The Military History Thread

[Ennath]

August 17, 1991
Siege of Kijevo

In 1991, Kijevo was a village of 1261 people, 99.6% of whom were Croats. It was surrounded by the Serb villages of Polaca, Civljane and Cetina. With the impending dissolution of Yugoslavia, the 3 Serb villages had become part of Serb Krajina and road access to Kijevo was restricted as barricades were set up in Polaca and Civljane on the roads serving the village. In response, its population set up an ad hoc militia.

Following an incident on April 1, Krajina forces captured 3 Croatian policemen from nearby Drnis, with the intention of exchanging them for Croatian Serb troops taken prisoner by the Croatian forces at the Plitvice Lakes. In turn, the militia of Kijevo captured several Serb civilians and demanded that the captured policemen be released in exchange. On April 2, JNA (Yugoslav Peoples’ Army) intelligence officers reported on this, and warned how local militias in Kijevo and Civljane, otherwise separated by barricades, were engaged in armed skirmishes that threatened to escalate. Kijevo became strategically significant because its location hindered Krajina road communications.

On the night of April 27-28, a group of Croatian Interior Ministry officers managed to reach Kijevo, and a Croatian police station was formally established in the village on April 28. The following day, JNA troops, commanded by 9th (Knin) Corps chief of staff Col. Ratko Mladic, moved in, cutting all access and preventing delivery of supplies to Kijevo. A skirmish took place on May 2 on Mount Kozjak, where a member of the Krajina paramilitary was killed while on guard duty.

Croatian President Franjo Tuđman called on the public to bring the blockade to an end, resulting in a large-scale protest against the JNA in Split on May 6. The following day, 80 tanks and tracked vehicles and 23 wheeled vehicles of JNA 10th Motorized Brigade left barracks in Mostar, only to be stopped by civilians near of Siroki Brijeg, west of Mostar. The convoy remained in place for 3 days as the crowd demanded that the JNA lift the blockade of Kijevo. The protest ended after Alija Izetbegovic, President of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, addressed the protesters, assuring them that the convoy was heading to Kupres rather than Kijevo. Tuđman and Cardinal Franjo Kuharic sent telegrams supporting Izetbegovic. The blockade was lifted through negotiations a few days later.

The May arrangement proved short-lived, as JNA units, again led by Mladic, put up barricades to prevent entry into the village on August 17. The next day, the Croatian Serb leader Milan Martic laid down an ultimatum to the police and inhabitants of Kijevo, demanding that they leave the village and its vicinity within 2 days or face attack.

Between August 23 and 25, Croatian forces evacuated nearly the entire civilian population of the village. On August 25, Croatian forces launched a failed attack on JNA barracks in Sinj, 24 miles southeast of Kijevo. The objective was to obtain weapons, needed as Croatian positions near Kijevo deteriorated.

On August 26, the JNA attacked Kijevo, opposed by 58 policemen with small arms only and commanded by police station chief Martin Cicin Sain. Between 0518 and 1300, the JNA fired 1500 shells against the village, and the Yugoslav Air Force flew 34 sorties. The same afternoon, the JNA mounted a ground assault. The attacking force consisted of approximately 30 tanks supported by JNA infantry and Croatian Serb militia. The JNA entered the village by 1630. Lt Col. Borislav Dukic, in command of the Tactical Group-1 tasked with capture of Kijevo and commanding JNA 221st Motorized Infantry Brigade, reported that the village was secured by 2230. The Croatian police fled in 3 groups via Mount Kozjak towards Drnis. The remaining Croatian population left after the artillery had destroyed much of the settlement. They were pursued by the Yugoslav Air Force. Krajina units commanded by Martic acted in concert with JNA to take command of the area.

The clash in Kijevo was one of the first instances where the JNA openly sided with the insurgent Serbs in the rapidly escalating Croatian War of Independence, acting based on Martic’s ultimatum. The defenders lost only 2 wounded, but one of the retreating groups was captured. The group, consisting of 20 men, was later released in a prisoner exchange. The JNA suffered no casualties. The village was looted and torched. The JNA units which took part in the fighting in and around Kijevo advanced towards Sinj in the following few days, capturing Vrlika before being redeployed to take part in the Battle of Sibenik in mid-September.

[Ennath]

640
Tang Conquest of the Oasis States

The Western Turkic Khaganate did not pose a major threat to the Tang dynasty in its early years, as it was far from Tang territory. Moreover, the Khaganate constantly suffered from internal divisions and was unable to focus itself against China. Its hegemony over the oasis city-states of the Tarim Basin therefore remained unchallenged. In turn, both the Khaganate and its vassal-allies at times nominally submitted to Tang overlordship.

In 628, the Western Turk chief Ashina Tong was killed by his uncle, Ashina Moheduo, who seized the throne (as Qulipiqie Khan). However, some supported Ashina Tong’s son Ashina Dieli (as Siyehu Khan). Both sought aid and marriage from China, but Emperor Taizong declined both. Eventually, in 630, Dieli was able to defeat and kill Moheduo, again reuniting the Khaganate. Meanwhile, Qu Wentai of the Turkic vassal state of Karakhoja, made a state visit to China.

In 632, Dieli, who had lost the support of his people due to his cruelty and suspicion, was deposed by his cousin Shina Nishu (Duolu Khan), who made nominal submission to China. This continued after his death in 634 by his brother Ashina Tong’e (Dielishi Khan). By this time relations with China were cooling, as China reopened the desert trade route through Yanchi, bypassing Karakhoja. The Karakhojans attacked Yanchi and pillaged it. By 638, the northern half of the Khaganate was supporting Ashina Yugu (Yipidolu Khan) and the realm split at the Ili River. Tong’e died in 639 and was succeeded by Ashina Bobu (Shaboluoyehu Khan).

Karakhoja renewed attacks on Yanchi in 638, allying with Ashina Bobu. Taizong rebuked Qu Wentai and ordered him to send his chief minister to China to discuss relations; only a lesser official was sent. The Karakhoja were also ordered to turn over exiles from the Eastern Turkic Khaganate, conquered by China in 630. The Emperor began planning an invasion.

