The Military History Thread

[Ennath]

January 25, 1644
Battle of Nantwich

In December 1643, on the recommendation of Prince Rupert, Lord Byron was commissioned field-marshal of Royalist forces in Cheshire, Lancashire and north Wales. Lord Capel, the King’s ineffectual lieutenant-general in the region, was recalled to Oxford. Although the Marquis of Ormond was appointed in Capel’s place, Ormond was instructed to remain in Ireland and delegate military command in north Wales and the Marches to Byron, who arrived at Chester on December 6 with reinforcements of 1000 horse and 300 foot from the Oxford army. Byron joined forces with Sir Michael Erneley’s regiments that had already arrived from Ireland. Byron marched from Chester against the Cheshire Parliamentarians on December 12 with an force of 5000 men, most of them hardened veterans of the Irish campaigns. He planned to isolate Nantwich, the headquarters of the Cheshire Parliamentarians, before advancing to capture it.

For several weeks, Byron conducted a ruthless campaign. On December 13, Captain Thomas Sandford led a daring raid on Beeston Castle, situated on a rocky hilltop and commanding the crossing through the Peckforton hills. Beeston was considered to be an impregnable stronghold but in a commando-style operation, Sandford and a small company scaled the rock face then climbed the castle wall. When Sandford’s men appeared inside, the garrison believed they faced a larger force and promptly surrendered. The Parliamentarian commander Captain Steele was subsequently executed for cowardice.

The fall of Beeston Castle opened up southern Cheshire to Byron’s forces, and outlying Parliamentarian garrisons were quickly overrun. On Christmas Eve, when a group of Royalists commanded by Major Connought plundered the village of Barthomley, 20 villagers took refuge in the tower of St Bertoline’s Church. The Royalists made a fire at the base of the tower to smoke them out, which forced them to surrender. Connought’s men then stripped and killed 12 in cold blood and wounded most of the others. Byron boasted of the massacre in a report to the Marquis of Newcastle, earning himself the nickname of the “Bloody Braggadoccio” when the letter was intercepted.

Sir William Brereton, the Parliamentarian commander in Cheshire, mustered a force from Lancashire and Cheshire at Middlewich. Before he could move against the Royalists, however, Byron launched a surprise attack on December 27. The Parliamentarians were routed with 500 men killed or captured. With his forces in disarray, Brereton retreated to Manchester and sent an urgent message to Parliament requesting help before the whole of Cheshire was lost. In response, Parliament’s Committee of Safety ordered Sir Thomas Fairfax to march to Brereton’s assistance. Early in January 1644, he marched with 1800 men across the Pennines in harsh winter weather to join forces with the Cheshire and Lancashire Parliamentarians at Manchester.

Having cleared most of Cheshire of the King’s enemies, Lord Byron advanced towards Nantwich, the last Roundhead stronghold in the county. Nantwich had been a Parliamentarian garrison since January 1643. The River Weaver formed a natural defense at the western approach; the town was further fortified with a circuit of earthworks, ditches and barricades. The garrison of nearly 2000 was well-supplied. Its commanders Sir George Booth and Col. Croxton had made preparations for a possible siege while Byron was campaigning in Cheshire.

Byron set up his headquarters at the nearby village of Acton and summoned Nantwich to surrender on January 10. The following day, after the summons was rejected, Royalist artillery opened fire. The bombardment continued for several days with frequent skirmishing. On January 18, after Byron’s second summons had been refused, the Royalists attempted to take the town by storm, but they were driven back with heavy losses of around 500 killed and wounded. Among the dead was Captain Sandford, who had taken Beeston Castle. Of the 5000 that had marched from Chester with Byron, less than 3500 were left.

On January 21, Fairfax, having crossed the Pennines to reinforce Brereton, marched from Manchester with a combined force of around 3000 foot and 1800 horse. On January 24, he swept aside a force of 200 Royalists attempting to block his advance as he passed through the forest of Delamere. Fairfax’s intention was to reinforce the garrison at Nantwich rather than engage Byron’s army in battle. He thought that the Royalist force was larger than it actually was, and that the veterans of the Irish service were likely to be better soldiers than his local levies.

As the Parliamentarians approached Nantwich, there was a change in the weather as a thaw set in and heavy rain began to fall. On the morning of January 25, the River Weaver became so swollen that Byron transferred his artillery and most of his infantry to the west bank where the ground was slightly higher. While Byron and most of his cavalry were still on the east side, the flood swept away Beam Bridge to the north of Nantwich and split the Royalist army in two. Byron was forced to march to the next bridge over the Weaver at Minshull to try to reunite his forces. In his absence, the Royalists on the west side of the river were commanded by Col. Gibson who drew up his forces around Acton church, deploying 4 regiments to block the road from the north along which Fairfax was marching, and another to cover the approach into Nantwich itself.

The Parliamentarians approached Gibson's position at around 2:00 PM. At the same time, news reached Fairfax that Byron’s cavalry was approaching the rear of the Parliamentarian column, having worked its way round from Minshull. Fairfax calmly detailed 2 regiments to hold the Royalist cavalry at bay and continued his advance towards Acton, turning his troops from the line of march so that the rearguard and vanguard became the wings of his battle formation. Fairfax planned to defeat the Royalist infantry at Acton before the cavalry arrived to reinforce them.

Unable to operate effectively among the small fields, hedgerows and lanes that made up the local terrain, Byron’s cavalry were held while Fairfax attacked the infantry. Despite the lack of cavalry support, the Royalist wings held firm against the Parliamentarian attack, inflicting heavy casualties. In the center, however, the Royalists gave ground. Col. Monck succeeded in rallying them but the center began to give way again when the Parliamentarians charged a second time. At this critical point, a force of musketeers from the Nantwich garrison marched out and swept aside the Royalist reserve regiment guarding the road into the town. With the added pressure of reinforcements from the garrison threatening the rear, the Royalist center collapsed completely. Fairfax’s troops swept through the gap in the Royalist line and quickly overwhelmed the stalwart regiments holding out on the flanks.

The Royalists fell back to Acton church where Gibson surrendered under terms. The artillery and baggage train were captured and about 1500 officers and men taken prisoner, many of whom changed sides. Byron retreated to Chester with his cavalry and surviving infantry. Although he had enough forces for the defense of the city, and had established a Royalist garrison at Beeston Castle, there was no question of another Royalist offensive in the region for some time. Fairfax’s victory at Nantwich had effectively neutralized the first wave of Royalist reinforcements from Ireland.

[Ennath]

368 BC
The “Tearless Battle”

Despite his great victory over the Spartans at Leuctra in 371 BC (see posting), the Thebans replaced Epaminondas as army commander after his political rivals successfully advertised the results of his last effort as disappointing. And being then distracted by events in Thessaly, they spared the Peloponnese an invasion in 368 BC. Still, the war there continued as the Arcadians and Argives marched again into Phliasian territory. This time, however, the defenders didn’t wait for their foes to reach town; moving out to meet the invaders’ vanguard as it crossed a river, the city cavalry attacked in the company of Athenian horsemen and support from a picked unit of hoplites. The troops caught across the river took a beating and were forced to retire onto high ground for fear of mounted envelopment. They spent the rest of the day there as the horsemen continued to harass even as they kept their comrades from crossing to their aid. This was undoubtedly a small action, involving no more than 300-600 spearmen in the elite lochos from Phlius, while the leading Arcadian and Argive elements are unlikely to have been more than twice that, else they probably would have been able to push the Phliasians aside horsemen or not. Pulling back at nightfall, the locals and Athenians retired behind the city walls and had no problem in fending off any subsequent attempts on those stout ramparts.

