The Military History Thread

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February 1, 1564
Siege of Concepcion

Francisco de Villagra, governor of Chile, died in Concepcion on June 22, 1563, leaving his cousin Pedro de Villagra as interim governor. Because he believed he had too few men to hold all the posts in Mapuche territory and still have a field army the new governor ordered the abandonment of Arauco in July 1563, taking off its artillery and noncombatants by sea while garrison under Lorenzo Bernal del Mercado marched over the rain soaked mountains and flooded rivers to Angol. The Mapuche destroyed the fort shortly after the garrison left and harassed their march. Regarding the abandonment of Arauco as a victory, it inspired the Mapuche north of the Bio-bio River to revolt.

In early 1564, Pedro de Villagra, was taking measures to protect all the towns and forts he already held against the growing Mapuche revolt and to organize a field army in Concepcion. He knew that one of the Mapuche objectives was to surround Concepcion, and preparations were made for a long siege.

Raids by Mapuche bands had made it unsafe for Spaniards to go farther than a few miles from the city. After a brief fight 3000 Mapuche in the Itata River valley under Loble defeated the troops of Captain Francisco de Vaca coming with reinforcements from Santiago. Meanwhile another 3000 warriors under Millalelmo defeated the troops coming from Angol under Captain, Juan Perez de Zurita, at a crossing of the Andalién River two leagues from Concepcion. Both defeats had reduced the garrison of Concepcion to a defensive posture only and cut off the city from aid by land. The survivors of the two battles had to retreat to Santiago and were in no condition to break through the investment.

Meanwhile the caciques Millalelmu and Loble, with 20,000 warriors from the area between the Itata and Bio-Bio rivers, had looted and destroyed Spanish estancias in the vicinity of Concepcion, took their herds and then settled down to besiege Concepcion in early February 1564. The Mapuche entered the outer city, sacking and burning it, the population crowding within the walls of the citadel with its 200 man garrison under Governor Villagra. The Mapuche then built a fortified camp on heights overlooking the city from which they descended to attack.

The siege lasted 2 months with continuous skirmishes. At the end of March, 2 Spanish ships arrived bringing food that permitted the population to continue the siege for much longer. On the other side the Mapuche had used up local sources of food and without pack animals and transport were finding it difficult to bring in enough to maintain their large force. Also the harvest season was coming and failure to bring in the crops would result in a winter of hunger for their families. With the recent news of the defeat of the Mapuche chief Illangulién at the Battle of Angol, they were also nervous that their undefended homes might be attacked from Angol or Santiago. On April 1, the Mapuche army raised the siege and dispersed to their homes for the winter.

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121 BC
Revolt of Gaius Gracchus

After the violent death of Tiberius Gracchus (133BC), the Gracchus family wasn't finished yet. Gaius Gracchus, a flamboyant and powerful public speaker, was to be a far more formidable political force than his elder brother.

The legacy of Tiberius Gracchus, the agrarian law, was being applied in a manner which created a fresh grievance among the allied regions of Italy. M. Fulvius Flaccus, one of the political supporters of Tiberius, suggested granting them Roman citizenship as compensation for any disadvantages they should suffer from agrarian reform. This naturally was not popular, as the people holding Roman citizenship sought to keep it as exclusive as possible. To get rid of Flaccus, the senate sent him off to Gaul to protect the Roman ally of Massilia, which had appealed for help against the aggressive Gallic tribes. (The result of Flaccus’ operations would be the conquest of Gallia Narbonensis.)

But while Flaccus was absent, Gaius Gracchus, having finished his term of office as quaestor in Sardinia, returned to Rome to take the place of his brother. Gaius was elected to the tribunate in 123 BC. The program initiated by the younger Gracchus was wider in scope and much more far-reaching than that of his brother. He reaffirmed his brother's land laws and established smallholdings in Roman territory abroad, extended the operation of the agrarian laws and created new colonies. One of these was to be the first Roman colony outside of Italy, - on the old site of the destroyed city of Carthage.

The first of a series of open bribes to the voters was to enact legislation by which the population of Rome was to be provided with grain at half price. The next measure struck straight at the power of the senate. Now members of the equestrian class should hold judgment in court cases over provincial governors accused of wrong-doing. It was a clear reduction in senatorial power as it restricted their power over the governors. Yet further favor was granted to the equestrian class by awarding them the right to contract for the collecting of the enormous taxes due from the newly created province of Asia. Further Gaius forced through huge expenditure on public works, such as roads and harbors, which once more mainly benefited the equestrian business community.

In 122 BC, Gaius was re-elected unopposed as Tribune of the People. Being that it had cost his brother his life to stand again for this office, it is remarkable to see how Gaius could remain in office without any major occurrence. Flaccus was also elected as Tribune, granting the two political allies almost absolute power over Rome.

Gaius’ most visionary piece of legislation, however, was too far ahead of its time and failed to get passed even in the comitia tributa. The idea had been to grant all Latins full Roman citizenship and to bestow upon all Italians the rights so far enjoyed by the Latins (trade and intermarriage with Romans).

When Gaius Gracchus stood for yet another term as Tribune in 121 BC, the senate put forward their own candidate, M. Livius Drusus with a program which was by its very nature designed to be more populist than anything Gracchus proposed. This populist assault on Gracchus’ standing as a champion of the people, together with the loss of popularity resulting from the failed proposal to extend Roman citizenship, led to his losing the vote for a third term.

Realizing the tactics of the Senate too late to counter them, Gracchus, along with Flaccus and thousands of supporters, led a protest in the streets of Rome. A large angry mob turned out on the Aventine Hill; the situation quickly escalated into armed revolt. The consul Lucius Opimius now proceeded to the Aventine Hill to restore order. Not only did he possess the authority of his consular office, but he also was backed by a senatus consultum optimum (martial law). The order authorized him to take action against anyone endangering the stability of the Republic, What followed on the arrival of Opimius with militia, legionary infantry and archers was a massacre. Thousands of the mob were killed outright, and later, up to 3000 more Gracchus supporters were rounded up, arrested and strangled. Gaius, realizing the situation hopeless, ordered his personal slave to stab him to death.

The legacy of the Gracchus brothers was one of social upheaval and the eventual disintegration of the Roman political and governing system. Their violent deaths were the first of many more political riots and executions to come over the next 100 years. Traditional powers of the Senate and the people were being torn apart, rebuilt and torn apart again. Ambitious politicians now had many new ways to exploit a system teetering on collapse and powerful men and political parties began to develop in extreme polar opposites. The voice of violence, riots and mob tactics was quickly to become the mainstay throughout the era. Even the Senate, once steadfast in cooperation against the Tribunes of the Plebs, began to splinter. With the fast rise and fall of the Brothers Gracchi, the stage was set for the rise of Marius, Sulla, Pompey and Caesar.

