The Military History Thread

[rustler]

Today, 26th of August is also the 668th anniversary of the Battle of Crecy, where Edward III famously defeated the French, and where the 16 year old Edward, Prince of Wales (The Black Prince) won his spurs.

[Ennath]

August 27, 479 BC
Battle of Plataea

Xerxes and his fleet had returned to Persia after the defeat at Salamis, out of fear for his maritime communications. Before departing, he formed a force under the command of Mardonius to complete the conquest of Greece. Assessing the situation, Mardonius elected to abandon Attica and withdrew north to Thessaly for the winter. This allowed the Athenians to reoccupy their city.

Over the winter there seems to have been some tension among the Greek allies. The Athenians in particular, who were not protected by the Isthmus but whose fleet was the key to the security of the Peloponnese, felt hard done by and demanded that an allied army march north in 479. When the Allies failed to commit to this, the Athenian fleet refused to join the Allied navy in the spring. The navy, now under the command of the Spartan king Leotychides, thus skulked off Delos, while the remnants of the Persian fleet skulked off Samos, both sides unwilling to risk battle. Mardonius remained in Thessaly, knowing an attack on the Isthmus was pointless, while the Allies refused to send an army outside the Peloponnese.

Sensing an opportunity, Mardonius attempted to woo Athens away from the other Greek cities. These entreaties were refused and the Persians began marching south in the spring, forcing Athens to be evacuated. Athens, along with representatives of Megara and Plataea, now approached Sparta and demanded that an army be sent north or they would accept Persian terms. Aware of the situation, the Spartan leadership was convinced to send aid by Chileos of Tegea shortly before the emissaries arrived. Arriving in Sparta, the Athenians were surprised to learn that an army was already on the move.

Alerted to the Spartan efforts, Mardonius effectively destroyed Athens before withdrawing towards Thebes with the goal of finding suitable terrain to employ his advantage in cavalry. Nearing Plataea, he established a fortified camp on the north bank of the Asopus River. Marching in pursuit, the Spartan army, led by Pausanias, was augmented by 8000 hoplites from Athens commanded by Aristides as well as forces from the other allied cities. Moving through the passes of Mount Kithairon, Pausanias formed the combined army on high ground to the east of Plataea.

Mardonius initiated hit-and-run cavalry attacks against the Greeks, possibly trying to lure them down to the plain in pursuit. Although having some initial success, this strategy backfired when the Persian cavalry commander Masistius was killed; with his death, the cavalry retreated. Emboldened by this success, Pausanias advanced his army to high ground closer to the Persian camp with the Spartans and Tegeans on the right, the Athenians on the left, and the other allies in the center.

For the next eight days the Greeks remained unwilling to abandon their favorable terrain, while Mardonius refused to attack. Instead, he sought to force the Greeks from the heights by attacking their supply lines. Persian cavalry began ranging in the Greek rear and intercepting supply convoys coming through the Mount Kithairon passes. After two days of these attacks, the Persian horse succeeded in denying the Greeks use of the Gargaphian Spring which was their only source of water. Placed in a perilous situation, the Greeks elected to fall back to a position in front of Plataea that night.

However, the retreat went awry. The Allied contingents in the centre missed their appointed position and ended up scattered in front of Plataea itself. The Athenians, Tegeans and Spartans, who had been guarding the rear of the retreat, had not even begun to retreat by daybreak. A single Spartan division was thus left on the ridge to guard the rear, while the Spartans and Tegeans retreated uphill; Pausanias also instructed the Athenians to begin the retreat and if possible join up with the Spartans. However, the Athenians at first retreated directly towards Plataea, and thus the Allied battle line remained fragmented as the Persian camp began to stir. Mardonius was surprised to find the heights empty and soon saw the Greeks withdrawing. Believing the enemy to be in full retreat, he gathered several of his elite infantry units and began pursuing. Without orders the bulk of the Persian army also followed.

According to Herodotus, there were 38,700 hoplites mustered, including 10,000 from Sparta, 8000 from Athems, 5000 from Corinth, 3000 each from Megara and Sicyon, as well as many smaller contingents. These were supplemented by at least 20,000 light troops. Numbers for the Persians vary widely. Herodotus put the number at 300,000, but the actual number was proabably around 80,000, including 10,000 cavalry and “Medizing” Greeks, most notably the Thebans.

The Spartans and Tegeans had by now reached the Temple of Demeter. The rearguard under Amompharetus began to withdraw from the ridge, under pressure from Persian cavalry, to join them. Pausanias sent a messenger to the Athenians, asking them to join up with the Spartans. However, the Athenians had been attacked by the Theban and were unable to assist Pausanias. The Spartans and Tegeans were first assaulted by the Persian cavalry, while the Persian infantry made their way forward. They then planted their shields and began an archery barrage, while the cavalry withdrew.

According to Herodotus, Pausanias refused to advance because the omens were not good in the goat sacrifices performed. At this point, as Greek soldiers began to fall under the barrage, the Tegeans started to run at the Persian lines. Offering one last sacrifice and a prayer to the heavens in front of the Temple of Hera, Pausanias finally received favorable omens and gave the command for the Spartans to advance; they also charged the Persian lines.

