The Military History Thread

[Ennath]

July 19, 1969
GreenIsland Raid

During the War of Attrition (1967-70), the declared Egyptian intention was to wear Israel down by constant, small-scale attacks on positions along the Suez Canal. On July 10, 1969, Egyptian commandos made their way across the Canal in dinghies and mounted a bloody attack on the Israeli position at Mezach on the East Bank. 7 Israelis were killed and 5 wounded, and others were taken back to Egypt as prisoners. Many of the Israeli soldiers serving along the Canal were reservists, concerned about their wives, children and jobs. Morale took a hit. The Egyptian raid merited a sharp response.

The IDF gave the responsibility of retaliation to Flotilla 13, the Israeli naval commando unit. The General Staff demanded “a response that would strike at the soul of Egyptian morale as the assault on Mezach had caused Israeli morale to suffer. The Israelis decided that Egypt’s most fortified position in the Suez Canal zone - Green Island - would have to be assaulted. Lt Col. Zeev Almog, chief of Flotilla 13, felt that the raid would require 40 men. However, his unit only comprised 30, mainly due to Almog’s extraordinarily demanding training standards. They were supplemented by troops from the secret Sayaret Matkal General Staff commando unit.

Green Island, or Al Jazeera Al Khadraa, was a fortress built by British forces during World War II. Located 2.5 miles south of the city of Suez and the mouth of the Suez Canal, it was a series of concrete bunkers sitting atop an 8-foot-high seawall, ringed by razor wire three rolls deep. At the end of the island, a concrete bridge jutted out into the water toward a circular five-yard high tower supporting a radar site and two heavy AA machine guns. Only 476 feet long and 160 feet wide, the island was heavily defended. Its garrison consisted of approximately 70 Egyptian infantrymen and 12 As-Sa'iqa commandos, 14 machine guns, two 37-mm AA guns, and four 85-mm AA guns. It was considered by the Egyptians to be impregnable.

Almog had reconnoitered the area several times himself, and he knew that there was only one way Green Island could be approached - underwater. Any above-water approach was doomed to fail, as the Egyptians had carefully covered all approaches to the island, and they were well-entrenched. The naval commandos could swim underwater for several hours, well-loaded with combat gear, and emerge suddenly right at the Egyptians’ doorstep. The Sayeret Matkal men were not trained for underwater operations, so they would have to remain safely away from the target until Flotilla 13 unit had arrived on the beach. Only when the beachhead was secured would the Sayeret Matkal, moored 1500 yards away, be called in. And in that period, the naval commandos would have to cut a passage through the barbed wire defenses for the Sayeret Matkal force.

The night before the task force headed out to Green Island, they trained and reviewed their roles. They made sure, as best they could, “that every single inch of Green Island was etched in the back of their minds as unforgettable fact.” They left base on the East Bank at 7:45 PM, July19. Each commando was equipped with his personal weapon, ammunition reserves, grenades, first-aid equipment, canteen and a flashlight, flippers, oxygen tanks, mask and life preserver. At 8:30, the Sayeret Matkal back-up force set out in 12 Zodiacs.

By 1:30 AM the naval commandos, behind schedule, finally reached their target. They still, however, had the element of surprise. At 15 yards from the island the flotilla leader noticed 2 Egyptian sentries. He ordered his men underwater again and told them to remove their diving gear. 5 minutes later, with their equipment safely taken care of, 20 figures emerged from the water and began cutting the wire, while others covered them. However, they were spotted by a sentry. The Egyptians was dropped but the battle was on. As the Egyptians raced out of their barracks the Israeli commandos began cutting them down at close quarters. They hurled smoke grenades at the Egyptian machine-gun nests to temporarily block their vision.

When the Israeli commandos set out for Green Island there was concern about the functioning of their weapons and ammunition after having been submerged underwater for several hours. These were well-founded concerns. Much of their weaponry and ammunition was not operable. Even a squad leader’s radio did not work.

The Sayeret Matkal group was supposed to land with the first rounds of fire from Flotilla 13, but they did not come as planned. Without waiting, the naval commandos raced forward. Some ascended the wall and with what weapons still worked. Many commandos were wounded but advanced in spite of it. As they did not know if the back-up force was going to arrive in time or not, the commandos on shore attacked bunkers “reserved for the Sayeret.” The Egyptians defended their positions staunchly after the surprise wore off. A number of commandos were killed. The Egyptians refused to surrender, holding their positions until they were wiped out.

After only 17 minutes, Flotilla 13 had taken over much of the island. It was only then that the Sayeret Matkal unit arrived. About half of the naval commandos were already wounded. The assault continued. The Israelis controlled the upper section of the island, but they realized that to destroy the whole structure they would need to wipe out the stiff resistance in the courtyard below. This required room-to-room combat. Then the Egyptian artillery on the West Bank opened up, wounding attackers and defenders alike. The Israeli commanders took it as a sign that it was time to get off the island.

At 2:15, Almog ordered the evacuation. The Israeli units had occupied 2/3 of the island. They eliminated remaining Egyptian forces and those who tried to escape. By 2:55 the teams were aboard the Zodiacs and heading for the East bank of the Gulf, having lost one Zodiac at the island to artillery fire. At 3:10, with the Israeli commandos still crossing the Gulf, satchel charges left on the island detonated, destroying the remaining facilities. Egyptian artillery now shelled both the Zodiacs and the beachheads set up to receive them, driving several boats away and delaying their landings while they searched for alternate beaches to divert to. Another Zodiac was lost when it was abandoned by its team less than 400 yards from Green Island, but the team was recovered by helicopter after spending several hours swimming.

Green Island remained a highly classified operation for 25 years. The Israeli commandos wiped out almost the entire garrison, killing 80 men. The Israelis lost 6 men dead and 14 wounded. The raid sent a clear message - even the most secure and well-defended position could be taken out. For months, nervous Egyptian units along the canal would fire at shadows, wondering where the next raid would come.

[Ennath]

1438
Chanca-Inca War

The Chanca were a people in Peru. Enemies of the Incas, they were centered primarily in the modern-day region of Apurímac. The Chancas were divided into 3 groups: the Hanan (or Upper) Chancas, the Urin (or Lower) Chancas, and the Villca (or Hancohuallos). The Hanan Chancas had their center in Andahuaylas, the Urin Chancas in Uranmarca, and the Villca in Vilcas Huaman.

The Chancas encompassed 2 ethnic groups with well-marked characteristics: the Hanan Chancas and the Urin Chackas, who surrendered voluntarily to the Quechua of Cusco (the proto-Incas), as early as 1230, and were not destroyed or subjected to forced land transfers, as were others conquered by the Inca..

According to Inca sources, the Hanan Chancas were bloody in battle. They inflicted cruel punishments on captives to show the enemy that they were not to be messed with, such as scalping, or skinning alive. These prisoners were hung upside down so the blood concentrated in the upper body as they made small cuts on the front of the toes, and from there they began to tear the skin gradually. Another common way to intimidate their enemies was to make cups from the skulls of prisoners, from which they drank the blood of the enemy. (This last was not unknown to the Inca themselves.)

