The Military History Thread

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December 11, 1899
Battle of Magersfontein

Lord Paul Methuen, with a force of 10,000, left his camps on the Orange River on November 11 to relieve the diamond mining town of Kimberley, under siege by the Boers and began a march north along the railway. After two relatively easy victories at Belmont (November 23) and Rooilaagte (November 25), the British had suffered something of a mauling at the Modder River (November 28, see posting), although in the end the Boers had retreated from that position. In the aftermath, Methuen decided to rest his men and wait for reinforcements, while he himself recovered from the bullet wound he had received and the railway bridge was re-instated to enable supplies and troops to be brought up from Orange River by train.

All this gave the Boers time to decide what to do next. Gen. Piet Cronje, the Boer commander, was inclined to take his army back to Spytfontein, close to Kimberly, and defend the line of kopjes there. This was the decision taken at the meeting of senior Boer commanders. Jacobus de la Rey, Cronje’s energetic subordinate, was in Jacobsdal for the funeral of his older son Aadrian, fatally wounded during the fighting. He thus missed the meeting at which the decision was made to withdraw. De la Rey eventually caught up with his commander and persuaded Cronje that the chosen position would be vulnerable to attack from the hills at Magersfontein, and so it was decided to make a stand there instead, and that the position must be fortified with greater subtlety than had been deployed at Modder River.

The Boers’ extensive intelligence system across Cape Colony, built up during the years before the war and relying upon the section of the Boer population there prepared to assist the 2 republics, enabled Cronje to form an accurate assessment of the length of time before Methuen would feel able to advance north. This was around 2 weeks, giving the Boers enough time to build the required field fortifications at Magersfontein.

At first the Boers built their defenses along the top of the kopjes. However, De la Rey was convinced that this was a mistake, and that the Boers would be much more dangerous if they instead dug trenches at the base of the hills. This would allow them to take advantage of the flat trajectory of their Mauser rifles. De la Rey was able to have this plan adopted. The 8500 Boer troops at Magersfontein dug themselves into a trench network along the base of the hills.

While he waited at Modder River Methuen ensured that there were regular cavalry patrols up the line to the Magersfontein kopjes so he was well aware that the next battle would be fought there. Scouting the Boer positions was carried out by cavalry and mounted infantry patrols with little local knowledge, if any, and what are described in the contemporary literature as “friendly Kafirs”, who were likely to have been infiltrated by the Boer intelligence service.

The railway bridge was completed by December 7, so that trains could move north of the river. The final reinforcements arrived on the 10th, so Methuen now had 11,000 infantry, 850 cavalry and mounted troops, 750 gunners with 30 guns and naval personnel with 4 long 12 pounders and a 4.7 inch gun. There was also a captive balloon, complete with telephone equipment to communicate with the ground. Canadian and Australian troops arrived at Belmont and were given the security of the rail line.

Boer reinforcements arrived from the besieging force at Kimberley and from Natal increasing the size of Cronje’s army to around 10,000. After the battle the British expressed considerable surprise at the sophistication of the entrenchment at the bottom of the hill. Methuen made several reconnaissances to establish the Boer positions, leading to regular skirmishing. On 9th, the British artillery bombarded the line of hills in an attempt to draw Boer fire and thereby establish the positions of their guns and rifle pits. The Boers did not respond. Methuen formed the view that he could not march round the Boer positions on either flank and would have to make another frontal attack up the line of the railway.

There would be an artillery bombardment of the hills for two hours before sunset on the 10th. The Highland Brigade would make a night approach march to the base of Magersfontein and attack up the hill at dawn, supported by the Guards Brigade and the fire of the British artillery. 9th Brigade would remain to guard the camp. Security was poor with the presence of many native drivers and railway workers and the uncertainty as to the loyalty of Cape Colony inhabitants. For this reason the plan was kept confidential to Methuen and his immediate staff, some half dozen officers. This had the disastrous effect of preventing the brigade and unit officers from ensuring that they and their men knew what they were expected to do and being given information on Boer dispositions.

The artillery began its bombardment of the hilltops on schedule; this achieved nothing, for the Boers were not on the hilltops. Just after midnight on December 11, the Highland Brigade began its advance. Not expecting any resistance at the base of the hills, the 4 Highland regiments (Black Watch, Seaforths, Argylls, and Highland Light Infantry) advanced in close formation under Maj. Gen. Andrew Wauchope. At 4 AM, just as Wauchope was about to deploy his men for the assault, the Boers opened fire. It was later claimed that they must have been warned by Boer sympathizers or in some other mysterious way, but the artillery bombardment was surely enough warning, and Methuen had attempted night marches at both Belmont and Rooilaagte. The Highlanders didn’t stand a chance. At 400 yards the Boer rifle fire was devastating. Wauchope was killed early on. Half of the brigade fled, trampling the commander of the Highland Light Infantry on their way. Most of the survivors were pinned in place, just as they had been at Modder River.

Despite this disaster, the British came close to victory. On the right, a mixed company of Seaforths and Black Watch managed to get around the Boer left, and were about to climb the rear slopes of the hill. The only Boers here were Piet Cronjé and 6 of his staff, who had been attempting to sleep there. As the Highlanders climbed the hill, Cronjé and his party opened fire. Misjudging their numbers, the Highlanders stopped and opened fire themselves. By the time they realized their mistake, the chance was gone. The gap in the Boer lines had been closed, reinforcements hurried to the area, and finally the British artillery, unaware of the presence of the Highlanders, began to shell the area. The best chance for a British victory had slipped away.

Meanwhile, in front of the Boer lines the Highland brigade was prone, trying to avoid being shot. Several times small attacks were made, but with no success. At around 11 AM, a second attack was sent in, this time with the Gordons, but they too were forced to the ground.

Methuen failed to react. He still had the Guard Brigade, but did nothing with them. The Highlanders were ordered to remain where they were until nightfall, in the hope that the Boers would once again retreat overnight. However, this was not to be. At around 1.30, the Boers made an attempt to gain a position from where they could fire at the Highlanders from the flank. An attempt to deal with this threat was misinterpreted by many as the start of a retreat. This rapidly turned into a rout as Boer rifle fire poured into the retreating Highlanders, causing more casualties than during the initial attack.

At around 5.30, the Boer guns, which had not fired during the day, opened up on the British cavalry. This triggered a general withdrawal of the exhausted British troops who had been fighting all day in the blazing heat, with inadequate cover, under fire from opponents they could not see. Methuen accepted the inevitable and ordered his force back to the camp at Modder River. The next morning the balloon went up and reported that the Boers were clearly still in their positions.