The Persian infantry were of the heavy (by Persian standards) sparabara type, but this was still much lighter than the Greek hoplites. As at Marathon, it was a severe mismatch. The fight was fierce and long, but the Greeks (Spartans and Tegeans) continued to push into the Persian lines. The Persians tried to break the Greeks' spears by grabbing hold of them, but the Greeks responded by switching to short swords. Mardonius was present at the scene, riding a white horse, and surrounded by a bodyguard of 1000 men; while he remained, the Persians stood their ground. However, the Spartans closed in on Mardonius; according to tradition, a Spartan named Arimnestus saw him, picked up a large rock off the ground and threw it hard at Mardonius; it hit him squarely in the head, killing him. It is possible he was killed by a slinger, but Greek accounts tend to focus solely on the citizen hoplites and rarely credit light troops with anything. With Mardonius dead, the Persians began to break; his bodyguard remained and was annihilated. Quickly the rout became general, with many Persians fleeing in disorder to their camp. However, Artabazus had disagreed with Mardonius about attacking the Greeks and had not fully engaged the forces under his command. As the rout commenced, he led these men away from the field, on the road to Thessaly, hoping to escape eventually to the Hellespont.

On the opposite side of the field the Athenians had triumphed in a tough battle against the Thebans, who retreated in a different direction from the Persians, allowing them to escape without further losses. The Allied Greeks, reinforced by the contingents who had not taken part in the main battle, then stormed the Persian camp. Although the Persians initially defended the wall vigorously, it was eventually breached; the Persians, packed tightly together in the camp, were slaughtered.

As with most ancient battles, casualties for Plataea are not known with certainty. Greek losses may have ranged from 159 to 10,000. Herodotus claimed that 43,000 Persians survived the battle.

The remnants of the Persian army, under the command of Artabazus, tried to retreat back to Asia Minor. Travelling through the lands of Thessaly, Macedonia and Thrace by the shortest road, Artabazus eventually made it back to Byzantium, though losing many men to Thracian attacks, weariness and hunger. While Artabazus retreated, the Greek army began efforts to capture Thebes as punishment for joining with the Persians. Around the time of Plataea, the Greek fleet won a decisive victory over the Persians at the Battle of Mycale. Combined, these two victories ended the second Persian invasion of Greece and marked a turn in the conflict. With the invasion threat lifted, the Peloponnesians returned home, but the others began their counterattack against the Persians. Over the next 30 years the Greeks, primarily the Athenian-dominated Delian League, would expel the Persians from Macedon, Thrace, the Aegean islands and Ionia. Peace with Persia came in 449 BC with the Peace of Callias, finally ending a half-century of warfare.

[Ennath]

August 28, 388
Execution of Magnus Maximus

Maximus was a distinguished general, who served under Count Theodosius in Africa in 373 and on the Danube in 376. Assigned to Britain in 380, he defeated an incursion of the Picts and Scots in 381.

At this time, the army was disillusioned and dissatisfied with the Western emperor, Gratian, due to perceived favoritism toward Alans over Roman citizens. (The Alans were Sarmatian people of Ukraine and early adopters of Christianity, who migrated west and south into the Caucasus). Finally, in 383 it all boiled over and the garrison in Britain revolted and proclaimed Maximus as the new Augustus of the west.

At once the new emperor crossed the Channel, taking a large portion of the British garrison with him and taking Gratian by complete surprise. Following his landing in Gaul, Maximus defeated Gratian near Lutetia (Paris) after most of the emperor’s troops defected to the new Augustus. Gratian fled, but was killed at Lugdunum (Lyon) on August 25. Continuing into Italy, Maximus was stopped from overthrowing Valentinian II, who was only twelve, when Theodosius I, the Eastern Emperor, sent Flavius Bauto with a powerful force. Negotiations followed in 384 including the intervention of Ambrose, Bishop of Milan, leading to an accord with Valentinian II and Theodosius I in which Maximus was recognized as Augustus in the west.

With his recognition as emperor, Maximus adopted the name Flavius, in order to portray himself as an adopted member of the imperial family. He made his capital at Augusta Treverorum (Trier) and ruled Britain, Gaul, and Spain. Maximus was a orthodox Christian, who, like Theodosius in the east, vehemently punished heretics and pagans. It was on his orders that Priscillian and six companions became the first people in the history of Christianity to be executed for heresy.

Then, in the summer of AD 387, Maximus invaded Italy in a successful attempt to oust Valentinian II. The young emperor fled with his mother to Theodosius in Constantinople.

The move was ill-timed. Theodosius had signed an agreement with Persia in 386, ending the long wars and was no longer tied up in the east and stood ready to attack the usurper. Theodosius invaded from the east in July 388. Maximus’ generals were defeated at Siscia and Poetovio. Meanwhile the Franks under Marcomer had taken the opportunity to invade northern Gaul, at the same time further weakening Maximus' position.

Maximus surrendered in Aquileia and, although he pleaded for mercy, was executed. The Senate passed a decree of Damnatio memoriae against him. However, his mother and at least two daughters were spared. Theodosius' trusted general Arbogast strangled Maximus' son, Flavius Victor, at Trier in the fall of the same year.

[Ennath]

August 29, 1622
Battle of Fleurus

After failing to relieve Heidelberg, Frederick V, Elector Palatine, decided to disband his army. On July 13, 1622 the now- unemployed army of Ernst von Mansfeld and Christian of Brunswick was hired by the Dutch to help in the relief of the siege of Bergen-op-Zoom. The Protestant army departed from Alsace and quickly crossed Northern France, entering the Spanish Low Countries through Hainaut.

The Spanish Army of Flanders, under command of Ambrogio Spinola, besieging Bergen-op-Zoom, a town on the estuary of the Scheldt River, was in a dangerous position; while a relieving Dutch army was being assembled to the East at Breda he faced invasion from the South. He was in danger of being trapped between the two enemy armies, his line of retreat towards Antwerp blocked by the invading German army. Gonzalo Fernandez de Cordoba, commander of the Spanish army in the Palatinate, was recalled in a hurry to stop this army. Cordoba marched through Luxembourg and the difficult terrain of the Ardennes, and was able to intercept Mansfeld and Brunswick at the border of Brabant.