The height of the Chanca expansion occurred between 1200 and 1438. In 1438, the Hanan Chanca leader Anccu Hualloc raised an army of 40,000 and invaded the Quechua Kingdom of Cusco. They brushed aside resistance and moved to encircle the city. The Quechua leader Viracocha and many of the nobility fled to Qullasuyu and were close to giving up until Prince Yupanqui rallied the resistance. A bloody battle was fought in Yawarpampa (“field of blood”), ending in Quechua victory. According to the victors, 22,000 Chancas and 8000 Quechua died at Yawarpampa. Anccu Hualloc was injured and captured. The Hanan Chancas were chased as far as Antahualla (Apurímac). Chanca power was shattered and the Hanan Chanca were subjected and broken up by the victors.

Yupanqui took up sovereign power and founded a new dynasty under the title of Sapa Inca, and embarked on a program of military expansion. The Inca Empire was born.

[Ennath]

July 20, 1860
Battle of Milazzo

In the aftermath of their defeat at Palermo (see posting), the Neapolitans withdrew from most of Sicily. By the second half of June they had 18,000 men at Messina, 2000 at Syracuse, 1000 at Milazzo and 500 in Augusta. Gen. Clary, one of the few effective Neapolitan commanders on the island, was promoted to Marshal and given command of the garrison of Messina. He drew up a plan for a counteroffensive to recapture Catania and then Palermo. This plan was approved, and then almost immediately cancelled by the confused government at Naples, but Clary still made one offensive move, shifting 3000 of his best troops, under Col. Bosco, west along the north coast towards Milazzo. He was ordered to post his men in the villages outside Milazzo to prevent the garrison from being besieged.

While the Neapolitan leaders were trying to decide what to do next, Garibaldi split his growing army into 3 columns and prepared to occupy most of Sicily. Bixio was given the southern column, which crossed the island and then advanced along the south coast towards Syracuse. Cosenz was sent along the inland roads towards Catania. Giacomo Medici was given the northern column and was ordered to move along the road towards Messina.

Bosco and Medici inevitably clashed. Medici was already at the village of Barcellona, west of Milazzo, when Bosco left Messina. The two first met on July 15. Medici, with around 2000 men, decided to offer battle and took up a position at Meri. Bosco, with the 3000 men from Messina, marched towards them, but then decided not to fighter and instead turned north and made for Milazzo. Bosco’s orders did not allow him to instigate a battle, but only to defend himself and it was clear that Medici’s outnumbered men wouldn’t leave their defensive positions.

A period of skirmishing followed. Bosco based in Milazzo and was reinforced by the garrison. Medici occupied a number of outposts near the town, including the hamlets of Archi and Coriolo. Bosco had orders to occupy Archi, and he interpreted them as allowing him to attack in this case. On July 17, he sent 4 companies of infantry under Major Maringh, supported by cavalry and artillery, to take Archi. Maringh won a minor skirmish but then withdrew. He was arrested for his failure and later on the same day a second column, under Lt-Col. Marra, was sent to attack Coriolo. This time Medici’s men had the better of the fighting, but Archi was lost. That night Bosco, believing himself outnumbered, withdrew back into the town. The result of the action was that Bosco was isolated in Milazzo, which was now placed under the blockade he had been sent out to prevent.

Garibaldi and Clary responded very differently to the news from Milazzo. Clary refused to send help, but did sent excuses. In contrast, Garibaldi ordered Cosenz to reinforce Medici, and then left Palermo on a steamship and dashed to the front. Bosco was more active than his commander, and decided to make a stand on the peninsula that linked Milazzo to the mainland. This narrow area was filled with scattered hamlets, cornfield and vineyards, many of which were surrounded by strong walls or thick cactus hedges. Bosco created a strong defensive position here, turning the walls into firing positions by cutting loopholes. The only weaknesses in the defensive lines were the beaches to its east and west and the straight roads that led into the town. Bosco deployed 2500 of his best men in this defensive line, supported by 8 guns and a cavalry squadron. The garrison of 1000 remained in the castle, where they had 40 guns. Finally 400 men were posted on the head of the peninsula to the north of the town to guard against any landings there.

Garibaldi probably had slightly more men by the time all of his reinforcements had joined Medici’s 2000, perhaps 4500 in all, but they started the day with 2 cannons, neither of which played much part in the fighting. There was no cavalry, and many of the newer troops had little or no military experience or training. They did have better weapons than earlier in the campaign, their old muskets having been replaced with Enfield rifles.

The battle began soon after dawn on July 20. Garibaldi’s men attacked all along the line. They captured San Pietro in the center of the line without any fighting, while on the right a force of Lombards pressed along the eastern beach. On the left a force of Tuscan volunteers under Malenchini ran into the Neapolitan guns and was driven off. Bosco ordered a pursuit, and his right wing advanced almost a mile. Garibaldi sent Cosenz deal with this crisis, while he took part in the attack on the right. Cosenz was able to rally the Tuscans and partly restore the situation, but was unable to advance.

On the right the Garibladians slowly forced the Neapolitans to pull back, but at heavy cost. Eventually, by the early afternoon, Bosco had been forced back to his last position outside Milazzo. This was at the point where the main road along the eastern beach crossed a bridge over a culvert leading to the sea, and was close to a tunny-pickling factory on the shore. Bosco had posted 2 of his 8 guns here, but Garibaldi was able to call on some last reserves and managed to take the position. One of the guns was captured.

At this point Garibaldi’s habit of putting himself in the front line almost caused a disaster. Bosco ordered his cavalry to retake the lost gun. They charged along the road out of the town and scattered Garibaldi’s men. The cavalry then found itself dangerously isolated amongst scattered enemies, and was forced to retire. As they retreated they found Garibaldi and one of his aides alone in the road, and a fierce melee followed. Garibaldi and his aide Missori managed to fight off this last attack, and the cavalry retreated into the town.

At this point the front line had rotated counter-clockwise. Bosco’s men had advanced in the west but been forced to retreat in the east. Garibaldi’s men were holding their positions on both flanks, but the troops on the right suffered heavy losses as they came under small arms fire from the town gate and cannon fire from the castle. Garibaldi ordered most of his men to take shelter in the tunny factory, while others kept up a harassing fire against the garrison. This pause in the east lasted for about 2 hours.

While his men were sheltering on the right, Garibaldi moved to the left. He now had a small navy, made up of the Tüköry, a 10-gun paddle steamer that had deserted from the Neapolitan Navy. This ship arrived off the coast at Milazzo on the afternoon of the battle. Garibaldi was rowed out to his warship and ordered it to open fire on the victorious Neapolitan right. This naval bombardment, combined with news from their left, forced the Neapolitans to retreat, and the Garibaldians were able to advance up to the town. After 8 hours of hard fighting, Bosco had been forced out of all of his defensive positions and was now under siege in the town. He reported his losses in the fighting at 150 men, but his army was now badly demoralized. He decided not to try and hold the town and instead moved his entire army into the castle. Garibadi had lost about 750 men.

At about 4 PM, the Garibaldians entered the town and found that it was undefended. They moved into the town, built barricades to guard against any sortie from the castle, and prepared for a blockade. Bosco still held a strong position, for Garibaldi lacked any siege guns, but there were few supplies in the castle, and the morale of the defenders began to crumble. Clary, at Messina, had more than enough men to come to Bosco’s aid, but no such effort was made. Clary and Bosco were able to communicate by semaphore, and passed discouraging messages between themselves, all intercepted by Garibaldi’s men.

