The Military History Thread

[Ennath]

May 27, 1860
Battle of Palermo

Garibaldi’s Thousand had landed at Marsala on May 11, 1860, and advanced straight towards Palermo. Governor Castelcicala had dispatched a small force under Gen. Landi west from Palermo, and on May 15, that force clashed with Garibaldi’s smaller army at Calatafimi. Despite having the larger army, better equipment and a strong position the Neapolitans were defeated. They suffered more losses during the retreat to Palermo, and when they reached the city on May 17, they looked beaten. This lowered the morale of the defenders, which was already suffering because of Garibaldi’s reputation and a fear that the Sicilians would rise against them. Landi returned to Palermo on the day after the arrival of a new governor, Ferdinando Lanza. Lanza had a confused mission, and at the same time as he prepared to defend Palermo he also wanted to retreat east to Messina. This was despite his having 21,000 men under his command, supported by artillery and by the Neapolitan fleet. Garibaldi in contrast had just over 3300 men.

Garibaldi decided to take a calculated gamble. He would move his men through the mountains south of Palermo and attack from an unexpected direction. Once inside the city he expected the people to join the revolt, restoring the balance of numbers. His success after that would depend on the resolve of the Neapolitan garrison. His first move was to move along the road to Monreale and then onto Palermo. He camped at the pass of Renda, and prepared to force the Neapolitans out of Monreale. For once the Neapolitans took the initiative, and a lively attack early on May 21 dispersed the local rebels and forced Garibaldi to move further east, onto the read that led from Corleone to Palermo. He took up a new position on a mountain above Parco. His hope now was that the Neapolitans would attack from Palermo, allowing his troops on the coast to attack them in the flank, but this had to be abandoned when the troops at Monreale threatened to get above his position. Garibaldi moved east to Piana degli Albanesi (an Albanian community).

Garibaldi's next move was to send his cannon, sick and wounded up along the road south to Corleone. This column moved on the afternoon of May 24 and was visible from the plains around Palermo. The Neapolitans assumed that Garibaldi was going to retreat south away from the city. That evening the Thousand moved south, but under cover of darkness they turned east and slipped way, reaching Marineo the next day and Misilmeri, southeast of Palermo just before midnight. Meanwhile, the Neapolitan troops from Monreale turned south and headed towards Corleone in a vain attempt to find Garibaldi.

On May 26, Garibaldi joined up with a large force of Sicilian rebels who had been raised east of Palermo. His plan now was to attack Palermo from the southeast, while a diversionary force approached from the west (this force arrived a day late). Lanza, in Palermo, now believed that he was safe and that Garibaldi was retreating south, so the attack caught him unprepared. Bizarrely, Garibaldi was discovered by 3 British naval officers who visited his headquarters after chancing upon his men, and two officers of the US Navy. International attention was clearly now focused on Palermo. Messengers from within the city also arrived with news of the garrison. Most of the Neapolitan troops were to be found west and north of the city. The ancient heart of Palermo was undefended, and the southeastern gates were only weakly held. Garibaldi decided to attack the Porta Termini. He now had around 750 of his original Thousand, still armed with their poor muskets and bayonets. They were supported by up to 3000 local rebels, armed with a mix of weapons. Against them Lanza had around at least 17,000 men (with 4000 on their way south to Corleone). However Lanza appears to have been one of the few people in the city not to know exactly when Garibaldi would attack.

At the time, Palermo was still a fairly compact city, built on a northeasterly coast. It was split by two major roads built by the Spanish, meeting at the center of town. The east-west road (the Toledo) linked the harbor in the east with the Royal Palace in the west. The old harbor was just north of this road, and the Castellammare was north of the harbor.

In the darkness early on May 27, Garibaldi and his men made their way down a steep path from the hills east of Palermo onto the plains around the city. The first part of the attack began badly. Garibaldi had to force his way across the Ponte dell' Ammiraglio, a major bridge over the Oreto River. His army was badly organized, with a small advance guard from the Thousand, followed by the Sicilians, with the main part of the Thousand at the back. The defenders of the bridge opened fire as this column approached and the Sicilians dispersed into the fields beside the road. This left the advance guard isolated and under heavy fire, but Garibaldi was able to get the rest of his men into the battle quickly enough to rescue the situation. A second bridge was passed more easily.