Ammunition was low in both armies. Rumors began to spread of a truce to collect the wounded, and although no such armistice was officially agreed, one soon came into effect. British losses were devastating. Methuen’s army had lost 205 dead, 690 wound and 76 missing or captured. The Boers had lost around 250 men. The Highland Brigade was especially badly hit, suffering 752 casualties - the Black Watch alone lost 355 men. Methuen claimed that the defeat at Magersfontein was due to the failure of the Highland Brigade to attack the Boer trench. This assertion aroused the indignation of the Highland regiments.

The battle of Magersfontein ended any hope that Methuen would be able to relieve Kimberley. He retreated to the Modder River, where he remained until Field Marshal Roberts arrived in February 1900. Methuen was then sidelined. The Boers remained in their trenches, strengthening their position in preparation for the next British attack. That attack would never come. When Lord Roberts finally arrived, he decided to launch a great flank march around the Boer lines and into the Orange Free State.

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December 12, 1937
Panay Incident

A flat-bottomed gunboat built in Shanghai in 1926 specifically for river duty, USS Panay served as part of the US Navy’s Yangtze Patrol under the Asiatic Fleet, which was responsible for patrolling the Yangtze River to protect American lives and property in China.

After invading China in the summer of 1937, Japanese forces moved in on the city of Nanking (now known as Nanjing) in December. Panay evacuated the remaining Americans from the city on December 11, bringing the number of people aboard to 5 officers, 54 enlisted men, 4 embassy staff, and 10 civilians, including newsmen and cameramen.

On the morning of the 12th, the Japanese air forces received information that fleeing Chinese forces were in the area in 10 large steamers and a large number of junks and that they were 12-25 miles upstream from Nanking. While anchored upstream from Nanking, Panay and 3 Standard Oil tankers, Mei Ping, Mei An and Mei Hsia, came under attack from Japanese naval aircraft. Panay was hit by 2 of the 18 bombs dropped by 3 B4Y torpedo bombers and strafed by 9 A4N fighters. According to Lt. J.W. Geist, an officer aboard the Panay, “the day before we told the Japanese army in the area who we were,” and 3 American flags were plainly visible on the ship. Planes also machine-gunned small boats taking the wounded ashore. The Times correspondent Colin MacDonald, who had also been aboard, saw a Japanese army small boat machine-gun the Panay as it was sinking in spite of the American flag painted on the side of the ship. Since Japanese planes continued to circle overhead, survivors cowered knee deep in mud in a swamp. The gunboat sank; 4 people were killed and 48 wounded. The 3 tankers were also bombed and destroyed, and the captain of Mei An and many Chinese civilian passengers were killed. The vessels had been helping to evacuate the families of Standard Oil’s employees and agents from Nanking during the Japanese attack on that city.

Two newsreel cameramen were aboard (Norman Alley of Universal News and Eric Mayell of Movietone News); they were able to film part of the attack and, after reaching shore, the sinking of the ship in the middle of the river. Survivors were later taken aboard the American vessel Oahu and the British gunboats HMS Ladybird and Bee. Earlier the same day, a Japanese shore battery had fired on Ladybird.

The Japanese government took full responsibility for sinking Panay but continued to maintain that the attack had been unintentional. Chief of Staff of Japanese naval forces in northern China, Vice Adm. Rokuzo Sugiyama, was assigned to make an apology. The formal apology reached Washington, DC on Christmas Eve.

Although Japanese officials maintained that their pilots never saw any American flags on Panay, a US Navy court of inquiry determined that several flags were clearly visible on the vessel during the attacks. At a meeting held at the American embassy in Tokyo on December 23, Japanese officials maintained that one navy airplane had attacked a boat by machine gun for a short period of time and that Japanese army motor boats or launches attacked the Chinese steamers escaping upstream on the opposite bank. However, the Japanese navy insisted that the attack had been unintentional. The Japanese government paid an indemnity of $2,214,007.36 to the US on April 22, 1938, officially settling the incident.

Modern historians have gone back and analyzed the attack. Many now believe that the attack may have been intentional. According to John Prados, Navy cryptographers had intercepted and decrypted traffic relating to the attacking planes which clearly indicated that they were under orders during the attack and that it had not been a mistake of any kind. This information was not released at the time for obvious security reasons. Writer Nick Sparks believes that the chaos in Nanking created an opportunity for renegade factions within the Japanese army who wanted to force the US into an active conflict so that the Japanese could once and for all drive the US out of China.

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1638
Beaver Wars

When the Dutch came to North America, they traded with the native tribes. Unlike the French and English, they were also willing to trade firearms. The Iroquois Confederation fought to ensure they were the sole trading partners for the Dutch. However, as the Iroquois lands in western New York became depleted of fur-bearing animals that were their currency with the Dutch, the Confederation saw the writing on the wall. They knew they needed new sources of pelts. They tried to get permission to hunt in lands controlled by the Hurons, who refused. The Iroquois felt surrounded by hostile tribes. Their recent victory over the Mahicans and some of the smaller Algonquin tribes had taught them that war could be the answer.

And so it began. The Iroquois began lashing out at their neighbors, one by one. They would fall upon a tribe, defeat it utterly in battle, and then capture those who did not flee and absorb them. Adoption of enemy captives was an established native tradition - particularly among the Iroquois. Successful wars had the effect of replenishing the ranks of their warriors. The survivors who had fled to neighbors presented the Iroquois with an excuse to go to war with those tribes, too. They would demand tribes who had sheltered refugees surrender them to the Confederation. Inevitably, their demand would be refused, and a new war begun.

The powerful tribes ringing the Confederation’s homeland never joined together to defeat the menace. Perhaps they did not recognize the threat. Perhaps diplomats from the Confederation were effective in convincing the tribe to stay at peace with them. Evidence also suggests that the Huron, Neutrals, Erie, and Susquehannock were also feeling the pinch of depleted hunting and trapping lands. Temporary peace with the Iroquois allowed them to raid into the Ohio Valley. Evidence suggests Erie and Susquehannock attacks caused the Miami and Shawnee to begin to migrate out of the Ohio Valley.

The first tribe to fall to this well-oiled war-making machine were the Wenro. In 1638, the Iroquois attacked this small, Iroquoian tribe of about 2000. Wenro lands bordered those of the Seneca to the southwest. Many Wenro fled to their Neutral relatives, who turned their back on them. Wenro refugees were forced to seek shelter instead among the Huron, which angered the Confederation.

In 1648, they attacked the Neutrals (a name given by the French, as the tribe was neutral in the Iroquois-Huron wars; they were otherwise fairly aggressive) around Detroit, and the Huron north of Lake Ontario. By 1651, the Neutrals had been destroyed as a nation and many members absorbed by the Seneca. Earlier in the decade, the Huron had been weakened by epidemics, their numbers shrinking to perhaps 10,000. The Iroquois launched a series of raids that burned their major towns. Despite backing from the French, the demoralized Huron fled, many seeking refuge with the Tionontati (by Georgian Bay). The Iroquois followed into Tionontati lands and burned their towns as well. The Iroquois pursued the Huron and Tionontati refugees further north, towards Lake Superior and seized the abandoned lands.