In 640, after a last attempt to get Qu Wentai to comply, Gens. Hou Junji and Xue Wanjun were sent to invade Karakhoja. Qu Wentai was not at first concerned, believing himself secure against a small army and sure that a large force could not cross the deserts surrounding his kingdom. By fall, however, Hou was almost at his capital (also named Karakhoja). Qu Wentai died, apparently of a stroke, and his son Qu Zhisheng succeeded. Hou rejected a proposal to make a sudden attack on the funeral procession and captured Tiandi, just east of the capital. As the Chinese marched on Karakhoja itself, the new king wrote to apologize for his father’s behavior, but Hou replied with a demand for surrender; this was refused. Hou put Karakhoja under siege, but Ashina Bobu did not aid the city as promised, but withdrew home. With no aid coming, Qu Zhisheng surrendered. The kingdom was annexed to China and a garrison installed. Qu Zhisheng and his officials were taken to China.

Meanwhile, Ashina Bobu, under attack by Ashina Yugu, formally submitted to Tang in 641, but this did not help him and later in 641, one of Ashina Yugu’s generals captured him; he was executed, reuniting the Western Turkic Khaganate. The new ruler attacked former Karakhoja territory in 642, but was repelled. Further internal revolt followed as a general named Huluwu rebelled. The rebels sough aid from China and Taizong named Ashina Moheduo’s son as Yipishekui Khan. Civil war followed.

Meanwhile, Yanchi had remained friendly with Tang, but in or before 644, the Western Turkic general Ashina Quli had taken the Yanchi King Long Tuqizhi’s daughter to be his brother's wife, and, in response, Long Tuqizhi began to favor the Western Turkic Khaganate and decreased tributes to Tang. Chinese Gen. Guo Xiaoke requested permission to attack Yanchi, and in 644 Taizong approved. Three of Long Tuqizhi’s brothers were in China at the time and one, Long Lipozhun, became guide for the Chinese army. It is said that because Yanchi’s capital (of the same name) was surrounded by water, it took few precautions, and Guo made a surprise nighttime crossing, capturing the city and its king. Guo put Long Lipozhun in charge and withdrew. Three days later, Ashina Quli arrived with a relief force, but Guo had already withdrawn; he seized Long Lipozhun and pursued Guo, who halted his advance.

Another Western Turkic general, Ashina Chuna, made one of his subordinates protector general over Yanchi. The protector general, in the stead of the king, thereafter submitted tributes to Tang. But when his emissary arrived in Chang’an, Taizong rebuked him and stated, “I attacked Yanchi. Who are you to occupy it?” The protector general abandoned Yanchi, and the Yanchi nobles supported Long Lipozhun’s cousin Long Xuepoanazhi to be the new king, but continued to be submissive to Ashina Chuna.

In 646, the Yipishekui Khan offered tributes to Tang and requested to marry a Tang princess. Emperor Taizong agreed, but ordered him to submit, as dowry, 5 states that were Western Turkic vassals, Kucha, Yutian, Shule, Zhujupo (modern Kashgar) and Congling. There is no historical record of what the response was, but no marriage ever took place.

In 647, Kucha’s king Suvarnadeva died, and was succeeded by his brother Haripushpa. Haripushpa decreased tributes to Tang and also attacked neighboring states submissive to China. The next year, an angry Taizong commissioned Gens. Ashina She’er (a former Eastern Turkic prince), Qibi Heli and Guo Xiaoke to invade Kucha. They were aided by levied vassals from the Eastern Turks, Tibet and Tuyuhun. In fall 648, Ashina She’er advanced into the Dzungarian Bain and subdued the Chuyue and Chumi tribes. The Chinese then struck south into the Tarim Basin between Kucha and Yanchi. Long Xuepoanazhi abandoned Yanchi and took up position in eastern Kucha, but Ashina She'er captured and executed him, making his cousin Long Xiannazhun king of Yanchi.

Ashina She’er then marched on Kucha. Haripushpa sent his chancellors Nali and Jieliedian to resist the forward Chinese commander Han Wei. Han feigned retreat, and when the Kuchan forces pursued, he counterattacked and defeated them.. Ashina She’er then attacked the Kuchan capital at Yiluolu, and Haripushpa fled. Ashina She’er had Guo secure Yiluolu and pursued Haripushpa, who by this point had fled to Bohuan (in modern Aksu). Ashina She’er besieged it for 40 days and captured it, taking Haripushpa and Jieliedian, but Nali escaped and led remaining Kuchan troops and Western Turkic relief forces to attack Yiluolu, catching Guo by surprise and killing him in battle. However, Nali could not control the city and was forced to flee. The Kuchans themselves then captured Nali and delivered him to Ashina She’er, who She'er made a younger brother of Haripushpa the new king, and received tribute from the Western Turkic Khaganate.

Emperor Taizong died in 649. Subsequent to his death, a Western Turkic prince that he had supported, Ashina Helu, defeated and killed the Yipishekui Khan, taking over the Western Turks, but subsequently attacked Tang territory. Taizong’s son and successor Gaozong launched 2 campaigns against Ashina Helu in 655 and 657, defeating the Turks and putting 2 subservient princes in charge.

The Tang established the Four Garrisons of Anxi in the Tarim Basin in 659. The Tibetans invaded the Tarim Basin in the 660s and drove Tang out in 670. A Tang counterattack regained it in 692. China maintained control over the region for another century, but the An Lushan rebellion (see posting) caused the Four Garrisons to be cut off from the empire and finally lost to the Tibetans for the second and last time in the 790s.

[Ennath]

August 18, 1940
The Hardest Day

Eagle Day (see posting) was a disappointment for the Germans. This was due in large part to poor intelligence, which failed to identify Fighter Command airfields and distinguish them from those of Bomber and Coastal Commands. Still, the Germans pursued their strategy on August 15, suffering 76 losses. Undeterred, they prepared to make another large-scale attack on RAF bases on August 18.