The Protestant advance guard met Spanish cavalry scouts on August 27 and on the 29th they found Cordoba's army entrenched. Cordoba, much weaker in cavalry, had assumed a blocking position north of the town of Mellet, near Fleurus, with flanks supported by woods. The Protestant commanders deployed their army to try to break through the Spanish position.

The Protestant army had left Sedan with 25.000 men, but the swift march had reduced it to 14.000 (8000 foot, 6000 hotse and 11 guns), many stragglers killed by angry Walloon peasants. Protestant cavalry was highly motivated and of good quality, many of the recruits were members of the German lesser nobility, and most were heavily armoured cuirassiers. The infantry was of much lesser material, poorly equipped, it had suffered the most in the march.

Cordobahad 6000 infantry, 2000 cavalry and 4 guns. The infantry was of mixed quality; the Tercio of Naples was an elite unit that traced back its history to 1567, and Cordoba placed it in the post of honor to the right, blocking the road. The Fugger Regiment and Verdugo Tercio were also experienced units, veterans of the Bohemian campaign, the rest of the units were garrison troops of lesser quality mobilized by Cordoba to fill his command.

After a short cannonade, Mansfeld ordered a general advance. Some gaps opened up in the poorly drilled German infantry, and De Sylva, commainding the Spanish left, attacked an exposed flank, routing one battalion. However, Streiff, his German opposite, counterattacked and the Walloon cavalry suffered considerable damage from enemy pistol fire. De Sylva's cavalry took refuge behind the baggage wagons, while Streiff turned on the Spanish infantry, but without much success.

On the Protestant left, Brunswick had massed most of his cavalry. Cordoba's deployment made it impossible to outflank his position, but Brunswick hoped to overwhelm the Spanish by a massed frontal assault. The first charge was repulsed, but Brunswick reordered his command and launched a second charge; the first line was repulsed again but the second line succeeded in pushing back the Walloon Horse.

Brunswick turned then against the Spanish infantry, but his own infantry failed to adequately support the attack, the Tercio of Naples held its ground, and murderous enfilade fire from musketeers in the nearby woods sent the Protestant cavalry reeling back in disorder. In a desperate final charge, Brunswick was wounded, and his cavalry, demoralized, finally fell back. After five hours of fighting, Mansfeld ordered a general retreat. It was midday and he intended to take the road through Liege around Cordoba to reach Breda.

The Germans had lost some 5000 men in the fierce battle, the Spanish 1200. The Spanish army was too tired to pursue. However, next day, Cordoba sent Gauchier ahead with the cavalry; he found the Protestant army strung out along the road. The Protestant cavalry fled without putting up much of a fight, leaving the infantry to its fate. In march column, unable to deploy, the infantry was cut to pieces. Gauchier also captured the artillery and the army baggage. The Protestant army had been all but destroyed.

The Spanish victory was complete. Brunswick and Mansfeld's remnants, about 3000 cavalry, finally joined the Dutch army. Spinola was compelled to lift the siege of Bergen-op-Zoom, but as he was no longer in danger of being cut off, he was able to secure his siege train and his entire baggage train. Brunswick and Mansfeld served for only three months in Dutch pay; their unruly bands had no place in the disciplined Dutch army.

[Ennath]

August 30, 1933
Battle of Pampa Grande

After the repulse of the Bolivian offensives around Nanawa, the Paraguayans were ready to take the initiative with some tentative offensives themselves. It was necessary to keep the pressure on as Paraguay was virtually bankrupt and depended on captured enemy supplies to keep fighting.

The battles of August had forced the Bolivian high command to withdraw much of 9th Division at Alihuata, leaving the area with only scattered units. 700 men of the Chacaltaya regiment entrenched near Arce, astride the road from Alihuata, while the Ballivian regiment was deployed 3 miles to the left, in Pampa Grande.

The Paraguayan commander, Jose Felix Estigarribia, was aware of the weakness of the Bolivian deployment. Reconnaissance patrols learned of the weakness and isolation of the three outposts. On August 30, Paraguayan artillery pounded the trenches of the Chacaltaya regiment, while infantry assaulted the flanks. A small Bolivian detachment left Alihuata to relieve the Chacaltaya but failed to clear the way. Another strong detachment, consisting of the 18th Regiment, managed to evict the Paraguayans, securing the rear of the Chacaltaya. The Paraguayan command, however, was ready to repeat this maneuver.

General Hans von Kundt, commanding Bolivian forces, had left specific instructions that the Loa Regiment should not be used without his permission. Lieutenant Colonel David Toro, nominally as Chief of Operations of the High Command, but had no authority to take troops under his direct command. He received a distress message which said that the Chacaltaya was being surrounded again and that the Ballivian regiment wa also in danger. As Toro was trying to contact Kundt to obtain authorization to deploy the Loa regiment, the situation of the Ballivian and the Chacaltaya was deteriorating. Toro finally decided to move on his own. Upon learning of this, Kundt rebuked his Chief of Operations and traveled to Alihuata to meet the situation himself. Kundt assumed that the center of gravity of the Paraguayan offensive was the attack against the Chacaltaya Regiment. The truth was that the Paraguayan command, under Jose Felix Estigarribia, was committing very little strength there. On September 7, Paraguayan 1st Division pulled back to shorten the line, but this increased pressure on Bolivian 4th Division, as well as the 9th.

On the evening of the following day, Paraguayan 7th Division, in torrential rain and over muddy roads, launched its main assault on Bolivian 9th Division, forcing it backward.The Loa regiment joined with the Ballivian to extend the line and prevent a flanking move, but the Paraguayans extended their line as well, threatening to encircle the two units. On the 9th, Paraguayan 8th Division forced back Bolivian 4th near Campo Aceval, while 6th and 7th Divisions continued to pressure Bolivian 9th and, by the morning of September 11, had cut the road to the rear of Pampa Grande, completing the isolation of the Ballivian and Loa Regiments.