The Huron’s French allies were next. Montreal and many settlements in the St. Lawrence valley were attacked, settlers kidnapped, and the governor of New France sent for regular troops from France. They attacked Confederation lands, burning towns when they could not find enemy armies. Eventually, the two major powers patched things up with a treaty, which gave the Iroquois a chance to consolidate their conquests and begin to plot new ones.

The north secured, the Confederation then turned upon the powerful Susquehannock of Pennsylvania, who lived in fortified towns that were sometimes even protected by artillery. As their lands were depleted of beaver, they raided the Ohio Valley to obtain new sources. War between the Susquehannock and Iroquois dragged on for 25 years. The Confederation was able to overwhelm the Susquehannock in 1675 only after they’d been abandoned by all their European trading partners. Many were adopted into the Iroquoian tribes, while the rest took shelter with the English.

While this war was dragging on, the Erie were the next to feel the might of the Confederation. Known as skilled warriors, the Erie defied Iroquois threats to hand over Neutrals who had sought refuge. Proud to a fault, the Erie raided the Seneca, sparking open war in 1653. Although the Erie inflicted losses on the Confederation, they were outgunned and outnumbered; 3 years later, they too were beaten. Many were adopted into Iroquois families, but a large remnant fled south to reappear in history as the fierce Westo tribe in the Southeast. At this point, the Iroquois had broken through all barriers to the OhioValley, into which raiding and hunting parties now poured.

War had come to the Ohio Valley before. Tribes including the Neutrals, Erie, and Susquehannock raided or hunted for furs in what is now Ohio, Michigan, and Indiana as their own lands became depleted. As these tribes fell one by one, the Confederation sent war parties streaming in. Some tribes, like the Miami, initially tried to take advantage of the newcomers, allying with them against old foes. Others steadily pulled back, either migrating towards friends and allies, or simply hoping to buy safety with distance. The Iroquois were relentless in their pursuit of beaten opponents, though. One reason for this may be that they needed fresh captives. As the Beaver Wars raged on, they needed to adopt new members into their depleted tribal ranks as much as they needed the furs that the Ohio Valley provided.

Because of its distance from European settlements, the early phase of this theater is the least well documented. It appears that the Kickapoo and Potawatomi were the first to be driven out. Already recoiling from earlier attacks by the Neutrals and others, they steadily retreated up the Michigan peninsula; by 1667, many had fled to Green Bay, where they gathered in multi-tribal communities to protect themselves from pursuit or hostile tribes native to these new lands. The Shawnee were next. Possible allies of the Susquehannock, they had been suffering from attacks as much as the Kickapoo and Potawatomi had been. With the Iroquois invading in earnest, they left the Ohio Valley in the late 1660s. A village-based society, they split into different groups, each seeking safety in their own way. One group even remained as Iroquois allies, while others sheltered with the Illinois on the Mississippi River, and still other bands went as far south as Savannah, Georgia (which is named after them).

In the Miami, the Iroquois found an opponent who was their equal in diplomacy. As Iroquois war parties entered the Ohio Valley, the Miami allied with them to attack their enemy, the Illinois. This allowed them to remain in their homeland. The Miami participated alongside the Iroquois in the devastating attack on the Grand Village of Kaskaskia, which killed thousands of Illinois. In 1682, the Iroquois took affront at Miami sheltering of Shawnee refugees. The wily Miami changed sides and convinced the French to arrange a peace between them and their old Illinois foes. Many Miami moved to Ft. St. Louis to be closer to their new allies. Although they suffered during a Seneca invasion in 1684, the Miami triumphed alongside their Illinois and French allies and drove off the attackers. Iroquois attacks continued, though. In 1687, Iroquois raiders carried off a large group of Miami women and children from their village near present-day Chicago. Perhaps fed up with a lack of help from their allies, the Miami left Ft. St. Louis and returned in force to defend their northern Indiana homeland.

The largest tribe furthest west to be directly affected, the Illinois, were a powerful confederacy living in southern Wisconsin and northern Illinois. Rumors of war arrived in their lands in the form of Shawnee and Miami refugees. The Illinois welcomed them and permitted them to settle - a move sure to incite the anger of the Iroquois. As early as the 1650s, emissaries demanded the Illinois surrender the refugees. When they refused, an Illinois village was raided in 1655. Continued attacks led the Illinois to move their villages west across the Mississippi. Although the 2 confederations made attempts to patch things up from time to time, the war simmered on as Illinois hunters and trappers took beaver from lands in the Ohio Valley, which the Iroquois claimed as their own. The 1680 raid on Kaskaskia was the worst defeat the Illinois suffered in the Beaver Wars, but 4 years later, they successfully defended Ft. St. Louis and drove off the Iroquois. Many historians feel this was a turning point in the Beaver Wars.

Meanwhile, the Huron had fled north and west via the Great Lakes. Given the Iroquois penchant for following up their victories, it was only a matter of time before blood was spilled in the cold, northern lakes. With the first ring of rivals defeated, the Iroquois fell upon the Ottawa, Potawatomi, and Ojibwa of the Michigan peninsula. Soon, entire populations had fled either across or along Lake Michigan, finding a reprieve around what is now Green Bay. The relentless Iroquois continued to pursue. The refugees had nowhere to go at this point, and began to fight back with success.

In the mid-1650s, a large Iroquois warband attempted to attack the multi-tribal Green Bay community. It ended badly, with the raiders retreating in 2 groups. Those who recoiled south were destroyed by the Illinois, while those who went north were wiped out by a fierce tribe the French called the Salteaur. Another raid met a similarly disastrous end in 1662 at the hands of the Ottawa and Salteaur. A few year’s later, the combatants signed a temporary truce, as both were exhausted. At this point, several tribes began to drift back east towards their homelands. The Potawatomi began to migrate back around Lake Michigan, while the Wyandot and Ottawa settled near the straits of Mackinac. The powerful Ojibwa held their ground.

However, the Five Nations did not give up easily. In the 1680s, they renewed their attacks across the Great Lakes. Entire fleets of canoes are reported to have engaged in battle. However, the northern tribes were held together by the glue of alliance with France. After sporadic attempts at peace with the Iroquois, the French became serious about taking the Confederation down once and for all. They employed the Ottawa as their navy to safeguard convoys of furs to New France, an economic lifeline. They encouraged the tribes diplomatically to keep up the pressure. As the Iroquois lost the war on the lakes, French-allied Indians began to raid the Five Nations’ homelands. The Confederation was forced to sue for peace. In 1701, at a gathering of many tribes, peace was signed, and the Beaver Wars came to an official end.