German intelligence suggested that the RAF was down to just 300 serviceable fighters. In fact, there were 855 machines serviceable, with another 289 at storage units and 84 at training units. The Luftwaffe's plan of attack was simple. German bombers were to strike at airfields in the southeast. The most important airfields in this region, under 11 Group (Keith Park), were the Sector Stations at Kenley, Biggin Hill, Hornchurch, North Weald, Northolt, Tangmere and Debden. The first 5 were on the periphery of Greater London. Tangmere was near the coast at Chichester, while Debden was in the north near Saffron Walden. Each of these airfields housed 2-3 squadrons and had its own sector operations room. From there, its fighters were directed from its satellite airfields into combat. There were 6 satellites at Westhampnett, Croydon, Gravesend, Manston, Rochford and Martlesham Heath. Finally, there was Hawkinge, just inland from Folkestone. Not all of these airfields were targeted on August 18.

Despite the failure of Adlertag and considerable loss rates afterward, Albert Kesselring, commanding Luftflotte 2, convinced Göring that the only sound strategy was to continue to send heavily escorted bombers to destroy British airfields. Kesselring also advocated the use of Jagdgeschwader (fighter wings) in free-chase tactics. Bf 109s were to be sent out in advance of the main raids to force the British fighters into large-scale air battles which, in theory, would destroy RAF aircraft in combat and deplete British defenses. However, Kesselring changed his operational methods. In consultation with Hugo Sperrle, commanding Luftflotte 3, he chose not to scatter his effort against many targets. Instead, he narrowed down the targets to a short list in order to concentrate his striking power. Kenley, North Weald, Hornchurch and Biggin Hill were chosen as the prime targets.

The morning weather was clear and sunny, ideal flying conditions. At his headquarters in Brussels, Kesselring ordered attacks on Biggin Hill and Kenley. Both airfields contained sector operations rooms and were selected because they were the largest ones known to be operating fighters. German intelligence had no knowledge of the sector operations rooms there. The rooms were above ground and had little protection. If these buildings were to be hit, it would be a serious blow to the control system in the region.

The operation began at 0900 but was postponed due to heavy haze reducing visibility up to 4000 feet. At 1100, the Germans began taking off, but clouds over Calais hampered the gathering of the bomber formations, costing valuable time and scattering the attacks. The British followed the main raids and were aware of all the approaching aircraft, save for the low-altitude 9 Staffel. This activity increased until 1245 when 6 separate concentrations were reported. The plotters estimated the strength of the force as 350 aircraft, one-third more than the actual size. A total of 10 squadrons were scrambled, with 9 more held in reserve.

The Germans first met opposition just past the British coast. The Observer Corps passed a steady stream of information and it was soon realized that a coordinated attack was underway. All aircraft were ordered up. Those not in combat condition were flown northeast to avoid their being caught on the ground. The BBC high-power transmitter at Hatfield was shut down to deny the Germans the opportunity to use it as a direction-finding beacon, shutting down the Home Service broadcast in the process. The Germans now relied on the railway lines to find their target and soon began a low-level attack.

A fierce battle developed over Kenley and within minutes all the attacking bombers had been hit. For their efforts, the Germans destroyed 3 hangars, hit several other buildings and destroyed 8 Hurricanes on the ground. It would have been worse had the bombs been released higher; many bombs landed horizontally and did not explode on impact. At the end of the day just 1 hangar was left operational at Kenley. The low-level raid put the airfield out of commission for 2 hours. 2 Hurricanes were shot down by return fire, while 4 bombers were shot down and 2 seriously damaged. Low-level attacks were abandoned after this.

The 3 squadrons covering Biggin Hill were bounced by German fighters, but while 615 Squadron took heavy loss, it kept the German fighters occupied, allowing the others to engage the bombers, putting the bomb-aimers off their targets. Some turned aside to hit Croydon; others never released their bombs at all. KG 1, meanwhile, had a clear run to Biggin Hill, successfully protected by their fighter escort. Most of the bomber crews noted the absence of fighter opposition and speculated that the RAF might be at the end of its tether. Most of the personnel at Biggin Hill had time to take cover before the bombers arrived. The airfield, however, suffered only slight damage. West Malling had a similar experience.

The German fighters were now low on fuel and could only do so much to protect the bombers. Damaged stragglers lagged behind the main bomber streams returning home and were easy prey for RAF fighters if they could be found. RAF controllers faced difficulties of their own. Thickening haze made it impossible for the Observer Corps to plot the route of German formations. A concentrated force of RAF fighters, should it be able to engage, might be able to inflict serious damage. However, the haze might enable the Germans to slip by and leave the concentrated force near Canterbury striking at thin air. Instead of adopting an “all or nothing” approach, Park ordered the fighters to spread out and engage singly if needed. The plan worked. The BF110s in particular suffered heavily during this phase. No RAF machines were lost. The day marked the start of a decline in Bf110 operations. Production was not keeping pace with losses, and there simply were not enough aircraft to go around. The main battle was over, but more combats took place as Kesselring sent in even more Bf109s to support the withdrawing bombers.

Meanwhile, Sperrle ordered his dive bomber units to begin operations against the radar stations and airfields on the south coast. The targets for the afternoon were RAF Ford, Thorney Island and Gosport, all belonging to the Fleet Air Arm or Coastal Command. Included in the target list was the radar station at Poling. German recon had identified the airfields as fighter bases. The high altitude and poor resolution of the photographs meant the aircraft on the ground could not be identified properly and the Germans believed them to be fighter fields.

At 1359, Poling picked up the German formations and reported them as 80 strong. Smaller forces represented the German fighters moving up behind it. The British estimated the attack force to be 150 strong. It was an underestimation by half. 10 and 11 Groups dispatched squadrons to intercept. 609 Squadron remained in reserve around Middle Wallop to meet any unexpected German moves. The numbers meant a ratio of 1 RAF fighter to every 4 German aircraft, or 1 British to every 2 German fighters. Even had the fighter controllers realized the strength of the raid, there was little that could be done. Other fighters were refueling and rearming after the attacks on Kenley and Biggin Hill and would not be available.

Poling took severe punishment from very accurate bombing. Since Ventnor radar had been knocked out already, this attack demonstrated that an attack on Fighter Command’s communication and control system was possible. Emergency equipment had been installed on site in case of a breakdown, but the information was significantly less reliable. In fact, Poling was so badly damaged it was out of action for the rest of August. Fortunately, there was a mobile radar at the Isle of Wight to fill in. Another was due to be set up near Poling anyway, so the chain remained unaffected. The damage done to Kenley and Poling were no more than inconveniences to Park and Dowding.