Meanwhile, the Spartans, taking advantage of their relief from the predations of Epaminondas, were now able to assume a more aggressive stance. The result would be an engagement that forever became part of their lore. This happened when Archidamus (who’d succeeded his elderly sire in command of the army) set out to reclaim Caryae at summer’s end. His forces included not only Sparta’s citizen hoplites (around 2500) and maybe 600-700 light-armed men, but also a fresh contingent from Dionysius of Syracuse. The latter might have numbered 1500 heavy infantry and 500 light foot plus 50 cavalry. Taking Caryae, Archidamus shifted next into the Arcadian-Messenian frontier region. He ravaged the countryside there for some time, but upon arrival of a relief force from Arcadia and Argos retired to a strong position in the hills above an otherwise unknown location called Malea. After a time, the commander of the mercenaries, Cissidas, announced that his men’s term of employment was up and they would be departing. He and his troops headed for Laconia to take ship: however, they found their path blocked at a narrow pass by a force of Messenians. Cissidas was apparently unsure of the opposition’s strength and followed a prudent course of sending back for help. But just as Archidamus was coming to his assistance, the Arcadians and Argives suddenly appeared. Their manpower is speculative, but might have included the standing army of Arcadia (5000 hoplites) and some 2000 spearmen from Argos. Typical light support would have been 1500 foot skirmishers and 300-400 horsemen.

This convergence of forces led to a battle at a road junction at Malea where a broadening of the valley allowed for wide deployment. Archidamus had 4000 heavy foot, with Spartan hoplites occupying his right wing, Iberians likely standing in the middle and Celts on the far left with the light forces on the flanks. Across the way, the Arcadians would have formed the right wing and center of their formation and set the spearmen from Argos to hold the left end with their light troops out on either side. What followed seems to have been a classic example of Spartan reputation and demeanor so cowing a foe that they gave way almost without a fight. As the enthusiastic Spartans drew near in their intimidating slow march to pipes, most of the Argives panicked (perhaps still aligning and unready to fight), with those at the rear leading a rush from the field. This left no more than a few brave souls standing their ground to be speared down by the advancing, crimson-clad steamroller. The rest of the enemy array was immediately caught up in the collapse of its left wing and soon joined the mob streaming rearward. Giving chase, Archidamus’ allied cavalry and light foot cut down many of the fleeing men, as did the Celts whose lighter gear allowed good speed.

In light of an ardent pursuit by the Spartans’ allies, casualties in this engagement must have run very high among the losers. Xenophon reported “vast numbers” of slain and we might estimate this at a crippling 20-30%. Such a cost was in strong contrast to that on the other side, where not a single Spartan had fallen. As a result, there was no need to grieve in Sparta and this victory came to be known most popularly as the “Tearless Battle.”

[Ennath]

January 26, 1995
Cenepa War

The border between Peru and Ecuador has been unclear ever since both countries came into being. In July 1941, full-scale war saw most of the disputed area occupied by the Peruvians. In 1946, the Ecuadorians discovered an inaccuracy in the geographical assumptions in the upper Cenepa Valley of the Cordillera del Condor on which the treaty after the first war was based; in 1960, they declared the agreement invalid. Peru contested this, stating that such discrepancies had already been solved in an arbitration that had taken place in 1945, and that all that had to be done was to close the border following the 1945 arbitration. For the next 35 years, a 48 mile strip of mostly unpopulated and little explored territory, deep in the Amazonian rainforest and almost inaccessible by land, was left undemarcated, serving as a flashpoint for recurrent crises between Ecuador and Peru. An attempt to rectify the situation by force in 1981 led to another Ecuadorian defeat.

Following the 1981 conflict, there were increasing demands on Peru’s military resources. It maintained most of its heavy armor and aircraft plus 30% of its infantry along the border with Chile, a residue of the 1879-84 War of the Pacific. Although the leftist Shining Path guerrilla movement had suffered a crippling blow in September 1992 with the capture of its messianic leader Abimael Guzman, these and other guerrillas still tied down many of the best-trained mobile forces in the southern highlands. Some assets were also devoted to the fight against drug traffickers in the Upper Huallaga Valley and elsewhere. This left about 40% of the army and a small percentage of Peru’s aircraft near the frontier with Ecuador. Peru’s economy was in near chaos after a nearly 2 million percent inflation between 1985 and 1990. The new Fujimori administration judged that Peru was in no position to fight another border war with anyone. Ecuador, on the other hand, perceived Peru as its most important threat. But a significant portion of the army was stationed near Quito, the capital, to deal with internal security. The Ecuadorian Air Force was divided among Guyaquil, Quito and the northwestern littoral - the disputed area. Concerning morale, the advantage had shifted to the Ecuadorians. The Peruvian military had been worn down by its 15-year fight with leftist guerrillas. At one point, the Peruvian navy even had to use its highly trained submariners for shore duty against the guerrillas. Frequently, Peruvian conscripts were sporadically paid and poorly equipped.

Access to the disputed jungle area, which was about the size of the District of Columbia, had improved little over the centuries. Few roads existed and many outposts were sustained by aircraft using airstrips hacked out of the foliage and by helicopters.

Then, at the end of 1994, a new crisis suddenly erupted, this time in the undemarcated border area proper, around the Condor range and the Cenepa headwaters. Peruvian accounts state that in November 1994, a Peruvian patrol, advancing through the Cenepa headwaters, was intercepted by an Ecuadorian patrol. Being told they had crossed into Ecuadorian territory, the Peruvians were escorted to the Ecuadorian outpost of Base Sur, where the patrol was given supplies before continuing their journey. Afterwards, realizing Base Sur was actually in Peruvian-claimed territory, the Peruvians asked the Ecuadorians for a meeting of superior officers. The meeting took place in Base Sur. According to Ecuadorian accounts, during the meeting the Peruvian officer claimed that the presence of Ecuadorian outposts in the headwaters of the Cenepa river constituted a violation of Peruvian territory, and that therefore the posts had to be abandoned and the troops moved back to the line of the Condor range. The Ecuadorian account of the meeting also states that the Peruvian officer went on to deliver an ultimatum: if the Ecuadorians did not abandon the area by the end of the week, the Peruvians would dislodge them by force. After the meeting both Quito and Lima began to send reinforcements to the area, laying minefields and preparing supply depots, while further meetings between superior officers failed to break the deadlock.

By the new year, profiting from its internal lines, the Ecuadorian Army had strengthened its presence in the area to a considerable degree, including several Special Forces formations, as well as artillery and BM-21 multiple rocket launchers. The entire Ecuadorian perimeter was covered by AA batteries and, most significantly, several teams carrying Soviet-made SA-16 Igla and British-made Blowpipe man-portable SAMs. Meanwhile, the Ecuadorian Air Force (FAE) was frantically getting up to operational status, and adapting existing airfields in southeastern Ecuador to function as forward-deployment bases. The army as a whole numbered 57,000. There were 57 combat aircraft, 95 helicopters and 30 transports.

For the Peruvian military, the mobilization process was somewhat more problematic. The Cenepa valley area was devoid of any major roads, population centers, or helicopter bases on the Peruvian side. The Peruvian Army and Air Force (FAP), had to organize an air-bridge to get reinforcements to the zone. The army numbered 115,000 men. There were 95 combat aircraft, 150 helicopters and 70 transports. The Peruvian Navy had a large strength advantage.

Altogether, by the third week of January, both sides had managed to deploy around 5000 troops to the immediate vicinity of the disputed area.

On January 26, helicopters of both sides began firing on enemy positions. The Ecuadorians captured a Peruvian helipad. Both countries ordered general mobilization the following day, but the Peruvian High Command, its resources stretched, decided against a full-scale invasion of Ecuador. On January 28-29, the Peruvians went on the attack, claiming to have taken 3 Ecuadorian strongholds, denied by the Ecuadorians.

The air war intensified. During the first 2 days, Ecuadorian Mirage F1JE fighters, flying from a base only 6 minutes flying time from the disputed area, shot down a Peruvian Su-22 Fitter attack aircraft, while an Ecuadorian Kfir C2 shot down an A-37 Dragonfly. A MANPAD shot down a Peruvian Mi-8T on the 28th. Taking advantage of local air superiority, Ecuadorian A-37s attacked Peruvian ground positions.