The Ohio Valley had been virtually depopulated. Much of the area had simply become too dangerous to inhabit. The Miami had pulled west into Indiana, the Shawnee had migrated to other lands, and the Potawatomi and Erie were all long gone. This no man’s land would create a vacuum which would draw tribes back into the area. As all of these tribes staked out new lands, conflicts inevitably arose. The driving forces behind most of these skirmishes, though, were the machinations of the Europeans. As such, many of the battles during this post-Beaver Wars phase saw one tribe acting on the instigation of France or Britain. The other effect of living in the Ohio Territory was the growing cosmopolitan nature of Indian settlements. Tribal political bonds were weakening, and villages were composed of members of many tribes acting on the interests of their particular village’s needs. Ohio became, in effect, a melting pot of various Indian tribes, which meant the Beaver Wars style of tribal warfare slowly disappeared.

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December 13, 1862
Battle of Fredericksburg

Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside had reluctantly accepted his appointment to replace George McClellan as commander of the Army of the Potomac in early November 1862. Pres. Abraham Lincoln was hoping for a military victory to gain more credence and political backing for the Emancipation Proclamation, which would go into effect on January 1. Burnside proposed moving the Union army to Falmouth, directly across the Rappahannock River from Fredericksburg, and making a direct attack on the Confederate capitol of Richmond, circumnavigating Robert E. Lee’s forces who were then in Culpepper and Winchester in the Shenandoah Valley. Burnside was never a terribly confident general, but he understood well the pressure to act vigorously. After all, Lincoln had just removed McClellan, because he judged McClellan to be excessively cautious. Consequently, upon receiving approval for his plan, Burnside moved quickly.

By November 19, after a series of rapid marches, elements of Burnside’s army had reached the banks of the Rappahannock opposite Fredericksburg. Fortunately for Lee, mismanagement in Washington delayed the arrival of the pontoon bridges needed to cross the river. On November 25, the long-overdue bridges finally arrived, and Burnside began actively looking for opportunities to cross the river below Fredericksburg in order to maneuver the Confederates out of their positions as heavy snowfall brought movements to a crawl. During this long delay, Lee had the chance to react and ordered James Longstreet and Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson to a line along the river just outside the town. The Rebel troops had ample time to find advantageous defensive positions and establish supply lines. Burnside was finally left with an unpromising set of options: either anger Washington by calling an end to the campaign season and going into winter quarters, or make a direct assault on Lee’s formidable defensive position. Burnside chose the latter.

In the early morning hours of December 11, the Union soldiers began to assemble the pontoon bridges to make a direct crossing into Fredericksburg, hoping speed and surprise would bring success. However, William Barksdale’s Mississippians delayed the crossing by taking positions in the town and shooting at the soldiers attempting to assemble the bridges. In response, Burnside ordered Fredericksburg to be shelled, though this had little effect on Barksdale’s men. Finally, in mid-afternoon, Burnside had several groups of soldiers row across the river to establish a foothold and drive Barksdale out of the town. After a bloody fight in the streets, Barksdale’s remaining soldiers finally withdrew and the pontoons could be assembled - but the Mississippians had purchased an extra 12 hours for Lee to establish his forces. Union troops crossed into Fredericksburg on December 12 and looted what remained of the town.

The Confederates were in a 7-mile long, curving line, with Longstreet’s corps on the left along Marye’s Heights, west of town. Heights south of Fredericksburg to the south end of Prospect Hill were held by Stonewall Jackson’s corps. Burnside decided to attack both flanks rather than strike with the full force at the center. The main thrust would be made by William Franklin’s Grand Division, consisting of 1st and 6th corps, against Jackson’s position, while Edwin Sumner’s Grand Division, 2nd and 9th corps, would feint against Longstreet on Marye’s Heights. In a misstep, Burnside waited until the morning of December 13 to issue orders to Franklin and Sumner rather than issuing them after their meeting on the 12th. When he did finally issue the orders, his wording was ambiguous about how forcefully Franklin was to mount the attack south of the city.

In the morning fog on December 13, Franklin ordered a single corps, John Reynolds’ 1st, to move into place south of the city along the railroad. As the fog lifted, Major John Pelham opened fire on Union lines with a single gun he had moved into position on Prospect Hill ahead of the Confederate line. Able to delay the Union advance for about an hour and reveal the Union battle plan, Pelham retreated back to the Confederate lines at about 11 AM.

After adjusting his lines, Reynolds had the Confederate line heavily shelled for an hour, though with little effect or response from Jackson, who had ordered his gunners to hold their fire until the Federal infantry advanced. As the Union soldiers approached Jackson’s line for a more direct attack, the Confederates responded, pushing them back. An artillery duel ensued, with Union guns now scoring hits. In the early afternoon, Reynolds ordered his 2 divisions to approach the Confederate line, where they found a hole in the line left by Jackson, who wrongly assumed the terrain - swampy woodland - was impassable. Seizing the opportunity, George Meade began to roll up the Confederate line. Jackson ordered his reserves to counterattack, while Meade sent word to David Birney for reinforcements that would never come; Birney refused to coordinate efforts with Meade. Left unsupported and facing an overwhelming onslaught, Meade retreated, with the Confederates pushing their advantage. The area of intense fighting would become known as the Slaughter Pens. By late afternoon, Jackson had readjusted his lines and tried to goad the Union into attacking, but Meade refused to respond. With darkness approaching, the battle south of Fredericksburg came to an end.

The attack to the north, with Longstreet on Marye’s Heights and Sumner emerging from the city streets, was even less successful. Sumner’s men had to cross about half a mile of open ground that included a mill race (a trench 5 feet deep, 15 feet wide, and filled with 3 feet of water) before approaching a stone wall, behind which Longstreet had his men entrenched, with artillery on the heights behind. As the fog lifted and artillery from the battle downriver were heard, Sumner began ordering wave after wave to advance toward Marye’s Heights. Throughout the day, the Union divisions advanced and were cut down by Confederate artillery and gunfire. Late in the day, the 9th Corps of Joseph Hooker’s Grand Division attempted to flank the sunken road but only succeeded in adding more casualties to the heaps that lay in the fields.

Darkness finally brought an end to the slaughter. Even in victory, Lee and Jackson were frustrated that they had not been able to find an opening for a counterattack. Burnside, meanwhile, found himself dealing with a recalcitrant Hooker. The corps commander, who would soon take Burnside’s job, had been openly critical of the decision to attack at Fredericksburg and, by his own initiative, had called off the assaults on Marye's Heights on the grounds that he had already “lost as many men as my orders required me to lose.” A devastated Burnside briefly considered personally leading a final, desperate charge before being talked out of it on December 14. Instead, he asked for a daylong truce to bury the dead, which Lee granted, and ordered his army to retreat across the Rappahannock the night of December 14-15. Of the approximately 120,000 men in Burnside’s army, more than 12,000 were killed, wounded, or captured, while Lee lost about 5300 of his 80,000 men.