The government in Naples also briefly considered sending a relief force, but the Navy refused to cooperate and instead they sent a transport fleet with orders to evacuate the garrison. This fleet arrived on July 23, and a capitulation was quickly negotiated. The garrison marched out with their arms and half of their mules, while the cannons in the castle, their ammunition, all of their horses and their remaining mules were left behind. The garrison marched out of the castle on July 25 and was shipped to Messina.

Garibaldi followed close behind. His men entered Messina without opposition, despite still being outnumbered by the garrison. On July 28 Clary signed an armistice in which he agreed to restrict his men to the castle and not to open fire on Garibaldi’s men or ships. This removed the last major obstacle on Sicily to Garibaldi’s crossing to the mainland. There was a risk that Britain and France would prevent the crossing, but this was averted by Cavour’s diplomacy, and on the night of August 18-19, Garibaldi slipped past the Neapolitan Navy and crossed to the mainland.

[Ennath]

July 21, 1861
1st Battle of Bull Run

In the wake of the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter, President Lincoln called for 75,000 men to aid in putting down the rebellion. While this action saw additional states leave the Union, it also began a flow of men and material into Washington, DC. The growing body of troops in the capital was ultimately organized in to the Army of Northeastern Virginia. To lead this force, Gen. Winfield Scott was compelled by political forces to select Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell. A career staff officer, McDowell had never led men in combat, but Lincoln and Scott urged him to attack Virginia at the first opportunity. McDowell felt his volunteer army was insufficiently trained to take the field. Lincoln urged him on with the words “You are green. They are green. You are both green together”.

Assembling around 35,000 men, McDowell was supported to the west by Maj. Gen. Robert Patterson and a force of 18,000. Opposing the Union commanders were two Confederate armies led by Brig. Gens. P.G.T. Beauregard and Joseph Johnston. The victor of Fort Sumter, Beauregard led the 22,000-man Confederate Army of the Potomac which was centered near Manassas Junction. To the west, Johnston was tasked with defending the Shenandoah Valley with a force of around 12,000. The two Confederate commands were linked by the Manassas Gap Railroad which would allow one to support the other if attacked.

As Manassas Junction also provided access to the Orange & Alexandria Railroad, which led into the heart of Virginia, it was critical that Beauregard hold the position. To defend the junction, Confederate troops began fortifying the fords to the northeast over Bull Run. Aware that the Confederates could shift troops along the Manassas Gap Railroad, Union planners dictated that any advance by McDowell be supported by Patterson with the goal of pinning Johnston in place. Under heavy pressure from the government to win a victory in northern Virginia, McDowell departed Washington on July 16, 1861. Patterson had begun moving on the 6th.

McDowell immediately encountered significant difficulties. There were no reliable maps of northern Virginia available. The ground had to be scouted by staff officers and units that had no experience of this role. Other than a small battalion of Marines, some artillery batteries and a scattering of officers, none of the Federal regiments had experience of marching under load, maneuvering in battle, managing their rations, camping in the field or, in many instances, even firing their weapons. Lincoln had been correct in saying that the army was green, but he was wrong to comment that the Confederates had the same problem. Virtually all the Confederate volunteer regiments were recruited from rural communities where the use of firearms was second nature from childhood. While still a small number, the officers from the pre-war regular army made up a higher proportion of regimental officers in the Confederate Army than they did in the Federal Army. It was significantly easier to defend a position with inexperienced troops, as fell to Beauregard, than to make a complicated approach march and attack, the task faced by McDowell.

Moving west with his army, he intended to make a diversionary attack against the Bull Run line with 2 columns while a 3rd swung south around the Confederate right to cut their line of retreat to Richmond. Enduring extreme summer weather, McDowell's men moved slowly and camped at Centerville on July 18. Beauregard had been warned of the Federal advance by a Confederate spy in Washington, Mrs. Rose O’Neal Greenhow, and other sources. The Confederates lay in prepared positions behind Bull Run, the stream that flowed round Manassas providing a defensive barrier. Confederate positions stretched from Stone Bridge, where the Warrenton Pike crossed Bull Run, to Union Mills Ford in the South, covering some 5 major fords. Beauregard did not intend to remain on the defensive. His intention was to advance across Bull Run and swing around behind McDowell’s left flank as the Federal Army advanced to attack him.

Searching for the Confederate flank, McDowell dispatched Daniel Tyler’s division south to demonstrate at Blackburn’s Ford in the middle of the Confederate position. Tyler’s orders were to not become involved in a full battle. The aim was to act as a diversion and to pin the Confederates to the upstream fords while the main Federal force crossed Bull Run. Nevertheless, the skirmish soon developed into a full attack on Longstreet’s brigade entrenched on the far bank. The Federals were forced to withdraw in the afternoon.

While Tyler’s action was under way, McDowell saw that the country south of the Warrenton Pike was too dense for his army to move easily to outflank the Confederate right. He therefore switched his outflanking maneuver to the Confederate left. His new plan called for Tyler’s division to advance west along the Warrenton Turnpike and conduct a diversionary assault across the Stone Bridge. The divisions of David Hunter and Samuel Heintzelman would swing north, cross Bull Run at Sudley Springs Ford, and descend on the Confederate rear. To the west, Patterson was proving a timid commander. Deciding that Patterson would not attack, Johnston began shifting his men east on July 19.

By July 20, most of Johnston's men had arrived and were situated near Blackburn’s Ford. Assessing the situation, Beauregard intended to attack north towards Centerville. This plan was preempted early on the morning of July 21 when Union guns began shelling his headquarters at the McLean House near Mitchell’s Ford as McDowell’s attack got underway. Crowds of onlookers from Washington were camped nearby to view the action, using the battle as an excuse for a picnic.

Despite having crafted a good plan, McDowell’s attack was soon beset with issues due to poor scouting and the overall inexperience of his men. While Tyler’s men reached the Stone Bridge around 6:00 AM, the flanking columns were hours behind due to poor roads leading to Sudley Springs. Union troops began crossing the ford around 9:30 and pushed south. Holding the Confederate left was the 1100-man brigade of Nathan Evans. Dispatching troops to contain Tyler at the Stone Bridge, he was alerted to the flanking movement by a semaphore communication. Shifting around 900 men northwest, he assumed a position on Matthews Hill and was reinforced by Barnard Bee and Francis Bartow. From this position they were able to slow the advance of Hunter’s lead brigade under Ambrose Burnside.

This line collapsed around 11:30, when the brigade of William Sherman struck their right. Falling back in disorder, they assumed a new position on Henry House Hill under the protection of Confederate artillery. Though possessing momentum, McDowell did not push forward, but instead brought up artillery to shell the enemy from Dogan Ridge. This pause allowed Thomas Jackson’s Virginia Brigade to reach the hill. Positioned on the reverse slope of the hill, they were unseen by the Union commanders. Controversially, Jackson had not responded to Bee’s urgings to bring his brigade forward into the fighting on Matthew’s Hill. In the course of this action, Jackson earned the nickname "Stonewall" from Bee though the latter’s precise meaning remains unclear. (As Jackson remained concealed, Bee returned to the remains of his battered brigade and commented that Jackson was standing like a “Stone Wall”. There is reasonably convincing evidence that Bee’s comment was a complaint not a compliment. Bee died in the battle so the only source for the comment was his chief of staff.)