Despite tenacious and sustained counterattacks and constant harassment by the Bolivian Air Force, which had complete control of the skies, the Paraguayans, by the 14th, completed the isolation of both 4th and 9th Bolivian Divisions around Pampa Grande.

Ballivian's line was broken by a Paraguayan attack and even kitchen and courier staff had to be sent to close the gap. During the night the pressure remained constant. Scattered break-out attempts failed. Some aircraft were able to drop bags of coca to the defenders. On September 15, the third day of the siege, a hellish sun increased the thirst of the Bolivian troops. Four trucks had brought water shortly before the encirclement and it was carefully shared out to half a liter per day per person. Thirst prevented the soldiers eating the pieces of meat fed them; their dry throats didn't allow them to swallow.

By the morning of the 15th, small groups had begun to surrender and by nightfall, resistance in the pocket had ceased and 931 Bolivians went into captivity. The remainder of the trapped divisions, some 3340 men, managed to escape southwestward.

This battle, despite the small numbers engaged, marked a change of strategy for the Paraguayan army. Estigarribia, promoted Brigadier General in recognition of his victory, was unable to assess the operational capacity of the enemy army. It was easy to observe the slow and hesitant reactions of the Bolivian command, and the habit of sending reinforcements in small quantities where the situation was almost hopeless. It was also observed, in the prisoners taken, the growing demoralization of Bolivian troops and junior officers, who increasingly distrusted orders from their senior commanders. The Paraguayans would become bolder in future.

[Ennath]

August 31, 1951
Battle of the Punchbowl

Following the breakdown of armistice negotiations in August 1951, the United Nations Command decided to launch a limited offensive in the late summer/early autumn to shorten and straighten sections of their lines, acquire better defensive terrain, and deny the enemy key vantage points from which they could observe and target UN positions, forcing the enemy back to the negotiating table. 1st Marine Division was ordered to attack Yoke Ridge and advance to a new defensive line to be called the Hays Line marked by the southern edge of the Soyang River to the north of the Punchbowl. The sector was defended by North Korean (NKPA) II Corps. On August 30, in preparation for the attack, a battalion of 1st Korean Marine Regiment (1st KMC) occupied Hill 793 on the eastern edge of the Punchbowl between Line Kansas and Yoke Ridge.

At 0600 on August 31 7th Marines and two Battalions of 1st KMC launched the assault with an attack from Hill 793 up the eastern edge of the Punchbowl towards Yoke Ridge in the west and Tonpyong in the east. By late morning despite heavy rain and minefields, the assault units had reached Yoke Ridge and were engaging the NKPA defenders. By the end of the day, the US/ROK force occupied the southeastern end of Yoke. On September 1, 1st KMC moved west along Yoke Ridge while 7th Marines moved north, both assault groups clearing bunkers. The NKPA launched several small-scale counterattacks, but these were broken up. The US/ROK forces consolidated their positions in the evening under NKPA mortar and artillery fire. During the night, the NKPA launched a night attack on 1st KMC on Hill 924 driving them out of the position that they had secured earlier that day.

On the morning of September 2, supported by heavy artillery fire, 1st KMC recaptured Hill 924 and moved further west towards its next objective, Hill 1026. 3/7 Marines advanced towards Hill 602 through heavily-wooded terrain and seized the hill by 1430. The NKPA launched several company-sized counterattacks on Hill 602, all of which were beaten back. At 0400 on September 3, 1st KMC renewed their attack on Hill 1026, while 27 Marines assumed the defense of Hill 924. As they advanced, 1st KMC encountered a large NKPA force advancing towards Hill 924, forced it back and seized Hill 1026 by midday, beating back a counterattack and advancing northwest to seize Hill 1055 and west to take Hill 930, thus securing all of Yoke Ridge. Meanwhile to the west of the Punchbowl, ROK 35th Regiment, 5th Division advanced unopposed from Line Kansas to Hill 450 approximately 2 miles southwest of Hill 1026, while the US 2nd Infantry Division took Hill 1181 2½ miles southwest of Hill 930 against light resistance.

From September 4 to 10, the allies consolidated their positions on Yoke Ridge, established the Hays Line and built up ammunition and supplies for the second phase of the attack on Kanmubong Ridge. The Kanmubong Ridge was located immediately north of Yoke Ridge and it was considered essential to seize it on order to defend the Hays Line and to allow X Corps to attack the NKPA main line of resistance (MLR) which was believed to be located approximately 2 miles north of it. The NKPA used the lull to reinforce their positions on Hill 673 opposite Hill 602. The interim period saw active patrolling by both sides.

7th Marines received orders to launch an attack at 0300 on September 11 from the Hays Line through a narrow valley, across a tributary of the Soyang River and then uphill towards Hills 680 and 673, with Hill 749 as a further objective. Supporting the 7th Marines would be 1st Tank Battalion. 3/7 Marines was tasked with capturing Hill 680 and despite extensive artillery preparation, their advance proceeded slowly with the defenders able to providing interlocking fire from their bunkers; by the end of the day 3/7 Marines were forced to dig in some 300 feet south of the summit. 1/7 Marines was tasked with capturing Hill 673, but, faced with strong opposition from well-protected bunkers, was forced to stop short of its objective. During the night, 2/7 Marines moved to the rear of Hill 673, cutting off the NKPA on the hill and by 1400 on the 12th, Hill 673 had been secured. On the night of September 12-13, the 1st Marines relieved 1/7 and 3/7 Marines on Hill 673; 2/7 Marines could not be relieved as they were closely engaged on Hill 749 and so 2/1 Marines moved forward to relieve them the following day.

