, 1915
Battle of Jassin

Jassin was a small village in German East Africa, 80 miles north of Tanga, near the coast. It was a center for the production of palm oil, sugar, and sisal used for making cord or rope; there was a stone-built sisal factory about 1000 yards north of the village. Jassin was in an unhealthy swamp area when it rained, but was linked to the town of Moa by a trolley railway and a road that ran through it from Tanga to the settlement of Mwumoni. With the coming of war in 1914, the village changed hands 3 times, before beginning the new year in Allied hands.

The village was in the Umba River area, and troops were posted on the south bank, with the largest concentrations at Jassin, Samanya (Umba Camp) and Bwago Macho. Samanya had 4 companies of Indian 101st Grenadiers, Wavell’s Arab Company and a machine gun section. Bwago Macho had Lt. Jones’ scout company, patrolling the upper Mwena. The whole area was overgrown with bayonet-like bush, which slowed the Germans, but provided cover as they approached Jassin.

The German commander in East Africa, Col. Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, decided to attack Jassin in order to prevent further danger to Tanga. Nine companies of Schutztruppe were gathered for the assault, with 142 European officers and NCOs (and 102 Europeans of 7th Schutzen Co.), 1350 askaris and 400 Arabs, with 23 machine guns and 4 field guns. Major Keppler would attack Jassin’s left flank, Captain Adler would attack the right, while Captain Otto would attack frontally. The plan was to lure the Allies into a trap in and around the village.

The garrison of Jassin consisted of a company of 101st Grenadier (137 sepoys), 2 companies of 2nd Jammu & Kashmir Rifles (150 sepoys), a machine gun of the King’s African Rifles, an Indian signal section of 6 men, and 2 British captains. Another 40 Jammu and Kashmir Gurkhas garrisoned the sisal factory. Col. Raghbir Singh commanded. The garrison was well-supplied with food and water, but demoralized due to the unhealthy climate. At Umba Camp were 3 companies of King’s African Rifles, 28th Indian Mountain Battery, half a battalion of the Jind Imperial Service Infantry Battalion, and Wavell’s scout cavalry, nearly 800 men. The only Allied plan was to respond to German moves and reinforce a threatened sector.

At dawn on January 18 as the Germans moved out. At 0515, they came under heavy fire from the village, causing heavy loss to the machine gun crews and killing Major Keppler; Captain Stemmermann assumed command of the right flank. Meanwhile, Adler split his column in 2; one company moved northwest to intercept any reinforcements from Umba Camp, while another attacked the village and sisal factory; the latter falling after a hard fight; the 29 surviving Gurkhas breaking out in a charge with bayonets and khukris to return to the village. The advance ground to a halt after this. Otto’s column in the center took heavy losses, but the Arabs broke and ran as soon as they were fired on. Lettow-Vorbeck was hit in the arm. After 4 hours of hard fighting, the village was surrounded.

As the attack began, Col. Singh ordered a signal rocket fired to alert Umba Camp. Lt. Col. Cunningham, in temporary command there, sent 3 KAR companies along the north bank of the Umba River toward Jassin, but these were halted by the German blocking force, which was reinforced by Adler. The KAR troops launched a bayonet charge across the Umba, gaining a bridgehead, but were obliged to retreat after 2 hours’ heavy fighting and await fresh troops. Unknown to them, the Germans were almost out of ammunition. With the arrival of the mountain battery, the British renewed the attack, but were stopped with the loss of 56 out of 120 men.

Michael Tighe, now commanding the relief force, planned to resume the attack the next morning, with naval support and 2 companies from Mombasa, as he believed that the garrison could hold for 7 days. However, most of the garrison’s ammunition had already been used up and the only machine gun had stopped working. Col. Singh had been killed, Captain Hanson assumed command. The Allies didn’t know that the Germans were also virtually out of ammunition, only Captain Frome’s 47mm gun and revolver gun having enough left to bombard the village. Hanson thought about a break-out, but decided to remain and defend the position.

On the morning of January 19, Frome opened a bombardment at 0500, and 40 minutes later the Gurkhas tried to break out by attacking his battery. The attempt failed with heavy loss. At 0800, Hanson saw no sign of help, and to save lives sent a massage of surrender under a white flag. Captains Hanson and Turner were released on parole, while the other defenders passed into captivity.

The defenders lost 76 men killed and 82 wounded; some 400 men were taken prisoner. However, German losses were high; 86 men were killed (including 25 Europeans) and about 200 were wounded.

Even though he had won the battle, Lettow-Vorbeck decided that he could not afford more actions of this type, confirming his inclination to fight a guerrilla war, rather than risk pitched battles. He turned his attention to operations against the Uganda Railway. The British response was to withdraw and concentrate their forces in order to reduce their risks and make defense easier while they waited for troops to be made available from other fronts. As a result, the invasion of German East Africa was postponed for some time.

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January 19, 1847
Taos Revolt

In the summer of 1846 Gen. Stephen Watts Kearny marched with 1750 troops over 850 miles across the Plains from Ft. Leavenworth to the Mexican territory of New Mexico. On August 18, the Americans took possession of the city of Santa Fe without a fight, as Governor Manuel Armijo had retreated to Chihuahua. Kearny, as military governor of New Mexico, assured the populace that the United States government would respect their property and religion and protect them from marauding Indians. With the territory seemingly pacified, in September 1846 Kearny appointed the Taos trader Charles Bent as governor of New Mexico Territory and went on to California. He left Col. Sterling Price and a small contingent of troops in Santa Fe to maintain the peace.