Meanwhile, other Stukas hit Ford, well covered by fighters. Bombs struck the field’s oil tanks and storage compounds causing an enormous blaze which contributed to the crippling damage on the airfield. Gosport also came under attack soon after. Only scattered damage was done at Thorney Island. While 3 of the 4 Ju87 groups bombed their targets without interception, the 28 Stukas of I/StG77 were attacked by 43 and 601 Squadrons (18 Hurricanes). The escorting Bf109s were too far away. 15 Stukas were destroyed. The battles brought the number of Ju87s lost thus far in the campaign to 59 with a further 33 damaged. The price was too high and with the exception of sporadic attacks on convoys later in the year, the Ju87 played no further part in the Battle of Britain.

By 1700, the Luftwaffe was ready to strike again. Radar stations were now plotting more German formations off Kent and over the Pas-de-Calais. Luftflotte 2 was now going after North Weald and Hornchurch. The British correctly estimated the German strength as 250 aircraft. To meet the threat 11 Group scrambled 13 squadrons. KG 53’s raid on North Weald was met by heavy cloud cover and turned back, but was heavily engaged. As it retreated out to sea, the German bombers dumped their bombs; 32 fell on the town of Shoeburyness. 4 bombers and 5 Bf110s were lost. The Hornchurch raid was also turned back by clouds, followed by heavy air combat.

The Luftwaffe lost 69-71 aircraft destroyed or damaged beyond repair, about 7% of the force committed. Personnel losses were 94 killed, 40 captured and 25 returned with wounds. The British lost 27-34 fighters destroyed or damaged beyond repair. 10 pilots were killed and another mortally wounded. 19 were wounded, 11 of them out for the rest of the campaign. About 28 aircraft were destroyed on the ground, not all of them fighters.

The next day, Göring read the reports on the losses. The Luftwaffe was his power base. A failure would be bad, but a severe weakening of the Luftwaffe would be far worse. He emphasized to his commanders the need to preserve their strength. The fighters were now to provide close escort for the bombers rather than range freely looking for opportunities. The fighter pilots resented the change, but could do little but comply.

Overall, each side suffered more losses on this date than on any other day during the Battle of Britain. In terms of the outcome, the battle does not appear to have been strategically favorable to either side. The loss rates were in the British favor, but both air forces had sustained a level of attrition they could not support for long.

[Ennath]

August 19, 1944
Battle for Paris, Part 1

Adolf Hitler wanted Paris defended to the last man. The city’s 70-odd bridges were to be prepared for demolition. Paris, Hitler instructed, must not fall into the enemy’s hands except as “a field of ruins.” The military commander of Paris, Gen. Dietrich von Choltitz, had erected strong defenses outside the city manned by about 20,000 troops. Another 5000 remained inside the city. Choltitz, however, had no intention of seeing Paris destroyed. He loved its beauty as well as its cultural significance. He was appalled by the destruction he could unleash.

Paris was also the prize in a contest for power within the French Resistance. The city was the hub of national administration and politics, the center of the rail system, the communication lines and the highways. It was the only place from which the country could be governed. The overall aim of the Resistance, to get rid of the Germans, bound men of conflicting philosophies and interests. But there were political differences among them. De Gaulle had organized the Resistance outside France to support his provisional government. But inside France, a large and vociferous contingent of the left contested de Gaulle’s leadership. De Gaulle had named Gen. Marie Pierre Koenig head of the Resistance and placed him under Eisenhower’s command. Rumors of civil unrest in Paris and talk of liberation by the inhabitants prompted Koenig to try to stop activities that might cause upheaval. A revolt in Paris might provoke bloody repression by the Germans or it could place the Communists in power.

Despite Koenig’s instruction, the approach of American troops promoted patriotic excitement in the city. On August 15, employees of the Paris Metro, the Gendarmerie, and police went on strike; postal workers followed the next day. By August 18, more than half the railroad workers were on strike and the city was at a standstill. Virtually all policemen had disappeared from the streets. Several anti-German demonstrations occurred, and armed Resistance members appeared openly. The German reaction was less than forceful, prompting small, local Resistance groups, without central direction or discipline, to take possession the next day of police stations, town halls, national ministries, newspaper buildings and the Hotel de Ville.

There were perhaps 20,000 Resistance members in Paris, but few were armed. Nevertheless, they destroyed road signs, punctured the tires of German vehicles, cut communication lines, bombed gasoline depots and attacked isolated pockets of German soldiers. On August 19, continuing their retreat eastwards, columns of German vehicles moved down the Champs Élysées. Posters calling citizens to arm had previously been pasted on walls by FFI members. These posters called for a general mobilization of Parisians, arguing that “the war continues”; they called on the Parisian police, the Republican Guard, the Gendarmerie, the Garde Mobile, the Groupe mobile de réserve (the police units replacing the army), and patriotic Frenchmen (“all men from 18 to 50 able to carry a weapon”) to join “the struggle against the invader”. Other posters assured that “victory is near” and promised “chastisement for the traitors” (Vichyites and collaborators). The posters were signed by the Parisian Committee of the Liberation, in agreement with the Provisional Government of the French Republic, and under the orders of Regional Chief Colonel Rol (Henri Rol-Tanguy), the leader of the Communist partisans, who took command in the Ile de France region. The first skirmishes soon began.

Resistance leaders persuaded Raoul Nordling, the Swedish counsel general, to negotiate with Choltitz. That evening, August 19, the two men arranged a truce, at first for a few hours, then extended it indefinitely. The arrangement was somewhat nebulous. Choltitz agreed to recognize certain parts of Paris as belonging to the Resistance. The Resistance, meanwhile, consented to leave particular areas free to German troops. But no boundaries were drawn, and neither the Germans nor the French were clear about their respective areas. The armistice was to expire on the 24th. Skirmishing continued, however.