On September 13, 2/1 Marines were ordered to seize Hill 749 and then move northwest to Hills 812, 980, and 1052, while 3/1 Marines would move west from Hill 680 to take Hill 751 and then attack northwest to Hill 1052. Hill 749 proved to be a heavily defended maze of bunkers, covered trenches and tunnels and part of the MLR. 2/1 Marines seized the summit at 1210, but were soon driven back and finally gained control of the summit by 1500, but it would be 2025 before they could relieve 2/7 Marines on the reverse slope of the hill. 3/1 Marines' advance towards Hill 751 was delayed by mines and the more urgent needs for supporting arms on Hill 749, by the evening 3/1 Marines dug in short of Hill 751, where they endured mortar fire and 10 counterattacks during the night. September 13 saw the first operational use of Marine helicopters in combat as HRS-1 helicopters conducted 28 flights to resupply the Marines near Hill 793 and evacuate 74 casualties.

On September 14, the two Marine Battalions continued their assaults. 2/1 Marines had to clear bunkers in a wooded area to the north of Hill 749 before advancing along the ridgeline towards Hill 812. By 1530 the attack had bogged down in the face of flanking fire. 3/1 Marines, supported by accurate airstrikes, was able to seize most of Hill 751 by dusk, digging in and repulsing a counterattack at 2250. In the early morning of the 15th, 3/1 Marines fought off two counterattacks and Marine tanks subsequently destroyed 10 bunkers in front of Hill 751. 3/1 Marines on Hill 751 were ordered to hold for further orders while 2/1 Marines was ordered to continue clearing Hill 749. Delayed preparatory fire, limited air support, and a tenacious defense meant that 2/1 Marines were unable to make any appreciable gains by nightfall. That night, 5th Marine Regiment moved forward to relieve the 1st Marines and continue the assault on the Kanmubong Ridge.

At midnight on September 15-16, under cover of an intense barrage, NKPA 91st Regiment of 45th Division launched a major counterattack against Hill 749, continuing until 0400, but were repeatedly repulsed for few gains and heavy loss. At dawn 2/1 Marines resumed the assault, making slow progress against the NKPA dug in along the ridgeline. On Hill 751, 5th Marines were ordered to take Hills 812 and 980 and began their assault at 0830, but the assault made little progress in the face of machine gun and mortar fire. 3/5 Marines attacking towards Hill 980 had to pull back to their line of departure after 2 hours, while 2/5 Marines attcking towards Hill 812 were held up until 1700, but by 1900 had managed to secure ground southeast of Hill 812.

Orders for September 17 were to continue the previous day's assaults. A dawn artillery barrage caused significant casualties on the NKPA defenders who were eating in the open. 2/5 Marines advanced towards Hill 812 at 0700 making good progress until a mortar and artillery barrage came down on the recently captured positions; the Marines then had to advance slowly neutralizing bunkers one by one. By 1345 the summit of Hill 812 was secured, but the NKPA remained dug in on the reverse slope and had to be cleared out in close-quarters fighting. After securing Hill 812, 1/5 and 2/5 Marines began to assault west towards Hill 980 and the Marines made good progress against the unprepared defenders until reaching a granite point later named The Rock where heavy machine gun fire from bunkers in Hills 980 and 1052 stopped any further advance. The 5th Marines were then ordered to halt and dig in on the most defensible terrain. The previous day General Van Fleet had visited the 1st Marine Division CP and ordered X Corps to suspend all major operations after the 20th as further attacks along the Hays Line could no longer be justified and he wished to concentrate all of X Corps' fire support to conclude the Battle of Heartbreak Ridge.

On September 18, the Marines dug in and consolidated while the KPA launched several counterattacks and continued to fire from their dominating positions on Hills 980 and 1052. On the early morning of the 19th, the NKPA twice attacked 2/5 Marines' western outpost near The Rock, but stumbled into their own minefield, suffering serious losses. After midnight on the 20th, the NKPA launched an intense mortar and artillery barrage on the Marines between The Rock and Hill 812, at 0230 a company attacked past The Rock towards Hill 812 cutting off several outposts. The US artillery responded firing over 1600 rounds between 0240 and 0450. The Marines counterattacked at 0500 forcing the NKPA to withdraw and the Marines had reoccuppied their original positions by 0630. Also on that day, ROK 8th Infantry Division to the east was struggling to secure Hill 854. 1st Marines were ordered to assist, but the attack did not begin until 1730 and quickly bogged down in the face of well-defended bunkers. 1st Marines began to dig in at 1700 having gained only a small amount of ground. 3/1 Marines resumed the assault on Hill 854 the next day and by 1745 it had been secured. The battles had cost US forces 69 killed and 575 wounded, while the ROK troops lost 122 killed and 466 wounded. North Korean losses are estimated at 2375 killed and 4700 wounded.

The UN offensive in the Punchbowl area concluded on September 21; however the NKPA continued to probe the UN lines and fire on their positions. Following the conclusion of the Battle of Heartbreak Ridge to the west, UN forces consolidated their positions and the line of hills north of the Punchbowl formed part of the new frontline, now named the Minnesota Line. The failure to press on and capture Hills 980 and 1052 was viewed by many Marines as a tactical error as those heights overlooked the UN lines and numerous casualties resulted in the stalemate period that followed.

The NKPA captured Hill 812 from ROK 12th Division in June 1953. The Demilitarized Zone now runs along the line of hills captured by the UN forces in September 1951.