In the months that followed, tensions quickly rose between the territory’s Mexican and Indian population, and the new American regime. Under Price’s watch the soldiers sometimes engaged in requisitioning food and items from merchants without paying, abusing the women, and damaging the villages. More than that, Mexican landowners grew concerned for their titles to plots previously granted by the Mexican government. And finally, due in large part to the efforts of a few paranoid anti-American priests, Mexicans came to fear for the future of their Catholic church. With the majority of American forces currently waging war further south in Mexico or else pressing further west to the Pacific Coast, the environment was ripe for rebellion.

On January 14, 1847 Bent traveled to his home in Taos without military accompaniment, not expecting any trouble. Early in the morning of January 19 a newly-formed group of Hispanic and Taos Indian rebels under the leadership of Pablo Montoya and Tomás (Tomasito) Romero broke into Bent’s house and killed him, along with his brother-in-law Pablo Jaramillo, Taos sheriff Stephen Lee, and 3 others. Pablo Montoya was the commanding officer of the rebellion and he is said to have called himself “the Santa Ana of the North.” After the murders in Taos, a large contingent of rebels then went on to nearby Arroyo Hondo where they attacked Simeon Turley’s mill and distillery. After a long siege they killed Turley and 6 other men and burned down the distillery. Two more Americans were killed by the rebels in Rio Colorado (now Questa), north of Arroyo Hondo.

Col. Price in Santa Fe was soon alerted and marshaled his forces. He began to march north on January 23, and at the same time the rebels were marching south with the intention of attacking Santa Fe. He met them near Santa Cruz de la Cañada and scattered them. A smaller battle took place near Embudo on January 27 with the same result; then Price and his men marched east to Las Trampas, through Chamisal and over the pass (now known as US Hill) to the Taos valley community of Rio Chiquito where they camped on the night of February 2. On February 3, Price marched through the town of Taos without opposition and found the rebels assembled in the Taos Pueblo. As Price began to lay siege to the Pueblo, the rebels took refuge in the Church of San Gerónimo de Taos. Price’s artillery blew holes in its thick adobe walls and set it on fire, forcing the rebels to flee. In the ensuing melee over 150 were killed and the church virtually destroyed. Seven American soldiers were killed. The next day the people of the Pueblo sued for peace. Pablo Montoya and other rebels were also captured.

Meanwhile, on January 20 another insurgent leader, Manuel Cortez, organized a group of about 200 armed men in the Mora area. They first killed some traveling American merchants, and then took over the town of Mora. On January 24, Captain Israel Hendley with 80 American troops attacked and a house-to-house battle followed. Hendley was killed and the troops then retreated to Las Vegas, claiming 25 rebels killed and 17 captured. On February 1, Captain Jesse Morin, replacing Hendley, returned to Mora with 200 troops and a howitzer. The inhabitants fled to the mountains, and Morin and his men destroyed the town, razing all the buildings.

On February 6, Montoya was brought before a drumhead court-martial and quickly sentenced to death. He was hung in Taos on February 7. The rest of the captured rebels were jailed and on April 5 brought before a court headed by Judge Charles Beaubien, whose son Narciso had been killed by the rebels. 15 of the 16 men accused of murder and 1 of the 5 accused of treason were sentenced to death. Observers at the time commented on the illogic and illegality of convicting citizens of another nation of “treason.” However, the accused had no one to defend them and no recourse to appeals. The condemned were executed in a series of hangings in Taos on April 9, April 30, and May 7.

With the exception of one later incident, this ended the rebellion in Taos, but on the eastern slope of the Sangre de Cristo Mountains it continued for several months. The leader of the rebellion in Mora, Manuel Cortez, was not captured when the Americans took the town. Cortez and his men, apparently with the aid of Comanche, Apache, and Cheyenne allies, continued to wage guerrilla warfare. On May 20, near Wagon Mound, the rebels attacked an army wagon train and grazing party; they killed 1 soldier, wounded 2, and made off with about 200 horses and cattle. Major Edmundson, commander at Las Vegas, went in pursuit with a detachment of troops and met them on May 26 in a canyon of the Canadian River. In the ensuing battle the American troops ran short of ammunition and had to retreat without defeating the rebels or recapturing the lost livestock.

In early June Lt. R. T. Brown attempted to retrieve livestock taken from Las Vegas. He and 3 soldiers with him were killed. Major Edmundson responded by attacking Las Vegas where he killed 10-12 and took about 50 prisoners, at the same time burning down the mill of the alcalde, whom he suspected of complicity. The prisoners were sent to Santa Fe, some of them later tried by court-martial, sentenced to death, and executed by hanging.

Two more battles took place in July. A detachment of 31 American troops was attacked at La Cienega near Taos, with 6 Americans killed. A final battle with the forces of Manuel Cortez took place later in July near the village of Anton Chico, in which Cortez was killed and about 50 prisoners taken and sent to Santa Fe; 25-30 were tried by court-martial, sentenced to death and hanged. Although Price continued to worry about constant rumors of further plans for insurrections, the rebellion died out after July and diminished into isolated raids and the theft of livestock.

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January 20, 1945
Reduction of the Colmar Pocket

A German salient on the west bank of the Rhine 40 miles long and 30 miles deep was formed in November 1944 when the German defenses in the Vosges Mountains collapsed under pressure from 6th Army Group. Gen. Jean de Lattre de Tassigny’s French 1st Army forced the Belfort Gap and destroyed IV Luftwaffe Corps. Soon thereafter, French forces reached the Rhine north of the Swiss border between Mulhouse and Basel. Likewise, in the northern Vosges, French 2nd Armored Division spearheaded a US 7th Army advance, forced the Saverne Gap, and drove to the Rhine, liberating Strasbourg on November 23. The effect of these advances was to confine the German presence in southern Alsace west of the Rhine to a semi-circular pocket centered on the town of Colmar that came to be known as the Colmar Pocket.