On August 20, as barricades began to appear, Resistance fighters organized themselves to sustain a siege. Trucks were positioned, trees cut down, and trenches dug in the pavement to free paving stones for the barricades. These materials were transported by men, women, and children using wooden carts. Fuel trucks were attacked and captured. Civilian vehicles were commandeered, painted with camouflage, and marked with the FFI emblem. The Resistance would use them to transport ammunition and orders from one barricade to another. Skirmishes reached their peak on August 22, when some German units tried to leave their fortifications. At 0900 on August 23, under Choltitz’s orders, the Germans opened fire on the Grand Palais, an FFI stronghold, and German tanks fired at the barricades in the streets. Hitler gave the order to inflict maximum damage on the city. However, the truce was son restored.

The truce was advantageous to the French, who were uncertain when Allied troops would arrive. Their leaders knew the Resistance’s weakness, hoped to preserve the capital from damage and were anxious to prevent repressive German countermeasures. The truce was advantageous to the Germans because it maintained order and let Choltitz devote his attention to defending the outskirts against Allied troops without having to worry about a civilian insurrection within. During his negotiations with Nordling, Choltitz made a significant pronouncement. He could not be expected, he said, to surrender to irregular troops like the Resistance. This appeared to mean that in order to save his honor he would make a show of fighting before capitulating to Regular forces.

Resistance emissaries left the French capital to seek Allied commanders and de Gaulle. Some made contact and delivered exaggerated reports of disorder in Paris. But the most important messages said that Choltitz would surrender his garrison as soon as Allied troops seized his headquarters in the Hotel Meurice on the Rue de Rivoli. De Gaulle feared civil unrest in the city. It might cause violent German reaction. It might bring unreliable radical Resistance elements to power. The parties of the left were especially strong in Paris. The commander of the Resistance in the capital was a Communist. De Gaulle was sensitive to the ancient dictum, “He who holds Paris holds France.”

On August 21, de Gaulle and Koenig conferred with Eisenhower. The Supreme Commander did not consider the liberation of Paris to be a primary objective. The goal of the Allied armies was to destroy the German Army and end the war in Europe. Paris was considered to have too great a value, culturally and historically, to risk its destruction. Eisenhower was keen to avoid a drawn-out battle of attrition; it was also estimated that, in the event of a siege, 3600 tons of food per day, as well as significant amounts of building materials, manpower, and engineering skill, would be required to feed the population after the liberation of Paris. Basic utilities would have to be restored, and transportation systems rebuilt. All of these supplies were desperately needed in other areas of the war effort. He promised to use Jean Leclerc’s 2nd French Armored Division for the liberation when the time was right. This division was part of Wade Haislip’s US XV Corps, in Patton’s 3rd Army.

Later that same day, de Gaulle sent Eisenhower a hand-carried letter, threatening politely to order Leclerc to Paris himself. After Eisenhower read the letter, he jotted on the margin of the note that he would probably “be compelled to go into Paris.” Several days earlier, the Combined Chiefs of Staff had informed Eisenhower that there was no objection to de Gaulle’s entry into the capital. The Allies would then recognize de Gaulle’s provisional government as the de facto government of France. Most Frenchmen, it was becoming increasingly clear, approved of de Gaulle. It was finally decided on the 22nd that, in order to avoid bloodshed and destruction in the city, Allied troops would have to be used.

Information supplied by the Resistance provided Eisenhower with the military reason he needed for liberating Paris. His solution was to send reinforcements to the Resistance in order to repay “their great assistance in the campaign.” He also ordered an immediate shipment of food and coal to the city. Since reinforcement was a military action, the liberation was to be Allied rather than French. Leclerc was to liberate Paris “to help the French recapture their pride after four years of occupation”, but Allied troops were to accompany the French into the capital. US V Corps (Leonard Gerow) was chosen to command with 2nd French Armored and 4th US Infantry Divisions, some US recon and engineers and whatever British unit Montgomery chose to send. That evening, Gerow phoned Leclerc and told him he expected no serious opposition. He ordered the Frenchman to start for Paris that night. However, Leclerc waited until early on the morning of August 23 to move.

[Ennath]

August 19, 1944
Battle for Paris, Part 2

Gerow’s force traveled toward Paris on two routes. The northern column, expected to be the main effort, consisted of the bulk of the French division in the lead, some American recon engineer troops and 4 battalions of Corps artillery. The southern column consisted of a French combat command, most of the US cavalry, V Corps HQ and 4th Infantry Division. British troops failed to show up. The columns made good progress. By nightfall they were less than 20 miles from the capital. The northern column was beyond Rambouillet on the road to Versailles. The southern column was in similar position. Just short of their goal, however, the French met German opposition.

Leclerc reached Rambouillet in the evening and learned from recon and civilians that the Germans had set up a solid defensive line outside of Paris. Getting into the city would be no easy matter. Trying to speed his advance, Leclerc changed his main effort from the northern column to the southern by sending a combat command from the northern force to the southern. In so doing, he inadvertently chose to make his main effort at the place where the German defenses were strongest. He put his main effort out of range of supporting artillery in the northern column. And finally, he impinged on the route of advance reserved for 4th Infantry Division.

The division attacked at dawn on August 24. The northern column fought fiercely to gain about 15 miles. By evening, the troops had reached the Pont de Sevres, a wide bridge across the Seine. It was still intact, and a few tanks crossed and entered the suburb of Boulogne-Billancourt. Paris proper was less than 2 miles away at the Porte de St. Cloud. But the troops stayed put, as enthusiastic civilians swarmed over them in welcome, pressing flowers, kisses and wine on their liberators. The main column in the south advanced about 13 miles with great difficulty. The head of the column was still about 5 miles from the closest entrance, the Porte d’Orléans; 8 miles from the Ile de la Cité and Notre Dame, the center of the capital.

The supposed expiration of the armistice at noon on the 24th was very much on the minds of the Americans. It was incredible to them that the French were making such little progress. To Gerow, Leclerc’s attack seemed halfhearted. Hoping to shame the French into greater effort, Gerow asked Bradley whether he could send 4th Division into the city. Bradley was angry. How long could Choltitz wait for regular troops before destroying the capital? Bradley said he could not let the French “dance their way to Paris.” He told Gerow, “To hell with prestige. Tell the 4th to slam on in and take the liberation.”