Meanwhile, Peru assembled a 2500 man force and on February 1 launched an offensive, supported by T-55 tanks, at El Alto. Some 1000 Ecuadorians, employing and ambush and hit-and-run tactics, resisted. The Peruvians captured the outposts of Cueva de los Tayos and Base Sur. The United Nations brokered a cease-fire on the 17th, but it broke down. On February 22, the Peruvians attacked Tiwinza, which was strongly fortified. Both sides called in significant air support and the Ecuadorians, backed by artillery stationed on the surrounding hilltops, resisted stubbornly, halting the attack. On March 1, the UN brokered another cease-fire and this one held. Ecuador and Peru signed the Declaration of Itamaray on March 17, providing for the separation of the combatants, demobilization, the restoration of normal relations, and the start of substantive talks.

Unlike earlier fights, Ecuador got the better of it this time. They admitted to 104 casualties, though Peru claimed 350. Peru admitted to 60 casualties; other sources put the total at over 450; in addition, 4 aircraft and 3 helicopters were lost. The Ecuadorian achievement may be attributed to carefully choosing where to fight and improved tactics and logistics.

The prospect for a solution to the dispute had significantly improved. Ecuador announced its willingness to work within the framework of the 1942 protocol and Peru acknowledged that t territorial dispute did exist. The 2 sides went on to negotiate the final demarcation of the border, in a lengthy process marked by one crisis after another, with total war almost erupting in August 1998. Finally, on October 26, 1998, in Brasília, Jamil Mahuad, President of Ecuador, and Alberto Fujimori, President of Peru, signed a Presidential Act, which proclaimed “the definitive resolution of the border disputes between the two nations”. In a decision that certain political sectors on both sides took as a setback, the agreement ruled that the border was indeed the line of the Cordillera del Condor, as Peru had been claiming since the 1940s. While Ecuador was compelled to give up its decades-old territorial claims to the eastern slopes of the Cordillera, as well as to the entire western area of Cenepa headwaters, Peru “gives” to Ecuador, as a “private property” but without sovereignty, 1 square kilometer of its territory, in the area where the Ecuadorian base of Tiwinza - focal point of the war - had been located. The final border demarcation came into effect on May 13, 1999.

[Ennath]

January 27, 1863
Repulse from Ft.McAllister

Fort McAllister was a small earthen fort located along Genesis Point and armed with several heavy cannon to defend the Great Ogeechee River approach south of Savannah, GA. It was expanded repeatedly by adding more guns, traverses and bombproofs. Obstructions and eventually torpedoes (mines) completed the riverine defenses.

In July 1862 the blockade runner Nashville ran up river to escape blockaders, and would remain trapped. Learning that the Nashville was lying near the fort, Rear Adm. Samuel du Pont (CO of the South Atlantic Blockade Squadron) ordered Cmdr. Charles Steedman to make a “reconnaissance in force” and to destroy the fort if possible. At this time the main battery consisted of five 32-pounder and one 42-pounder smoothbores. On July 29, Steedman led the wooden gunboats Paul Jones, Unadilla, Huron and Madgie against the works in a 90-minute long-range exchange. Steedman found that approaching the fort would likely cause unacceptable losses and withdrew.

An 8” Columbiad was added to the fort in August and the garrison was replaced with the Emmett Rifles and Republican Blues. Under Cmdr. John Davis the Federal gunboats Wissahickon and Dawn and a mortar schooner engaged the fort for several hours on November 19. The fort did not reply to the initial long-range bombardment and waited until the warships ascended the river to the guns’ effective range. When the lead vessels reached 3000 yards the garrison opened fire, holing the Wissahickon below the waterline. The Federals withdrew. Damage to the fort was minor and readily repaired.

Adm. du Pont dispatched an ironclad in an attempt to capture the fort, sink the Nashville and burn the railway bridge farther upriver. This would provide the first test of the new Passaicclass monitor armed with the massive new 15” Dahlgren gun, at the time the heaviest cannon mounted on a warship. The single turret contained one 11” Dahlgren in addition. On January 27, 1863 the monitor Montauk, 3 gunboats, and a mortar schooner again engaged the fort. Cmdr. John Worden of the Montauk shelled the fort for 5 hours at a range of 1500-1800 yards, tearing up the parapets, but causing no lasting damage or casualties. Likewise, 13 hits scored by the fort’s artillery did little but denting the monitor’s plate and sink a small launch. The defenders repaired the damaged earthworks during the night.

On February 1, Worden tried again. The prior night, Federal scouts had removed several mines from the channel so that the vessels could approach more closely. Montauk spent another 5 hours bombarding at only 600 yards. The garrison commander, Major John Gallie, was killed and 7 were wounded. Major George Wayne Anderson assumed command of the fort. The monitor was struck by 48 rounds and the turret jammed for a time. Following this engagement, the river defenses would be augmented with the placement of nine Rains torpedoes in the channel near where Montauk had engaged the fort.

Unable to run the blockade, the Nashville had been sold and converted into a commerce raider under Capt. Thomas Baker. It was renamed Rattlesnake and on February 27 Baker attempted to make the open sea during rainy weather, but was deterred by a blockader. Returning, the raider ran aground on a bend upriver from the fort but still visible to the blockaders. The next morning Worden anchored Montauk about 1200 yards from the fort, and began firing on the stranded ship as the fort fired on the ironclad in an attempt to distract the Union vessel. After only a few minutes Montauk sent its fifth shot into the raider’s hull. This and subsequent shells produced a fire and eventually explosions which destroyed the ship. As Montauk withdrew down river, it struck a mine. Quick action by the commander and pilot steered the vessel onto a mud bank as the tide receded, sealing the leak until repairs could be effected. Following temporary patching, the rising tide refloated the boat. Eventually Montauk was sent to Port Royal for permanent repairs.

Du Pont now recognized that a single monitor turret lacked the rate of fire to force the capitulation of the earthen battery. He therefore ordered 3 ironclads - Patapsco, Passaic, and Nahant - to test their guns and mechanical appliances and practice artillery firing by attacking the fort. Montauk was to be held in reserve as its 15” gun had already fired a large number of rounds and its durability was unknown at the time. Capt. Percival Drayton of the Passaic would command this expedition. Anticipating an attack, the fort was again expanded, adding a 10” Columbiad. Additionally, several sharpshooters were placed in the marsh on the opposite side of the river near where the monitors were likely to station during an attack.

On March 3, 1863, the 3 ironclads conducted an 8-hour bombardment. They were supported by 5 gunboats and 3 mortar schooners held out of range of the fort’s guns. Several steamers containing the 47th New York Infantry waited nearby to occupy the fort when subdued. The lead monitors anchored about 1200 yards from the fort and commenced shelling as the fort attempted to target the gun ports when the turrets rotated to fire. The bombardment knocked out the 8” Columbiad, tore large holes in the face of the fort, and for a time disabled all but the 10” Columbiad, before several other guns could be returned to service. The Confederate sharpshooters in the marsh were targeted with grapeshot to discourage interference.

While most of the damage experienced by the ironclads was the result of firing of their own cannon, the 10” Confederate mortar battery inflicted some potentially fatal damage to Passaic. The battery commander, Capt. Robert Martin, realized that explosive shell would have little effect, so he filled shells with sand instead of gunpowder to increase weight and density. One of these struck and partially penetrated the ironclad, only being stopped from penetrating all the way through the vessel because it struck on a beam.

As the tide was receding and night was falling, the ships withdrew. Capt. Drayton attempted to prevent repair of the earthworks overnight by maintaining mortar fire. This prevented slave labor from conducting the repair, but it did not prevent Confederate soldiers from working. The damage had been repaired by the next afternoon. The attack on the fort had failed and no further naval assaults were ordered. Valuable information about several deficiencies of the monitors had been revealed by the action and efforts would be made to remedy them where possible.