Apart from Normandy, the areas of France most bitterly defended by the Germans were Alsace and Lorraine. This was largely because these were claimed as part of Germany and would be defended as strongly as any other German soil. This perception informed Hitler’s November 27 decision that committed Siegfried Rasp’s 19th Army to a do-or-die defense of the pocket. The Germans formed Army Group Oberrhein under Heinrich Himmler and tasked his command with the defense of the front between the Bienwald and the Swiss border. Of prime importance were the bridges over the Rhine at Breisach and Chalampé, since it was over these bridges that supplies were delivered.

The logistical crisis and heavy combat of autumn 1944 had dulled the fighting edge of Allied forces. The French replacement system was limited by the amount of training infrastructure they had been able to reestablish since reentering France in August 1944. This problem was exacerbated by the policy of “blanchissement” (whitening); the colonial troops from West and Northwest Africa had won a good combat reputation, but they were almost as feared by French civilians as by German soldiers. They were sent south and replaced with units raised from the French Forces of the Interior (FFI), While the FFI troops were capable of defensive operations, they had to undergo a steep learning curve in order to become effective at offensive operations, particularly where complex activities such as combined-arms operations were concerned. Coupled with a supporting arms structure weaker than that of other Allied field armies, the sag in French troop proficiency allowed the Germans to hold the Colmar Pocket against an unsuccessful French offensive on December 15-22, 1944.

During Operation Nordwind (see posting), German troops attacked north out of the Colmar Pocket on January 7-13 towards Strasbourg, but were held. 6th Army Group was then ordered by Eisenhower to eliminate the pocket. Since the bulk of Allied troops surrounding the pocket were French, this mission was assigned to French 1st Army. US 3rd and 36th Divisions, in the Vosges since December, would be in support. Realizing the French would need the assistance of additional US troops, Gen. Jacob Devers, commanding 6th Army Group, arranged for the transfer of US 28th Division from the Ardennes front.

Émile Béthouart's French I Corps attacked the south face of the pocket on January 20. 2nd and 4th Moroccan Divisions had as their initial objective Ensisheim. 9th Colonial Division conducted secondary attacks on the right flank of the corps, north of Mulhouse. In support were tanks of the French 1st Armored Division. Attacking in a snowstorm, the I Corps initially achieved tactical surprise against Erich Abraham’s 13th Corps. The attack slowed through the night as German counterattacks began. The difficult weather and terrain (unlike most of the terrain on the Alsatian Plain, the terrain the French I Corps fought in was hemmed in by woodlands and urban areas) coupled with defense in depth stymied the I Corps advance. The French attack, however, succeeded in drawing German mobile reserves (106th Panzer Brigade and 654th Heavy Antitank Battalion) and German 2nd Mountain Division south. 9th Division pushed 3-4 miles through the suburbs of Mulhouse and the woods north of the city. On January 24, a German armored counterattack near Richwiller was repulsed by the French colonial troops, with the Germans losing 15 AFVs. Overall, the gains of I Corps were greater in the western part (right flank) of its sector of the front, but the Germans in large part succeeded in stalemating the corps’ advance.

Joseph de Monsabert’s II Corps launched its attack on January 22-23. The attacking units were US 3rd and French 1st Divisions. South of the 3rd Division, US 28th Division defended its sector. In reserve was French 2nd Armored Division. 3rd Division aimed to cross the Ill River, bypass the city of Colmar to the north, and open a path for French 5th Armored Division to drive on the railway bridge supplying the Germans in the Pocket at Neuf-Brisach. Despite determined German opposition, progress was steady. It was during this advance that a German attack on the 26th was stopped almost single-handed by Lt. Audie Murphy, winning him his Medal of Honor. Jebsheim fell to US and French troops in a hard fight on January 26-29. French 1st Division attacked east with the Rhine as their objective. The Germans mounted a defense in depth, using positions in the villages and forests to command the open ground to their front and liberally planting land mines to slow and channel the French advance. Wishing to avoid dug-in German infantry and armor in the Elsenheim Woods Avoiding the heavily defended position at the Elsenheim Woods, the French took the village of Grussenheim on the 28th at heavy cost. After this German resistance began to crumble and the French surged forward, reaching the Rhine on February 1.

Noting the slow progress, de Lattre requested reinforcements. Concurring, Devers subordinated US XXI Corps to the 1st Army and it took up position between the two French corps on January 28, assuming command of 3rd and 28th Divisions. Two additional divisions were also assigned to XXI Corps - 75th Infantry and 12th Armored. Finally, French 5th Armored Division, 1st Parachute Regiment, and 1st Choc (commando) Battalion were placed under XXI Corps. The corps was given the mission of capturing the city of Colmar and driving on the bridge at Breisach. For their part, the German high command misread the Allied objectives, believing the Allied assault to be a general pressure along the front designed to induce collapse at any given point. Hitler had agreed to a partial withdrawal in the north (the Erstein salient) but forbade a general withdrawal over the Rhine. On January 29, Army Group Oberrhein was dissolved and the units in the Colmar Pocket were again subordinated to Army Group G (SS-Obergruppenführer Paul Hausser).

XXI Corps began its attack on the night of January 29-30, crossing the Colmar Canal. The fortified town of Neuf-Brisach was taken on February 6, by US troops, with the help of 2 French children and another civilian, who showed the Americans undefended passages into the town. The Germans, having evacuated what remained of their units, had destroyed the bridge over the Rhine at Breisach. The town of Colmar itself was cleared by 28th Division and French armor by the 3rd. Meanwhile, 12th Armored Division moved south through 28th Division with the objective of linking up with French I Corps and splitting the Colmar Pocket. On February 5, Combat Command A of the division made contact with 4th Moroccan Mountain Division of French I Corps, some 17 days after I Corps launched its assault. Thereafter, 12th Division screened German exit routes from the Vosges and supported the 28th Division.