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February 2, 1864
Battle of Mysunde

Danish public opinion expected the forthcoming war with the German Confederation to take place at the Danevirke, the ancient line of earthworks along the border, placing almost mythological belief in the impenetrability of the fortification system. In practice, the fortifications had fallen into disrepair. The barracks for the soldiers had not been built, connecting roads were not finished, and the obstacles in front of the fortifications had not been put in place. As a result, when the Danish army entered the positions in January, they had a lot of work to do, with the winter frost making digging difficult. In addition, the Danevirke was far too long to be adequately defended by the 38,000 man Danish army.

Mysunde itself was a small fishing village of approximately two dozen houses on the south side of the Schlei. It was a part of the eastern section of the Danevirke, but the real importance of the position was due to narrowness of the Schlei at this point. This meant that it was one of the few points where the eastern flank of the Danevirke was not covered by natural obstacles. Consequently, the defense of the position was of great strategic importance; a breakthrough at the crossing point would allow the Prussians to envelop and surround the Danish forces at the border, while the Austrians kept the Danes pinned in their positions.

Prussian I Corps under Prince Friedrich Karl had begun its advance at 8:00 in the morning on February 2, with the aim of taking the Danish positions at Kochendorf. However, the Prussians soon discovered that the Danish army had no intention of defending Kochendorf and had retreated northward. By 8:45, the vanguard was able to report that Kochendorf was in Prussian hands. The decision to push on and capture Mysunde was immediately taken; 3 brigades remained in reserve, while the rest of the Corps continued the advance. By 10:00, Major von Krohn, leading the Fusilier Battalion of the 24th Regiment, was in sight of the Danish positions at Mysunde.

The Danish position at Mysunde was essentially a series of bastions placed around the village. The two most important bastions, referred to as A and B, were placed on either side of the southern road leading into the village. The position was defended by the 6th Fortification Battalion led by Captain Hertel, who had at his disposition 20 cannons and about 100 men, as well as the 1st battalion of 18th Regiment. All of the Danish cannon were the old-fashioned muzzle-loading smoothbore variety, rather than the more accurate and long-range breech-loading rifled cannon used by the Prussians. The 3rd Brigade was bivouacked 11 km north of Mysunde in reserve. The Danes would have 2500 men altogether, with the 20 bastion guns, to face 10,000 Prussians, with 64 guns.

The Prussian Vanguard was led by the fusilier battalions of 13th, 15th, and 24th Regiments, as well as the 1st Battalion of 60th Regiment, and the Westphalian Rifle Battalion. The advance encountered a Danish outpost near Langsø at approximately 10:30. After a brief but intense firefight, the Danish troops retreated back towards Mysunde.

A dense fog made it extremely difficult to determine enemy movements, and consequently only a few shots were fired from the Danish guns in the bastions as the Prussians closed in. At 11:30, the 1st Battalion of 3rd Danish Regiment arrived under Captain Arntz, and along with a squadron of dragoons, carried out a reconnaissance in front of the bastions. 1000 paces in front of the bastions, they encountered the fusilier battalions of the 15th and 24th and came under intense fire. Major von Krohn lead the fusiliers in a bayonet attack that threw the Danish infantry back. With several officers wounded or killed, Captain Arntz ordered his battalion into position at the bastions. It is only at this point, that the Danish commanders realized that they were facing not just a Prussian reconnaissance force, but an actual assault on the fortifications.

Having successfully thrown back Arntz’s battalion, the Prussians continued their advance, occupying on the right flank a fence just a hundred yards from Bastion B and other cover 200-250 yards in front of the Danish center. A lively exchange of fire played out, with scant protection for either side as the trenches were in disrepair. Danish eyewitness accounts describe having to lie on their bellies on the frozen ground while exchanging fire with the Prussians.

At around noon, the Prussian artillery had begun to arrive and deployed on a ridge in front of the position with a battery of 24 6-pounder cannon and 24 howitzers. At 12:45, it opened fire on the bastions, followed shortly by 16 additional guns from the reserve artillery. With their numerical superiority, the Prussian command hoped to suppress or drive back the Danish fortification troops by weight of fire. An intense duel now developed between the 20 Danish cannon in the bastions and the 64 Prussian cannon on the ridges. However, the fog made identifying and targeting the enemy effectively impossible. As the smoke from the cannons mingled with the fog and further obscured the features of the terrain, the gunners on both sides were soon reduced to simply aiming at the flashes from the cannonfire of their opponents.

From their positions in the trenches, the Prussian infantry were causing significant casualties among the Danish gunners, particularly in the exposed Bastion B. Danish 3rd Brigade had been ordered to reinforce Mysunde, but they were still too far distant. Two companies that had been stationed on the coast northeast of the village were hurriedly rushed south. To reduce the fire on Bastion B, a company of 18th Regiment attempted to push back the Prussian fusiliers in front of the bastion, but the assault was repulsed by a withering fire.

The Prussian infantry now began a methodical advance toward the bastions, while the Prussian howitzers moved forward to a position within 700 yards of the defenses. 3 of the Danish guns were knocked out, but the majority of the Prussian shells went over the Danish positions to hit the village where most of the buildings caught fire. In their exposed positions, the Prussian howitzer crews also suffered heavily. It was apparent, now that the Prussians were preparing a general assault. Multiple attempts by the Prussian infantry to form up for an assault and advance across the open terrain in front of the fortifications were met by canister and enfilade fire from the bastions, forcing the Prussians to fall back into cover or go to ground. The Prussian infantry were able to advance to the coast of the Schlei on the right flank of the Danish positions, but here again intense musket fire from the Danish infantry repulsed the attack.

Faced with determined Danish resistance, the Prussians decided to withdraw. It was apparent that the only way to take Mysunde would be through a frontal assault, and while the Prussians probably had the numerical superiority to succeed, the casualties would have been high - an unacceptable result to the Prussian high command in this politically sensitive conflict. At 4:00, the Prussian forces began to pull back. The Danes lost 141 men dead or wounded while the Prussians lost 199. A truce was arranged to bury the dead and recover the wounded. The truce allowed the Prussians to extricate a company of around 100 men who had advanced too far and who were now precariously pinned down too close to the Danish positions. Their escape due to the truce angered the Danish soldiers, although it also amused them to see the Prussians “...running away as fast as they could”. Prince Friedrich Karl attempted to turn the defeat into a positive by emphasizing the difficulty of the terrain and praising the gallantry of his men.