The first test of the 15” Dahlgren gun and single-turret monitors against the sand parapets of Ft. McAllister had revealed several things: the very slow rate of fire of the very large cannon in two-gun turrets resulted in little offensive power and allowed defenders time to fire against the open gun ports, then take cover. The defenders could fire much more rapidly. Even several monitors firing at once did not create a sufficient volume of fire to suppress the battery. The monitors were subject to jamming of their turret rings or other mechanical failures that could take their battery out of action. The thin monitor decks were vulnerable to plunging fire from heavy mortars. Earthworks could be rapidly repaired overnight or the following day so that a garrison could return to full effectiveness. Long-range mortar fire against a fort was so inaccurate as to be ineffective. Suppressing fire against earthworks would be required overnight to limit the ability to repair damage. Obstructions and mines prevented passage past forts, even though the monitors might be invulnerable during the passage. Sand forts held up well to shelling, while mud forts did not. Properly constructed traverses and bombproofs prevented forts from easily being taken out of action on the flank.

Du Pont attempted to address the shortcomings as best he could while preparing for the attack on Charleston. He ordered the strengthening of the decks with additional armor. He attempted to create a “submarine torpedo exploder” on the bow of his vessels to clear mines. He added as many ironclads to the assault as possible to increase the total volume of fire. His warnings and concerns about the inability of monitors to reduce earthen forts would go unheeded as he prepared the assault on Charleston harbor.

Ft. McAllister would not be subdued by naval bombardment, but would succumb to an infantry assault at the end of Sherman's March to the Sea (see posting) in December 1864.

[Ennath]

312 BC
Battle of Gaza

Antigonus’ growing power led Ptolemy, Cassander, and Lysimachus, at the instigation of Seleucus (who had taken refuge with Ptolemy) to deliver an ultimatum to Antigonus to restore Seleucus and share his other gains with the rest of them. Antigonus refused and continued his conquests, seizing Syria, Bithynia, and Caria. Antigonus left his son Demetrius behind in Syria while he dealt with Cassander in the Aegean. Ptolemy, after leading sea-borne raids in Cilicia, returned to Egypt and decided on a full-scale invasion of Syria.

Ptolemy went on the offensive in early 312, marching with Seleucus into southern Syria/Palestine. He marched through the desert with 18,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry to Gaza. Most of his foot soldiers were Egyptian (perhaps 9000 pantodapoi with pikes and 3000 skirmishers). The rest were Macedonian (maybe 3000 phalangites) and Greek (3000 hired spearmen).

Demetrius, though advised against it, decided to offer battle. He had 10,000 mercenary foot (8000 hoplites and 2000 skirmishers, including Persian archers), 2000 Macedonian pikemen, 1000 Lycian and Pamphylian spearmen, 500 Persian slingers, 5000 horse and 43 elephants.

Demetrius was determined to win the battle with cavalry on his left wing. He deployed 3500 cavalry, including all his lancers, 1500 light infantry, and 30 elephants under his personal command on the left. The infantry phalanx of some 11,000 was deployed in the center, with 13 elephants in front with a complement of light-armed troops. On the right, 1500 cavalry with orders to keep the formation oblique and refuse battle until the issue had been decided.

On the other side, Ptolemy had initially set up to favor his own left wing. He seems to have had the same design as Demetrius, replicating the past strategies of Epaminondas and Eumenes that sought to carry the day against the enemy’s best men; however, once he saw that his foe was also favoring his left, he reordered to boost his right and again match strength against strength. This put Ptolemy, Seleucus and their 3000 best riders on that flank, under personal command. Anti-elephant spiked devices, possibly caltrops, where connected by chains and thrown in front of the cavalry. These were supported with javelinmen and archers placed to harass the enemy elephants. The center consisted of the phalanx with 18,000 infantry. 1,000 cavalry was deployed on the right. The result of deployment was that Demetrius was evenly matched on his left, but could not get to use his superiority on the right because he was refusing that wing.

The battle opened with the confrontation of the advance-guards of the stronger cavalry wings, in which Demetrius drove off his opponents. Ptolemy and Seleucus responded by riding around Demetrius’ left flank to attack. Hard struggle followed, that degenerated into hand-to-hand scrimmage, with horseman fighting with their swords after their lances had been shattered.

While the cavalry battle on the flank was progressing, Demetrius brought forward his elephants apparently hoping to demoralize, rather than actually engage, the opposing troops. As the elephants approached the “minefield”, the Ptolemaic archers and javelinmen began showering the elephants and their drivers. This, together with some elephants stepping on the caltrops, led to them getting out of control. After shooting down nearly all the drivers, Ptolemy's forces were able to capture all the elephants involved in the attack.

The loss of the elephants panicked Demetrius' cavalry and several units fled After trying to keep more from following, Demetrius and the remaining cavalry had to retreat but still managed to stay in formation while retiring over the open plain. His phalanx, so far having been only lightly engaged at best, now broke as some of its men tossed spears and shields to run after their cavalry. Ptolemy’s heavy troops closed about the
enemy foot still on the field, killing a portion before the rest could surrender. (Diodorus cited only 500 lost on Demetrius’ side, mostly horsemen. However, Plutarch put the death toll at 5000. If the claim by both historians of 8000 captured is accurate and refers to phalangites, then those killed more probably came to 2-3000.) In the confusion that followed the defeated army’s flight, the victors found Gaza’s gates still
open and entered to seize the town with little effort.

Demetrius sent to Phyrgia for his father’s help and retired to call up troops out of Cilicia and various garrisons. Seleucus headed to Babylon with 800 infantry and 200 horsemen. Gathering more soldiers in route, he took over the city and recruited to bring his army to 3000 foot and 400 cavalry. He then ambushed Antigonus’ general Nicanor at night along the Tigris and gained most of his 10,000 infantry and 7000 cavalry as well. Having now collected a considerable army, he settled in to rule Babylonia.

Ptolemy, in the meantime, sent the Macedonian general Cilles to engage Demetrius, who had moved into northern Syria. Demetrius learned of this and made a forced march to reach Cilles’ camp before dawn. Striking that morning, he captured the Macedonian and 7000 of his men without a fight. Having suffered this reverse and with Antigonus now marching down with an army to join his son, Ptolemy elected to abandon Syria and Phoenicia and retreat into Egypt. Antigonus and Demetrius spent the rest of the year carrying out an unsatisfactory campaign against Nabataea in modern Jordan (as a preliminary step for the possible invasion of Egypt) and a more successful march to Babylon, which Seleucus’ local general gave up rather
than make a futile resistance against overwhelming odds.

[Ennath]

January 28, 1810
Battle for Guadeloupe

The French West Indian colonies were almost completely cut off from France due to the British naval strategy of close blockade: squadrons of British warships patrolled the coasts of both France itself and the West Indian islands under French control. This hindered communications, severely restricted trade and prevented the reinforcement of the French garrisons. As a result, the colonies began to suffer food shortages, their economies stagnated and public and military morale began to severely erode. In desperation, the commanders of the main colonies, the Leeward Islands of Martinique and Guadeloupe, sent a series of messages to France during the summer of 1808, entreating the French government to send food and military supplies. The French responded with a series of frigates and smaller vessels, sailing to the Caribbean independently or in small squadrons. Some of these ships reached their destinations, but the majority were captured by the Royal Navy blockades. Those few ships that did safely make port were trapped there, unable to make the return journey without risking defeat by the British ships waiting offshore.

The British had intercepted a number of the messages, and the decision was made to capture the French West Indies before substantial reinforcements could arrive. During the winter of 1808, ships and troops from across the Caribbean began gathering off Barbados under the command of Vice-Adm. Sir Alexander Cochrane and Lt.-Gen. George Beckwith, with the intention of invading Martinique early in 1809. A smaller force was sent to French Guiana, which was invaded and captured in early January 1809 (see posting). In late January the invasion of Martinique began, and despite resistance in the central highlands, the island fell to the invaders in 25 days. Cochrane then split his attention, sending a number of ships and men to aid the Spanish in Santo Domingo while still maintaining a strong blockade force in the Leeward Islands.

In April 1809, a French squadron of 3 ships of the line and 2 frigates with supplies arrived at the Iles des Saintes, south of Guadeloupe. There they were blockaded until April 14, when a British force under Maj.-Gen. Frederick Maitland captured the islands. The French squadron managed to escape; the ships of the line sailed north with the British following. The two French frigates went for Basse-Terre on Guadeloupe with their supplies and reinforcements. Later the ships of the line split up. The Hautpoult was captured off Puerto Rico while the other two escaped to France. The frigates were trapped in Basse-Terre. In June, they attempted to return to France. Only one escaped the blockade squadron, although the escapee was also captured a month later in the North Atlantic.