At the start of February, French I Corps was still clearing German resistance between Cernay and Ensisheim, both of which were still under German control. The clearing of this area was not completed until February 3. On the 4th, I Corps attacked north across the Thur River and, encountering only limited resistance, the 4th Moroccan Division was able to push to the southern outskirts of Rouffach. The following day, the division linked up with the Americans, and the 9th Colonial Division attacked Ensisheim, the original corps objective; the town fell on the 6th. On February 8, the French cleared the Harth Woods while the 1st Armored Division advanced south toward the German bridgehead at Chalampé in addition to linking up with elements of French 2nd Armored Division at Fessenheim the same day.

During this period, the shrinking German pocket on the west side of the Rhine was subjected to heavy artillery fire and strikes by US and French aircraft. Finally, on February 9, I Corps eliminated the German rearguard at Chalampé, and with no major German forces left on the west bank, the Germans blew up the bridge at Chalampé. This signaled the end of Allied operations in the Colmar Pocket and the end of any significant German military presence in Alsace. The cost was some 13,500 French and 8000 US casualties. German losses were at least 22,000, and perhaps as high as 38,000.

6th Army Group stood on the Rhine from the Swiss border to a region well north of Strasbourg. German 19th Army, although not completely destroyed, lost the bulk of its experienced combat troops (only the 708th Volksgrenadier Division escaped somewhat intact) and was forced to reform in Baden, using large infusions of inexperienced Volkssturm to replace its grievous losses. The elimination of the Colmar Pocket allowed 6th Army Group to concentrate on Operation Undertone, its assault to penetrate the Siegfried Line and invade Germany, undertaken in March 1945.

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567 BC
Defeat of Aprieh

Aprieh inherited the throne from his father, Pharaoh Psamtik II, in February 589 BC and his reign continued his father’s history of meddling in Judean affairs. In 588 BC, he dispatched a force to Jerusalem to protect it from Babylonian forces sent by Nebuchadnezzar II, but his forces were crushed and Jerusalem, following an 18-month-long siege, was destroyed by the Babylonians (see posting). His unsuccessful attempt was followed by a mutiny of soldiers from the strategically important Aswan garrison. While the mutiny was contained, Aprieh later attempted an expedition to Libya in 570 BC to contain the growing Greek colonies around Kyrene (who gave Cyrenaica its name), but his forces were mauled by the Greeks.

When the defeated army returned home, a civil war broke out in the Egyptian army between the indigenous troops and the foreign mercenaries. There was a belief among many of the Egyptian troops that they had been betrayed in order that Aprieh might rule more absolutely with the support of his Greek mercenaries. Many of the Egyptian people sympathized with the troops.

Ahmose, one of the army’s generals, was sent to meet with the disgruntled soldiers. He was a veteran campaigner who had directed a successful campaign in Nubia in 592 BC. The mutineers, instead of dispersing, proclaimed Ahmose king. Aprieh, who by now had to rely entirely on his mercenaries, was defeated. He fled to the Babylonians and was killed mounting an invasion of his native land in 567 BC with the aid of a Babylonian army. Ahmose (now Ahmose II) then married Chedebnitjerbone II, one of Aprieh’s daughters, in order to legitimize his kingship (though the throne was occupied by a male, legitimacy passed through the females - thus pharaohs often married their sisters).

[Ennath]

January 21, 1944
The Little Blitz

The brainchild of Luftwaffe chief Hermann Goering, Operation Steinbock was a reaction to the Allied strategic bombing campaign against Germany. Throughout late 1943, the Reichsmarschall lobbied Hitler to direct the Reich’s dwindling bomber force to undertake massive retaliatory strikes on London. By pounding the enemy capital to dust, he argued, the Allies might be deterred from future raids on German cities for fear of reprisals. Also, news that England was in taking a beating would be pure gold for the Nazi propaganda machine.

Others within the Luftwaffe high command, notably Hugo Sperrle, commander of Luftwaffe forces in the west, argued vigorously against the plan, asserting that Germany’s limited air power should be hoarded for use against a future Allied invasion. Sperrle also recommended using the bombers’ long range to attack Allied shipping beyond the range of land-based air cover. Ultimately, the thirst for vengeance and the need to show German civilians that the English were suffering as well trumped pragmatism and in November, Goering’s strategy was given the green light - German bombers would again savage London.

To carry out the campaign, Berlin assigned Dietrich Peltz. The veteran of more than 320 combat missions immediately set himself to the task of organizing the raids. But from the start, the shortcomings of the strategy became all too evident. First and foremost, the Luftwaffe was not built for strategic bombing. From its very founding in the 1930s, Hitler’s air force was organized around the concept of Blitzkrieg. German bombers specialized in tactical missions and close air support, not city busting. Undeterred, Peltz stripped what heavy aircraft he could from all fronts for the upcoming attacks. More than 500 aircraft were massed across France, Germany and the Low Countries. Do-217s, Ju-88s, Ju-188s and Me-410s would make up the bulk of the force. And while purpose-built strategic bombers were in short supply, a number of He-177s were earmarked for Steinbock. This aircraft had a heavy bomb load, but suffered from engine problems. The bomber crews were relatively inexperienced.