On receipt of this information, Leclerc made one more attempt to get his troops into Paris during the night of August 24. He sent a vanguard (Colonne Dronne) to Paris, with the message that the entire division would be there the following day. Composed of Spanish Republican exiles, this small force, under Captain Raymond Dronne, rolled along side roads and back streets, crossed the Seine by the Pont d’Austerlitz, drove along the quays on the right bank and reached the Hotel de Ville just before midnight.

The bells of nearby Notre Dame began to ring joyously. Another church took up the refrain and then another. Soon all the churches in Paris were ringing their bells in celebration. Not many Parisians had gone to sleep that night. The telephones had been working, and everyone knew that soldiers were in the suburbs. The bells of the churches could mean only one thing: The liberators had arrived.

On the following morning, an enormous crowd of joyous Parisians welcomed the arrival of 2nd French Armored Division, which swept the western part of Paris, including the Arc de Triomphe and the Champs Elysées, while the Americans cleared the eastern part. The Germans had melted away during the night. 2000 remained in the Bois de Boulogne, and 700 more were in the Luxembourg Gardens. But most had fled or simply awaited capture. Early in the afternoon of August 25, under the arcades of the Rue de Rivoli, a young French officer sprang into the Hotel Meurice. He burst into Choltitz’s room. In his excitement, he shouted, “Do you speak German?” Choltitz replied coolly, “Probably better than you.” He then allowed himself to be taken prisoner.

In the presence of Leclerc and the commander of the French Resistance in Paris, Choltitz signed a formal act of capitulation. He surrendered, not to the Supreme Allied Command but rather to representatives of the provisional government of France. Teams of French and German officers circulated copies of the document to the scattered groups of Germans still in the city. As for the political situation, de Gaulle’s supporters proved to be more astute and better disciplined than their opponents. Taking advantage of the insurrection that began on August 19, they had seized and occupied many of the government buildings and secured the reins of political control. It is estimated that between 800 and 1000 Resistance fighters were killed during the battle for Paris, and another 1500 wounded. The French regulars lost 71 dead and 225 wounded. US casualties are uncertain. The Germans lost 3200 dead and 12,800 prisoners.

On the day following the liberation, de Gaulle wrote Eisenhower and thanked him for letting Leclerc liberate Paris. That afternoon, with cheering crowds present, de Gaulle, Koenig and Leclerc paraded from the Etoile, now named the Place de Général de Gaulle, down the Champs Elysées to the Place de la Concorde. Some scattered gunfire came from the rooftops. Then de Gaulle proceeded to the Cathedral of Notre Dame, where a packed church took part in a mass of celebration and thanks.

When Hitler learned that Allied troops were entering Paris, he asked whether it was burning. Enraged by the negative response, he ordered artillery, V weapons and planes to destroy the city. His military commanders, however, were too busy trying to come to grips with the collapsing military situation in France and making preparations to keep the Allies from entering Germany.

[Ernesto75]

Von Choltiz was not a choir-boy.

Before being in Paris he was in Russia and not a very soft-hearted officer.
I think Palo will agree with me on this.

He had many things to get if not forbidden at least forgotten.

Being in Paris when the war was getting lost for the Germans was a heaven sent gift to him.

He may have liked Paris but this was not the real reason he chose to surrender without fight and without executing Hitler's order to destroy Paris.
To him the situation was most convenient.

He was certainly a very clever man.

Leclerc accepted to let Rol Tangy, the chief of the FFI, to sign with him the act of reddition.
That was a mistake which infuriated De Gaulle, and he was right.

Von Choltiz'son tried several times to have his father rehabilitated, without success.

[Ernesto75]

We can’t talk about the liberation of Paris without citing General Von Choltiz but also Raoul Nordling.
Raoul Nordling was a Swedish businessman and diplomat serving as consul of Sweden in Paris from 1905 to 1959.


Although Swedish by nationality he was born in Paris on 11 november 1881 and died In France at Neuilly-sur-Seine on 1st october 1962.
He spoke perfectly French and Swedish but not German.


It is funny to see what Wikedia says : very little in German, a little in English but most is in French.
In fact he had learnt French before Swedish.
You can say he was more French than a Frenchman.


From 1905 to 1959 he acted as a mediator in his role of consul of Sweden.


During WW I, he had helped the sending of diplomatic courrier from France towards Russia, circumventing the difficulties caused by the German Navy in the Baltic Sea.


During WW II, he also acted as a mediator between the Allies and the Germans.


From 15 August 1944 he entered in long negociations with General Von Choltiz.


He obtained the liberation of 3 245 political prisoners.


On the morning of 25 August he brought an ultimatum from Colonel Billotte, second to General Leclerc, to General Von Choltiz.
In answer General Von Choltiz surrendered in the afternoon of 25 August.


General Von Choltiz was worried about what would happen to his family in Germany.
Raoul Nordling organised their extraction.


He also intervened to try to obtain a more lenient treatment for the collaborator Louis-Ferdinand Céline who had fled to Denmark.


He was made recipient of the Croix de Guerre avec Palmes in 1949 and received the Légion d’Honneur in 1962.

[Ennath]

August 20, 1914
Battle of Gumbinnen

At the outbreak of war, Maximilian von Prittwitz’s orders were very strict and clear: his German 8th Army was to remain on the defensive in East Prussia, without attempting any offensive action, as all German efforts were to be concentrated against France, according to the Schlieffen Plan. In addition, should the Russians increase their pressure, he was authorized to fall back as far as the Vistula River, abandoning eastern Prussia.

8th Army comprised I Corps (Hermann von Francois), XVII Corps (August von Mackensen), I Reserve Corps (Otto von Below), and XX Corps (Friedrich von Scholtz), plus 1st Cavalry Division, facing the Russian 1st Army (Pavel Rennenkampf) and 2nd Army (Alexander Samsonov). The Russians enjoyed considerable numerical superiority, but were hampered by significant deficiencies in their services of supply and field communications.

Francois was convinced that German training and equipment made up for their lack of numbers, and was pressing for offensive action. On the 17th he launched, on his own initiative and against orders, an attack against Russian 1st Army at the Battle of Stallupönen (see posting). By the time he withdrew to Gumbinnen 10 miles to the west, his corps had inflicted 5000 casualties and managed to capture about 3000 Russian prisoners.