Once the Federals moved onto Henry’s Hill, Jackson’s brigade advanced to the attack. The focus of the fighting was the exposed Federal gun line. The guns were too advanced to operate effectively and Confederate rifle and gunfire killed the gunners and horses. The guns were captured and retaken in a number of attacks by the infantry of each side. In the course of the fighting, there were several issues of unit recognition as uniforms and flags had not been standardized.

On Henry House Hill, Jackson's men turned back numerous attacks, while additional reinforcements arrived on both sides. Johnston and Beauregard realized that the crisis of the battle was around Henry’s Hill and directed Confederate brigades from the positions behind the Bull Run fords around Manassas into line with Jackson on and around Henry’s Hill. The brigades of Jubal Early and Kirby Smith came up on the left of the Confederate line and beyond the Federal right at about 4:00. About that same time, Oliver Howard arrived on the field with his Federal brigade and took a position on the Union right. He soon came under heavy attack by Smith and Early; his flank was shattered and his brigade driven from the field. The pressure on their right caused the Union line to waver. Col. J.E.B. Stuart took his regiment of Virginia cavalry in a charge that overwhelmed a New York regiment. Beauregard ordered a general advance.

The Federal line began to dissolve and the regiments withdraw across Sudley Ford and the Stone Bridge, initially in reasonable order. The Confederates were in no condition to press the retreat although their guns maintained a fire on the Federal regiments. At some stage, possibly as the Federal regiments reached the crossing over Cub Run, the retreat dissolved into a rout with the troops streaming back in disorder. A small number of units, particularly the Marines and the gun batteries maintained order and covered the retreat of the volunteer regiments.

Urged on by Jefferson Davis, Johnston and Beauregard dispatched the brigades of Bonham and Longstreet across Bull Run to intercept the Federal army by cutting the Warrenton Pike. Richardson’s Federal brigade presented a firm front and Federal artillery opened a bombardment which was sufficient to deter the Confederates from pressing the move. Small groups of Confederates continued the pursuit, capturing troops as well as dignitaries who had come from Washington to watch the battle. They also succeeded in hampering the retreat by causing a wagon to overturn on the bridge over Cub Run, blocking Union traffic.

Union forces lost 460 killed, 1124 wounded, and 1312 captured/missing, while the Confederates incurred 387 killed, 1582 wounded, and 13 missing. The remnants of McDowell’s army flowed back into Washington and for some time there was concern that the city would be attacked. The defeat stunned the North, which had expected an easy victory, and led many to believe that the war would be long and costly.

Bull Run led the Southern States to hope and expect that they would win the war. Both sides dug in for a long struggle. Lincoln signed a bill for the raising of an army of 500,000 men, enlisted for 3 years in place of the 3 month volunteers. McDowell was replaced by George McClellan as commander of the Federal Army in Washington. Beauregard was promoted to full General in the Confederate Army.

[Ennath]

July 22, 1691
Battle of Aughrim

The Jacobite position in Ireland in the summer of 1691 was a defensive one. In the previous year, they had retreated behind the River Shannon, which acted as an enormous moat around the province of Connacht, with strongholds at Sligo, Athlone and Limerick guarding the routes into Connacht. From this position, the Jacobites hoped to receive aid from Louis XIV of France via the port towns and eventually be in a position to retake the rest of Ireland.

Godard van Ginkel, Baron Reede, the Williamites’ Dutch general, had breached this line by crossing the Shannon at Athlone - taking the town after a bloody siege. The Marquis de St Ruth (Charles Chalmont), the French Jacobite general, moved too slowly to save Athlone, as he had to gather his troops from their quarters and raise new ones from rapparee bands (guerrilla fighters named for the half-pikes many were armed with) and the levies of Irish landowners. Ginkel marched through Ballinasloe, on the main road towards Limerick and Galway, before he found his way blocked by St Ruth’s army at Aughrim on July 22. Both armies were about 20,000 men strong. The soldiers of St Ruth’s army were mostly Irish Catholic, with a few French, while Ginkel’s were English, Scottish, Danish, Dutch and French Huguenot (members of William III’s League of Augsburg) and Irish Protestants.

The Jacobite position at Aughrim was quite strong. St Ruth had drawn up his infantry along the crest of a ridge known as Kilcommadan Hill. The hill was lined with small stone walls and hedgerows which marked the boundaries of farmers’ fields, but which could also be improved and then used as earthworks for the Jacobite infantry. The left was bounded by a bog, through which there was only one causeway, overlooked by Aughrim village and a ruined castle. On the other, open, flank, St Ruth placed his best infantry under his second-in-command, the Chevalier de Tessé, and most of his cavalry, under Patrick Sarsfield.

The battle started with Ginkel trying to assault the open flank of the Jacobite position; this attack ground to a halt after determined Jacobite counterattacks and the Williamites halted and dug in behind stakes driven into the ground to protect against cavalry. The French Huguenot forces committed here found themselves in low ground exposed to Jacobite fire and took a great number of casualties. This area is still known locally as the Bloody Hollow. In the center, the Williamite infantry under Hugh Mackay tried a frontal assault on the Jacobite infantry on Kilcommadan Hill. The Williamite troops, mainly English and Scots, had to take each line of trenches, only to find that the Irish had fallen back and were firing from the next line. The Williamite infantry attempted 3 assaults, the first of which penetrated furthest. Eventually, the final Williamite assault was driven back by cavalry with heavy losses and pursued into the bog, where more were killed or drowned. In the rout, the pursuing Jacobites manage to spike a battery of Williamite guns.

This left Ginkel with only one option, to try to force a way through the causeway on the Jacobite left. This should have been an impregnable position, with the attackers concentrated into a narrow lane and covered by the defenders of the castle. However, the Irish troops here were short on ammunition. Mackay directed this assault, consisting mainly of cavalry, in 2 groups - one along the causeway and one parallel to the south. The Jacobites stalled this attack with heavy fire from the castle, but then found that their reserve ammunition, which was British-made, would not fit into the muzzles of their French-supplied muskets. The Williamites then charged again with a reasonably fresh regiment of Anglo-Dutch cavalry under the Huguenot Henri de Massue. Faced with only weak fire, they crossed the causeway and reached Aughrim village with few casualties. A force of Jacobite cavalry under Henry Luttrell had been held in reserve to cover this flank. However, rather than counterattacking, their commander ordered them to withdraw, following a route now known locally as Luttrell’s Pass. Henry Luttrell was alleged to have been in the pay of the Williamites and was assassinated in Dublin after the war. The castle quickly fell and its Jacobite garrison surrendered.