[Ennath]

September 1, 1979
Operation Uric

By 1979, the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF) had to deal with an increasing flow of externally trained insurgents coming into what was now Zimbabwe Rhodesia, from neighboring countries, especially from Mozambique, which had begun a program of integrating ZANLA and FRELIMO forces. The objectives of Operation Uric were to attack the ZANLA forces in their command and training center and to cut off supply routes into the Gaza Province of Mozambique, the main ZANLA staging area, opposite the area of Zimbabwe Rhodesia nicknamed “the Russian Front”. It was also hoped that the destruction of rail lines, roads and bridges as far as 200 miles into Mozambique would have an impact on the economic situation and the morale of those who supported ZANLA and Robert Mugabe. Targets were the bridges at Aldeia Da Barragem along with a vital irrigation canal feeding a major agricultural area in Mozambique. Air strikes were planned on FRELIMO installations in Mapai and Maxaila to demoralize the garrisons. Afterwards the base at Mapai would be taken and destroyed by Zimbabwe Rhodesian ground forces.

On September 1, 200 troops were deployed into an area 100 miles inside of Mozambique east-southeast of Chigubu. Helicopters were at Chipinda Pools airstrip within Zimbabwe Rhodesia. Mines were planted and the local Mozambican commanders were left confused as to the situation. The main attack began on September 5, delayed by bad weather. Rhodesian SAS troops were airlifted to Aldeia De Barragem and four other targets to destroy bridges and infrastructure. Hunter jets and Cessna Lynx’s provided air support. During evacuation of a wounded soldier one AB-205A helicopter was shot down by an RPG-7. On September 6, the base at Mapai was bombarded by Hunters, destroying the command center and the main radar station. Afterwards the Zimbabwe Rhodesian troops were transported by helicopter to attack positions near the base. During transport operations one South African Puma helicopter was hit by an RPG-7 killing all 14 commandos and the South African pilots. This was the highest loss of life for the Rhodesian Security Forces in a single incident during the war. The crash site was later bombed in an attempt to cover the South African markings on the Puma helicopter. The Mapai base was fortified by interconnecting zig-zag trenches which provided good cover for the defenders and heavy fighting followed. Mapai was repeatedly bombed by Hunters and Canberras. Shortly before sundown the decision to withdraw was taken by General Walls, the Rhodesian commander.

The battle resulted in over 400 dead ZANLA and FRELIMO fighters and a number of damaged bridges, buildings and infrastructure. Zimbabwe Rhodesian casualties were 25. Despite the achieved kill-ratio of over 15:1 the operation was not regarded as a success by the Zimbabwe Rhodesian military. It became obvious to the Rhodesian Security Forces that they would soon be technologically inferior to their enemies, who were well equipped by their Russian advisors. Zimbabwe Rhodesian soldiers were well trained and motivated, but international sanctions and isolation lead to increased problems in replacing aircraft, arms and ammunition.

Politically the operation lead to Mozambican dictator Samora Machel putting pressure on Robert Mugabe to take part in the Lancaster House peace talks. He wanted to prevent Mozambique from being dragged further into the war, which already had negative effects on its economy.

[rustler]

Following on from Ennaths above post, if anybody is interested......

There is an extremely interesting book about the troubles in Rhodesia at the time, and in particular about the armed conflict, called 'The Elite: The story of the Rhodesian Special Air Service'.

http://vintage-erotica-forum.com/sho...AS#post2707091

There is also a pictorial version of the book.


Vastly outnumbered, not too well equipped, isolated and up against Soviet trained and equipped troops, the Rhodesian SAS and the RLI, had an immense job on their hands.
The book is a fascinating one!

[Ennath]

September 2, 1898
Battle of Omdurman

In the mid 1890’s, concerned by increasing French and Italian interest in the Upper Nile, London decided that Egyptian authority should be restored in the area, now ruled by the turbulent Mahdist state. Horatio Herbert Kitchener, the new Sirdar (commander) of the Anglo-Egyptian Army, received his marching orders on March 12, 1896, and his forces entered Sudan on the 18th. Numbering at first 11 000 men, Kitchener's force was armed with the most modern military equipment of the time, including Maxim machine-guns and modern artillery, and was supported by a flotilla of gunboats on the Nile. Their advance was slow and methodical, with fortified camps built along the way, and two separate narrow gauge railways were hastily constructed from a station at Wadi Halfa. It was not until June 7, 1896, that the first serious engagement of the campaign occurred, when Kitchener led a 9000 strong force that wiped out the Mahdist garrison at Ferkeh.

By 1898, the main expedition was ready to complete the conquest. An expedition, commanded by Kitchener, was organized in Egypt. It was composed of 8200 British and 17,600 Egyptian and Sudanese soldiers. The Mahdist forces numbered more than 60 000 warriors, but lacked modern weapons. After defeating a Mahdist force in the Battle of Atbara in April 1898, the Anglo-Egyptians reached Omdurman, the Mahdist capital in September.

The battle took place at Kerreri, 7½ miles north of Omdurman. Kitchener arrayed his force behind a thorn zeriba in an arc around the village of Egeiga, close to the bank of the Nile, where a gunboat flotilla waited in support, facing a wide, flat plain with hills rising to the left and right. The British and Egyptian cavalry was placed on either flank. The Camel Corps and some Egyptian cavalry were sent to the Kerreri Hills, north of the position.

The Khalifa Abdullah's Ansar (sometimes referred to as Dervishes), were split into five groups – a force of 8000 under Osman Azrak was directly opposite the British, in a shallow arc along a mile of low ridge leading onto the plain, and the other Mahdist forces were initially concealed from Kitchener's force. Abdullah al-Taashi and 17,000 men were concealed behind the Surgham Hills to the west and rear of Osman Azrak's force, with 20,000 more positioned to the northwest, close to the front behind the Kerreri hills, commanded by Ali-Wad-Helu and Sheikh ed-Din. A final force of around 8000 was gathered on the slope on the right flank of Azrak's force.