For the Danes, the successful defense prevented the encirclement and entrapment of the Danish army at the Danevirke. The victory boosted the morale of both the troops and the general public, but unfortunately it also strengthened the perception of the Danevirke as an impenetrable defense line. Consequently, the victory here increased the outrage felt by the general public when only 4 days later General de Meza ordered the Danish army to retreat. General Gerlach, who held command of the 1st Division defending Mysunde, reluctantly assumed overall command of the Danish army after the dismissal of De Meza.

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February 3, 1509
Battle of Diu

Just two years after Vasco da Gama reached India by sea, the Portuguese realized that the prospect of developing trade had become an impossibility, due to the opposition of Muslim merchant elites in the west of India, who incited attacks against Portuguese feitorias, ships and merchants, and lead to the massacre of the Portuguese in Calicut in 1500. Thus, the Portuguese signed an alliance with a rebellious vassal of Calicut, the raja of Cochin, who allowed them to establish a base. The Zamorin of Calicut invaded Cochin, but the Portuguese were able to cripple the trade of Calicut, which at the time served as the main exporter of spices back to Europe, through the Red Sea. In December 1504, the Portuguese destroyed the Zamorin's yearly merchant fleet bound to Egypt, laden with spices.

When King Manuel I of Portugal received news of these developments, he decided to nominate Francisco de Almeida as the first viceroy of India with orders not limited to safeguarding Portuguese feitorias, but also to curb hostile Muslim shipping. Almeida departed Lisbon in March 1505 with 20 ships and his 20-year-old son, Dom Lourenço, who was himself nominated “captain-major of the sea of India” Portuguese intervention seriously disrupted Muslim trade in the Indian Ocean, threatening Venetian interests as well, as the Portuguese became able to undersell the Venetians in the spice trade in Europe. The Muslim traders in India as well as the sovereign of Calicut sent envoys to Egypt pleading for aid.

The Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt was the main middleman between the spice regions of India and the Venetians buyers, mainly in Alexandria, who then sold the spices in Europe at a great profit. Venice broke diplomatic relations with Portugal and started looking for ways to counter its intervention in the Indian Ocean sending an ambassador to the Mamluk court and suggested that “remedies” be taken against the Portuguese. The Mamluks had little expertise in naval warfare, so Sultan Al-Ashraf Qansuh al-Ghawri requested Venetian support, in exchange for lowering tariffs. Venice supplied the Mamluks with Mediterranean-type carracks and war galleys manned by Greek sailors, which Venetian shipwrights helped disassemble in Alexandria and reassemble in Suez. The native dhows, with their sewn wood planks, could carry only light guns. Command of the expedition was entrusted to a Kurdish Mamluk, former governor of Jeddah Amir Hussain Al-Kurdi, Mirocem in Portuguese. The expedition included not only Mamluks, but also a large number of Turkish, Nubian and Ethiopian mercenaries as well as Venetian gunners Most of the coalition’s missile troops were archers.

The fleet left Suez in November 1505, 1100 men strong. They were ordered to fortify Jeddah against attack and quell rebellions around Suakin and Mecca. They had to spend the monsoon season on the island of Kamaran and called at Aden, where they got involved in costly local politics, before finally crossing the Indian Ocean. Hence only in September 1507 did they reach Diu, a city at the mouth of the Gulf of Khambhat, in a journey that could have taken as little as a month to complete at full sail.

The Gujarati were the main long distance dealers in the Indian Ocean, and an essential intermediary in the trade between Egypt and Malacca, mostly cloth and spices. In the 15th century, the Sultan of Gujarat nominated Malik Ayyaz, a former bowman and slave, as governor of Diu. A cunning and pragmatic ruler, Malik Ayyaz turned the city into the main port of Gujarat, avoiding Portuguese hostility by a policy of appeasement - up until Hussain unexpectedly sailed into Diu. Malik Ayyaz received Hussain well, but besides the Zamorin of Calicut, no other Indian ruler was forthcoming against the Portuguese, unlike what the envoys to Egypt had promised. Ayyaz did not wish to antagonize the Portuguese, but he could not reject Hussain for fear of retaliation from the powerful Sultan of Gujarat - besides obviously Hussain’s own forces now in the city. Caught in a double bind, Ayyaz decided to only cautiously support Hussain.

In March 1508, Hussain and Ayyaz sailed south and clashed with Portuguese ships in a 3-day engagement in the harbor of Chaul. The Portuguese commander was Lourenço de Almeida, tasked with overseeing the loading of allied merchant ships in that city and escorting them back to Cochin. Although the Portuguese were caught off-guard, the battle ended as a pyrrhic victory for the Muslims, who suffered too many losses to be able to proceed towards the Portuguese headquarters in Cochin. Despite the loss of the flagship and the commander, the rest of the Portuguese fleet escaped. Hussain was left with no other choice but to return to Diu with Malik Ayyaz and prepare for Portuguese retaliation. Hussain reported this battle back to Cairo as a great victory, however.

Upon hearing of the death of his only son, Francisco de Almeida retired to his quarters for 3 days, unwilling to see anyone. The presence of a Mamluk fleet in India posed a grave threat to the Portuguese, but the viceroy now sought to personally exact revenge. Nevertheless, the monsoon was approaching, and storms inhibited all navigation in the Indian Ocean until September. Only then could the viceroy call back all available ships and assemble his forces in Cochin. Before they could depart, on December 6, 1508, Afonso de Albuquerque arrived from the Persian Gulf with orders from the King of Portugal to replace him as governor. Almeida had a personal vendetta against Albuquerque, as the latter had been assigned to the Arabian Coast specifically to prevent Muslim navigation from entering or leaving the Red Sea. Yet his intentions of personally destroying the Muslim fleet in retaliation for his son’s death was such a personal issue that he refused to allow his appointed successor take office. In doing so, the viceroy was in rebellion against royal authority, and would rule Portuguese India for another year as such. On December 9, the Portuguese fleet departed for Diu.