The Marquis de St Ruth, after the third infantry rush on the Williamite position up to their cannons, appeared to believe that the battle could be won and was heard to shout, “they are running, we will chase them back to the gates of Dublin”. However, as he tried to rally his cavalry on the left to drive the Williamite horse back, he was decapitated by a cannonball. At this point, the Jacobite position collapsed quickly. Their horsemen, demoralized by the death of their commander, fled the field, leaving the left flank open for the Williamites to funnel more troops into and envelope the Jacobite line. The Jacobites on the right, seeing the situation was hopeless, also began to melt away, although Sarsfield did try to organize a rearguard action. This left the Jacobite infantry on Killcommadan Hill completely exposed and surrounded. They were slaughtered by the Williamite cavalry as they tried to get away, many having thrown away their weapons in order to run faster.

Estimates of losses vary. Some recent studies put the Williamite dead as high as 3000, but they are more generally given as 1-2000, with 4000 Jacobites killed. However the Williamite death toll released at the time was only 600 and they claimed to have killed fully 7000 Jacobites. Many of the Jacobite dead were officers, who were very difficult to replace. On top of that, another 4000 Jacobites either deserted or were taken prisoner, and those remaining had lost the better part of their equipment and supplies.

Aughrim was the decisive battle of the Williamite war in Ireland. The city of Galway surrendered without a fight after the battle, on advantageous terms, and the Jacobites’ main army surrendered shortly afterwards at Limerick after a short siege.

Since it marked the end of the Catholic Jacobite resistance, Aughrim was the focus of Loyalist (particularly Orange Order) celebrations in Ireland on July 22 up until the early 19th century. Thereafter, it was superseded by the Battle of the Boyne (see posting) in commemorations. The battlefield site became the subject of a more recent controversy over plans to build the new M6 motorway through the former battlefield. Historians, environmentalists and members of the Orange Order objected to the destruction of the 1691 battlefield. The motorway opened in 2009.

[Ennath]

1791
Sino-Nepalese War

Tibet had been using Nepali coins since the time of the Malla kings. When Prithvi Narayan Shah launched an economic blockade on the Kathmandu Valley during his unification campaign, Jaya Prakash Malla of Kathmandu faced an economic crisis which he tried to alleviate by minting lower quality of coins mixed with copper. After Prithvi Narayan Shah successfully conquered the Kathmandu Valley and firmly established the rule of the Shah Dynasty in Nepal, he reverted to minting pure silver coins. But by then the damage to confidence in the Nepalese coins had already been done. The Tibetans demanded that all the impure coins in circulation be replaced by pure silver ones, a demand that would place a huge financial burden on the newly founded Shah dynasty. Prithivi Narayan Shah was not willing to bear such a huge loss over a matter for which he was not responsible, but was willing to vouch for the purity of the newly minted coins. The case remained unresolved due to his untimely demise in 1775. Queen Mother Rajendra Laxmi, the Regent of minor King Rana Bahadur Shah, inherited the coinage problem.

By 1788 Bahadur Shah, the youngest son of Prithivi Narayan Shah, and the uncle and now regent for Rana Bahadur Shah, had inherited the problem. On the plea of counterfeited coins, Tibet started spreading rumors that it was in a position to attack Nepal. Nepalese merchants in Tibet were harassed. Another sore point was Nepal’s decision to provide refuge to the Shamarpa Lama, Mipam Chödrup Gyamtso, with his 14 Tibetan followers, who had fled from Tibet on religious and political grounds. Yet another cause for conflict was the low quality salt being provided by Tibetans to Nepal. In those days all the salt came from Tibet. A Nepalese delegation was sent to Tibet to resolve these issues, but the Nepalese demands were rejected. The Nepalese found the quarrel over coinage a good pretext to expand their kingdom and to raid the rich monasteries in Tibet.

In 1788, Bahadur Shah sent Gurkha troops under the joint command of Damodar Pande and Bam Shah to attack Tibet. The Gurkha troops entered Tibet through Kuti and reached as far as Tashilhunpo (about 250 miles from Kuti). A fierce battle was fought at Shikarjong, in which the Tibetans were badly defeated. The Panchen Lama and Sakya Lama then requested talks. The Gurkhas pulled back to Kuti and Kerung.

When the Qianlong Emperor of China heard the news of the invasion of Tibet, he sent a large army under the command of General Chanchu. Chanchu was briefed on the situation by Tibetan lamas and decdied to remain until the dispute was settled. Peace talks took placed at Khiru in 1789. Tibet was held responsible for the quarrel and was required to pay compensation to Nepal for the losses incurred in the war. Tibet had also to pay tribute every year in return for Nepalese evacuation of captured territories. The first installment of tribute was paid and the Gurkhas withdrew. However, a year later, Tibet refused to continue tribute payments. The war resumed in 1791.

Bahadur Shah sent a force under Abhiman Singh Basnet to Kerung and another Damodar Pande to Kuti. Damodar Pande attacked Digarcha and captured the monastery there. He also arrested the minister of Lhasa, Dhoren Kazi and returned to Nepal. As soon as this news reached the Qianlong Emperor, he sent 70,000 soldiers under the leadership of Fuk'anggan to defend Tibet. Thus 1792 would see the war become a conflict between Nepal and the Qing empire.

The Chinese demanded that Nepal return the property looted at Digarcha. They also demanded the return of the Shamarpa Lama. Nepal rejected the demands. The Qing imperial army responded with direct military intervention. The Qing forces marched along the banks of the Trishuli river until they reached Nuwakot. The Nepalese attempted to defend here, but were already faced with overwhelming odds. Heavy losses were taken by both sides, but the Gurkhas were pushed back to the hill near the Nepali capital.

At the same time, Nepal was dealing with military confrontations along 2 other fronts. Sikkim had begun incursions along Nepal’s eastern border. Along the far western side, the war with Garhwal continued. Within Nepal’s own borders, the kingdoms of Achham, Doti and Jumla openly revolted. The division of effort faced made it much harder to defend against the Qing army. The anxious Bahadur Shah asked for 10 howitzers from the British East India Company. Captain William Kirkpatrick arrived in Kathmandu, but he insisted on a commercial treaty in return for delivery of the weapons. The wary Bahadur refused and the guns were not received.

After a series of successful battles, the Qing suffered a setback when they tried to cross the monsoon-flooded Betrawati, close to Nuwakot. On September 19, a Nepalese counterattack hit a Chinese camp at Jitpurfedi. Although the Chinese were defeated here, they could not be dislodged from Nepal. A stalemate ensued, and with their resources low and a looming uncertainty regarding how long they would be able to hold on in addition to the need to continue their expansion drive on the western frontier, the Gurkhas signed a treaty on terms dictated by the Qing that required, among other obligations, both Tibet and Nepal to send tribute to the Qing emperor every 5 years and accept the suzerainty of the Qing emperor.

While Tibet came under greater control of the Qing after the war, Nepal still retained its autonomy. However the weakening of the Qing dynasty during the 19th century led to the disregard of this treaty. For instance, during the Anglo-Nepalese War of 1814-16, when the British East India Company launched an invasion of Nepal, not only did China fail to help her feudatory, but it also failed to prevent the cession of Nepalese territory to the British. Similarly, during another Nepalese-Tibetan War, in 1855-56, China was conspicuously absent. The Qing were not particularly interested in ruling Nepal; their war was primarily aimed at consolidating their control of Tibet which, in turn, was related to military strategy throughout Central Asia.