Garibaldi was now about a mile from the Porta Termini, but he was able to cross this gap without any problems. The gate itself was defended by a barricade but few soldiers, and once the Thousand were through Garibaldi lead them to the Fiera Vecchia, an ancient marketplace, while some of his men attempted to convince the Sicilian rebels to enter the city. From the market, the Thousand were sent out into the city to try and raise a revolt. After a cautious start, large parts of the population came out, but they lacked any real weapons and Garibaldi had none to offer them.

Lanza’s response was to bombard the city, from the Palace and the Fleet. A more effective plan would have been to send his strong infantry force against Garibaldi, who was still badly outnumbered. After a couple of hours even this bombardment stopped, and the rebels were given the time they needed to seize key points and build barricades. By midday the Neapolitans only controlled the area around the Palace, the Castellamare and the nearby Mint. They also controlled large barracks built on the northern side of some quays outside the original city, as well as the Quattro Venti suburb a little further to the west. In the afternoon, Lanza decided to concentrate most of his troops at the palace, and ordered the troops at the Quattro Venti to move there, while the troops heading south were also recalled. The Neapolitans finally began to fight in the streets, and attempted to push east along the Toledo.

On May 28, Lanza realized he had isolated himself at the Palace. He could still communicate via semaphore with the Castellamare, and he used those messages to ask Adm. Mundy, commander of the British fleet off Palermo, for his permission to use the cover of the British flag to hold a conference of his senior officers on HMS Hannibal. Mundy refused, but did send an emissary to Garibaldi, who gave permission for Lanza to send his men to the harbor. Lanza refused to take advantage of this opportunity.

On May 29, Garibaldi’s men made some real progress. The Cathedral was captured, and the Neapolitans were forced to abandon the Archbishop’s Palace. The Garibaldians now controlled several buildings facing onto the square outside the Royal Palace, but this was only a temporary success. The Neapolitans launched a determined counterattack, and the line stabilized at the eastern end of the cathedral. Both sides were starting to run out of supplies - Lanza's decision to concentrate at the Palace meant they were running out of food, while Garibaldi’s men were beginning to run out of ammunition. He had even attempted to plead for supplies from a Piedmontese naval vessel moored in the harbor, but without success. In later years several of Garibaldi’s senior officers admitted that they were on the verge of defeat, but they were saved once again by Lanza, and by the Royal Navy.

Mundy had offered his flagship as a venue for peace negotiations. Lanza seems to have read this as a threat to intervene to protect British citizens, and his morale was in any case already rather shaken. On the morning of May 30, he sent a letter to Garibaldi offering to arrange for negotiations and a ceasefire. Unsurprisingly Garibaldi agreed, and an armistice was arranged, to begin at noon. The peace negotiations were nearly sabotaged by Von Mechel, the commander of the detachment that had been recalled from the road south. He had some of the best troops in the Neapolitan army, and had already scored some successes. Just after noon, he attempted to fight his way into the city through the Porta Termini. His men were only convinced to stop fighting by the combined efforts of a British naval officer and 2 Neapolitan officers on their way to Garibaldi.

The negotiations took place on HMS Hannibal, and involved Gens. Letizia and Chretien for the Neapolitans and Garibaldi himself. They were observed by the commanders of the British, French, American and Piedmontese ships. After some stormy scenes a 24 hour armistice was agreed. During this time, Garibaldi managed to buy some gunpowder from a Greek trader, and stronger barricades were built around the Neapolitan positions. At the same time the Neapolitans began to plan an all out attack, to be carried out at noon on the following day, but the plans were cancelled on the morning of the 31st.

The armistice was extended by three days, and messengers were sent to the Court at Naples. The Court provided no encouragement, and on June 6, Lanza signed a surrender document. On the following day the garrison marched out of the city, leaving a small force at the Castellamare. The evacuation took a little longer, but the last Neapolitan troops sailed away on June 19.

On the previous day Garibaldi began receiving reinforcements. A second expedition of 2500 volunteers had been dispatched from Piedmont, this time with the tacit protection of a Piedmontese warship - Count Cavour was increasingly willing to associate himself with the successful expedition. The Royal Navy caused a scare on the night of June 18-19 by carrying out gunnery practice off the coast, but western Sicily was now secure. More reinforcements arrived for Garibaldi, and the scene of conflict moved to eastern Sicily, where the target was Messina and passage to the mainland.