Union soldiers wrote letters home suggesting that “Virginia is not worth such a loss of life,” while rumors in Washington foretold a Lincoln resignation, a radical Republican coup, even a military government with an angry McClellan at its head. Union morale was already low after McClellan, popular with the troops, had been replaced by Burnside; Burnside’s missteps at Fredericksburg sowed the seeds of insubordination, leading to his ineffective second offensive against Lee in January 1863, derisively called the “Mud March.” Morale in the army was at an all-time low, with desertions totaling 86,330 by the end of January 1863, almost 27% of the entire Army of the Potomac. Burnside offered his resignation, which Lincoln accepted and replaced him with Joe Hooker, who would come to grief at the Battle of Chancellorsville (see posting).

The Richmond Examiner, on the other hand, celebrated “a splendid victory to the defender of the sacred soil,” and the normally reticent Lee was seen to be “jubilant, almost off-balance.” His setback at Antietam had been redeemed, it seemed, and Confederate independence, in December 1862, still seemed a real possibility.

Burnside, reassigned to the western theater, got a measure of revenge in November 1863 when Longstreet’s corps, also temporarily assigned to the west, battered itself unsuccessfully against his defensive position at Knoxville, Tennessee.

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December 14, 835
Sweet Dew Incident

Both Li Xun and Zheng Zhu were associates of the powerful court eunuch Wang Shoucheng, and it was Wang who introduced both to Emperor Wenzong. Nevertheless, as, over the years, Wenzong showed signs of resentment toward the powerful eunuchs, Li and Zheng began plotting with Wenzong to destroy the eunuch faction. In summer 835, Li and Zheng presented Wenzong with a detailed plan to pacify the empire - starting with destroying the eunuchs.

Wenzong first diverted some of Wang’s power by giving the command of 1 of the 2 guard armies, under eunuch control, to Wang’s rival, fellow eunuch Qiu Shiliang, replacing Wei Yuansu. Then, as Wei and the directors of palace communications (also eunuchs) Yang Chenghe and Wang Jianyan were also in conflict with Wang, to placate Wang and to eliminate Wei, Yang, and Wang Jianyan. Wenzong had these 3 sent out of the capital Chang'an and later ordered them to commit suicide. Also as part of the plan, Zheng was sent out of Chang'an to serve as the military governor of Fengxiang Circuit, so that he could gather troops to use against the eunuchs. Li and Zheng also had 6 eunuchs of Wang’s old faction sent out to survey 6 remote circuits, planning to eventually send edicts to order them to commit suicide.

Late in the year, Wenzong sent poisoned wine to Wang Shoucheng. As the next part of the plan, as Wang was set to be buried on December 20, Zheng would bring his personal guards back to Chang'an to attend the funeral, which the eunuchs were all expected to be attending. Zheng’s guards would then slaughter them. However, Li Xun, who by this point had become jealous of Zheng, worried that the latter would receive all the credit. He thus decided to act first. To that end, he quietly had 4 loyal associates given military commands and had them gather troops to be ready to act against the eunuchs.

On December 14, Wenzong was hosting a meeting at Zichen Hall with imperial officials. Han Yue, general of the Left Jinwu Corps and one of Li’s conspirators,, stated that the night previous, there was sweet dew that descended on a pomegranate tree outside his HQ. He bowed to Wenzong, and the officials congratulated the Emperor (as sweet dew was considered a sign of divine favor). Li Xun suggested that Wenzong go observe the sweet dews himself so that he could receive the blessings from heaven. Wenzong agreed, and the officials proceeded to Hanyuan Hall, near the Left Jinwu HQ. On arrival, the emperor ordered officials to examine the sweet dews. After they did so, Li Xun returned and announced, “After we took our examinations, it appeared to me that those were not real sweet dews. Wenzong expressed surprise, and ordered the eunuchs to examine the sweet dews.

After the eunuchs left, Li Xun immediately summoned 2 of his commanders, who had several hundred soldiers; these stood outside Hanyuan Hall. Li Xun had them summoned inside to receive the edict to act. Qiu Shiliang began to sense that something was wrong. Suddenly, a gust of wind blew up a screen, and Qiu saw many armed soldiers. The eunuchs were surprised and quickly ran outside. The guards were about to close the gate to shut them in, but Qiu yelled at them, and they were confused for just long enough for the eunuchs to escape. They ran back to Hanyuan Hall, to report to Wenzong what was happening.

When Li saw the eunuchs running back to Hanyuan Hall, he yelled at the Jinwu guards to protect the emperor. The eunuchs, however, yelled that there was an emergency and the emperor must return to the palace at once. Despite Li Xun’s attempts to stop them, they succeeded, while Li’s troops killed or injured 10 eunuchs. The litter entered the palace and the gate was shut. The officers at Hanyuan Hall paused for a moment, and then fled. Li Xun, knowing that he had failed, put on a green uniform belonging to his staff members, got onto a horse, and followed.

By this point, Qiu Shiliang and the other eunuchs had realized that Wenzong was complicit, and they were openly cursing the emperor in his presence. They sent the guards officers Liu Tailun and Wei Zhongqing, with 500 soldiers each, to attack those they considered to be associates of Li Xun and Zheng Zhu. The gates were shut, preventing escape, and over 1000 officials and officers were slaughtered. Various files, seals, books, and other equipment owned by the government were destroyed in the process. The eunuchs also sent cavalry outside the imperial city to try to capture those who had fled.

Wang Ya, who was in his 70s, walked to a tea shop at Yongchang District, and was captured there; the soldiers took him to their HQ, where he was tortured into falsely confessing that he and Li Xun were planning to overthrow Emperor Wenzong and support Zheng as the new emperor. Meanwhile, the guards were also pillaging wealthy households under the guise of searching for Li Xun’s associates. It was said that many street hoodlums also used this opportunity to take vengeance and to pillage.

When the emperor convened his usual morning conference on the 15th, he asked why so many officials were absent. Qiu showed him Wang Ya’s confession; the emperor responded “Then not even execution is enough for their crimes.” Meanwhile , the eunuchs restore control of the guards and ended the pillaging of the city.

Li Xun was captured on the way to Fengxiang and given an escort to deliver him to Chang’an. Fearful of humiliation and torture, he asked the escort’s commanding officer to behead him. The officer agreed and decapitated Li Xun, delivering the head to Chang'an.