The Portuguese first passed by Calicut, but the Muslim fleet had already left for Diu. Off Baticala, Portuguese galleys destroyed a Calicuti raiding squadron. At Angediva, the fleet took on fresh water and Almeida met with an envoy of Malik Ayyaz, though the details of the meeting are unknown. From Angediva, the Portuguese set sail to Dabul, an important fortified port belonging to the Sultanate of Bijapur. The captain of the galley São Miguel, Paio de Sousa, decided to investigate the harbor and put to shore, but he was ambushed by a force of about 6000 men and was killed, along with other Portuguese. Two days later, the viceroy led his forces ashore and crushed the garrison stationed by the riverbank in an amphibious attack. Dabul was razed and all its inhabitants killed, along with the surrounding riverside populations, including the cattle and even stray dogs as retaliation. The consequences of provoking the Portuguese were demonstrated, as per the viceroy's intention. At Bombay, Almeida received a letter from Malik Ayyaz, assuring that his Portuguese prisoners were well treated. Almeida’s response was respectful, but menacing, amounting to “join me or I destroy Diu”. He prepared for battle, with 9 naos, 6 caravels, 2 galleys and 2 brigantines.

In the 10 months between the Battle of Chaul and Diu, important developments took place on the Muslim side: The relationship between Hussain and Ayyaz worsened, with Hussain now plainly aware of the duplicity of Ayyaz, who had taken custody of the Portuguese prisoners at Chaul - which Hussain apparently intended “to send back to Cairo stuffed”. Hussain was also short of cash to pay his mercenaries. He was forced to pawn his artillery to Ayyaz himself. Only fear of the Sultan’s reaction kept him from returning to Egypt. He sailed with 10 carracks, 6 large and 30 small galleys, and about 120 war boats.

On February 2, the Portuguese sighted Diu. As they approached, Malik Ayyaz withdrew from the city, leaving overall command to Hussain. He ordered the oar ships to harass the Portuguese fleet before they had time to recover from the journey, but they did not pass beyond the range of the fortress’ cannon. As night fell the Muslim fleet retreated into the channel, while the viceroy summoned all his captains to decide on the course of action. The following morning, the Portuguese could see that the Muslims had decided to confine themselves to the harbor protected by its fort, latching their carracks and galleys together close to shore and await attack, relinquishing the initiative. The Portuguese divided into 4 groups: one to board the carracks, one to attack the stationary enemy galleys from the flank, a bombardment group in support, and the flagship, which would prevent the escape of light craft.

At 11:00 am, the royal banner was hoisted atop the Flor do Mar and a single shot fired, signaling the start of the battle. The Portuguese ships were better built and better manned, with better gun crews and infantry with armor, arquebuses and grenades. The smaller, lighter Muslim craft were outmatched. Even when their nimble small craft came near, they were unable to board due to inferior height and a mass of gunfire and grenades. Most of the Mamluk ships were sunk or taken, along with 4 Gujarati carracks. Over 1300 men were killed. The Portuguese losr 30 men dead and 300 wounded. Malik Ayyaz returned the prisoners from Chaul immediately afterward. Almeida achieved his vengeance, brutally executing his Mamluk captives.

Almeida refused to take over Diu, claiming that it would be too expensive to maintain; the Portuguese would soon change their mind, but Malik managed to stall them for the rest of his life. Almeida handed over his command to Albuquerque and left for home, but was killed in December in a skirmish with the Khoi near the Cape of Good Hope.

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52 BC
Siege of Avaricum

At the start of the great Gallic revolt Vercingetorix had hoped to prevent Caesar from joining his legions in their winter quarters, but when that failed the Gauls moved to besiege the town of Gorgobina. Caesar was forced to bring his legions out of their winter quarters to prevent the fall of this town, which had been settled in 58 B.C. by the allied Boii. Caesar captured Vellaunodunum, Cenabum and Noviodunum. Vercingetorix was forced to abandon the attack on Gorgobina, but he was unable to prevent the fall of Noviodunum. After the capture of that town Caesar moved on to besiege Avaricum.

Caesar was aware that Avaricum (modern Bourges) was the biggest and best fortified town of the Bituriges, and he believed that if he could capture the town then the entire tribe would surrender. Vercingetorix didn’t share this opinion. At a council of war he called for a Fabian strategy and persuaded the Bituriges to burn most of their towns and villages to prevent the Romans from finding supplies. He also wanted them to destroy Avaricum, but the Bituriges convinced the council that they could defend their capital, and against his better judgement Vercingetorix agreed to garrison the town.

Avaricum was easy to defend. The town was protected by a river and a sizable marsh, and there was only one narrow approach. Caesar camped outside that narrow entrance, and began to build a giant mound and siege towers. The marshy location of the town prevented the Romans from building their normal line of circumvallation by the river and marsh.

Vercingetorix followed behind, and set up his own camp 15 miles from town. This camp was also protected by swamps, which prevented the Romans from attacking it. Scouts keep the two Gallic forces in touch while Vercingetorix concentrated on attacking any Roman foraging party that strayed too far from their main camp. The Romans soon ran short of supplies, partly because of these attacks, but more worryingly because the Aedui, Rome's most valuable allies in Gaul, were reluctant to provide supplies; his other main ally, the Boii, simply had no food to spare.

When he discovered that the Romans had completed their siege towers, Vercingetorix moved his camp nearer and prepared to ambush the next days’ foraging party. When Caesar’s scouts reported this move he decided to attack the new camp. Early on the following day, while Vercingetorix was waiting in vain for the Roman foragers, Caesar and the main Roman army advanced towards his camp, where they discovered the Gallic army formed up on a hill. For a short time it looked as if a major battle was about to begin, but the armies were separated by a swamp and neither side was willing to risk moving first. Eventually the Romans returned to their camp. Many eager Gauls were disappointed and when Vercingetorix returned to his camp he was accused of planning to betray his army, and was forced to defend his actions.

The siege lasted for 27 days. The Gauls had become much more skilled at defending their towns against Roman siege engines, and many of the inhabitants of Avaricum were experienced iron miners, which gave them the skills needed to counter the Roman mound. When the Romans tried to use grappling hooks to pull stones from the walls the Gauls used their own machines to drag the grappling hooks inside the city. When the Romans attempted to dig tunnels under the walls the Gallic miners dug countermines.

After 25 days the Roman mound was 330 feet wide and 80 high, and was getting close to the city walls. Just after midnight the Romans realized that the mound was sinking. The Gauls had dug tunnels underneath and had set fire to the pit props, collapsing the tunnel. The mound must have had some wooden supports, for the Gauls then poured pitch on it from above in an attempt to burn down the mound, while at the same time they launched sallies from gates on either side. The lateness of the hour and the flames caused great confusion in the Roman camp, but eventually, with the help of the entire besieging army, the situation was restored and the Gallic attack failed.