With this success, Francois persuaded Prittwitz to launch an offensive against Russian 1st Army while the 2nd Army was still far to the south. Francois argued that his troops, many of whom were native East Prussians, would be demoralized by abandoning their homeland to the Russians, and that the Russians were not as strong as they appeared to be. Prittwitz was convinced, and decided to engage Rennenkampf at the earliest opportunity, pitting his 150,000 Germans against 200,000 Russians. This decision went against the orders of Helmuth von Moltke, the German Chief of Staff, which specifically ruled out any offensive on the Eastern Front until France was defeated.

On August 19, Russian cavalry came into contact with a German infantry regiment outside Gumbinnen. Instead of withdrawing, the Russians dismounted and brought up their artillery to continue the fight, driving the Germans back. However, they suffered 400 casualties and after expending most of their ammunition were forced to retreat themselves. This was the signal Francois had been awaiting, and he convinced Prittwitz to launch a counterattack the next day. With Prittwitz’s approval, François started moving I Corps forward that night, reinforced by 1st Cavalry Division. 2 more corps and an additional division were to follow, while Scholz secured the rear.

The German offensive was launched somewhat in haste, certainly before 2 of his corps were in readiness. Mackensen, whose XVII Corps was sited in the center, and Below, to the south, did not achieve a full state of readiness until some 4-8 hours after Francois had commenced the attack in the north with I Corps at 4 AM on the morning of August 20. As for the additional division dispatched by Prittwitz, it arrived too late to see any action whatsoever.

Although Francois’ target, Russian 28th Division, put up a spirited defense, its artillery in particular, they soon expended most of their shells. This left them at the mercy of the German artillery, and they were forced to retreat 5 miles in the early afternoon. The lines stabilized when Russian 29th Division arrived, and the battle turned into a stalemate.

To the south, Mackensen’s XVII Corps and Below’s I Reserve Corps were still moving up and were not ready. However, Francois’ early success encouraged Mackensen to attack regardless. He struck Russian III Corps at 8 AM, but Below was not ready with his own attack until noon.

Alerted by Francois’s earlier attack, the Russians had spent the time preparing for the assault by moving up their heavy artillery. At first the German advance went well, but faltered once they came under Russian artillery fire, and the Russians were able to turn their flanks and force them to retreat in disorder to the Insterburg-Angerburg line, 15 miles back. Below followed. Francois, aware that the German center and right were in disarray, was similarly obliged to authorize a retreat. The Germans lost 7500 men killed and wounded, plus 7000 prisoners. Russian losses were about 19,000 altogether.

Prittwitz, panicked by the effectiveness of the Russian counterattack, and concerned that Samsonov’s advancing 2nd Army would combine to envelop him, despite Rennenkampf’s apparent unwillingness to pursue, ordered a general withdrawal to the Vistula, effectively conceding East Prussia.

Moltke, in Berlin, was furious at Prittwitz’s planned withdrawal. Promptly recalling Prittwitz and his deputy Waldersee to Berlin - an effective dismissal - he brought Paul von Hindenburg out of retirement and gave him command of 8th Army, assigning as his Chief of Staff the bold, aggressive Erich Ludendorff, who had latterly impressed during the German capture of Liege (see posting).

Fortunately for Hindenburg, the retreat to the Vistula had not been fully executed when he arrived in the east on August 23. Consulting with Ludendorff and Col. Max Hoffmann, Prittwitz’s deputy chief of operations, he resolved to reverse Prittwitz’s withdrawal, choosing instead to launch an offensive against Samsonov. This action resulted in the crushing Russian disaster of Tannenberg.

[Ennath]

1107
Norwegian Crusade

The years immediately following the First Crusade were perilous to the nascent Crusader States formed in its wake. Undermanned, isolated and surrounded by foes, only the disunity of their enemies was in their favor. The Kingdom of Jerusalem had passed to King Baldwin I. The security of the realm was tied to the sea; only by a conquest of the urban centers that dotted the coast could the future of the Latin presence in the region be assured.

Nearly annual campaigns were focused on these cities, still under Egyptian control. Acre was captured in 1103, Jerbail in 1104, Tripoli in 1109 and Beirut in 1110. It was into this expansion, conducted with fewer than 500 knights and a few hundred infantry that the first new crusading expedition from the West arrived, under the command of King Sigurd I of Norway.

Sigurd had assembled a fleet of some 60 ships and 5000 men at Bergen in 1107 and set sail for the Holy Land in the autumn of that year. Initial command had been disputed between himself and his brother Eystein I, but Sigurd, being a seasoned traveler, eventually was chosen. Crossing the North Sea he stopped in England for the winter before heading out once more in 1108. Moving on past France Sigurd came to the coast of Spain and Portugal; there he encountered a pirate fleet, which rather than attempting to avoid he attacked and captured some 8 ships. In Portugal he besieged the castle of Sintra, capturing it and killing all that would not convert to Christianity, repeating the feat at Lisbon.

In 1109, the fleet rounded Gibraltar, defeating another pirate fleet and continuing on to the Balearic Islands. The Balearics at the time were perceived by Christians as nothing more than a pirate haven and slaving center. The Norwegians raided Formentera, Ibiza and Minorca, taking considerable booty. They seem to have avoided attacking the largest of the Islands, Majorca, most likely because it was at the time the most prosperous and well-fortified center of an independent taifa kingdom. They arrived in Sicily where they wintered again.



Sigurd finally arrived at the city of Acre in the spring of 1110. He was enthusiastically welcomed and feasted by Baldwin I, conducting him personally to Jerusalem from the coast, and thence to the River Jordan. Sigurd promised to assist Baldwin in the conquest of the coast, particularly the city of Sidon which had been able to hold out against Baldwin’s efforts to capture it in 1108, so long as Baldwin would provide all the food. The Sidonians had summoned a fleet from Fatimid Egypt which had proved too much for the ragtag assembly of Italian ships that had been present in the Holy Land at that time. With the assistance of Sigurd’s fleet the Franks this time had a better opportunity to secure their hold on the coast.