[Ennath]

July 23, 1916
Battle of Pozières

The village of Pozières, on the Albert–Bapaume road, lies atop a ridge roughly in the center of what was the British sector at the Somme. Close by is the highest point on the battlefield. Pozières was an important German position; the fortified village was an outpost to the second defensive line, known to the British as the O.G. Lines. This German line extended from beyond Mouquet Farm in the north, ran behind Pozières to the east, then south towards the Bazentin ridge and the villages of Bazentin le Petit and Longueval. This southern section of the German second line was captured on July 14 by British 4th Army (Lt Gen. Sir Henry Rawlinson). The possibility of “rolling up” the German second line by turning north now presented itself if Pozières could be captured.

The British Commander-in-Chief, Sir Douglas Haig, lacked the ammunition to immediately execute another broad-front attack after July 14. Believing that Pozières and Thiepval would become untenable for the Germans as the British continued their eastward momentum, Haig ordered Rawlinson to concentrate on the center between High Wood and Delville Wood as well as the villages of Guillemont and Ginchy. The plan was to take Pozières by a “steady, methodical, step-by-step advance”. Between July 13 and 17, 4th Army made 4 small attacks at Pozières with no success and high casualties. The village was subjected to a heavy bombardment and reduced to rubble. On two occasions the attacking infantry got into the trench that looped around the south and western edge of the village, known as Pozières Trench but both times were driven out. Attempts to get east of the village by advancing up the O.G. Lines also failed.

Rawlinson planned to deliver another attack on a broad front on July 18 involving 6 divisions between the Albert–Bapaume road in the north and Guillemont in the south. Haig decided to transfer responsibility for Pozières to the Reserve Army (Hubert Gough), which had been holding the line north of the road. The attack was postponed until the night of July 22-23. To Gough’s army were attached the 3 divisions of I Anzac Corps. Australian 1st Division reached Albert on July 18 and despite the postponement of the offensive, Gough, who had a reputation as a “thruster”, told the division commander, Harold Walker, to attack the next night. . Walker, an experienced English officer who had led the division since Gallipoli, insisted he would attack only after adequate preparation. Consequently, the attack on Pozières once more fell in line with 4th Army's attack on the night of July 22-23.

The plan called for Australian 1st Division to attack Pozières from the south, advancing in 3 stages half an hour apart, while north of the Albert–Bapaume road, 48th (South Midland) Division (X Corps), would attack the German trenches west of the village. The village and surrounding area were defended by elements of German 117th Division. Early on July 22 Australian 9th Battalion attempted to improve its position by attacking up the O.G. Lines towards the road but was repulsed.

The preparation for the attack involved a thorough bombardment of the village and the O.G. Lines lasting several days, and including phosgene and tear gas. The infantry was scheduled to attack at 12:30 AM on July 23, with Australian 1st and 3rd Brigades. The infantry crept into no man’s land, close behind the bombardment and when it lifted the German trenches were rushed. The first stage took the Pozières Trench that ringed the village to the south. The second stage saw the Australians advance to the edge of the village. The third stage brought the line to the Albert–Bapaume road. The few survivors from the German garrison retreated to the northern edge of the village or into the O.G. Lines to the east. It was also intended that the O.G. Lines would be captured as far as the road but here the Australians failed, partly due to strong resistance and partly to the confusion of a night attack on featureless terrain.

The failure to take the O.G. Lines made the eastern end of Pozières vulnerable and so the Australians formed a flank short of their objectives. On the western edge of the village, the Australians captured a German bunker known as Gibraltar. During the day, some troops probed across the road and with minimal effort occupied more of the village. That night 8th Battalion of Australian 2nd Brigade, which had been in reserve, moved up and secured the rest of the village. The attack of 48th Division on the German trenches west of Pozières achieved some success but the main attack by 4th Army between Pozières and Guillemont was a costly failure.

As a consequence of being the sole British gain on July 23, Pozières became a focus of attention for the Germans. Forming as it did a critical element of their defense, the German command ordered that it be retaken at all costs. 3 attempts were made on July 23, all broken up by British artillery or swept away by machine gun fire. Communication was as difficult for the Germans as it was for the British, and it was not until 7:00 AM, July 24 that they discovered that Pozières had been captured. With British activity declining elsewhere on its front, German IV Corps opposite Pozières, was able to concentrate most of its artillery against the village and its approaches. The western approach to the village, from Casualty Corner near the head of Sausage Valley, received such a concentration of shellfire that it was thereafter known as Dead Man's Road. The German bombardment intensified on July 25, in preparation for another counterattack.

German IX Corps relieved IV Corps and its commander cancelled the planned attack, choosing to concentrate on the defense of the O.G. Lines, the next British objective. The bombardment reached a climax on July 26 and by 5:00 PM the Australians, believing an attack imminent, appealed for a counter-barrage. The artillery of I Anzac Corps, II Corps and the guns of the 2 neighboring British corps replied. This in turn led the Germans to believe the Australians were preparing to attack and so they increased their fire yet again. It was not until midnight that the shelling subsided.

Once Pozières had been secured, Gough pushed for immediate moves against the O.G. Lines north and east of the village. The first task was to take the lines up to the Albert–Bapaume road, the original objectives. Attacking in the dark, only Australian 5th Battalion found either of the O.G. trenches and it was counter-attacked by German 18th Reserve Division. Simultaneously on the Australian right, British 1st Division made an attempt to capture Munster Alley, the section of the Switch Line where it intersected the O.G. Lines. A tumultuous grenade fight developed but only a small section of trench was held.

Australian 2nd Division took over the sector on July 27 and Gough, eager for progress, pressed for an immediate attack. The division commander, Gordon Legge, lacked the experience and confidence of Walker and succumbed to the pressure. On the night of July 28-29, in conditions far less favorable than those experienced by 1st Division on the first night, 2nd Division readied to attack. The remorseless German bombardment made effective preparations virtually impossible. The dust raised by the shelling prevented the Australian observers from directing their field guns which were tasked with cutting the wire entanglements. An attack by British 23rd Division on Munster Alley dragged in Australian 5th Brigade. The main attack went ahead, scheduled to start at 12:15 AM on July 29, but Australian 7th Brigade was late in reaching its start line and its movement was detected by the Germans; when the attack began, the Australians were met by a hail of machine gun fire. South of the road 5th Brigade remained pinned down, unable to even get started. On their left, 7th Brigade encountered uncut wire. On the northern flank some minor progress was made by 6th Brigade but everywhere else the attack was a failure. 7th Brigade had to be withdrawn to reserve, so great were its losses.

Haig was disparaging of the division's failure, telling Lt Gen. William Birdwood, I Anzac Corps commander, “You're not fighting Bashi-Bazouks now.” Legge and his staff resolved to do the job properly. To avoid the confusion of a night advance, the plan was to attack at 9:15 PM, just before dark. However, to attack at dusk meant assembling by day which was only possible to do in the protection of trenches. Therefore, a system of approach and assembly trenches had to be dug at night. Whenever the Germans detected digging parties, they mistook them for troops assembling to attack and called down a barrage. Originally the attack was to be made on August 2 but the trenches were still incomplete, the digging either being disrupted or the completed trenches demolished by shellfire. The attack was postponed to August 4 when the trenches were finally deemed ready. This careful planning and preparation delivered success and when 2nd Division went in, both O.G. Lines were captured. South of and astride the Albert–Bapaume Road the O.G. Lines had been so thoroughly obliterated by prolonged shelling that the Australians ended up advancing beyond their objectives. From their vantage in the O.G. Lines on the eastern edge of the Pozières ridge, the Australians now looked over the village of Courcelette close by and the woods around Bapaume 5 miles distant. The German commander ordered “At any price Hill 160 Pozières ridge must be recovered.”