[Ennath]

67
Siege of Gamla

Situated at the southern part of the Golan, overlooking the Sea of Galilee, Gamla was built on a steep hill shaped like a camel’s hump, from which it derives its name (Gamla meaning “the camel” in Aramaic). The town benefits from the natural defense of being perched on a ridge that falls off steeply on the north, south and west, and is thus very difficult to attack, but also extremely tough to approach for more pacific purposes, such as with building materials. Access to it today is limited to a single path. Although the site was inhabited since the Early Bronze Age, the city appears to have been founded as a Seleucid fort during the Syrian Wars (3rd century BC) which later became a civilian settlement. Jews inhabited it from the last quarter of the 2nd century BC, and it was annexed to the Hasmonean state under king Alexander Jannaeus in c. 81 BC.

Gamla was capital of the Golan district of the Galilee, and most of its residents were farmers. Initially loyal to the Romans when revolt broke out in 66, Gamla turned rebellious under the influence of refugees from other locations.

Flavius Josephus (Joseph ben Matityahu), Commander of Galilee, fortified Gamla as his main stronghold on the Golan and most of what is known of the siege comes from him. Josephus gives a very detailed topographical description of the city, which he also referred to as Gamala, and the steep ravines which precluded the need to build a wall around it. Only along the northern saddle, at the town's eastern extremity, was a 1150-foot-long wall built. It was constructed by blocking gaps between existing houses and destroying houses that lay in its way.

It was one of only 5 cities in the Galilee and Golan to stand against Vespasian’s legions, reflecting the cooperation between the local population and the rebels. At the time of the revolt, the town minted its own coins, probably more as a means of propaganda than as currency. Bearing the inscription “For the redemption of Jerusalem the H(oly)” in a mixture of biblical Hebrew and Aramaic, only 6 of these coins have ever been found.

Josephus also provides a detailed description of the Roman siege and conquest in 67 by components of legions X Fretensis, XV Apollinaris and V Macedonica. The first attempt to storm the town took place in late September and involved the building of a siege ramp, but failed. On the second attempt, the Romans succeed in breaching the walls at 3 different locations and penetrating the town. A furious melee ensued all the way up the steep hill. Fighting in the cramped streets from an inferior position, the Romans attempted to defend themselves from the roofs. These subsequently collapsed under the heavy weight; “By this means,” wrote Josephus, “a vast number of the Romans perished in this war…” Vespasian himself was trapped and had to fight his way out.

In the aftermath of the defeat, Vespasian spoke to his troops, telling them that they could not always expect to win easily. “After all, you have slain myriads of Jews, but yourselves have paid but a trifling contribution to fortune. As it is a mark of vulgarity to be over-elated by success, so is it unmanly to be downcast in adversity; for the transition from one to the other is rapid, and the best soldier is he who meets good fortune with sobriety, that he may still remain cheerful when contending with reverses.” The siege was renewed and eventually, townspeople began to flee the town through the ravines and underground passages.

Finally, in early November, 3 Romans from the XV Legion, entered the city quietly at dawn, taking a guard tower. Panic ensued among the Jews, and 2 of their leaders, Joseph and Chares by name, died. Only the following day, however, did the Romans enter the village en masse. Josephus records what happened then: “Despairing of their lives and hemmed in on every side, multitudes plunged headlong with their wives and children into the ravine which had been excavated to a vast depth beneath the citadel. Indeed, the rage of the Romans was thus made to appear milder than the frantic self-immolation of the vanquished.” 9000 Jews died that day, according to the historian. These numbers appear to be exaggerated and the number of inhabitants on the eve of the revolt has been estimated at 3-4000.

Gamla has remained uninhabited during the intervening 2 millennia. In 1968, the year after the Golan was conquered by Israel, the geographer Itzhaki Gal, who undertook a survey of the area for the Nature Reserves Authority, proposed that the site might be the location of ancient Gamla; 8 years later, archaeologist Shmarya Guttman began an excavation, which led to the unearthing of the village.

[Ennath]

May 28, 1918
Battle of Cantigny

As the United States was technically not an ally, but rather a co-belligerent of the Entente, Gen. John Pershing, commanding the American Expeditionary Force, had for some time been resisting Allied efforts to integrate American troops as they arrived into the British and French armies. Instead, he wanted to commit them to battle as wholly American armies. Nevertheless, during the crisis of the Somme offensive at the end of March 1918, Pershing had offered to lend the Allies his 5 divisions to help stem the German advance. The offer was gratefully accepted, and US 1st Division was ordered into the Picardy region to help Gen. Marie-Eugène Debeney’s French 1st Army, exhausted after halting the advance of Gen. Oskar von Hutier, commanding German 18th Army.