Subsequent French attempts to supply their one remaining colony were minor; most of the brigs sent were seized without reaching the island. The only significant attempt, launched in November 1809, achieved initial success in the destruction of the frigate HMS Junon on December 13, but ultimately failed when the armed storeships Loire and Seine were destroyed on December 18 in a battle with a British squadron off the southern coast of Guadeloupe. During the autumn and winter, British forces were collected from across the Caribbean at Fort Royal, Martinique, under Cochrane and Beckwith for the invasion of Guadeloupe.

Beckwith mustered 6700 men from a variety of garrisons and sources. These troops were split into two divisions: the largest, 3700 men under Beckwith with subordinate command given to Maj.-Gen. Thomas Hislop, was to be deployed at Le Gosier on the island’s south shore. The second division, 2450 men under Brig.-Gen. George Harcourt, was initially ordered to wait on the Iles des Saintes before being deployed after the main attack to the rear of the French garrison. A small reserve under Brig.-Gen. Charles Wale would provide support if required. As the French had no significant naval resources, the Royal Navy’s contribution was much smaller than that required for the Martinique invasion the year before. Cochrane attached ships of the line to both divisions, Beckwith sailing in Cochrane’s flagship HMS Pompee (74), accompanied by HMS Abercrombie (74) with Commodore William Fahie, while Harcourt sailed with Commodore Samuel Ballard in HMS Sceptre (64). Ballard and Fahie were in command of the transports and smaller vessels that carried the invasion forces and bore responsibility for ensuring that the amphibious landings were successful as well as for any naval units that participated in the land campaign.

The French were weakened by years of isolation. Although the available troops numbered 3-4000, there was an epidemic on the island and a significant proportion of the garrison was unfit for duty. Apart from the capital, the rest of the island’s defenses were manned by local militia, among whom morale was low and desertion rates high. Stores of all kinds were in short supply and the governor, Gen. Jean Augustin Ernouf was unable to maintain garrisons around the island’s extensive perimeter.

Cochrane and Beckwith sailed for Guadeloupe on January 27, 1810, arriving off Le Gosier in the evening and landing the larger division at the village of Sainte-Marie under the command of Hislop the next morning. The division split, with one half marching south towards Basse-Terre and the other north. Neither met serious opposition, the militia deserting in large numbers and abandoning their fortifications as the British approached. Messages were sent by the approaching British ordering the surrender of towns and forts, and both forces made rapid progress over the following 2 days. On January 30, Ernouf took up a position with his remaining garrison in the Beaupère–St. Louis Ridge highlands that guarded the approaches to Basse-Terre, Hislop forming his men in front of Ernouf’s position. Later in the day, Harcourt’s men came ashore to the north of Basse-Terre, outflanking the strongest French positions at Trois-Rivières and forcing their withdrawal to Basse-Terre itself.

With his capital coming under bombardment from gun batteries set up by sailors organized into naval brigades, Ernouf marched out to meet the British on the plain at Matabar on February 3. Ernouf attacked and initially drove the British back, before superior numbers forced him to retire after he was flanked by Wale’s force attacking from the north. Wale was wounded in the attack, in which his men suffered 40 casualties. While Ernouf was retreating, Commodore Fahie seized the opportunity to attack the undefended town of Basse-Terre, landing with a force of Royal Marines and capturing the town, cutting off Ernouf’s route of escape. Isolated and surrounded, the French general requested a truce at 0800 on February 4 to bury the dead from the battle the day before. This was accepted, and on February 5 he formally surrendered. British casualties numbered 52 killed and 250 wounded. French losses were heavier, in the region of 500–600 casualties. 3500 soldiers were captured. By February 22, the nearby Dutch colonies of St. Maarten, St. Eustatius and Saba were all persuaded to surrender without a fight.

Guadeloupe was held as a British colony for the remainder of the war, only restored to France after Napoleon’s abdication in 1814. The following year, during the Hundred Days, Guadeloupe’s governor Charles-Alexandre Linois declared for the Emperor once more, requiring another British invasion, although of much smaller size and duration, to restore the monarchy.

[Ennath]

January 29, 1883
Zulu Civil War

After the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, Zululand was divided into 13 sections ruled by “kinglets”. Some were ruled by insignificant chiefs, many of whom had assisted the British during the war. One, however, was given to Zibhebhu kaMapita, inkosi (chief) of the Mandlakazi tribe. Zibhebhu was King Cetshwayo’s second cousin. He had supported the acceptance of the British ultimatum to Cetshwayo, but had loyally supported him during the war. The remnants of Cetshwayo’s Usuthu faction of the Zulu Royal House had been placed under the authority of the Mandlakazi. These included Ndabuko, Siwedu (the King's brother) and his son, Prince Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo. Fearing that King Cetshwayo would eventually be restored to his position, Zibhebhu constantly humiliated Prince Dinuzulu, and reportedly tampered with the King's harem.

On January 29, 1883, Cetshwayo returned to Zululand, rebuilding his Ondini home. The King’s return saw the entire region in a state of chaos, but because he had been stripped of his powers, he was unable to use what influence remained to restore order. Furthermore, Zibhebhu was no longer the King’s loyal subject; he had become his most bitter enemy. The result of this division of Zululand was inevitable; in 1883, a vicious civil war broke out.

The first major clash took place in the Msebe River valley on he March 30, 1883. The Royalists suffered a humiliating defeat with heavy losses. On July 21, Zibhebhu attacked Ondini. The casualties included many prominent personalities, such as the victor of Isandlwana, Inkosi Ntshingwayo kaMahole Khoza and King Cetshwayo’s youngest son Prince Nyoniyentaba. The King barely escaped with his life, and took refuge in Eshowe where he died on February 8, 1884. The chieftainship of the Usuthu passed to Prince Dinuzulu.

Matters in Zululand became chaotic, and the Boers of the area made the most of them by offering to support Dinuzulu. On May 21 1884, at Zaalflaager, near Hlobane, they poured a bottle of castor oil over Prince Dinuzulu’s head, and anointed him as king of the Zulus. This action was ridiculed by Zibhebhu but the Boers offered to assist Dinuzulu in return for land.

Urged on by Ndabuko, 100 Boers under Louis Botha, Lucas Meyer and some Germans from the Luneburg area, led by Adolph Schiel, advanced on Zibhebhu, joined by some 1000 Usuthu warriors. They followed the course of the Mkuze River, aware that Zibhebhu had taken up a position in the Mkuze River gorge, where it passes through the Lebombo mountains. The scene was set for the Battle of Ghost Mountain.

Zibhebhu had concealed his Mandlakazi warriors between the slopes of eTshaneni peak and the Mkuze River. Higher up, near the summit, on the southern slope and hidden from view, he had concealed those members of his tribe who had been unable to bear arms. On the north bank, he had hidden his women, children and cattle in the gorge, protected by a spur in the mountains. They were guarded by another section of his force. It was a brilliantly selected position which not only provided cover for his warriors, but also provided him with an escape route via the Mkuze gorge and onto the Makathini flats, should a retreat become necessary.

The Usuthu army approached the ambush on June 5, 1884, with the Boers and Germans in the rear. As they approached, a Mandlakazi warrior fired a shot prematurely, giving away their position. Instantly, the Usuthu moved into its traditional horn formation, but discovered that the topography prevented an encircling movement. As the right horn swept forward, it met the full onslaught of Zibhebhu's army near the base of eTshaneni on the right. A fierce and bloody battle ensued but it soon became clear that the Mandlakazi had gained the upper hand. Buoyed by their success, the Mandlakazi redoubled their efforts, and the Usuthu turned and fled. The Boers, mounted on their horses, checked both the Usuthu retreat and the Mandlakazi attack, as the latter left the cover of the dense bush, and they forced the Mandlakazi to turn and seek shelter in the bush on the slopes of eTshaneni. Taking note, the Usuthu turned and pursued the Mandlakazi up the slopes, resulting in their line of retreat being cut. This turned the Mandlakazi retreat into a rout. As the attack continued, the abaQulusi, allies of the Usuthu, crossed the Mkuze River and stormed the ridge where the women, children and cattle had been concealed, scattering the defending force, and capturing the cattle - the Mandlakazi wealth.