The shelling of Omdurman by the British began on September 1. In the process of testing a new explosive called Lyddite, the Mahdi’s tomb was targeted and destroyed.

The battle began in the early morning of September 2,, at around 6:00. The Dervish army came on at a fast walk; the left, led by the bright green flag of Ali-Wad-Hedu, heading for the Kerreri Hills; the center, marching into the wide plain, and the right, swarming up the ridge around the eastern end of the Jebel Surgham. A few guns accompanied the Dervish center, and were the first weapons to open fire, throwing up clouds of sand short of the line of troops. The retaliation was immediate; a barrage from 4 of the Sirdar’s batteries at a range of 3000 yards. On the Dervish right, the division led by the red flag of Sherif advanced over the Jebel Surgham ridge, to be met by fire from the 32nd Field Battery, and the guns of the boats moored at the southern end of the line. The Dervishes hurried down the reverse face of the ridge, towards the British battalions on the left of the Sirdar’s line. Osman Sheikh ed Din led the left of the attacking force, against the northern end of the zariba, where the weakest Egyptian battalions were stationed.

While this attack was in progress, the Khalifa and his trusted deputy, Yakub, watched, with their 15,000 troops, from behind the Jebel Surgham, intending, if the frontal assault by Osman Azrak was successful, to emerge from their cover and join in. If unsuccessful, the Khalifa could withdraw to Omdurman, with his most reliable and important force intact, to fight again, or carry out some other stratagem.

Ali-Wad-Helu’s men, with their bright green flag, headed for the Kerreri Hills, with instructions to await the outcome of the fight in the plain and, if the Sirdar’s army advanced towards Omdurman, to emerge from the Kerreri Hills and attack the Sirdar’s army in the rear.

The hand to hand combat began in the Kerreri Hills, where Broadwood was positioned with the Egyptian cavalry on the western end of the hills, the Camel Corps next in the line and the Horse Artillery at the eastern end. The number of Dervishes attacking the Kerreri Hills, and the speed of their advance, made it necessary for the mounted troops to retreat with some urgency. The Camel Corps suffered particular difficulty, as camels are unable to move swiftly across rocky hills, with their soft padded feet. The Camel Corps reached the northern end of the zariba, and were saved from the pursuing Dervishes by a barrage of gunfire from the gunboats moored at that end of the camp. While the Camel Corps moved east to the river, Broadwood’s cavalry and the horse artillery continued north.

The Sirdar sent Broadwood an order for the cavalry to move into the zariba, but Broadwood chose to continue the withdrawal of the cavalry and horse artillery to the north of the Kerreri Hills, thereby drawing Ali-Wad-Helu’s menacing force away from the vulnerable northern end of the zariba. As his cavalry withdrew north, squadrons, in turn, halted and gave dismounted fire at the pursuing Dervishes. In this way Broadwood lured Ali-Wad-Helu’s force 3 miles away to the north, while the main Dervish attack went in, thereby performing a valuable service. The 2 gunboats, after covering the Camel Corps’ escape into the zariba, sailed north, and fired in support of Broadwood, until the Dervishes withdrew west into the desert, out of range, whereupon Broadwood returned to the main camp, with the gunboats resuming their original positions.

In the central plain, the division led by the white flags came down from the Jebel Surgham ridge, and joined the main body advancing on the zariba, making an attacking Dervish force of around 20,000 warriors. As the range shortened, infantry small arms fire all along the British and Egyptian line joined the artillery and Maxim barrage, inflicting heavy casualties on the advancing Dervishes. Dervish casualties were particularly heavy in the attack against the 2 British brigades, armed with magazine Lee-Metford rifles, and supported by Maxims and the gunboats. The Dervish attack here came to a halt 800 yards from the zariba, with the Dervishes lying down in the sand and, where armed with rifles, returning fire. The Dervish attack against the Sudanese and Egyptian battalions managed to get within 300 yards before being halted. The leader, Osman Azrak, rode on until he was shot. The attack all across the plain was at a halt by 8:00, and the Dervish soldiers melting away back across the plain after about 4000 casualties.

Kitchener was anxious to occupy Omdurman before the remaining Mahdist forces could withdraw there. He advanced his army, deploying in separate columns for the attack. The British light cavalry, the 21st Lancers, was sent ahead to clear the plain to Omdurman. The 400-strong regiment attacked what they thought were only a few hundred dervishes, but in fact there were 2500 infantry hidden behind them in a depression. After a fierce clash, the Lancers drove them back (resulting in three Victoria Crosses being awarded). Meanwhile, the Khalifa to reorganized his forces. He still had over 30,000 men in the field and directed his main reserve to attack from the west while ordering the forces to the northwest to attack simultaneously over the Kerreri Hills.

Kitchener's force wheeled left in echelon to advance up Surgham ridge and then southwards. To protect the rear, a brigade of 3000 mainly Sudanese, commanded by Hector MacDonald, was reinforced with Maxims and artillery and followed the main force at around 1300 yards. Curiously, the supplies and wounded around Egeiga were left almost unprotected. MacDonald was alerted to the presence of around 15,000 enemy troops moving towards him from the west, out from behind Surgham. He wheeled his force and lined them up to face the enemy charge. The Mahdist infantry attacked in two prongs and MacDonald was forced to repeatedly reorder his battalions. The brigade maintained a punishing fire. MacDonald's brigade was soon reinforced and the Mahdist forces were forced back; they finally broke and fled or died where they stood. The Mahdist forces to the north had regrouped too late and entered the clash only after the force in the central valley had been routed. They pressed Macdonald's Sudanese hard, but the Lincolnshire Regiment was quickly brought up and with sustained section volleys repulsed the advance. A final desperate cavalry charge of around 500 horsemen was utterly destroyed. The march on Omdurman was resumed at about 11:30.