1st Division, soon to be known throughout France as the “Big Red One” after its post-Armistice formation insignia of a red number 1, had started to arrive in France on June 26, 1917. Composed of 1st and 2nd Brigades (16th and 18th, 26th and 28th Infantry Regiments), 1st Division had been commanded by the able Maj. Gen. Robert Lee Bullard since December 14. At the end of April the division had a strength of about 26,500 all ranks. Due to rapid expansion of the US Army after joining the war, American divisions were relatively short of field officers, so officers commanded more men than usual in the double-sized US divisions.

The Americans desired to make a show of strength after US 26th Division was surprised in the line by a raid on Seicheprey in the Lorraine region on April 20–22. A division attack to retake Montdidier was contemplated but ruled out because it would also involve supporting attacks by French divisions on either side. On April 23, 1st Division held the sector between the French 9th and 6th Corps, with 1st Brigade’s 18th Regiment holding the left-hand half of the line and 16th Regiment the right-hand, 2nd Brigade being in reserve. The nationality of the troops opposite Cantigny could not long be concealed from the Germans: First Quartermaster General Erich Ludendorff had given special orders that once Americans had been discovered in the line, they were to be subjected to immediate shelling with high explosives and gas shells to test and possibly break their morale before they became hardened to the realities of trench warfare. On May 3, the Germans fired over 15,000 rounds at 18th Regiment, causing 800 casualties, 200 of them killed. But the shelling was by no means one-way. 1st Division’s artillery brigade of 1 155mm and 2 75mm field regiments responded in kind, firing upwards of 10,000 rounds a day in counter-battery fire.

On May 15, Debeney ordered Bullard to capture Cantigny, a salient in the Allied lines (approximately 3 miles deep), defended by two battalions of German 82nd Reserve Division. The objective had little but tactical significance. The day chosen for the assault was May 28, a day after the date scheduled by the Germans for the start of the Aisne Offensive. Bullard had 13 days in which to prepare his plan and his men. The unit chosen for the honor of leading the first American offensive of World War I was the 28th Infantry Regiment.

On May 27, 28th Regiment moved up to its assault lines and prepared for the coming action. Around midnight the Germans sent out two strong patrols (over 30 men in each) to bring back American prisoners for interrogation. One of these patrols was caught and wiped out in no-man’s land. The other reached the American lines in the Casablanca sector and after a brisk fight pulled back with 1 prisoner. The Americans immediately sent a patrol in pursuit, and this caught the German patrol before it reached its lines, rescued the prisoner and destroyed the German patrol before returning to its own lines. That night's activities, including a German artillery bombardment, cost the Americans 50 casualties.

At 0645, American troops left their trenches following an hour-long preparatory artillery barrage in which German counter-battery fire gave away the location of German artillery positions. A rolling barrage advancing approximately 100 yards every 2 minutes gave the attacking troops plenty of time to keep up with it. 28th Infantry Regiment (Col. Hansen Ely) plus 3 machine-gun companies and a company of engineers, made the assault on the village, situated on high ground surrounded by woods, making it an ideal target for German artillery.

Aiding the capture, the French provided air cover, 368 heavy guns, trench mortars, tanks, and flamethrowers. The advancing American infantry was aided by 10 Schneider tanks of French 5th Tank Battalion, used to eliminate German machine gun positions. With this support, and advancing on schedule behind a creeping barrage, 28th Infantry took the village in 30 minutes. It then continued on to its final objective, positions 1.2 miles from its jump-off point, just as the rolling barrage reached its final line, at 0813. Much to everyone’s surprise and relief, they met spotty resistance.

With the attack apparently successful, US troops consolidated and prepared for the inevitable German counterattack. German artillery fire against the new American positions increased by noon and enemy artillery and machinegun fire into what was now a shallow US salient in the German line became intense. The first German attack, a small attack at 0830 against the extreme right of the new American position, was easily repulsed, but German artillery bombarded 28th Infantry for most of the day. At 1710 the first large-scale attack took place, and a company of 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry commanded by Major Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., was used to reinforce a weak spot in the American line. Another German counterattack at 1840 was also repulsed by a combination of artillery and Infantry defensive fire. A series of counterattacks over the next two days were also defeated and the position held, , but not without inflicting a rising number of American casualties.