On December 17, a grand procession was held for the executions of the key associates of Li Xun. The officials were taken to the imperial ancestral shrines and the shrines to the gods of earth and were presented as if they were sacrificial animals. With the imperial officials ordered to oversee, they were executed by being cut in half at the waist, and then their heads were cut off and hung outside Xing'an Gate. Their relatives, no matter how distantly related, were executed, including children, and some who had somehow initially escaped death were confiscated to be government slaves. It was said that during these few days, none of the decisions being made in Emperor Wenzong’s name were actually made by Wenzong himself (or even known by him); rather, Qiu and Yu Hongzhi were making all decisions.

Meanwhile, Zheng Zhu, unaware of Li Xun’s actions, was still acting on the original plan. When he received the news, he returned to Fengxiang. The local official invited Zheng to a feast, provided Zheng’s guards food and drink, and then, at the feast, while Zheng was not paying attention, killed and decapitated him. He then had Zheng’s guards, household, and a large number of his staff members, slaughtered.

After the incident, the eunuchs, led by Qiu Shiliang and Yu Hongzhi, controlled the political scene completely and for almost the rest of Tang dynasty, the eunuchs were in firm control of the government, determining the successions of emperors.

[Ennath]

December 15, 1899
Battle of Colenso

Gen. Redvers Buller had been appointed to the South African command before the war had even begun. It was to be his first independent command after nearly 40 years in the army, during which time he had earned an impressive reputation, but had never had to produce his own plans. He had not been overly confident in his suitability for the command even before accepting it. His journey from Britain to South Africa took 2 weeks, during which time he was out of touch with events on the ground.

When he left Britain, Buller’s plan had been to assemble his army at Cape Town, and march directly along the railway that led to Bloemfontein and Pretoria. However, when he reached Cape Town, on October 31, events had moved beyond that. On October 15, Kimberley had been besieged. This alone would not have mattered, for Buller’s route into the Boer republics would not have taken him past Kimberley. However, the day before Buller reached Cape Town was “Mournful Monday”. Sir George White, the British commander in Natal, had attempted a 2-pronged attack on the Boer army. Both had resulted in defeats (Lombard’s Kop and Nicholson’s Nek). Within a few days Ladysmith was besieged (see posting). Buller was forced to divide the corps that was assembling at Cape Town. He left Lord Methuen with a sizeable contingent to force his way up the western railway line to Kimberley, while Buller took 4 infantry brigades and a mounted brigade to Natal to relieve Ladysmith. Maj. Gen. Gatacre was left with a minimal force to hold the Eastern Cape.

After spending most of November at Cape Town, Buller moved on to Natal. The situation there looked to be most dangerous. Boer forces had moved south of Ladysmith, and briefly threatened the port of Durban. That danger was already past when Buller reached Pietermaritzburg, on November 25. A large army was forming around Estcourt, ready to move north. Buller did not officially take command of that army, which remained under the nominal command of Cornelius Francis Clery, with Buller visiting. At first Buller remained at Pietermartizburg, concentrating on logistical matters. This was his real strength as a general and the campaign that followed might have gone rather better if he had kept away from the front, but when the time came for the army to move, Buller took charge, if not command - orders were still issued in Clery’s name. On December 8, a key bridge at Frere was repaired, and Buller began to move. He now had 18,000 infantry, 2600 mounted troops and 36 guns.

The route to Ladysmith was defended by a Boer force under Louis Botha, stretched out along the Tugela River. 12 miles south of Ladysmith, the Tugela ran along the southern flank of a series of kopjes, although there was one important hill (Hlangwane) on the southern side of the river. Botha had around 7000 men to defend a line nearly 50 miles long. His approach was to concentrate at the most obvious crossing place, at Colenso, where the railway to Ladysmith crossed the Tugela. There he had around 4500 men, with the rest spread out in case Buller attempted a flank attack.

Botha’s biggest problem was the Hlangwane. This vulnerable position was crucial to the entire defensive line - if the British could seize that hill, they would be able to bombard the left flank of Botha’s line. Botha had a great deal of trouble convincing any of his men to occupy this position, with no easy line of retreat. It took all of his persuasive powers, backed up by the distant support of Pres. Kruger, to convince his commanders that they had to occupy the position. On December 14, lots were drawn, and the Wakkerstroom and Standerton commandos occupied the hill.

Botha’s plan was to keep his men in hiding while the British advanced towards the river. His artillery was hidden in the hills north of the river. He hoped that the British could be tempted to cross the railway bridge across the Tugela. Once they were on the northern side of the river the hidden guns would open fire, as would the Boer riflemen. The British would be trapped with no line of retreat. Botha hoped to destroy Buller’s army.

Buller informed London that the Boer positions at Colenso were impregnable and must be bypassed. His plan was to evade the Boer defenses by crossing the Tugela further west at Potgeiter’s Drift and marching to Ladysmith by the Acton Homes road. However, on receiving news of the heavy British defeats at Stormberg Junction (December 10, see posting) and Magersfontein (December 11, see posting), Buller abandoned this plan, taking the view that he must attack without delay at Colenso, in spite of his expressed view that these positions were impregnable. He decided on a 3-pronged assault. On the left Hart’s brigade was sent to find a drift (ford across the river) believed to cross west of Colenso. On the right Lord Dundonald’s mounted brigade would attack Hlangwane. In the centre Hildyard’s Brigade would attack straight down the railway line, just as Botha hoped. Finally Lyttelton’s and Barton’s brigades were held in reserve. Details were vague, the maps used inaccurate and misleading and reconnaissance limited at best.

The British plan quickly fell apart. On the left Hart was following a clear track towards the river, when his guide told him to turn right. This led his brigade into a loop in the river, lined by Boer trenches. The attack on the left stalled under devastating fire. In under two hours Hart’s men suffered 532 casualties, nearly half of the British losses for the battle. Buller was forced to send in Lyttleton’s brigade to rescue Hart. Things didn’t go much better in the center. Hildyard’s brigade had been slow to start. His guns, under the command of Col. Charles Long, had not been. Long believed in close range artillery fire and so advanced to within 700 yards of the river. By this point he was nearly a mile ahead of the infantry.

Long formed his guns, but as he opened fire, one of Botha’s men fired back, and very quickly the rest of the Boers in that part of the line joined in. Long’s artillery came under concentrated long range rifle fire soon after 6 AM. Much of the rest of the battle would be distorted by repeated attempts to rescue the guns. However, Botha reported that Long’s actions had saved the British army, by preventing them from advancing into his trap. Long’s men managed to hold onto their guns for an hour, but at 7:00. they were forced to retreat, having used up most of their ammunition. Two entire infantry brigades were close enough to have rushed support forward, but with Buller focusing his attention on the battle on the left nothing was done.