On the following day the garrison of Avaricum planned to escape and cross the marsh to join Vercingetorix. This plan required secrecy, but the Romans were alerted by the sounds of arguments coming from within the town, where the women were pleading with soldiers not to abandon them to the Romans. Aware that secrecy was lost the garrison abandoned the evacuation plan, but the disturbance helped convince Caesar that it was time to attack.

The next day, under the cover of a storm, the Romans successfully reached the top of the town walls. The Gauls formed up in the open marketplace, ready to resist the expected Roman attack, but instead of climbing down into the town the Roman infantry spread out along the top of the walls. This unnerved the defenders, who believed that they were about to be trapped in the city. The defensive block dissolved and the Gallic soldiers attempted to break out of the city gates. Some were killed by the Roman infantry in the narrow approaches to the gate and most of the rest were caught by the cavalry outside the town.

The fall of Avaricum was followed by a massacre. Caesar described this as having been caused by a combination of anger at the massacre of the Romans at Cenabum and frustration after the long difficult siege, but his brief description gives no indication of his attitude to this massacre (normal practice was to enslave the population of a captured city, with most of the money going to the commander of the victorious army).

The fall of Avaricum didn’t have the effect Caesar had hoped. Vercingetorix managed to restore the morale of his army and was soon able to replace the troops lost during the siege. More importantly the Aedui finally abandoned their long attachment to the Roman cause and joined the revolt. Caesar lost one of his best sources of cavalry, and faced an ever more powerful coalition of Gallic tribes. His next move, an attack on Gergovia, ended with his only major defeat in Gaul, but Vercingetorix then attempted to defend Alesia, a move that gave Caesar a chance to defeat the Gallic army in a single location (see posting).

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February 4, 1582
Retreat from Pskov

Polish King Stefan Bathory prepared thoroughly for the campaign of 1581. Russia was on the ropes and the campaign against Pskov was to be the decisive blow. German and Hungarian mercenaries, his best troops in the previous 2 campaigns, were heavily recruited. The royal Polish infantry was beefed up by selecting the best troops from other units.

Stefan’s army set out on August 8, 1581 and on the 17th besieged the fortress of Ostrov, the last barrier before Pskov. The wall was breached, and 3 days later and the town surrendered. The populace, remembering the previous year’s sack of Velikiye Luki, quickly swore loyalty. On August 25, Stefan’s army approached Pskov, but the cavalry and scouts had already been there and the town was prepared for assault. The citizens had added 2 walls with packed earth between them, and wooden towers on the stone walls, mounting artillery. However, there were not enough guns. In 1580, Tsar Ivan had decided that the city was indefensible and ordered some of the guns taken away. Luckily, only a few heavy guns were taken; these were lost in Lake Ilmen.

Russian authors claimed 100,000 attackers facing a Russian garrison of 17,000. Europeans claimed 30,000 Poles against 57,000 Russians. Pskov’s entire population at the time was barely more than 20,000 and Bathory was unlikely to have more than 30,000, so numbers were roughly even. Ivan Shuisky and Andrei Khvorostinin had about 7000 infantry, plus Cossacks and noble cavalry. All adult male citizens took up arms.

On September 2, Stefan’s army began building siege works. At this point, the main weakness of his army became apparent. Each national unit fought separately. The main rivals were the Poles and Hungarians, each seeking to be the first into the town. To all his appeals for coordinated action, Bathory received the reply, “Every cat hunts by itself.”

On the 8th, Hungarian gunners managed to create a great breach near the Svinussky Tower. Both Poles and Hungarians wanted to be the first through, to get the best booty. While they argued, 50 German and French mercenaries conducted a reconnaissance; they entered the breach and found a second, wooden, wall behind. Meanwhile, Polish troops captured the Svinussky Tower. The Hungarians, in response, captured the neighboring Pokrovsky Tower. While this competition was going on, Shuisky, already wounded, gathered reserves and then led a counterattack which retook the Svinussky Tower. The Hungarians abandoned the Pokrovsky Tower under cover of dark that night.

The failure of the assault depressed Stefan Bathory. It was clear that the capture of Pskov would not be quick or easy. He rejected a proposal to send the armed noblemen home and continue with only the mercenaries, as this would be an admission that he had no faith in the Commonwealth’s own army. Advisors then suggested taking the nearby small fortresses of Porkhov and Gdov, cutting off Pskov from Russia, and reducing the town by starvation. Bathory rejected this as well as being unworthy of a great campaign. An attempt at mining also failed, due to hard rock and Russian countermines.

Stefan was bothered by Russian units trying to gain access to Pskov by boat on the Velikaya River and by cart through the forests. The King, therefore, had to divert many troops, including the best Germans, to guard these routes. However, they were too few to completely seal off the town and small groups continued to get through. Those that couldn’t began building up nearby, threatening to trap the besiegers.

Tsar Ivan was in no hurry to raise the siege. He relied on “General Frost”, convinced that as soon as winter came, the western army would flee Russia. Indeed, at the first frosts, morale in Stefan’s army fell and desertions increased, sometimes into Pskov itself. The Lithuanian contingent issued an ultimatum - conclude a truce or they would leave the army. The mercenaries demanded more money to remain. Attempts to restore discipline only aggravated the troops. Finally, on October 20, the angry Lithuanians told the king that he had 18 days to win or to make peace.

The next major assault took place on October 29-30, directed at the breach, protected now by palisades. The Hungarians managed to storm the wall and partly demolish it, but were eventually repelled. An attack on the nearby Pskovo-Pechersky monastery also failed, the monks joining in repulsing repeated attacks by German, Hungarian and Scottish mercenaries.

It was obvious now that it was impossible to take the town by assault. Starvation was the only option. But sealing off the city would require a major campaign against nearby fortresses and the mood in camp was in no mood for such a grand project. On November 2, the decision was made to begin breaking camp. Soldiers demanded that the commanders mortgage their estates to ensure that there would enough money to pay them. Bathory saved the situation by guaranteeing payment, pledging the crown lands. The mercenaries remained near Pskov. On December 1, Bathory, the Polish nobles and some of the Lithuanians departed, planning to return in the spring.

Small clashes continued through the winter as the besiegers suffered terribly from the cold. However, on January 17, 1582, Alexander Khrushchev arrived with the news that the war was over, meeting with the Polish commander Jan Zamojski. On February 4, the besiegers withdrew from the walls of Pskov. The Poles considered the siege a success, in that Russia finally signed a peace treaty, while in Russia, the defense became a symbol of heroism.