The Americans reduced the salient and expanded their front by approximately a mile. By May 30, the new American position was sufficiently secured and the 16th Infantry Regiment relieved the 28th. The U.S. forces held their position with the loss of 1603 casualties including over 300 killed. The Germans lost some 1400 men, plus 250 captured.

Cantigny made a profound statement to Germans and Allies alike. It bolstered Allied morale to hear of American troops in the line, on the offensive and succeeding. It underscored Pershing’s persistent argument that American troops were more valuable in large formations of their own than as replacements for the Allies. Most important, it began a narrative of American success powerfully amplified by the stands of the 2nd and 3rd Divisions along the Marne just days later.

[Dr Pepper]

Originally Posted by Ennath

67
Siege of Gamla




.

I visited the site of Gamla during my UN posting in Israel-there is not a lot to see there these days-other than a few tumbled stones. I have to say that even allowing for 2000 years of erosion and land sculpting-the 'precipitous drops' described by Josephus are grossly exaggerated-the place is hilly and steep-but a long way from being the Cliffs of Moher! Certainly not in the league of Masada-and open to be flanked from N,S and the rear-[I do after all know the Golan like the back of my hand-I patrolled it multiple times a week for the best part of a year!]

[Mal Hombre]

Josephus was a Roman collaborator,He had to make His new masters look good.

[Ennath]

He not only wanted to make the Romans look good, but to make Vaspasian look good. The man was his patron; he even took the Roman name Flavius in the general's honor.

[Ennath]

May 29, 1948
Jerusalem’s Burma Road

Since December 1947, Arab irregulars had blocked the road to Jerusalem (Highway 1) at Bab El Wad and beyond. Supply vehicles escorted by improvised armored cars (buses and vans with iron plates bolted on) attempting to use the road, Jerusalem's only link to the coast, took heavy fire. Convoys carrying food, weapons, and medical sustained heavy losses, and often did not get through to the city.

This siege was broken for a brief time by Operation Nachshon in April, but on May 15, 1948, British forces withdrew from the Latrun monastery and police fort that dominated the road. Latrun was immediately occupied by the Palmach’s Harel Brigade. However, on the night of May 18, troops of the British-officered Transjordan Arab Legion seized Latrun, and subsequent attempts by the new Israeli Army to dislodge them failed.

Shortages of water, fuel, medical supplies and food became acute in Jerusalem, and Jewish inhabitants were reduced to starvation rations. Ammunition and weapons were in short supply as well, as the Arab Legion and irregulars kept up both nuisance shelling and attempts to attack. In the absence of road transportation, the Israelis had flown in supplies. Originally light planes had landed at a small runway in Jerusalem, but they were unable to carry large quantities of supplies. The arrival of several Dakotas, which could carry over 3 tons of supplies made the task easier, but these planes were too large to land, so the supplies had to be dropped by air. The quantities of ordnance that could be brought by air were totally inadequate. The Jewish leadership, under David Ben-Gurion, feared that the city would surrender, and a search for a way to bypass the Arab blockade commenced.

Israeli convoys and vehicles had traveled along a path called road called “The Gazelles route” on May 16-18. The Arab Legion used this road too. On May 16, a single armored vehicle had traveled this road. On May 17, several Palmach commanders including Amos Horeb, Zerubavel Arbel and Ben Dunkelman (a Canadian WWII veteran, who would rise to command of 7th Brigade) had traveled this route. On May 18, a convoy was sent to Jerusalem through this route, but it was hit heavily by enemy fire along the part of the route that was visible from Latrun.

The Arabs had retained a corridor that ran north-south to Beit Guvrin from Latrun. This was guarded by the villages of Beit Jiz and Beit Sussin. The two villages were conquered on May 28, allowing the newly created 7th Brigade to the west to link up with Harel Brigade to the east. Several individuals and groups had already traveled part or all of the way undetected through various paths either from or to Jerusalem. On May 27, one Moshe Eshed of the Givati Brigade and his 3 comrades had supposedly come from Jerusalem on foot. On the night of May 28-29, 150 troops marched from Hulda to Sha'ar Hagay over this bypass route without being detected. IDF archives record that on May 29, Col. David “Mickey” Marcus, Shlomo Shamir, commander of 7th Brigade, and the Brigade operations and engineering officers went out to map a route for motorized vehicles. that would connect Hulda with Sha'ar Hagay and thence to Jerusalem, and that would be safe from Arab attack. It was soon nicknamed the Burma Road, after the supply route to isolated China in World War II.