Just after 8:40 PM on January 22, more than 400 bombers appeared without warning over London. After a half hour of destruction, the attack was over. Firebombs had struck Parliament, the Embankment, New Scotland Yard and a host of other sites across the city center. Just before dawn, a second wave appeared. By sunrise, nearly 100 Londoners were wounded or dead. While the opening attack rocked London, only about 30 of the 475 tons (roughly 6 percent) of bombs dropped actually hit within the city core. Most landed harmlessly in sparsely populated outlying regions. Meanwhile, Allied fighters and flak crews claimed an estimated 25 aircraft. Another 18 bombers crashed on landing or flew off course during the mission and were lost. It was an embarrassing start.

A follow up strike on London was mounted a week later. Nearly 280 planes inflicted only moderate damage, while 28 Luftwaffe aircraft never made it back to base. Smaller missions were ordered on the nights of February 3, 13 and 18 causing additional casualties. The last of these raids saw 186 tons of ordnance fall on the city killing 200 civilians. A 200-plane mission spearheaded by 14 He-177s reached the city the night of February 20. Bombs fell all over Whitehall striking famous landmarks like Horse Guards Parade, St. James Park, the Treasury, and the Admiralty. Even 10 Downing Street suffered damage. More than 600 casualties were reported. The sorties continued unabated into March.

Despite the destruction German bomber crews were visiting on London, the missions to southern England were anything but milk runs. In 1940, British air defenses strained to meet the Luftwaffe’s offensive. But now in 1944, forces were far more robust. In order to reach their targets, the Germans were forced to run a gauntlet of Mosquito night fighters and radar guided searchlights and more accurate flak batteries all across southern England. London itself bristled with guns. While Hitler’s bombers were still managing to unload their payloads, the Luftwaffe was paying dearly for the opportunity. More than 72 German aircraft were destroyed in the first month of the campaign alone. Losses would only mount from there.

Germany continued the London raids into April, while committing other planes to sorties against Hull and Bristol. But while as many as 1500 British civilians were killed and nearly 3000 injured, Steinbock was clearly failing as far as Berlin was concerned - RAF and USAAF bombers continued to pound the Reich without reprieve. Worse, the high command was squandering planes and pilots the Luftwaffe could ill afford to lose. Of the 524 aircraft committed to the campaign, nearly 330 (60%) were lost. In fact, the operation probably did more harm to the German war effort than good. By May, the generals finally called off the raids.

Berlin was still determined to hammer away at the British Isles, but from that point on it would do so with rockets and missiles like the V-1 and V-2. These would continue to strike the city until the final weeks of the war.

[Ennath]

January 22, 1950
Westerling’s Revolt

Prior to the transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands on December 27, 1949, an Indonesian Cabinet consisting of both Republican and Federalist members was formed. This Cabinet was headed by Prime Minister Mohammad Hatta and included 11 Republicans and 5 Federalists including the pro-Dutch Sultan Hamid II of Pasundan. Ultimately, this federal government was short-lived due to conflicts between the Republicans and the Federalists as well as growing popular support for a unitary state.

Growing tensions between the Republicans and Federalists prompted Hamid II to conspire with Raymond Westerling, a demobilized Dutch officer, former commander of the DST (Depot Special Forces) commando unit, to organize an anti-Republican coup d’état which would ensure a federal Republic of the United States of Indonesia. By January 1950, Westerling had built up a militia force known as Angkatan Perang Ratu Adil (APRA, Legion of Ratu Adil). Westerling stated that the APRA counted 22,000 men, but was probably closer to 2000.

The APRA comprised various Republican elements including defectors from the Indonesian army, Islamic and communist battle groups. The Legion was further augmented by elements of the KNIL, Royal Netherlands East Indies Army, Westerling's old commando unit and several sympathetic Dutch nationals including 2 police inspectors. The Republican government attempted to negotiate with Westerling by offering to pay him US $100,000 in exchange for renouncing any revolutionary activities, but Westerling rejected the offer.

On January 5, 1950, Westerling sent an ultimatum to the government at Jakarta. His demands included recognition of the APRA as the official army of the state of Pasundan and unconditional respect for the autonomy of the federal states. Westerling added that if the answer was not positive, he could not be held responsible for the outbreak of large-scale fighting by the APRA. With no reply to his ultimatum, Westerling started the coup on the night of January 22-23, a month after international recognition of the Republic of Indonesia.

Westerling’s plan involved the near-simultaneous capture of Bandung and Jakarta, followed by the capture of Buitenzorg (modern Bogor) where some minor government departments were based. Westerling’s troops would infiltrate Bandung in trucks, disguised as members of the Indonesian Armed Forces. At 10 PM, they would seize ammunition stocks from the old KNIL depot in Bandung and dispatch them to a rendezvous point 15 miles away for delivery to Jakarta by 11 PM. At 5 AM on the 23rd, APRA forces based in nearby Tjimahi would capture military bases, police stations, and government buildings and communications facilities throughout Bandung and Jakarta.

At dawn on January 22, about 520 APRA soldiers entered Bandung. However, the government Siliwangi Division, which was encamped in the city, had been forewarned. A motorized unit was sent to intercept the APRA force, but was quickly defeated. Advancing through Bandung, the APRA captured key locations including army headquarters and the Siliwangi barracks. Within an hour, they had secured the city center and eliminated all resistance. Lt. Col. Adolf Lembong and 93 other Indonesian troops were killed, and there were reports of soldiers discarding their uniforms and fleeing.

However, the second phase of the coup d'état collapsed, as the majority of the KNIL’s commanders cooperated with the Indonesian government and refused to support Westerling’s actions. A Dutch officer discovered the unloading of ammunition from the Bandung arms depot into APRA trucks. Due to this, the ammunition convoy did not arrive in Jakarta as planned. Westerling's Legion was unable to launch its scheduled attack at 5 AM on January 23. There had been plans to seize the presidential palace and army barracks, and to arrest Republican politicians including Sukarno and Hatta. Unable to find any ammunition, Westerling was forced to abort his attack by 6 AM. With the coup attempt in tatters, the APRA retreated from Bandung after negotiations with KNIL Maj. Gen. Edu Engles. By 5 PM Republican forces had re-established control over Bandung.