By 5 August 2nd Australian Division was exhausted and was to be relieved by 4th Division. While the relief was underway on the night of August 5-6, the Australians were subjected to an intense bombardment; the salient they occupied could be shelled from all directions, including Thiepval which lay to the rear. On the morning of August 6, a German attack tried to approach the O.G. Lines but was met by machine gun fire and forced to dig in. The bombardment continued through the day, by the end of which most of 2nd Division had been relieved. At 4:00 AM on the 7th, shortly before dawn, the Germans launched their final counterattack. On a front of 400 yards they overran the thinly occupied O.G. Lines, catching most of the Australians in shelters in the old German dugouts and advanced towards Pozières. For the Australians, the crisis had arrived. At this moment, Lt. Albert Jacka, who had won the VC at Gallipoli, emerged from a dugout where he and 7 men had been isolated, and charged the Germans from the rear. This inspired others scattered across the plateau to join the action and a fierce melee developed. Jacka was badly wounded but as support arrived from the flanks, the Australians gained the advantage and most of the surviving Germans were captured. No more attempts to retake Pozières were made.

Gough’s plan had been to drive a wedge behind the German strongpoint of Thiepval. Having secured Pozières, the attack now moved to the next phase; a drive north along the ridge towards the German strongpoint of Mouquet Farm which protected the rear of Thiepval. I Anzac Corps would carry the advance along the ridge while, on their left, II Corps would keep in line, systematically reducing the Thiepval salient. Initially the task fell to 4th Australian Division, but both 1st and 2nd Divisions would be called on again. When the Australian ordeal on Pozières ridge was over in September, they were replaced by the Canadian Corps who held the sector for the remainder of the battle. The Australians and British had taken 31,000 casualties since the start of the battle. The O.G. Lines east of the village became the Canadian start line for the Battle of Flers–Courcelette.

[Ennath]

July 24, 1823
Battle of Lake Maracaibo

In early 1821, a Spanish squadron of 2 frigates, a corvette, 2 brigantines and 4 transports, delivered a considerable quantity of military stores to Venezuela. This permitted the Royalists to operate along the coast for 2 more years

On June 25, 1821, Revolutionary Commodore José Padilla sailed into Cartagena harbor and made off with 11 prizes while the port’s garrison was drawn to the landward side by a feint attack. The city surrendered on October 1.

By summer 1823, Maracaibo and Puerto Cabello were the only ports of any significance still in Royalist hands. Both fleets were active in operations around these cities. In early July, the efforts focused on Maracaibo as a Revolutionary army approached the city. The Royalist squadron of Captain Angel Laborde moved to the west coast of Lake Maracaibo on July 23, between Captain Chico and Bella Vista (north of Maracaibo) and anchored in line of battle. Meanwhile, Padilla’s Republicans waited until evening and then placed all their ships in a line parallel to the east coast of the lake and subtly advanced toward Punta de Piedra.

At sunrise on July 24, the Republican commanders were called to the brig Independiente where Padilla issued his final instructions and - still not satisfied - at 10:30, went personally on board all ships in the squadron, in order to harangue his crews. At 10:40, the wind veered to the northwest, and 10 minutes later the signal was made to prepare to sail, but with a lessening of the southward breeze the decision to raise anchor was postponed until it was affirmed the breeze was favorable, despite everything inviting an immediate attack on the Royalist squadron which was anchored in a line parallel to the coast and very close to it.

At 2:20 PM, Padilla made the signal to sail, and minutes later, to form line to attack all enemy ships simultaneously, the targets having been set earlier. The Republicans closed quickly, while the Royalists remained at anchor, waiting for the attack. Padilla led the main attack, while a detachment under Captain Nicholas Joly moved to cut off any retreat to the bay. At 3:45, the Royalists opened fire on the approaching Republicans, who held their own fire. Although some damage was sustained, the Republican salvoes, when they came at point blank range, were devastating.

Many Royalist vessels were destroyed outright and others captured. Some Royalists cut their anchor cables and tried to make sail and escape, but failed and the larger vessels were captured. Many of the crews jumped into the water to try and escape. The brig-schooner Esperanza was destroyed by an explosion. It was over in 2 hours. Ultimately, only 3 schooners managed to get away, seeking shelter by the Castle of San Carlos. Republican losses included 44 killed, with 164 wounded. Royalist casualties were higher, with 437 taken prisoner.

At days end, Padilla ordered his squad to make anchor where they had fought. Soon he moved to the port of Altagracia to repair damage. For his part, Laborde was able to pass by the fort and reach the bar, and after a stop in Puerto Cabello set sail for Cuba.

On August 3, Maracaibo surrendered. On November 23, the Royalists marched out of Puerto Cabello, flags flying and drums beating, boarded ships and sailed for Cuba. The fight for the independence of Gran Colombia was over.

[Ennath]

July 25, 1779
Penobscot Expedition

In June 1779, while most of the Revolutionary War was focused in the south, a small British fleet landed 700 soldiers on the Castine Peninsula, in the upper reaches of Penobscot Bay, Maine. Intent on establishing a base from which they could operate more effectively against American privateers, ensure the extraction of valuable naval stores, and develop a refuge for displaced Loyalists, the British enlisted local support and began the construction of Ft. George. Word soon reached Boston (Maine was a district of Massachusetts until 1820), and over the ensuing month the largest American naval force of the Revolutionary War, known as the Penobscot Expedition, was assembled.

An amphibious operation, the expedition consisted of 40 vessels, nearly 2000 seamen and marines, 100 artillerymen, and 870 militia. Mounting 350 guns, the sizable fleet included 3 Continental Navy vessels, 3 Massachusetts State vessels, 1 New Hampshire State vessel, 11 privateers, and 22 transports. The expedition was not, however, easily arranged. Several vessels and their crews were pressed into service, and although 1500 militiamen from 3 Maine counties were expected to carry out the assault, only 870 inexperienced and ill-equipped troops actually turned out. Gen. Solomon Lovell and Commodore Dudley Saltonstall shared joint-command, the former lacking extensive field experience and the latter indecisive and obstinate. Exceedingly confident of success, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts underwrote the entire campaign and failed to consult any significant military authority. Nonetheless, despite being planned by civilians and carried out by part time soldiers, the expedition’s various inadequacies escaped serious contemporary criticism, and the flotilla departed Boston Harbor amidst high expectations.