The critical parts of road began after Beit Sussin. The road winds and climbs at a gradient of 12.5%, and then goes down a similar slope. Along the ridge line, the road was visible from Latrun, and it had to be moved to the southern slopes to hide it. The mountain was extremely rocky, and the soil between the rocks was soft. The strip available for paving was very narrow. After a steep and winding descent between and over rocks, the road went into a narrow defile in Wadi Abu Abad and hooked up with the Gazelles Route. On the night of May 30-31, 10 jeeps were sent out from Hulda loaded with munitions and arms - a heavy mortar, 180 shells and 4 medium machine guns to be supplied to the Harel brigade. The convoy returned after the lead jeep overturned near Beit Sussin. On the night of May 31- June 1, after some improvements were made in the road, a second convoy set out, under the command of “Raanana,” the Harel operations officer. The passengers frequently had to hand carry the supplies and push the vehicles over the rocks and pits, but the convoy eventually reached Harel, marking the unofficial breakthrough of the Burma Road.

On June 1, the munitions inventory in Jerusalem regional headquarters indicated that about 40 rounds per rifle were left. Yitzhak Levi, head of the Jerusalem branch of Haganah intelligence, found out about the convoy that had gotten through to Harel brigade headquarters. David Shaaltiel, Jerusalem commander, agreed to send him to Tel Aviv with several jeeps. Levi managed to find 3. These joined the Haganah convoy that had come the previous night. They left Abu Ghush at 2200 hours and after 6 1/2 hours of pushing vehicles and coaxing them over the rocks and pits, they emerged on the main road, arriving a half hour later in Rehovot. From Rehovot, they got to Ramat Gan and the general staff headquarters. After spending a day requisitioning vehicles, ordnance and a bit of food, Levi had assembled a 17 vehicle convoy with 30 Czech machine guns, 100 3” mortar shells and other ordnance and food, as well as porters to carry the supplies over impassable parts of the route. The road back, with loaded vehicles and uphill, was much worse than the trip to Tel Aviv, but at 5:30 AM, Levi had reached Jerusalem with his supplies.

The supply of Jerusalem by the Burma road, and the effort to pave a road, began in earnest. Porters, donkeys and jeeps were used to transport goods. It was soon apparent that a cease fire was approaching. Under the terms of the cease fire, the UN would supervise the movement of goods and arms and no new roads could be built. Therefore, it was imperative to bring as much equipment as possible to Jerusalem and to complete the paving of the road by June 10.

The Arab Legion soon understood what was happening and their artillery fired on Beit Sussin and vicinity, but they were firing blindly as the road beneath the ridge could not be seen. Arab sharpshooters had better luck. On the night of June 5-6, they killed 1 person working on the road and wounded 3. A Legion patrol was out in the vicinity of Beit Sussin; 1 of its men got lost and was captured.

On June 8, the Solel Boneh construction company began working on the road in earnest, despite Arab artillery fire and sniper activity, which killed 2 workers and wounded 2. On June 9, the Arabs made a major attempt to control the road, attacking Beit Sussin. The Israelis lost 8 dead and 20 wounded but held the road. By this time the road was being used to transport tons of food as well as military supplies, but until June 11, about 2 1/2 miles of the road had to be traversed by donkeys and porters.

On June 11, the first day of the cease fire, the road was used for the first time by completely motorized vehicle transport. However, potholes kept opening up after the hasty paving job, and it was not really complete until June 14, when UN inspectors pronounced the road paved. At the same time, pipes were laid along this route for bringing fuel and water to Jerusalem. By the end of June the usual nightly convoy delivered 100 tons of supplies.

The 1966 film Cast a Giant Shadow, which dramatizes the career of Mickey Marcus, has a major part dedicated to the construction of the Burma Road.

[Ernesto75]

I well remember this part (the construction of the Burma Road).
The main actors were Kirk Douglas, as Colonel Mickey Marcus, the beautiful Senta Berger with also John Wayne, Yul Brynner and Frank Sinatra.