In the following weeks several small APRA units were defeated in a mopping up campaign by the Indonesian army and police. The Legion of Ratu Adil had ceased to function by the end of February. The attempted coup increased public agitation for the dissolution of the federal system.

By April 5, several key conspirators including Sultan Hamid II had been arrested. On April 19, Hamid confessed to his involvement in the botched Jakarta coup and to planning a second attack on Parliament scheduled for February 15. The role of the Pasundan government in the coup led to its dissolution by February 10, further undermining the federal structure. By late March, Hamid’s West Kalimantan was one of the 4 remaining federal states in the United States of Indonesia. Hamid’s role in the coup led to increased agitation in West Kalimantan for its integration into the Republic of Indonesia. Following a fact-finding mission, the government merged West Kalimantan into the Republic of Indonesia. Following clashes with demobilized KNIL troops under Andi Aziz in Makassar and the attempted secession of an Ambonese Republic of South Moluccas, the federal United States of Indonesia was dissolved on August 17, 1950, turning Indonesia into a unitary state dominated by the central government in Jakarta.

Westerling escaped with the help of the Dutch government to Singapore. Despite attempts by the Indonesian government to extradite him, he lived in exile in the Netherlands until his death in 1987.

[Ennath]

January 23, 1865
Battle of Trent’s Reach

The James River was key to Richmond’s defense. In April 1861, the mere rumor of the approach of the Federal warship Pawnee provoked near panic in the city. From that time forward, the Southerners worked diligently to secure the city from any attack by way of the river. The powerful batteries at Drewry’s Bluff were one formidable deterrent to naval operations on the James. In May 1862, its guns pounded a powerful Federal squadron so decisively that afterward the Union was reluctant to approach Richmond by river.

The Confederates, however, did not rely solely upon shore batteries. They had created a formidable squadron to guard the river approaches. The backbone consisted of 3 powerful ironclads. The flagship of the James River Squadron was CSS Virginia II. It was supported by the Richmond and Fredericksburg. Each of these carried 4 heavy guns and was equipped with a ram. To supplement these, the Confederates deployed 8 other vessels. These included the gunboats Nansemond, Hampton, Beaufort, Drewry and Torpedo (1-2 guns each) and 3 spar-torpedo boats. In one sense, the James River flotilla had performed its task too well. The Union navy was hesitant to challenge the daunting combination of warships and shore batteries. Thus, by early 1865, the Confederate naval force sat virtually idle while Federal ground forces closed in on the Confederate capital. With Robert E. Lee’s Army of the Northern Virginia besieged at Petersburg, however, pressure grew to use the naval force to help lift the siege.

Union naval forces on the James were badly depleted. The attack on Ft. Fisher (see posting) was underway. Federal naval units throughout the South had been stripped to the bare minimum to provide the ships for the massive armada that accompanied the expedition, and the James River force was no exception. This was exactly the opportunity the Confederates had been seeking, and they moved quickly to take advantage of it. Commodore John Mitchell was finally ordered to take his squadron down the James to attack City Point, Grant’s main supply base for the Siege of Petersburg. To prevent just such a move, the Federals had built obstructions and had fortified a stretch of the river known as Trent’s Reach, with a naval minefield, a net and shore batteries.

The fortifications were under the command of Col. Henry Pierce of the 1st Connecticut Artillery, mounting over 30 guns. The naval forces were under Captain William Parker, who commanded from the monitor USS Onondaga which carried 4 heavy guns. She was accompanied by the side-wheel gunboats Massasoit (10 guns) and Hunchback (4 guns). The small spar-torpedo boat Spuyten Duyvil was present at the action, though because she was an experimental craft, she did not participate in any actual fighting.

The Confederate attack began on the night of January 23, 1865. Commodore Mitchell lifted anchor at Chaffin’s Bluff just after sunset; his first task would be to sneak by the Union battery on Signal Hill and Ft. Brady in the darkness. Col. Pierce reported that at 8:00 one of his lookouts on the fort’s parapet spotted the rebel ironclads and a few other vessels moving down river and he ordered his gunners to open fire. Due to the poor design of Ft. Brady, the artillery could not be depressed enough to target the rebel vessels, which slipped past without damage. Mitchell continued on to the mine field at Trent’s Reach.

The Confederates arrived at Trent’s Reach at 10:30; Richmond and Virginia II were anchored half a mile from the obstruction to provide covering fire while Fredericksburg and a few of the smaller vessels cleared the way. Among the mine field were the hulks of several sunken vessels, in between them there was placed a spar torpedo, preventing any ship from passing through. The crew of the Fredericksburg went to work on removing the spar while the 3 torpedo boats made a reconnaissance of the channel. All of this was done under fire from 3 Union shore batteries and sharpshooters. Clearing the obstruction lasted into the next morning. By this time the few Federal warships in the area had been dispatched to the area. Captain Parker decided to make his stand at a pontoon bridge at Aiken’s Landing, further down river, where he would have more maneuverability. Parker was later criticized for not engaging the rebels as soon as possible and he defended himself by stating that he thought his “chances of capturing the whole fleet would be increased by allowing them [the rebels] to come down river to the bridge.”

The action ceased until the next day when Gen. Grant was informed of the situation. The general, not happy about Parker’s decision to withdraw, ordered the Onondaga to form up with the gunboats for an attack on the rebel fleet. Parker refused and after Grant complained to Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, the captain was relieved of duty. Defense of the James now fell to the second officer of Onondaga, Commander Edward Nichols. But when it came time for battle, Parker re-assumed authority and led the federal attack.