Baldwin gathered his army that summer set out for Sidon by land. The fleet set sail for Sidon and was intercepted by a Fatimid flotilla sailing down from Tyre. Battle was joined and the Norwegians were close to giving way until the arrival of Venetian ships, under the Doge Ordelafo Falieri, arrived to tip the scale back to the Christians. The Fatimid ships retreated and the city of Sidon was besieged from both land and sea in October. The Franks and Norwegians set in for a long siege, the defenders hopes of a relief fleet having been dashed. The Franks began to construct siege machinery to batter the walls. The city would eventually capitulate on December 4. The Patriarch of Jerusalem granted Sigurd a splinter of the True Cross to take back to Norway with him in thanks for his efforts and assistance.

After this, Sigurd and his men sailed to Cyprus, Greece and Constantinople. He then sold his fleet to Emperor Alexios I in return for a large number of horses, with which he would return home overland. Many of his men remained to take service with the Byzantines. Sigurd’s journey home reportedly took 3 years; ending in 1113, when he sailed from Denmark.

[Ennath]

August 21, 1900
Battle of Bergendal

By the spring of 1900, the tide had turned in South Africa. In June, Pretoria was occupied and the Transvaal (ZAR) government fled to towards Portuguese East Africa. They were pursued along the rail line by Gen. Pole-Carew’s 11th Infantry Division (7500 troops) and a cavalry division under Lt-Gen. John French.

In June, Boer Gen. Louis Botha sent a few officers ahead to Belfast to prepare ramparts and emplacements. It was the only place where the Boers could present a wide enough front to resist a superior force. North of the railway line, in a semi-circle around the town, was the Lydenburg commando, supported by a “Long Tom” cannon. The Middelburg and Johannesburg commandos were just east of the main road to Dullstroom, with another Long Tom. Nearby was the Krugersdorp commando. Adjecent to them, south of the railroad, was a detachment of the Zuid-Afrikaansche Rijdende Politie (ZARPs), who were to bear the brunt of the British attack, with the Germiston commando in support. The rest of Botha’s force was on the plateau of Gelukplato south of the railway. The force totaled about 7000 men and 20 guns.

Pole-Carew reached Middelburg in July and started assembling 11th Division. French and his cavalry advanced to Wonderfontein. On the Natal front Sir Redvers Buller broke through in February, but was then stopped; it was only on August 6 that he could start his advance towards Belfast. His task force consisted of 4th Infantry Division (Lt-Gen.. N.G. Lyttelton), with Brig. F.W. Kitchener of 7th Brigade and Maj.-Gen. Howard of 8th Brigade. Buller’s mounted troops consisted of 2nd Cavalry Brigade (J.F. Brocklehurst) and 3rd Mounted Infantry Brigade (Earl Dundonald). Buller's force consisted of 9000 troops with 42 guns. Buller reached Twyfelaar farm on the Komati River on August 15 and linked with French’s right flank. This enabled Buller to be supplied from Wonderfontein. The combined British columns would reach a strength of 19,000 men and 82 guns.

On August 21, Buller advanced to Van Wyk’s Vley, about 8 miles north of Twyfelaar. French remained on his left flank. While advancing the last 3 miles, Buller's right came under fire from the Bethal commando on Frischgewaagd. A fight ensued, lasting until early evening. The next day, Buller sent Maj-Gen. Walter Kitchener to attack with 2 battalions of foot, 4 mounted squadrons and 8 guns. However, the Boers had been reinforced during the night by the Carolina commando and tentative attacks achieved nothing.

On the 23rd, Pole-Carew and his division left Middelburg and advanced to Wonderfontein. Buller, with French still on his left, advanced to Geluk farm and established his HQ. On his eastern side was the Geluk Plateau on which the Heidelberg commando had built their sconces. He ordered 8th Infantry Brigade, assisted by Dundonald’s mounted troops and the South African Light Horse, to secure the plateau. A bitter fight developed, but the Boers held on, despite heavy losses.

The 24th was mainly spent in artillery duels, while Pole-Carew occupied Belfast. Lord Roberts arrived the next day to assume command of operations. French was ordered to get rid of the Boers on their right flank on Zuikerboschkop and then swerve right to Machadodorp. Buller was ordered to turn right and advance over Dalmanutha to Machadodorp. Pole-Carew had to extend his force northwards along the main road to Dullstroom to join French at Lakenvley.

French and his cavalry left Geluk very early on the 26th and first called at Belfast. They left there at 0900 and first proceeded west along the railway line, possibly to mislead Boer spies. When they were out of sight they swung right and unexpectedly appeared at Boschpoort farm. The Boers beat a hasty retreat, while French cleared the rest of the burghers from Zuikerboschkop and Langkloof. By 1400 he could send a message to Pole-Carew to commence his march northwards. The Infantry Division experienced some cross-fire from the east, but Pole-Carew gained command of all the high-lying ground between the railway line and Lakenvley. Most of the Middelburg commando had simply fled. Buller advanced northwards as well. His plan was to swing right at Vogelstruispoort farm and then proceed over Waaikraal to Dalmanutha. But that afternoon his scouts reported (erroneously) that the Boer right flank ended at the railway line. He therefore decided to make his breakthrough on the farm Bergendal the next day.

Buller himself went scouting early on August 27. The Boer right flank did not actually end at the railway line, but it did swing sharply clockwise. It thus formed a salient angle. The result was that their position at Bergendal farm (occupied by the ZARPs) was exposed. On both sides of this position the Boer sangars were facing away from the tip, with the result that those occupying them could not assist those on the tip in the case of a frontal attack.

36 guns were placed on the high ground and the bombardment of the ZARP position started at 1100. After 3 hours the Rifle Brigade and the Inniskilling Fusiliers charged and burst right through the Boer lines, prompting a general withdrawal by the defenders and Buller marched into Machadodorp to next day. The victory had cost 385 British casualties, while the Boers lost 78 men.

The ZAR government, meanwhile, had decamped to Nelspruit. A few days later, on September 1, Lord Roberts proclaimed the entire South African Republic British territory. However, Botha’s main force was still intact and would now turn to guerrilla warfare.