[Ennath]

May 30, 1942
Thousand Bomber Raid

Bomber Command gained a new commander in February 1942 - Air Marshal Arthur “Bomber” Harris. He believed that Bomber Command had yet to prove its true worth and he was concerned that it was not being strategically fully utilized. Its poor performance in bombing accuracy during 1941 had led to calls for the force to be split up and diverted to other urgent theatres i.e. Battle of the Atlantic. A headline-grabbing heavy raid on Germany was a way for Harris to demonstrate to the War Cabinet that given the investment in numbers and technology, Bomber Command could make a vital contribution to victory. He proposed a raid using near all of his front line and reserve strength in a bombing raid against a German city that would be so devastating that the people of Germany would force their leaders to sue for peace. His idea was known as the “Thousand Plan” Harris first discussed the plan with Air Vice-Marshal Saundby in May 1942. Saundby spent a few days checking on the figures and informed Harris that his 1000 bomber plan was just about feasible.

In May 1942, Bomber Command comprised 37 medium and heavy bomber squadrons (16 Wellington, 6 Halifax, 6 Lancaster , 5 Stirling, 2 Manchester and 2 Hampden). Assuming that at any one given time that some bombers would be out of service, this gave Harris about 400 serviceable bombers. If raids were suspended for 48 hours and the unserviceable planes were all serviced, this would increase the figure to 500. However, when Coastal Command - armed with Whitley, Hudson and Hampden bombers – was added, the figure increased dramatically. If Harris also added on those bombers that were being replaced with the new Lancasters, then he got near to his figure of 1000.

The raid had all number of problems even at the planning stage: 1000 planes in the air would make an easy target for AA fire. Could Bomber Command sustain heavy casualties? The Lancasters and other new bombers had modern navigational equipment on board, but many of the older bombers did not. How could Bomber Command compensate for this? Just how acute could mid-air collisions be? Harris envisaged a raid lasting just 1 hour. Was it possible that 1000 planes could get to the target and drop their bombs in such a short time span? Such an attack clearly needed decent night time weather.

Harris passed these problems over to the experts and expected them to find solutions. The scientists did - with 1 proviso. They estimated that there would be only 1 mid-air collision per hour if the raid was extended to 90 minutes and if the force had 3 separate targets to aim for within the target city with the altitudes of each force staggered. Buoyed by such news, Harris made an appointment to see his superior, Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff. To ensure that he had support for his plan, Harris also saw Winston Churchill who was enthusiastic. The only dispute was over the intended target.

Harris wanted Hamburg for its symbolic status; Churchill wanted Essen as the heart of Germany’s industrial might. However, scientists advised that Essen was not a good target as the city was covered by an industrial haze even at night and bomb aiming might prove difficult. Those who worked at the Operational Research Section advised that Cologne would be the ideal target as it was reasonably near for the planes in terms of flying and as a major railway hub, its destruction could seriously damage Germany’s ability to move goods in the region. It was decided that the target would be selected on the night of the raid and that the weather would be the determining factor. On May 20, Portal gave his support to the plan. This now allowed Harris to make concrete plans.

Coastal Command and Fighter Command were given their requirements, the first to assist in the bombing (and air/sea rescues) and the second to attack known German night fighter bases. The raid was planned for the night of May 27-28. However, just before the raid took place, the Royal Navy refused to allow Coastal Command aircraft to take part. The Admiralty considered Harris’ arguments too weak against the real and pressing threat of the U-boats in the Battle of the Atlantic. Harris scrambled around and, by crewing 49 more aircraft with student pilots and instructors, 1046 bombers eventually took part in the raid. Though he had no wish to use inexperienced crews, Harris felt that he had no other option - and the students could only gain from the experience.

The weather delayed the plan for a few days but on May 30, it had turned for the better. Hamburg was under a blanket of cloud, but Cologne was not. Harris ordered the raid to commence. Bombers took off at 2230 from 53 bases across Britain. Crews were told to pick out the River Rhine, once flying over Western Europe, and use it to lead them into Cologne. The first bombers to arrive were the most modern equipped with GEE navigational equipment - Stirlings and Wellingtons from 1 and 3 Groups. They had a specific target and for 15 minutes they had that target to themselves - the Neumarkt in the city’s old town. The idea was to set it alight with incendiary bombs so that it acted as a beacon for the other bombers coming in. These planes would bomb areas one mile to the north or south of the Neumarkt. The men at Bomber Command’s meteorological office has been right. The bombers flew above cloud from Holland right to the German border - here it disappeared, as had been predicted. When the first bombers got to Cologne, the moon gave the crews near perfect visibility. Within 15 minutes of the first bombs landing, the old town was ablaze.