Soon after Long’s guns were abandoned, the attack on the right began. At 7.15 Dundonald’s men advanced on foot towards Hlangwane, and made some progress up the hill, but they were outnumbered by the commandos on the hill. Buller had not realized how important Hlangwane was. Now Dundonald had got into a position where he could achieve a great success on the right, but only if he was reinforced. The same happened in the center. Hildyard’s brigade began its advance into Colenso at 8.00. Hildyard had a much better grasp of modern warfare than Hart or Buller. His brigade advanced in open order, taking advantage of any available cover, and reached the village. From there they were able to concentrate their own fire on the Boer trenches on the far side of the Tugela. The Boers were forced to pull back to a second line. For a moment they were exposed to the British artillery, but the retreated Boers were incorrectly identified as British troops, and they escaped. Hildyard was now in a good position, but needed reinforcements.

Thus at around 9.30, Buller was in a relatively good position. Despite the disaster on the left, and the temporary loss of Long’s guns, the attacks on the right and in the center were poised for success. All they needed was reinforcements, and Buller had 8 battalions in reserve. Unfortunately, at this point Buller was distracted by the fate of Long’s guns. At 9.30 he joined the gunners in their shelter, and took personal command of the efforts to retrieve the guns. The first attempt was led by Buller’s aide-de-camp, Captain Harry Schofield. With a band of volunteers Schofield managed to retrieve 2 of the guns, but not without cost. A second attempt failed to rescue a single gun.

Buller was not in the best state of mind to command a battle. His staff surgeon had been killed beside him; he himself had been hit by a spent shell and badly bruised. This was the first time he had been in command of a battle where he had devised the plan, and from his viewpoint everything was going wrong. At 10.30 he had ordered Hildyard to retreat from Colenso. Finally, at 11.00 he ordered a general retreat. The guns were to be abandoned. Even the retreat was not well handled. Several parties never received the order and remained in place well into the afternoon. On the right it proved to be very difficult to pull Dundonald’s men out of their hillside position. Their retreat was not complete until after 2 PM, and cost more men than the original attack. It was this pointless retreat that most damaged Buller’s reputation.

It was the climax of Britain’s “Black Week”. The disproportionate casualties demonstrate the ineptness of Buller’s attack. Boer losses were reported at 8 dead and 30 wounded. British losses were 145 dead, 762 wounded and 220 missing or prisoners. Buller was distraught. He sent a message to Gen. White in Ladysmith, suggesting that he should destroy his guns and surrender. It was clear from his telegraphs that he did not think he could win. Official opinion in Britain agreed, and on December 17, he was superseded by Field Marshal Lord Roberts. Ironically Black Week had very little impact on the state of the war. Neither Kimberley or Ladysmith fell as a result of the defeat of the relief columns at Colenso or Magersfontein, nor did Cape Colony rise against the British as a result of Stormberg.

[Ennath]

December 16, 1944
Operation Greif

On October 22, 1944 Otto Skorzeny, Hitler’s favorite commando, was summoned to meet Hitler at his HQ at Rastenburg. Here Hitler outlined the planned Ardennes Offensive and the role Skorzeny was to play in it. He was to form a special unit - Panzer Brigade 150 - whose purpose would be to capture one or more of the bridges over the Meuse before they could be destroyed. Hitler informed him that he had decided this could be better accomplished if Skorzeny and his men wore US uniforms. Hitler also remarked that small units disguised in enemy uniforms could cause great confusion by giving false orders, upsetting communications, and misdirecting troops. Skorzeny was well aware that under the Hague Convention of 1907, any of his men captured while wearing US uniforms would be executed as spies and this possibility caused much discussion with Gen. Jodl and Marshal von Rundstedt.

The timing of the offensive meant that Skorzeny had only 5 or 6 weeks to recruit and train a brand new unit for what Hitler named Operation Greif (“Gryphon”). Despite asking for 3300 men he was given an immediate go-ahead and promised full support. OKW issued an order on October 25 requesting suitable soldiers with “knowledge of the English language and also the American dialect”, passed to every HQ on the Western Front, and this request soon became known to the Allies.

The new unit needed much in the way of US equipment, but what was delivered fell short of requirements. There were only 2 Shermans, in poor condition, and Skorzeny had to use German substitutes. The brigade was also flush with Polish and Russian equipment sent by units who had no idea what the request was for. As far as English-speaking soldiers went, only 10 men who spoke perfect English and had some knowledge of American idioms were found, 30-40 who spoke English well but had no knowledge of slang, 120-150 who spoke English moderately well, and 200 or so who had learned English at school. Faced with these setbacks, Skorzeny scaled down Panzer Brigade 150 from 3 battalions to 2 and assembled the 150 best English speakers into a commando unit named Einheit Stielau. A total of 2500 men were eventually assembled at Grafenwöhr.

The Einheit Stielau commando unit had been assembled from the best English speakers, but few of them had much if any experience of undercover operations or sabotage. There was little time to train them properly, but they were given short courses in demolition and radio skills, studied the organization of the US Army and its badges of rank and drill, and some were even sent to POW camps to refresh their language skills through contact with US POWs. Dressed in US Army uniforms (the highest rank used was that of colonel), armed with US Army weapons, and using US Army jeeps, the commandos were given three missions: demolition squads were to destroy bridges, ammunition dumps, and fuel stores; reconnaissance patrols were to scout both sides of the Meuse and pass bogus orders to any US units they met, reverse road signs, remove minefield warnings, and cordon off roads with warnings of nonexistent mines; and disrupt the US chain of command by destroying field telephone wires and radio stations, and issuing false orders.

Panzerbrigade 150 moved out on the afternoon of December 16, behind 3 Panzer divisions, with the aim of moving around them when they reached the High Fens. However, when the 1st SS Panzer Division failed to reach the start point within 2 days, Skorzeny realized that Greif’s initial aims were doomed. As a consequence, on December 17 Skorzeny attended a staff conference at the 6th Panzer Army HQ, and suggested that his brigade be used as a normal unit. This was agreed, and he was ordered to assemble south of Malmedy and report to 1st SS Panzer Division HQ in Ligneuville. On December 21, the brigade, under Skorzeny's command tried to take Malmedy. Several assaults were repelled by the American defenders.