Reaching Castine (then called Bagaduce) on July 25, the Americans found only a modest earthworks situated in the peninsula’s center, a couple of outlying redoubts, and the water approach to Castine Harbor defended only by 3 sloops. Over the next 2 days, the Americans captured a British battery on a small island at the harbor entrance and began a series of ineffective attempts to dislodge the sloops from their anchorage across the approach to the harbor. Shortly thereafter, a difficult landing was effected under a formidable precipice on the southwestern shore of the peninsula known as Dyce’s Head. Within hours, Lovell and nearly 300 militiamen and 200 marines found themselves only a few hundred yards from the British fort. The British pickets, including Lt. (later General) John Moore, put up a determined resistance but received no reinforcement from the fort and were forced to retire, leaving the Americans in possession of the heights. 8 British troops were captured.

At this point, Lovell ordered the attackers to halt and entrench where they were. Instead of assaulting the fort, Lovell had decided to build a battery and bombard the British into surrender. The American casualties in the assault had been severe, 100 out of 400, largely marines. Saltonstall was so appalled by the losses incurred by his marines that he refused to land any more and even threatened to recall those already ashore. In addition his flagship, the Continental frigate Warren, suffered considerable damage during the engagement.

The Americans' momentum deteriorated quickly. Unable to convince Saltonstall to engage the vastly inferior enemy fleet and clear the way for the land forces to storm the garrison, Lovell and his inexperienced troops initiated a lengthy siege. Conversely, Saltonstall refused to attack with any vigor until Lovell had taken the bastion and the battery that overlooked the harbor. Only a waist-high earthworks when the rebel flotilla arrived, Ft. George was unsuccessfully besieged by the Americans for over 2 weeks. Ironically, British Gen. Francis McLean was prepared from the outset for the fort to be taken, as the American forces before him and his naval counterpart Captain Henry Mowat appeared overwhelming. To an American spy within Ft. George McLean divulged that he expected the fort to be overrun. As the siege progressed, however, he considered every passing day (with the Americans' continued inactivity), “as good as another thousand men.”

By August 13, the poorly coordinated siege of Ft. George reached an end when the Americans found themselves trapped within Penobscot Bay by a newly arrived British relief fleet. Led by Sir George Collier and his 64-gun flagship Raisonable, the fleet carried 204 guns, arguably inferior to the Americans’ collective armament, but clearly superior in individual strength, experience, and fighting ability. The following day, despite having re-embarked the troops with reasonable efficiency, Saltonstall initiated a bizarre retreat as his 32-gun flagship Warren overtook the transports and headed up river.

Of the utter confusion that followed, general Lovell admitted that “...an attempt to give a description of this terrible Day is out of my Power.” Coordinating an effective stand grew increasingly difficult over the ensuing days, as crews burned their vessels and took to the woods. A handful of vain attempts were made to gather troops and make a stand, but eventually, all the participants made off for home through the wilderness. Ultimately, all American armed ships and transports, save for 1 captured by the British, were destroyed along the river and upper bay, resulting in the greatest American naval disaster prior to Pearl Harbor.

The British lost 25 men killed and 34 wounded, with 26 captured. Apart from the 100 men killed and wounded during the assault of July 28, the known American casualties came to at least 130 killed and wounded. The chaotic retreat however, brought the American loss up to 474 killed, wounded, captured or missing.

The campaign, whose demise began in the earliest stages of its design, had ended in a spectacularly embarrassing turn of events for Massachusetts. In the aftermath, the Massachusetts General Assembly established a Committee of Enquiry and heard testimony from several high ranking officers. Commodore Saltonstall refused to testify before the Massachusetts inquiry by virtue of his position in the Continental Navy. Consequently, he escaped official discipline from Boston; the Continental Navy was less forgiving. After a court-martial held aboard the Continental frigate Deane on October 25, 1779, he was dismissed from the service and later pursued privateering. Artillery Train Commander Paul Revere also suffered a blow to his reputation. His perceived arrogance during the campaign led to the collective scorn of his fellow officers and was the subject of lengthy depositions, but resulted in no official reprimand. Interestingly, after his character had been sufficiently impugned by those with whom he served, Revere requested his own court-martial in an attempt to clear his name. His request was not granted.

[Ennath]

July 26, 1469
Battle of Edgecote Moor

In the wake of the Yorkist victory at the Battle of Hexham in 1464 (see posting), England entered a period of relative peace as the Lancastrian cause had largely been defeated. During this time, Richard Neville, Earl of Warwick, who had been instrumental in the ascent of King Edward IV, became disenchanted with the king as his influence at court steadily waned. The situation further worsened when Edward informed Warwick that he had married Elizabeth Woodville despite Warwick’s efforts to secure a French wife for the king. Further insult was added when Edward refused to allow his younger brother, the Duke of Clarence, to marry Warwick’s daughter Isabel. As discontent against Edward’s policies began to spread, Warwick contemplated changing allegiance and rebelling.

He found an ally in the jealous Clarence who was heir to the throne. Uniting, the two men inspired a series of rebellions in northern England before departing for Calais in July 1469. While there, Clarence married Isabel. Forced to react to the rebellions, Edward began marching north, enabling the 2 conspirators to land in Kent and build an army.

Edward soon found that the rebel forces outnumbered his own and he fell back to Nottingham to await reinforcements. Among those moving to his aid were troops led by the Earls of Pembroke and Devon. On July 12, Warwick and Clarence declared their support for the rebels who were led by Robin of Redesdale. Though his precise identity is not known, Redesdale is believed to have been Sir John Conyers, one of Warwick’s retainers. Six days later, Warwick began moving north with a large army to reinforce Redesdale. Learning of Warwick’s movements, Redesdale began moving south, bypassing the king at Nottingham.

In doing so, the rebel army neared the approaching forces of Pembroke and Devon. On July 25, the 2 men entered Banbury and learned that the enemy was near. In the course of the day, Pembroke and Devon supposedly argued over billets causing the latter to withdraw south to Deddington Castle with his men. This greatly weakened the Yorkist force as Devon possessed the army’s archers. The following morning, Pembroke moved his men to the Danes Moor where he occupied a strong hilltop position. Approaching the field, Redesdale deployed his army near Thorpe Manderville and moved to attack.

Unleashing volleys of arrows, Redesdale inflicted heavy losses. Lacking archers, Pembroke was unable to reply in kind and was forced to abandon the high ground. Moving down the slope, his troops clashed with the rebels and a melee ensued. In 2-3 hours of hand-to-hand fighting, Pembroke’s men began to gain the upper hand and Redesdale may have been killed. However, with victory in sight, the Yorkists were alarmed to see rebel reinforcements approaching the field. These were the advance elements of Warwick’s forces led by Sir John Clapham. Believing that Warwick’s entire army was about to enter the fray, the Yorkists began to break and flee. In the rout, large numbers of Pembroke’s troops were killed while he was captured the next day and executed.

Edgecote is one of the poorest documented battles of the Wars of the Roses and there has been much confusion regarding the precise location and details of the action. Losses are not known with precision though Yorkist estimates range from 2000 to 5000 men. In the wake of the battle, Edward’s army melted away and he was taken into “protection” by Warwick. Many of the king's close advisors, including Earl Rivers and John Woodville, were captured and executed. Fleeing south, Devon was also taken and killed.
Warwick briefly regained power and reconciled with Edward. This truce proved short-lived as he was forced to flee to France in 1470 after the Battle of Losecoat Field (see posting).