The battle lasted little more than an hour. Mopping up then commenced, and the Usuthu showed no mercy. Fleeing Mandlakazi warriors were either drowned in the river, or stabbed and shot as they fled. Amongst the dead were no fewer than 6 of Zibhebhu's brothers and many members of his family. Zibhebhu, mounted on his horse, watched the carnage from a high vantage point with his two white advisors, Darke and Eckersley. As the Usuthu turned towards him, he fled, taking refuge in the Eshowe district for 4 years before the British allowed him to return to his home at Bangonomo. In return for their assistance, the Boers were granted huge tracts of land which they later welded into the short-lived Nieuwe Republiek, with Lucas Meyer as its first and only President.

The war continued to simmer and the British eventually deployed troops in volatile areas of Zululand. The most significant engagement occurred at Ceza Mountain on June 2, 1888 where Capt Pennefather's force of 140 men of the 6th Inniskilling Dragoons, 66 Zululand Native Police and warriors of Mnyamana Buthelezi (who had by then switched loyalty) was attacked by the Usuthu, resulting in the death of two Dragoons. The Civil War culminated in the defeat of the Mandlakazi by the Usuthu at kwaNongoma on the June 23, 1888. The final action was fought on July 2 at Hlopekhulu, resulting in the death of a British officer, 2 mounted Basutho, three Zulu police, 40 Eshowe Levies and 15 of Buthelezi’s men to the loss of between 200 and 300 Usuthu.

King Dinuzulu was arrested and tried for High Treason. He was sent to St Helena but returned to South Africa on January 5, 1898, having been relegated to the position of Paramount Chief of the Usuthu clan by the British. He became unwillingly and unwittingly implicated in the 1906 Poll Tax Rebellion, imprisoned and released after Union in 1910 by his old friend Gen. Louis Botha. He died in 1913 and was buried with the kings of Zululand.

Zibhebhu died in 1905 and was buried near his homestead at Bangonomo. He was probably the most able Zulu military strategist since King Shaka.

[Ennath]

January 30, 1874
Battle of Amoaful

The British Gold Coast was formally established in 1867, and in 1872, the British expanded their territory when they purchased the Dutch Gold Coast, including Elmina which was claimed by the Ashanti. The Dutch had signed the Treaty of Butre in 1656 with the Ashanti; the treaty's arrangements proved very stable and regulated Dutch-Ashanti diplomatic affairs for more than 213 years. This all changed with the sale of the Dutch Gold Coast. In 1873, the Ashanti invaded the new British protectorate.

Gen. Garnet Wolseley with 2500 British troops and several thousand West Indian and African troops (including some Fante, long-time rivals and prey of the Ashanti) was sent against the Ashanti. The campaign was covered by war correspondents, including Henry Morton Stanley. Wolsley prepared his campaign carefully. There were sufficient supplies and military and medical instructions were printed for the troops. However, London refused appeals to interfere with British arms manufacturers who sold to both sides.

Wolseley was appointed on August 13, 1873 and went to the Gold Coast to make his plans before the arrival of his troops in January 1874. On September 27, a team of Royal Engineers landed at Cape Coast Castle. Their job was to expand the single file track that led to the Ashanti capital at Kumasi, 160 miles away, into a road suitable for troop movements. At the end of each day’s march, roughly every 10 miles a fortified camp would be built with 70 foot long huts inside a stockade in an area that had been cleared of trees and undergrowth to provide some protection against hostile natives.

Bridges were built across streams using trees, bamboos and creepers for ropes and a major bridge across the 63 yard wide River Prah was built using pre-manufactured sections brought from Chatham, England. In total 237 bridges would be built. Some of the camps were larger, such as at Prahsue, next to the bridge, with a medical hut and a tower on a mound, stores, forge, telegraph office and post office. It was stocked with 400 tons of food and 1.1 million rounds of ammunition. The labor was supplied locally, though to start with the men did not know how to use European tools and were liable to vanish into the forest if they heard a rumor that the Ashanti were nearby. Sickness, despite taking quinine daily, claimed many engineers. Even so, the road progressed. By January 24 Prahsue was reached with the telegraph line.

The first troops arrived in late December and from January 1, 1874 started marching along the road to the front, half a battalion at a time. The troops comprised a battalion each from the Black Watch, Rifle Brigade and Royal Welch Fusiliers, along with the 1st and 2nd West Indian Regiment, a Naval Brigade, two native regiments, Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers and Royal Marines.

Initially, Ashanti commanders had planned a stand at the crest of the steep Adansi Hills, which would have presented a difficult obstacle. However, the position was so formidable that some of the Ashanti king’s advisors feared that the British would not attack it and would retreat before they could be surrounded and their weapons and supplies captured. The king allowed himself to be persuaded and abandoned the Adansi Hills, to the surprise of the British, some of whom took it as a sign that the Ashanti would not fight.

The new Ashanti plan was to make a stand at Amoaful and, instead of using the usual enveloping attack, launch a surprise frontal assault before the British could fully deploy. The powerful king of Dwaben, leading 10,000 men, agreed, but King Kakari insisted on the traditional battle plan, proposed by the kingdom’s highest commander, the 70-year old Asamoa Nkwanta, perhaps the only leader with the charisma to inspire the troops to fight. He proposed fighting a defensive battle, forcing the British to attack through marshy ground, down a ravine, and then up a ridge. All this would take place in thick brush that would make the defenders nearly invisible. Two flanking forces would then hit the stalled British in the rear. However, the king of Dwaben was so enraged by the decision that he pulled his men out.

The Ashanti were so short of ammunition that some guns (“Dane guns”, cheap muskets imported to West Africa by Danish traders) were loaded with pebbles or even snail shells. A handful had modern Enfield breech-loaders, but the only other addition to the Dane guns were 1000 well-worn French muskets originally used at Waterloo.

By January 29, the road was more than half complete and the British were close to Ashanti outposts. Skirmishing between the two forces had begun. Wolseley was informed by a spy of Ashanti dispositions and he offered rewards for Ashanti prisoners who could provide more information. This ploy was unsuccessful, as his African advance troops preferred killing Ashanti prisoners to handing them over for questioning. Nevertheless, he had 40 African scouts out ahead of his force under Lord Gifford.

Early in the morning of January 30, Gifford scouted through thick bush toward Amoaful past magical items intended to deter attackers. As he approached the village of Egginassie, just south of Amoaful, he came under sudden fire, which killed 3 scouts. He returned fire and sent word of the contact. Later that day, another village nearby was stormed and captured. Wolseley ordered a general attack for the following day. The British would advance in square as far as the jungle would permit along a 600-yard front, while engineers and African laborers would do their best to open up the brush enough for a forward movement. The Black Watch would lead the advance, with the Rifle Brigade as the rear guard.

Gifford again began the action at Egginassie; reinforced by 2 companies of the Black Watch, he pressed ahead until he encountered the main Ashanti line. By 8:15 firing was occurring along the whole front. With no wind, smoke hugged the ground, obscuring vision. The Scots attacked, taking heavy casualties and forcing them to ground. Attacks against their flanks were deterred by reserves. The engineers also suffered heavily as they has to remain standing to do their work.