At 1:45 AM, Mitchell and his men finished clearing the obstructions so he steamed the Fredericksburg back over to the remaining ships at anchor. It was then that he discovered that Virginia II, Richmond, Drewry, and Scorpion were all resting on the river bottom in low tides and could not be freed until high tide which would come at about 11:00. The situation was complicated further at daybreak when the Union batteries started to become more accurate. Richmond was hit repeatedly, but her armor protected her from serious damage. It was different for the unarmored gunboats; they were “torn to pieces”. Drewry was so heavily damaged that her crew abandoned ship, just in time as 15 minutes later, a round ignited the powder magazine - the vessel exploded and sank. The shock wave heavily damaged the nearby torpedo boat Scorpion which had to be abandoned as well. To make matters worse for Commodore Mitchell, at 10:30 lookouts spotted the Onondaga, the 2 gunboats, and the Spuyten Duyvil approaching.

At 10:45, Onondaga opened up on the grounded ironclads at a range of around half a mile but the rebels could not return the fire due to the positions in which their ships were stuck, By 11:00 am the tide had been rising for hours and the Confederate ironclads finally began to float again and their guns were brought to bear. The naval duel did not last long and ended as the Confederates withdrew upriver a short distance. The Union ships pulled off downstream but the batteries kept firing. At 9:00 PM, Mitchell ordered the final move to City Point but it was found that Virginia II was unmanageable. She had been struck by gunfire 70 times and it caused steam to leak from the ironclad’s deck which impaired the pilot’s visibility. Drewry and Scorpion were lost and 1 other torpedo boat was disabled.

Union troops had also erected “Drummond lights” that illuminated the area around the minefield, allowing the batteries to fire nearly as accurately at night as they had in the daytime. It became apparent to Mitchell that their was no hope of success and at 2:45 AM, the rebels steamed back up the James. In order to get back to friendly waters they had to pass Ft. Brady and the Signal Hill battery. Another exchange of artillery ensued but this time the rebels stayed a while to try to silence the Union guns. Col. Pierce had expected the ironclads to return, so while they were engaging at Trent's Reach, the garrison of Ft. Brady and the surrounding batteries improved their positions. Pierce placed pickets down the river and at 3:00 AM one of them informed the colonel that the rebels were returning. When the fighting began again it was described as being very intense but the Confederates unable to silence the Union guns and they eventually broke off the action.

In cooperation with the naval effort, Confederate troops made 2 attacks on the Union picket line at Bermuda Hundred on January 23-24. Both were firmly repulsed.

The Confederate force failed in its objective of attacking City Point and had to return to Chaffin’s Bluff with nothing to show for the effort other than the loss of 2 ships and damage to most of the rest. Commodore Mitchell was relieved of command and replaced by Adm. Raphael Semmes, former captain of the raider Alabama. Even with its new commander, the squadron did not attempt another foray against the Union forces on the lower James. In February, the Union flotilla was reinforced by the formidable Atlanta and New Ironsides. When Richmond fell on April 3, the James River Squadron was scuttled.

[Ennath]

January 24, 1814
1st Battle of Bar-sur-Aube

After Napoleon’s disastrous defeat at Leipzig in October 1813 (see posting), the Coalition prepared to invade France itself. They planned to send the Army of Bohemia (Prince Karl Philipp zu Schwarzenberg) to invade via Switzerland and march to Langres. The Army of Silesia (Gebhard von Blücher) was ordered to cross the middle Rhine and advance on Schwarzenberg’s right while the Army of the North invaded the Netherlands. The Coalition armies counted 278,000 Russians, 230,000 Austrians, 162,000 Prussians, 197,000 other Germans and 20,000 Swedes.

To oppose this gigantic force, Napoleon had Marshal Claude Perrin Victor with 10,000 men on the upper Rhine, Marshal Auguste Marmont with 13,000 troops, Horace Sébastiani with 4500 more on the middle Rhine, Marshal Jacques MacDonald with 11,500 on the lower Rhine and Nicolas Maison with 15,000 in the Netherlands. Charles Antoine Morand and another 15,000 troops were besieged in Mainz. Altogether, the Emperor could field only 70,000 men. He planned to conscript 936,000 more men, but only a third were actually called up and, of these, only 1/8 fought as too few muskets were available. The emperor eventually drew 24,500 men and 58 guns from his southern armies. Due to French weakness, the Coalition armies’ advance from the frontiers to the Marne River was hardly opposed at all.

Among Schwarzenberg's formations were Austrian III Corps (Ignaz Gyulai, 15,000 men and 56 guns) and Württemberg IV Corps (Crown Prince Frederick William, 14,000 men and 24 guns).

Langres was held by Marshal Édouard Mortier with 7700 men of the Imperial Guard. On the evening of January 12, 1814, at Chatenay-Vaudin, 300 guardsmen surprised a strong Austrian patrol from Gyulai’s III Corps, capturing 27 soldiers and killing the rest. The next day, French probes captured 60 Austrians at Chaudenay and killed 44 Bavarians at Longeau-Percey while losing only 3 killed and 20 wounded. Intimidated by Mortier’s aggressive patrolling, Gyulai stopped for several days and waited for reinforcements. On the night of January 16-17, Mortier evacuated Langres and retreated north to Chaumont. Urged by the townspeople, the small Langres garrison surrendered at 6:00 PM on January 17.