[Ennath]

February 5, 1900
Battle of Vaal Krantz

In October 1899, Lieutenant General Sir Redvers Buller arrived in South Africa as the new British commander-in-chief against the Boers. Buller was an old South Africa hand and urged waiting until reinforcements arrived before tackling the invading Boer armies. The stop gap commanders-in-chief, pending Buller’s arrival in Natal, Major General Sir Pen Symons and Lieutenant General Sir George White, ignored this advice. Symons took the outnumbered British force across the Tugela into the northern tip of Natal. White, on taking over with the death of Symons, failed to pull the force back swiftly enough in the face of the Boer invasion of Natal and was bottled up in Ladysmith (see posting). The siege was covered by strong Boer positions along the Tugela River.

Buller’s first attempt to force the Tugela River positions came to grief at Colenso on December 15 (see posting). His second attempt was notoriously defeated at Spion Kop on January 24, 1900 (see posting). Buller’s 3rd attempt was at Val Krantz, on the left flank of the Boer positions around Spion Kop, beginning in the early hours of February 5, 1900. Buller had 20,000 troops, in 2nd Division (C.F. Clery), 5th Division (Charles Warren), and 3rd Division and the cavalry under the Earl of Dundonald. There were some 5000 Boers along the river, under Louis Botha.

British long range naval guns operated by detached sailors shelled the line of kops on the far bank of the Tugela River while the Lancashire Brigade demonstrated across the river at Potgeiter’s Drift. The real attack force, Lyttelton’s 4th Brigade, crossed by a pontoon bridge at Munger’s Drift, a mile to the east of Potgeiter’s and headed for Vaal Krantz, a hill at the bend in the river. The deliberate slowness with which Buller permitted Lyttelton’s force to begin the attack and the sight of the single pontoon bridge being assembled at Munger’s Drift gave the Boers ample warning that the true line of assault was up onto Vaal Krantz.

4th Brigade, comprising 1st Durham Light Infantry, 3rd King’s Royal Rifle Corps, 1st Rifle Brigade and 2nd Scottish Rifles, with the 2nd Devons from Hildyard’s brigade, scaled Vaal Krantz, driving the Boers from the lower slopes and coming under heavy fire from the surrounding higher positions. The initial plan was for Hildyard’s Brigade (2nd East Surreys, 2nd Queen’s West Surreys, 2nd Devons, and 2nd West Yorkshires) to cross the Tugela River immediately after Lyttelton and storm Green Hill. The cavalry brigade would then cross and make for Ladysmith followed by Hart’s brigade. But the ever-hesitant Buller lost all confidence in the attack as Lyttelton crossed and cancelled the order to Hildyard to cross the river, leaving Lyttelton to make the assault alone.

The Boers, only some 1200 strong, were led by Col. Viljoen in a spirited defense of Vaal Krantz, while Boer rifle and artillery fire built up from the surrounding hills. The Boers were in considerable difficulty. The spectacular success of the Battle of Spion Kop had persuaded the Boers, including Botha, that the British would now sue for peace, as they had in 1881 and many Boers had gone home. Hurrying back in the face of the threat of a further attack by Buller, they arrived during the days of Vaal Krantz and afterwards.

Buller’s reaction to the stiffening resistance was to order Lyttelton to abandon the attack and retreat. Lyttelton ignored the order and called for reinforcements. He urged Buller to bring more troops across the river and attack Doorn Kloof, the hill position on his right flank. But Buller convinced himself the Boer positions were too strong to be forced. The most Buller would risk was to reinforce Lyttelton with Hildyard’s brigade.

At dawn on February 6, the Boer artillery began a heavy bombardment with guns that had been brought up during the night. Lyttelton and other generals again urged Buller to commit more troops and expand the position by attacking Doorn Kloof. A council of war was held, but Buller could not be persuaded to take the risk. That night. the operation was abandoned and the British troops withdrew across the Tugela River, ending the battle. The British suffered 333 casualties and Buller attracted the nicknames of “the Tugela Ferryman” and “Sir Reverse Buller.” The Boers suffered about 80 casualties.

Buller’s fourth attack across the Tugela began on February 12, further east at Colenso. A force of Byng’s South African Light Horse assaulted Hussar Hill, which they took. Buller arrived and ordered the hill to be abandoned, the whole force retiring to the base at Chievely.

[Ennath]

February 6, 1981
Ugandan Bush War

After the defeat of Idi Amin in the Uganda-Tanzania War (see posting), an election brought former president Milton Obote to power. Calling the election fraudulent, Yoweri Musaveni, a member of the Military Commission, and his supporters formed the Popular Resistance Army (PRA) in the southwest. In February 1981, Museveni, and his armed supporters declared themselves the National Resistance Army (NRA). Museveni vowed to overthrow Obote by means of a popular rebellion. Several other underground groups also emerged to attempt to sabotage the new regime, but they were eventually crushed. Museveni, who had guerrilla war experience with FRELIMO in Mozambique, campaigned in rural areas hostile to Obote’s government, especially central and western Buganda and the western regions of Ankole and Bunyoro. Hostilities began on February 6, 1981, with an NRA attack on an army installation in the central Mubende District.

Museveni’s NRA attracted members from western Uganda. Also working to oust Obote were the Former Uganda National Army (FUNA), most of whose members had served under Amin, and the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF), which drew members from Amin’s home territory in the northwest. In addition, the Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM) and the Federal Democratic Movement of Uganda (FEDEMU), both based primarily in Buganda, opposed Obote.

The Obote government’s 4-year military effort to destroy its challengers resulted in vast areas of devastation and perhaps greater loss of life than during the 8 years of Amin's rule. Obote’s Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) had many Acholi and Langi who had been hastily enrolled with minimal training and little sense of discipline. Although they were survivors of Amin’s genocidal purges of northeast Uganda, in the 1980s they were armed and in uniform, conducting similar actions against Bantu-speaking Ugandans in the south, with whom they appeared to feel no empathy or even pity.

The UNLA mounted counterinsurgency operations in numerous areas, including Arua and Moyo in the northwest, Karamoja in the northeast, and Luwero north of Kampala. The army, whose ranks were filled with poorly trained, poorly clothed, poorly fed, and irregularly paid soldiers, had almost no ability to sustain operations. The government’s inability to maintain discipline over the armed forces allowed many units to degenerate into unruly gangs. The military perpetrated numerous human rights violations and engaged in theft, looting, assault, and holding civilians for ransom.