By 10:30, the battle was at a standstill. Wolseley refused to consider retreat and ordered his Hausa gunners to manhandle their piece across the swamp and fire point-blank into the Ashanti lines. This was accomplished despite losses, and the gun caused such appalling casualties that Ashanti fire began to slacken. Seizing the opportunity, the Scots and Welsh launched a bayonet charge, forcing the Ashanti from several successive positions. By midday, they were on the outskirts of Amoaful. Here the exhausted men took up defensive positions, their flanks under attack by the two Ashanti columns intended for this purpose. Other portions of the flanking force worked around the British rear. By 2:00, the firing in front had ceased, but the Ashanti were in the British rear, overwhelming a supply column; troops from the Rifle Brigade and 2nd West Indians rescued the remains. Heavy fighting declined, but scattered firing continued until sunset. Both sides spent a miserable night as it rained heavily. Ashanti morale suffered as news spread that the king had fled the field.

After the rain, the British were not able to organize themselves for an attack until the afternoon. This gave the Ashanti time to fortify the next town along the road and dry their powder. Gifford’s scouts and the Naval Brigade took the position only after some hard fighting. The battle had cost the British 20 dead and almost 200 wounded. Several hundred Ashanti had been killed.

The advance resumed on February 3, the British forcing their way through one position after another toward Kumasi. They arrived the following day, to find the city abandoned. The royal palace was demolished before the column pulled back. Wolseley had completed the campaign in 2 months and re-embarked for home before the fever season began.

The Treaty of Fomena in July 1874 ended the war. Among the terms were an indemnity of 50,000 ounces of gold, an end to the Ashanti practice of human sacrifice and free trade. The road from Kumasi to the coast was to kept open.

[Ennath]

January 31, 1968
Battle for Saigon, Part 1

By late 1967, the Vietnam War had not been going well from Hanoi’s point of view. VC and NVA troops had lost heavily in every encounter with US forces. Vo Nguyen Giap decided that a change of strategy was in order. Rather than continuing trying to slowly wear down American will, Giap wanted a Diebienphu-like master stroke, which would topple the southern regime as the southern population rose in revolt, according to the doctrine of the General Uprising. Giap’s plan depended on three key assumptions: that the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) would collapse under the initial impact; that the people of the South would follow through with the General Uprising; that faced with an overwhelming shock action, the American will to continue would crack.

The General Offensive was set for Tet 1968, the beginning of the Lunar New Year: The Year of the Monkey. General instructions were sent to units in the field, but the exact timing and specific unit objectives were withheld until the last moment. Starting in the fall of 1967, Giap staged a series of bloody but seemingly pointless battles in the border regions and in the north near the DMZ. All of these actions were designed to draw US units out of the urban areas and toward the borders. For the most part, they were carried out by NVA troops, while VC units moved into their Tet jump-off positions, built up their supplies and rehearsed.

By December 15, 1967, the US command (MACV) had turned over sole responsibility for the defense of Saigon to the ARVN. The main task of securing Saigon was assigned to 5th ARVN Ranger Group, supported in turn by 2nd Battalion, 13th Artillery, the only US combat unit remaining inside the city itself. Meanwhile, 39 maneuver battalions under III Corps Zone were earmarked for use against base camps near the Cambodian border. By the time of Tet, only 14 US and Free World maneuver battalions were scheduled to be inside the so-called Saigon Circle, a 29-mile zone around the capital.

Lt. Gen. Fredrick Weyand, commander of III Corps, didn’t like the pattern he was seeing. His troops in the border regions were experiencing too few contacts, and enemy radio traffic around Saigon was getting heavier. On January 10, 1968, Weyand (a former intelligence officer) went to his boss, Gen. Westmoreland, with his concerns. He convinced Westmoreland to allow a shift of some troops back inside the Saigon Circle. When the attacks did come, 27 maneuver battalions were back inside the Circle.

Giap’s plan didn’t exactly go off without a hitch. The secrecy of his buildup cost him in coordination. At 0015 on January 30, Da Nang, Pleiku, Nha Trang and 9 other cities in the center of Vietnam came under attack. The assaults were premature - units of the VC Military Region 5 had jumped off a day too early. At 0945, the Allies canceled the Tet ceasefire for the remainder of the country. At 1125 all US units were ordered to full alert. The units inside the Saigon Circle were ordered to take up blocking positions around Saigon and around the nearby Long Bin-Bien Hoa military complex. Surprise had been lost.

Perhaps the clearest indicator of the importance the enemy placed on the Saigon Circle was that the operation was under the command of Lt. Gen. Tran Van Tra, the second-highest ranking officer in the NVA. The Communist command had 8 major objectives for the Saigon Circle. With these achieved, they believed, would come the crippling of the Saigon government, and with that, the General Uprising. A combined force of 35 battalions, organized into one NVA and two VC divisions, was committed. VC and NVA units were to seize and neutralize the key command, control and communications centers inside Saigon; seize the artillery and armor depots at Go Vap; and neutralize Tan Son Nhut Air Base and the MACV command center. They would also seize the Cholon section of Saigon; destroy the Newport Bridge linking Saigon to Long Bin-Bien Hoa on Highway 1; seize the massive US logistics center at Long Binh; and neutralize the air base at Bien Hoa. Finally, they were to block any attempts by US 1st and 25th Divisions to reinforce Saigon along Highways I and 13.

At 0130 on January 31, the presidential palace in Saigon was attacked by a 14-man VC sapper platoon. During the early hour, Gen. Weyand sat in his Tactical-Operations Center (TOC) at Long Binh, watching the battle sites on his operations map light up. By 0500, he ordered the nearly 5000 American combat troops under immediate control into action. Later that morning, he ordered his deputy commander, Maj. Gen. Keith Ware, into Saigon to take command of all US forces in the city. As the morning of the 31st dragged on and Weyand’s forces were stretched thinner and thinner, his most pressing problem turned out to be the one that was probably the most militarily insignificant: the US. Embassy.

At about 0215, a taxi drove past the Embassy. When machine-gun fire from the cab raked the front gate, the 2 MPs on duty slammed it shut and immediately radioed for help. The compound was under assault by a 19-man sapper platoon. Rather than assault the gate directly, the sappers went farther down along the street and blew a hole in the wall with C-4 plastic explosive. Once inside the compound, they killed the 2 MPs, but not before the MPs managed to kill the VC platoon leader and his assistant. The sappers blew open the doors of the chancery with a rocket, but for some reason never entered the building. It wouldn’t have been hard, as there were only 3 marines inside. Deprived of their leader, the sappers just sat in the compound and exchanged shots with MPs on the outside who had responded to the call for help. Weyand, meanwhile, was under heavy pressure from above to regain control. At 0500, he sent a helicopter carrying troops from 101st Airborne Division. They tried to land on the chancery roof but were driven off by heavy fire. Another air insertion was attempted at 0800.; this one succeeded, and soon all the VC sappers were dead.

Elsewhere in the city, another VC platoon hit the ARVN Joint General Staff (JGS) compound at 0200. The first attack was driven back, and 1st and 2nd VC Local Force battalions were brought up to continue the assault. At 0400. a truckload of American MPs was racing to answer a trouble call from an American officers’ billet near JGS; the MPs were ambushed in an alley by a VC company on its way to the same compound. The resultant fight in the alley lasted 12 hours. 16 MPs were killed and 21 wounded. Meanwhile, other VC forces managed to get inside the JGS compound by 0930., but they were quickly ejected and routed by a reaction force of ARVN paratroopers.

A few blocks north of the US Embassy, yet another sapper platoon hit the National Radio station. The station had been reinforced during the night by a platoon of ARVN paratroopers, almost all of whom were sound asleep on the station roof when the attack started. The sappers took up positions in an adjacent apartment building where they could fire down on the ARVN soldiers. After killing all the paratroopers, the sappers had little difficulty taking over the station. They were accompanied by an NVA radio specialist who carried prerecorded broadcast tapes announcing the fall of the Saigon government and the General Uprising. Their plans fell apart at the last moment, however, when the night crew at the transmission site 14 miles away shut down the link on a prearranged signal.

The ARVN depot complex at Go Vap, on the northern edge of the city, was the primary objective of 101st VC Regiment. The plan called for the capture of ARVN tanks and howitzers. These heavy weapons were then to be used to assault the east end of Tan Son Nhut Air Base, about a mile away. Troops specially trained to operate the weapons accompanied the attack forces. Both assaults were successful, but once inside, the VC discovered that the tanks had been moved elsewhere. The VC managed to capture 12 howitzers, but the weapons were disabled at the last minute when the withdrawing ARVN troops had the presence of mind to remove the firing locks. A few hours later, the Go Vap complex was retaken by 4th ARVN Marine Battalion.