Skorzeny described the activities of the Einheit Stielau in an interview with the US Army in August 1945. According to him, one commando team on December 16 managed to persuade a US Army unit to withdraw from Poteau. Another team switched around road signs and sent an entire American regiment in the wrong direction. As a result, American troops began asking other soldiers questions that they felt only Americans would know the answers to in order to flush out the German infiltrators, which included naming certain states’ capitals, sports and trivia questions related to America, etc. This practice resulted in Brig. Gen. Bruce Clarke being held at gunpoint for some time after he incorrectly said the Chicago Cubs were in the American League and a captain spending a week in detention after he was caught wearing German boots. Gen. Omar Bradley was repeatedly stopped in his staff car by checkpoint guards who seemed to enjoy asking him such questions. The Skorzeny commando paranoia also contributed to tragic instances of mistaken identity. All over the Ardennes, American soldiers attempted to persuade suspicious security guards that they were genuine GIs. On December 20, 2 American soldiers were killed by a nervous military policeman. 2 more were killed and several wounded as late as January 2, when an task force from US 6th Armored Division moving into the Wardin area of Bastogne opened fire on US 35th Infantry Division in a case of mistaken identity.

Perhaps the largest panic was created when a German commando team was captured near Aywaille on December 17. Three men were captured when they failed to give the correct password. One gave credence to a rumor that Skorzeny intended to capture Gen. Eisenhower and his staff. A document outlining Operation Greif’s elements of deception (though not its objectives) had earlier been captured by 106th Infantry Division, and because Skorzeny was already well known, the Americans were more than willing to believe this story and Eisenhower was reportedly unamused by having to spend Christmas isolated for security reasons. After several days of confinement, he left his office, angrily declaring he had to get out and that he didn’t care if anyone tried to kill him.

In all, 44 German soldiers wearing US uniforms were sent through US lines, and all but 8 returned, with the last being sent through the lines on December 19; after this, the element of surprise had been lost and they reverted to wearing German uniforms. It was not an uncommon practice at the time to send camouflaged recon units behind enemy lines, but because of the impact of Operation Greif, every occurrence of this was attributed to Skorzeny’s men. In addition, German infantry often salvaged any items of US Army clothing they found, thus it was not out of the question that regular German troops might be killed or captured wearing items of US uniforms.

The 3 men captured on the 17th were given a military trial and were sentenced to death and executed by firing squad on December 23. Another 3 were shot on the 26th, 7 more on December 30, and 3 on January 13. The team leader, Günther Schulz, was tried by a military commission sometime in May 1945 and executed near Braunschweig on June 14.

After World War II, Skorzeny was tried as a war criminal at the Dachau Trials in 1947 for allegedly violating the laws of war during the Battle of the Bulge. He and 9 officers of Panzerbrigade 150 were charged with improperly using American uniforms “by entering into combat disguised therewith and treacherously firing upon and killing members of the armed forces of the United States.” They were also charged with participation in wrongfully obtaining U.S. uniforms and Red Cross parcels consigned to American prisoners of war from a POW. Acquitting all defendants, the military tribunal drew a distinction between using enemy uniforms during combat and for other purposes including deception; it could not be shown that Skorzeny had actually given any orders to fight in US uniforms. Skorzeny said that he was told by German legal experts that as long as he didn’t order his men to fight in combat while wearing US uniforms, such a tactic was a legitimate ruse of war. A surprise defense witness was F. F. E. Yeo-Thomas, a former Allied SOE agent, who testified that he and his operatives wore German uniforms behind enemy lines.

[Ennath]

587 BC
Conquest of Jerusalem

In 605 BC, Nebuchadnezzar II, king of Babylon defeated Pharaoh Necho at the Battle of Carchemish (see posting), and subsequently invaded Judah. To avoid the destruction of Jerusalem, King Jehoiakim of Judah, in his third year, Switched allegiance from Egypt to Babylon. He paid tribute and sent some of the royal family and nobility as hostages. In 601 BC, during the fourth year of his reign, Nebuchadnezzar unsuccessfully attempted to invade Egypt and was repulsed with heavy losses. The failure led to numerous rebellions among the states of the Levant which owed allegiance to Babylon, including Judah, where Jehoiakim stopped paying tribute to Nebuchadnezzar and took a pro-Egyptian position.

Nebuchadnezzar soon dealt with these rebellions. According to the Nebuchadnezzar Chronicle, he laid siege to Jerusalem, which eventually fell on March 16, 597 BC. Jehoiakim died during the siege. Nebuchadnezzar pillaged the city and its Temple, and the new king Jeconiah, who was either 8 or 18, and his court and other prominent citizens and craftsmen, and much of the Jewish population of Judah, numbering about 10,000 were deported to Babylon. Also, taken to Babylon were the treasures and furnishings of the Temple, including golden vessels dedicated by King Solomon. The first deportation is considered the start of the Jewish Diaspora (or exile). Nebuchadnezzar installed Jeconiah’s uncle, Zedekiah as puppet-king of Judah, at the age of 21.

However, Zedekiah revolted against Babylon, and entered into alliance with Pharaoh Hophra of Egypt. Nebuchadnezzar responded by invading Judah and began a siege of Jerusalem in December 589 BC. During this siege, “every worst woe befell the city, which drank the cup of God's fury to the dregs”. In the autumn of 588 BC, the siege was temporarily lifted on the approach of an Egyptian army, but this was defeated in April 587 BC, and the siege resumed. In late July, the wall was breached. Zedekiah and his followers attempted to escape but were captured on the plains of Jericho and taken to Riblah. There, after seeing his sons killed, Zedekiah was blinded, bound, and taken captive to Babylon, where he remained a prisoner until his death. He was the last King of Judah.

In late August, Nebuchadnezzar arrived in person and led the final conquest of Jerusalem. The city was pillaged and the First Temple destroyed. Most of the remaining people were taken into captivity in Babylon. The city was razed to the ground. Only a few people were permitted to remain to tend to the land.

[rupertramjet]

Wing Commander FF Yeo Thomas George Cross, was an incredible man, he choose to be a defence witness for Skorzeny, partly because he admired his exploits, often exaggerated, but he also saw that on a technical point all members of SOE, and affiliated allied organizations were equally guilty, therefore the trial was hypocritical, a man of great courage, both physical and moral, he would have been roundly condemned for his action by many!
http://nigelperrin.com/soe-yeo-thomas.htm#.WjUwBrhMyCk

[Dr Pepper]

Otto Skorzeny moved to Spain postwar-where no doubt he was well known to the Franco administration and was involved in a variety of shadowy activities. Somewhat extraordinarily-given his SS background-he was recruited by and worked for Mossad in the early 60s-largely to intimidate and/or eliminate former Nazi scientists working for the Egyptian government on defence projects. This information only came out in the past few years:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Otto_Skorzeny
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.711115
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016...-assassin-for/
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-30571335

Interestingly-he had enough clout to negotiate being removed from the implacable Simon Weisenthal's list of war criminals as part of the deal with Mossad-so either they were desperate or he had some serious bargaining chips that they weren't prepared to try and bluff him on....

He also advised the Argentinian government, and lived in Ireland for a while-certainly one of the most interesting characters thrown up by the Third Reich