In early 1983, to eliminate rural support for Museveni’s guerrillas the area of Luwero District, north of Kampala, was targeted for a massive population removal affecting almost 750,000 people. These artificially created refugees were packed into several internment camps subject to military control, which in reality meant military abuse. Civilians outside the camps, in what came to be known as the Luwero Triangle, were presumed to be guerrillas or sympathizers and were treated accordingly. The farms of this highly productive agricultural area were looted; civilian loss of life was extensive.

The army concentrated on the northwestern corner of Uganda, in what was then West Nile District. Bordering Sudan, West Nile had provided the ethnic base for much of Amin’s earlier support and had enjoyed relative prosperity under his rule. Having born the brunt of Amin’s anti-Acholi massacres in previous years, Acholi soldiers avenged themselves on inhabitants of Amin’s home region. In pursuit of remnants of Amin’s army in the northwest, UNLA troops killed thousands of civilians. According to a 1983 UN report, this reign of terror forced an estimated 260,000 refugees to flee to Sudan and Zaire. In the northeast, cattle rustlers acquired automatic weapons and ammunition, which they used on raids in neighboring districts as well as southern Sudan and Kenya. In response to these raids, the UNLA and Kenyan authorities mounted a pacification campaign, which resulted in the eradication or displacement of most of southern Karamoja’s population by mid-1984.

Despite these activities, Obote’s government, unlike Amin’s regime, was sensitive to its international image and realized the importance of securing foreign aid for the nation’s economic recovery. Obote had sought and followed the advice of the International Monetary Fund, even though the austerity measures ran counter to his own ideology. He devalued the Uganda shilling, attempted to facilitate the export of cash crops, and postponed any plans for reestablishing one-party rule.

The government's inability to eliminate Museveni sapped its economic strength, and the occupation of a large part of the country by an army hostile to the Ugandans living there furthered discontent with the regime. Abductions by the police, as well as the detentions and disappearances so characteristic of the Amin period, recurred. In place of torture at the infamous State Research Bureau at Nakasero, victims met the same fate at so-called Nile Mansions. Amnesty International issued a report of routine torture of civilian detainees at military barracks across southern Uganda. Obote, once seen by the donor community as the one man with the experience and will to restore Uganda's fortunes, now appeared to be a liability to recovery. Despite its many illegal activities, the UNLA’s atrocities in the Luwero Triangle attracted the most international attention. In 1980 the inhabitants of this region had welcomed Museveni’s NRA. The Luwero Triangle became known for its devastation.

In this deteriorating military and economic situation, Obote subordinated other matters to a military victory over Museveni. North Korean military advisers were invited to take part against the NRA rebels in what was to be a final campaign that won neither British nor United States approval.

By mid-1985, the demoralized UNLA began to disintegrate. The failure to defeat the NRA, which had emerged as the strongest anti-government guerrilla group, widened the gulf between the army and the Obote regime. The army was war-weary, and after the death of the highly capable General Oyite Ojok in a helicopter accident at the end of 1983, it began to split along ethnic lines. Acholi soldiers complained that they were given too much frontline action and too few rewards for their services. Obote delayed appointing a successor to Ojok for as long as possible. In the end, he appointed a Langi to the post. Obote's promotion of Opon Acak, a junior officer from Obote’s home region of Lango, to army chief of staff alienated much of the Acholi-dominated officer corps. Obote attempted to counter the objection of Acholi officers by spying on them, reviving his old paramilitary counterweight, the mostly Langi Special Force Units, and thus repeating some of the actions that led to his overthrow by Amin in 1971.

As if determined to replay the 1971 events, Obote once again left the capital after giving orders for the arrest of a leading Acholi commander, Brigadier Basilio Olara Okello, who mobilized troops and entered Kampala on July 27, 1985. According to Okello, he launched the coup “to stop the bloodshed; to create conditions for viable peace, unity, development, and the promotion of human rights”. Obote, with a large entourage, fled to Zambia. This time, unlike the last, Obote allegedly took much of the national treasury with him.

Before Oyite Ojok died, the NRA was nearly defeated, with Museveni in exile in Sweden. Following the UNLA infighting and the coup against Obote, the NRA’s war gained momentum. In December 1985, Okello’s government signed a peace deal, the Nairobi Agreement, with the NRA. However, the ceasefire broke down almost immediately, and in January 1986, Salim Saleh commanded NRA’s assault on Kampala, which led to the demise of Okello’s regime – with Museveni becoming president. NRA became the national army, and was renamed Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF).

[Ennath]

February 7, 1991
Downing Street Mortar Attack

During the Troubles, the Provisional IRA had repeatedly used homemade mortars against targets in Northern Ireland. The IRA had carried out many attacks in England, but had not used mortars there. However, in December 1988, items used in their construction and technical details were found during a raid in Battersea, South London by members of the Metropolitan Police Anti-Terrorist Branch.

In the late 1980s British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was top of the IRA’s list for assassination; following the failed attempt on her life in Brighton in 1984. Security around Downing Street had been stepped up following increased IRA activity in England in 1988, including the addition of a police guard post and security gates at the end of the street. Plans to leave a car bomb on a street near Downing Street and detonate it by remote control as Thatcher’s official car was driving by had been ruled out by the IRA’s Army Council owing to the likelihood of civilian casualties, which some Army Council members argued would have been politically counter-productive.

The Army Council instead sanctioned a mortar attack on Downing Street, and in mid-1990 2 IRA members travelled to London to plan the attack. An active service unit bought a Ford Transit van and rented a garage, and an IRA coordinator procured the explosives and materials needed to make the mortars. The IRA unit began making the weapons and cutting a hole in the roof of the van for the mortars to be fired through. They reconnoitered locations in Whitehall to find a suitable place to fire at the back of 10 Downing Street, the Prime Minister’s official residence and office. Once preparations were complete the two IRA members returned to Ireland, as the leadership considered them valuable personnel and did not wish to risk them being arrested in any follow-up operation by the security services. In November 1990 Margaret Thatcher unexpectedly resigned, but the Army Council decided the planned attack should still go ahead, targeting her successor John Major. The IRA planned to attack when Major and his ministers were likely to be meeting at Downing Street, and waited until the date of a planned cabinet meeting was publicly known.

On the morning of February 7, 1991, the War Cabinet and senior government and military officials were meeting at Downing Street to discuss the Gulf War. As the meeting began, an IRA member was driving the van to the bombardment site amid a heavy snowfall. The site was at the junction of Horse Guards Avenue and Whitehall, near the Ministry of Defense, about 200 yards from Downing Street.