The following day, just north of the city, US 1st Division turned the tables on the force that was supposed to block them from reinforcing Saigon. Moving southeast along Highway 13, the Americans ran into the 273rd VC Regiment. The VC took up defensive positions near Phu Loi but were caught there by the division’s artillery and sealed in the box by the infantry. Two days later, the 273rd had been virtually destroyed as an effective fighting unit.

During the evening of January 30, a large VC force infiltrated the Vinatexco textile factory across Highway I from Tan Son Nhut. At about 0320 the next morning, 3 VC battalions stormed the western side of the air base, which also housed the command for MACV. Even though the armor and artillery that were supposed to come from Go Vap never arrived, the western perimeter was breached and the Communist forces made it onto the runway. The base was defended by an assorted force consisting of the 377th Security Police Squadron, two platoons of MACV headquarters’ guard force, ARVN 52nd Regional Force Battalion, and Vice-Pres. Nguyen Cao Ky’s bodyguard. The only reserve consisted of 2 companies of ARVN 8th Airborne Battalion, who had been sitting at Tan Son Nhut awaiting air transport north. By 0415 this reserve had been committed. Calls for help went out to 25th Division at Cu Chi, about 15 miles northwest of Saigon.

[Ennath]

January 31, 1968
Battle for Saigon, Part 2

When the call for help arrived, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry sent C Troop down Highway 1 in the dark. While 1 platoon secured the Hoc Mon Bridge, just north of the base, the rest of C Troop crashed into the rear of the 3 VC battalions at about 0600. The VC responded with RPG’s; about one-third of the armored column was destroyed, but the cohesion of the VC attack was badly disrupted. B Troop was called in from its alert position about 30 miles away. It raced down Highway I and reached Tan Son Nhut in about 45 minutes. The new arrivals were placed across the enemy’s north flank, effectively putting the VC in a right angle between two armored columns. More gunships and artillery pounded the enemy, now firmly fixed in place. By 1000, the VC fled back into the textile mill, which was later leveled by air strikes. Around the base perimeter, mop-up operations continued well into the night.

Thirteen miles east, the Long Binh-Bien Hoa complex was attacked by the 5th VC Division. There, too, the battle was decided by armored and mechanized forces. 9th Battalion, 47th Infantry (Mechanized) was ordered into action at 0445. Company A was sent to relieve the attack on a large POW compound between the two cities on Highway 1. Company B was sent to reinforce the already breached perimeter of the Long Binh ammo dump. Company C was sent to relieve the attack on the ARVN III Corps headquarters in Bien Hoa City.

Company B arrived at the dump at 0630, ejecting the intruders. Company A, meanwhile, attacked from the Long Binh base across Highway I into elements of the 275th VC Regiment in Ho Nai Village and ‘Black Widow Village’ - so called because many widows of VC officers were thought to live there. To reach ARVN III Corps headquarters, Company C had to fight its way through the middle of the 275th Regiment and through the flank of the 274th attacking Bien Hoa Air Base. At 0545, it plowed into the rear of the 238th VC Battalion attacking the III Corps compound. Company C attacked from the march column and overran the besiegers. Bien Hoa City was cleared by 1730.

Meanwhile, another troop, from 5th Cavalry, was sent to relieve the attack on Bien Hoa Air Base. The troop had to move 18 miles down Highway 1 and run the same gantlet as Company C. Ten miles from Bien Hoa, they were momentarily stopped when the VC blew a bridge. The troop’s M113s could ford the stream, but the tanks could not. After a hasty fording operation, Troop A was once again on the move, but with only one of its tanks. The cavalry column had to fight through Bien Hoa city to reach the air base, where it linked up with troops brought in by helicopter at dawn. Together they ejected the attackers from the eastern end of the field. The fight took most of the day. The fight for Long Binh-Bien Hoa ended on the evening of February I with the arrival of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, after an 8-hour forced march.

The teeming Chinese section of Cholon, in the southwest corner of Saigon, was the Communists’ key population objective inside the Saigon Circle. Initially, the area was attacked by the 5th and 6th VC Local Force Battalions. As the fighting dragged on elements of every Communist unit known to be operating in Saigon were eventually identified there. The key to Cholon was the Phu Tho Racetrack. It was at the hub of most of the key streets and, by holding it, the VC could deny its use as a landing zone. Early on the 31st, Weyand ordered elements of 199th Light Infantry Brigade to reinforce ARVN rangers in Cholon.

The 6th VC LF Battalion had little trouble taking the racetrack. From there, a large number of political cadres fanned out to work through the huge urban sprawl. Some tried to whip up support for the General Uprising. Others went to serve execution warrants on government figures and ARVN officers. A month-long reign of terror in Cholon had begun.

Lead elements of the 199th reached Cholon about 0800. Six blocks from the racetrack, an RPG hit the lead APC, killing the platoon leader. Communist troops began to fire down onto the column from the surrounding buildings. The infantry dismounted and continued fighting house to house, exactly as their colleagues were doing in Bien Hoa at that very moment. By 1300 Company A had pushed to within two blocks of the racetrack. The VC then withdrew to prepared positions behind the concrete benches at the track. Company A assaulted the position, but was repulsed. At 1630 it tried again, this time supported by helicopter gunships. The Americans succeeded in taking the track, but the VC melted away into the streets of Cholon. Shortly after dark, Companies B and C were brought onto the racetrack by helicopter. The next morning, the troops at the racetrack were reinforced by two mechanized companies of 9th Division’s 60th Infantry, and the 33rd ARVN Ranger Battalion. Using the racetrack as a base of operations, they started working outward to clear Cholon. The VC tried to retake the racetrack later that day, but were beaten back.

The tedious city fighting ground on. By February 3, the South Vietnamese had 5 ranger, 5 Marine and 5 airborne battalions inside Saigon. The Americans had committed 7 infantry, 1 MP and 6 artillery battalions. On February 5, ARVN 5th Ranger Group started an operation to finally clear Cholon. For political and prestige reasons, the South Vietnamese JGS requested that the Americans pull out of Cholon and allow the ARVN to finish the job. Cholon was finally cleared on March 7.

By attacking everywhere at once, Giap had superior strength nowhere. He achieved great surprise, but he was unable to exploit it. Analyzing the battle for the Saigon Circle, General Weyand later concluded that it had actually been a large collection of relatively small independent actions. The assault had been launched piecemeal, and it was repulsed piecemeal. The cost was 1100 Communist dead.

The people of the South did not rally to the Communist cause. The General Uprising never took place-even in Hue, where Communist forces held an entire city for the longest time. Nor did the ARVN fold. It may have buckled in a few areas, but by and large it fought, and fought amazingly well.

If there was a single big loser in the Tet Offensive, it was the Viet Cong. The guerrillas of the South led the main attacks and they suffered the heaviest casualties. The guerrilla infrastructure, so carefully developed over many years, had been destroyed with a single throw of the dice. From that point on, the war was entirely run by the North. The VC were never again a significant force on the battlefield. When Saigon fell in 1975, it was at the hands of 4 NVA corps. And yet, Giap was quite correct in his third assumption about the will of his enemy.

The American military had been caught by surprise but still won. The generals knew the enemy was on the ropes, and now was the time to finish him off. Westmoreland and JCS Chairman Wheeler put together a plan requiring an additional 206,000 American troops to exploit the debacle, but the Johnson White House leaked the plan to the press. The story broke on March 10. The American public concluded the extra troops were needed to recover from a massive defeat, with accusations that it had been lied to, many coming from the hostile media. Less than three weeks later, Johnson announced that he would not seek re-election. As the American military historian S.L.A. Marshall summed up later, the Tet Offensive was “a potential major victory turned into a disastrous retreat through mistaken estimates, loss of nerve, bad advice, failure in leadership, and a tidal wave of defeatism!”