Schwarzenberg sent Russian 3rd Cuirassier Division (Ilya Duka) down the west bank of the Marne toward Chaumont and Württemberg IV Corps down the east bank. On January 18, Duka’s horsemen charged straight into an ambush at Marnay-sur-Marne. After significant losses, the cavalry fell back and called on Gyulai for infantry support. That day near Chaumont, Württemberg 9th Jäger Battalion tried to capture the bridge at Choignes in a downpour. The Germans rushed across and nearly captured the village but were routed by a Guard Grenadier bayonet attack that took 60 prisoners. The action ended in an inconclusive artillery duel. Mortier was in a strong position but anxious that the continual retreats of his fellow marshals would cause his forces to become trapped. He decided to withdraw north-west to Colombey-les-Deux-Églises on January 19.

Schwarzenberg had an opportunity to crush the French forces before him. Instead he called a halt at Langres while diverting 2 corps to seize Dijon to the south. Militarily this move made little sense but he was carrying out the instructions of Metternich to avoid major fighting. By nature a cautious general, Schwarzenberg was jittery about his lengthening supply lines stretching back to the Rhine, partly explaining the Army of Bohemia's slow 5 miles per day advance.

Mortier reached Bar-sur-Aube on January 20 and was joined by another 4800 men. The next day, he got a message that Napoleon was approaching his position, which made the marshal determined to stand and fight. During the next few days major units of the Army of Bohemia remained inert though both III and IV Corps gathered intelligence of Mortier’s positions from patrols. The arrival of Czar Alexander at the front on January 22 forced Schwarzenberg’s hand. Alexander urged Schwarzenberg to advance and when the Austrian made weak excuses, the czar accused him of sabotaging the campaign. To placate Alexander, Schwarzenberg agreed to a plan that Gyulai and the Crown Prince submitted to his headquarters.

On January 23, Mortier became aware of Allied movements that indicated there would be a fight the following day. Several thousand Don Cossacks under Matvei Platov lurked at Doulevant-le-Château only 15 miles to the northeast. He sent 500 infantry and 500 cavalry north to Trémilly where they drove off the Cossacks that evening. Mortier had 13,000 troops watching the approaches to Bar from the east and south.

According to their plan, Gyulai would assault Bar-sur-Aube at the same time that the Crown Prince attacked Colombey-les-Deux-Églises and Platov turned Mortier’s left. Ludwig von Stockmayer with 3 light infantry battalions, 4 cavalry squadrons and a horse artillery battery set out at 9:00 AM and marched west to Montheries. There they planned to turn north through the Dhuits Forest and come into the main highway west of Colombey-les-Deux-Églises while other forces would attack frontally. At 10:00, Karl August von Jett began to advance along the Chaumont-Bar highway. Inexplicably, 8 battalions, a cavalry regiment and a battery were left at Chaumont without orders. The Crown Prince directed the support column in person. At 11:00, Gyulai’s columns began to come into action against the Mortier’s southern defenses.

By some staff blunder, Stockmayer’s column left Montheries without a guide and missed the correct road. Instead of coming in behind Louis-Michel Letort, it emerged from the Dhuits Forest on the south side of Colombey-les-Deux-Églises. Spotting the danger, Letort evaded the trap and fell back toward Lignol. The Crown Prince led his 2nd and 4th Cavalry Regiments forward in attempt to cut the French off but supports arrived in time to help Letort pull back to the main French defense line near Voigny. An attempted Württemberg advance was stopped by Mortier’s 20-gun battery. The Crown Prince decided not to engage the French Guard infantry and withdrew to Lignol, until Gyulai’s advance showed some progress and conducted an artillery duel until dark. Platov’s Cossacks declined to cooperate with the Württembergers.

Gyulai conducted his assault on the south side with more intensity. His troops marched north along the west bank of the Aube in two columns. The right column under Louis Aloysius, Prince of Hohenlohe-Waldenburg-Bartenstein cleared French outposts from Bayel while the left column under Joseph von Haecht pushed the French from Baroville. Hohenlohe’s division repeatedly tried to storm the Boudelin bridge but each assault withered under the fire of the 14-gun battery. At Fontaine, Haecht’s division overran the village 3 times but each time they were driven out by Charles-Joseph Christiani’s 2nd Old Guard Division. Gyulai tried to break off the combat but found his own troops under attack in a prolonged struggle for the Aube crossings. At 6:00 PM the Austrians captured the Boudelin bridge but Gyulai decided not to try to cut off Mortier’s retreat. The Austrian general became angry that his Württemberger allies remained in place while his corps bore the brunt of the combat; evening ended the fighting.

One source lists Allied casualties at 1400, but this includes only Austrian units; French losses are given as 700. Another source asserted that each side suffered about 1000 casualties. A third source gave Allied losses as 1600.. The French reported losing only 400-500 casualties but an Allied officer claimed that the French lost 1000 killed and wounded plus 200 captured. The same officer counted 900 Württemberger casualties which suggests that they fought harder than their allies realized. The Austrians reported 647 killed and wounded and 190 missing.

At 11:00, Mortier notified Napoleon of his plans to retreat to Vendeuvre-sur-Barse and immediately sent orders for his troops to begin evacuating Bar-sur-Aube. The march discipline of the Imperial Guard was so good that the Allies were unaware of their departure until the next morning. Gyulai did not begin the pursuit until the afternoon then quickly halted at the broken bridge at Spoy. He mistakenly reported that the French retreated to Châlons-sur-Marne when Mortier was heading for Troyes. The Crown Prince’s troops halted and bivouacked in the area. After interrogating prisoners, Mortier concluded that the Crown Prince’s corps numbered 12-15,000 men while Gyulai had 30,000. He reported to the emperor that the Allies employed 60 artillery pieces against him. On January 26, Napoleon arrived at Châlons-sur-Marne and the Battle of Brienne followed on January 29 (see posting).