On arrival, the driver parked the van and left the scene on a waiting motorcycle. Several minutes later at 10:08 AM, as a policeman was walking towards the van to investigate, 3 mortar shells were fired, followed by the explosion of a pre-set incendiary device. This device was designed to destroy any forensic evidence and set the van on fire. 2 shells landed on Mountbatten Green, a grassy area near the Foreign and Commonwealth Office; 1 exploded and the other failed to detonate. The 3rd shell exploded in the back garden of 10 Downing Street, 30 yards from the office where the cabinet was meeting. On hearing the explosion the cabinet ducked under the table for cover. Bomb-proof netting on the windows of the cabinet office muffled the force of the explosion, which scorched the back wall, smashed windows and made a crater several feet deep in the garden.

Once the sound of the explosion and aftershock had died down, John Major said, “I think we had better start again, somewhere else.” The room was evacuated and the meeting reconvened less than 10 minutes later in the Cobra Room (a crisis response meeting location). No members of the cabinet were hurt, but 4 people received minor injuries, including 2 police officers injured by flying debris. Immediately after the attack, hundreds of police officers sealed off the government district, from the Houses of Parliament to Trafalgar Square. Until 6 PM, civilians were kept out as forensic experts combed the streets, and government employees were locked in behind security gates.

The IRA claimed responsibility for the attack with a statement issued in Dublin, saying “Let the British government understand that, while nationalist people in the six counties [Northern Ireland] are forced to live under British rule, then the British Cabinet will be forced to meet in bunkers”. Major told the House of Commons that “Our determination to beat terrorism cannot be beaten by terrorism. The IRA’s record is one of failure in every respect, and that failure was demonstrated yet again today. It's about time they learned that democracies cannot be intimidated by terrorism, and we treat them with contempt”.

The attack was celebrated in Irish rebel popular culture when The Irish Brigade released a song titled “Downing Street”, to the tune of “On the Street Where You Live”, which included the lyrics “while you hold Ireland, it's not safe down the street where you live”.

[Ennath]

500
Frankish-Burgundian War

By around 500 AD, the Frankish king Clovis ruled a large part of northern Gaul. He had inherited a smaller kingdom based in Flanders and had successfully expanded into the area north of the Loire, and had also conquered the Alemanni. The Burgundians were now one of his southern neighbors, with a kingdom based on the Rhone (although without access to the sea).

The Burgundians didn't have a single monarch during this period. King Gundowech (or Gondioc) had ruled until his death in 473. He was followed by his brother Chilperic I, but also left 4 sons - Gundobar (or Gundobad), Godegesil, Chilperic II and Godomar - who appear to have shared power with Chilperic I. Their uncle was Ricimer, one of the last men to hold real power in the Western Roman Empire (see posting). Gundobar had briefly succeeded to Ricimer’s position, but left the Roman court in 473 or 474 to return home. According to Gregory of Tours, Gundobar promptly killed Godomar and Chilperic II, and so after the death of Chilperic I in 480 only had to share power with Godegesil.

Clovis had a direct connection to the Burgundian royal family. His wife Clotilde was the daughter of Chilperic II, and so if Gregory’s story is correct would have had little love for Gundobar. Although Gregory of Tours doesn’t provide a date for this conflict the chronicle of Marius Aventicensis (written around 581) dates the fight to 500 AD.

By 500, Gundobar and Godegesil were at war with each other. Perhaps inevitably one of the brothers turned to their powerful neighbor Clovis for aid - in this case Godegesil, who promised to pay an annual tribute if Clovis helped him either kill his brother in battle or expel him from Burgundy. Clovis accepted this offer and led his army into Burgundy. Gundobar was unaware of his brother’s role in this, and sent a message to him suggesting that they should unite against the Frankish invader. Godegesil promised to come to his aid, but when the 3 armies came together on the River Ouche, Godegesil revealed his true colors and sided with Clovis. The allies crushed Gundobar’s army, but Gundobar himself escaped and fled south to Avignon.

In the aftermath of this battle Godegesil promised to give Clovis part of the kingdom, and then left to enter Vienne in triumph. This would prove to be a fatal mistake. Clovis pursued Gundobar and besieged Avignon. Godegesil would have been wiser to accompany Clovis. Avignon held out staunchly against Clovis, who didn’t have a siege train. One of Gundobar’s advisors pretended to desert him, and convinced Clovis to accept an annual tribute in return for leaving Gundobar as joint king of the Burgundians. Some Franks remained with Godegesil, although it isn’t clear what their role was.

Gundobar paid the first year's tribute, but after that refused to pay any more. He then raised an army and attacked his brother Godegesil, who took refuge at Vienne. The date of these events is unclear - Gregory of Tours doesn't say how long a gap there was between the siege of Avignon and the siege of Vienne, but it would seem likely that a year must have passed for the time for the second tribute to have passed. However our only dating evidence comes from the chronicle of Marius Aventicensis, who dated the battle of the Ouche and the siege of Avignon to 500 AD, and he places the siege of Vienne in the same year as the previous fighting. In this version of events the failure to pay the second installment of the tribute could reflect increased confidence after Gundobar’s victory.

A lengthy siege appears to have followed, with Gundobar replying on a blockade to starve out his brother. This plan succeeded quicker than Gundobar could have expected. When food began to run short in Vienne Godegesil expelled the common people; rather carelessly he included the man in charge of the aqueduct that brought water into the city. This man went to Gundobar and promised to show him a way in. A party of troops were led along the aqueduct, taking iron crowbars so they could force their way past a vent that blocked the route.

Presumably, Gundobar launched a feint against the walls to distract the defenders, because when the party from the aqueduct emerged into the city the defenders were on the walls. With attackers inside, the defenders had little chance. Gundobar’s men were able to seize the gates and let the army waiting outside into the city. A battle broke out in the streets, and Gundobar’s men were soon victorious. Godegesil took refuge in the Arian cathedral, but both he and the Arian bishop were killed.

The party of Franks that had been with Godegesil was trapped in a tower. Gundobar treated them with some leniency. They were captured and sent into exile with Alaric II of the Visigoths, at Toulouse (it is interesting that they weren’t sent to Clovis). Gundobar killed those senators of Vienne who had supported his brother. A few years later Gundobar attempted to take advantage of Clovis’ defeat of the Visigoths at Vouillé (507, see posting), but came off worse in the fighting that followed and was unable to expand south into Provence, although he did retain his throne.