This was the first time that the “bomber stream” tactic was used and most of the tactics used in this raid remained standard for Bomber Command for the next 2 years and some elements remained in use until the end of the war. It was expected that such a large number of bombers flying in a bomber stream through the “Kammhuber line” would overwhelm the German night fighters’ control system, keeping losses to an acceptable proportion. The recent introduction of GEE allowed the bombers to fly a given route at a given time and height. The British night bombing campaign had been in operation for some months, and a statistical estimate could be made of the number of bombers likely to be lost to night fighters and flak, and how many would be lost through collisions. Minimizing the former demanded a densely packed stream, as the controllers of a night fighter flying a defensive box could only direct a maximum of 6 potential interceptions per hour, and the flak gunners could not concentrate on all the available targets at once. Earlier in the war, 4 hours had been considered acceptable for a mission; for this raid all the bombers passed over Cologne and bombed in a window of 90 minutes, with the first having arrived at 0047 on May 31. It was anticipated that the concentration of bombing over such a short period would overwhelm the Cologne fire brigades and cause conflagrations similar to those inflicted on London during the Blitz.

In Cologne itself, the reaction of the civil defense force was slow. This was the 105th time in the war that air raid sirens had indicated a raid. When it became apparent that this was a raid, the bombers were already dropping their loads. The initial attackers had dropped incendiary bombs on the old town and the fires made targeting far easier for those bombers still coming in. Only 4 bombers were lost in collisions over the city. The intensity of the attack was such that the final run of bombers could see the glow of the flames 100 miles away. Smoke from the fires rose 15,000 feet. Such was the density of the smoke, the RAF could not get any decent reconnaissance photos of the city for a week after the attack.

868 aircraft bombed the main target, with 15 bombing other targets. 1455 tons of bombs were dropped, 2/3 being incendiaries. The action of fire fighters and the width of the streets stopped the fires combining into a firestorm, but nonetheless most of the damage was done by fire and not directly by the explosive blasts. The only military installation damaged was the flak barracks. The damage to civilian homes, most of them apartments in larger buildings, was considerable. 469 people were killed (411 civilian) and 5027 injured. Some 45,000 were made homeless.

However, for all the bombs dropped, Cologne was not destroyed. Industrial life around the city was paralyzed for a week but within 6 months it had recovered. Of the 1046 bombers that took part in the raid, 39 were lost - primarily to night fighters. This represented a loss of 4% which was considered the maximum Bomber Command could sustain. The main result achieved by the raid was the declaration by Winston Churchill in a communication to Harris that the raid was: “This proof of the growing power of the British bomber force is also the herald of what Germany will receive, city by city, from now on.”

[Dr Pepper]

[QUOTE=Ennath;4052893]May 29, 1948
Jerusalem’s Burma Road

Since December 1947, Arab irregulars had blocked the road to Jerusalem (Highway 1) at Bab El Wad and beyond. Supply vehicles escorted by improvised armored cars (buses and vans with iron plates bolted on) attempting to use the road, Jerusalem's only link to the coast, took heavy fire. Convoys carrying food, weapons, and medical sustained heavy losses, and often did not get through to the city.

(1) Knocked out Israeli vehicles are still to be seen on the route-just off the roadside-left there as memorials. They seem to acquire the odd lick of paint (deep red/maroon primer mainly) from time to time-so someone obviously is tasked with their upkeep-and Israel not being noticeably wet-don't seem to have deteriorated much over the years.

This siege was broken for a brief time by Operation Nachshon in April, but on May 15, 1948, British forces withdrew from the Latrun monastery and police fort that dominated the road. Latrun was immediately occupied by the Palmach’s Harel Brigade. However, on the night of May 18, troops of the British-officered Transjordan Arab Legion seized Latrun, and subsequent attempts by the new Israeli Army to dislodge them failed.

(2) This formerly British fort is now the venue of the IDF armoured museum-and an excellent one it is-on a par with Bovington and Aberdeen. To those of you with an interest in AFVs I thoroughly recommend a visit, should you be in the region.