The Sirdar’s force then turned its attention to the city of Omdurman. Entrance was gained by the gate on the eastern side, and the several holes blown in the walls by the riverboat and howitzer bombardment. The Khalifa ordered his beaten army to hold the city, but this instruction was largely ignored, the Dervishes bypassing Omdurman, and carrying on south towards their homes. Realizing that he did not have the force to hold the city, the Khalifa left Omdurman on a donkey with a handful of attendants, and headed south.

Around 9700 Mahdists were killed, 12,000 wounded and 5,000 taken prisoner. Kitchener's force lost 47 men killed and 382 wounded, the majority from MacDonald's command. Controversy over wounded Mahdists killed after the battle began soon afterwards. Churchill, present as a war correspondent and riding with the 21st Lancers, thought Kitchener was too brutal in his killing of the wounded. The Khalifa escaped and survived until 1899, when he was killed in the Battle of Umm Diwaykarat.

[Ennath]

September 3, 401 BC
Battle of Cunaxa

In the year 404 BC, as Persian ruler Darius II lay dying, his wife pleaded with him to give the throne to his second son – called Cyrus the Younger – but Darius refused. As a result, Artaxerxes II became the new Persian monarch. In revenge, Cyrus plotted to assassinate his brother at the coronation, but was arrested beforehand. However, Cyrus was not executed, on the intervention of his mother. He was instead pardoned and returned to the Anatolian satrapies (provinces) of Lydia, Phrygia Major, and Cappadocia, essentially being banished from his brother's presence at Babylon (which had become the administrative capital of the empire during the reign of Artaxerxes I, the grandfather of Artaxerxes II). Cyrus almost immediately began fomenting his rebellion, using the resources of his governorships to gain the Persian throne.

In the spring of 401, Cyrus had completed his preparations, and left the city of Sardis and marched east. He marched his army through southern Asia Minor, across Syria, and into Mesopotamia. In late August, as his force approached the capital, Cyrus received reports that his brother's army was marching to meet him. Cyrus's army was near the town of Cunaxa on the eastern bank of the EuphratesRiver and 50 miles north of Babylon. A large plain nearby was the perfect place for a pitched battle.

Cyrus placed the Greek mercenaries (10,400 hoplites and 2500 peltasts under the Spartan Clearchos) on the right, near the river. To the Greeks, this was the place of honor. They were supported on their right by some cavalry, 1000 strong, as was the tradition of battle order in that day. Cyrus himself with 600 bodyguards was in the center, to the left of the Greek mercenaries - the place where Persian monarchs traditionally placed themselves in the order of battle. Cyrus' Asiatic troops were on the left flank. This was a fairly large force of levied troops under his second-in-command Ariaios. Finally, the rebel camp, with its supplies and camp followers, was perhaps a mile in the rear, guarded by a small contingent of Greek soldiers.

Inversely, Artaxerxes II placed his left on the river, with a unit of cavalry supporting it also. Artaxerxes was in the center of his line, with 6000 cavalry, which was to the left of Cyrus, his line being so much the longer. Artaxerxes line overlapped Cyrus' line significantly, since he was able to field many more troops. On the right and left flanks were large numbers of various levy infantry, most from the central and eastern satrapies of the empire. They were mostly light infantry, with two small bodies of archers placed in the rear of the army, either as a reserve or as a rear security force. Accompanying these bowmen were two units of light horsemen, perhaps house archers. Finally, on the far left flank, there was a small cavalry contingent under the command of Tissaphernes, a successful general and statesman. The great King had about 40,000 men, including 20 scythed chariots.

While the rebel army was organizing its line, Cyrus approached Clearchos and ordered him to move into the center so as to go after Artaxerxes. However, Clearchus, fearing for his right flank, refused, and promised Cyrus, according to Xenophon, that he would "take care that all would be well". Cyrus wanted to place him in the center as the Greeks were his most capable force, and most able to defeat the elite Persian cavalry and in the process kill the Great King. That Clearuchus did not obey this order is a sign of the lack of control that Cyrus had over his army, as a couple of other occasions throughout this campaign prior to the battle reveal also.

Before the final attack began, Xenophon, the main relator of the events at Cunaxa, who was probably at the time some kind of mid-level officer, approached Cyrus to ensure that all the proper orders and dispositions had been made. Cyrus told him that they had, and that the sacrifices that traditionally took place before a battle promised success.

At about 2:30 PM, the entire Imperial army began a slow march forward. Shortly thereafter, the rebel left also moved toward the Imperial battle line, with Prince Cyrus's horsemen staying close to the right division. The two armies were about a mile apart.

At 3:00, the rebel right wing finally began to move forward. The Greek mercenaries covered half the distance to advancing Imperial army in a little less than half-an-hour. Seeing the inexorable advance of the hoplites, the entire Imperial infantry – both right and left flanks – turned and ran without striking a single blow, carrying the bow and horse archer units with them. The infantry's panic apparently carried over to the horses of the chariots and these scattered, many going into their own troops. A few of these chariots headed into the hoplite array; fortunately, the Greek officers ordered their men to open ranks, and the chariots penetrated the formation but inflicted no casualties.

However, two units in the Imperial army did not join the general rout - the cavalry unit under Tissaphernes, and the bodyguard King Artaxerxes. As the Imperial infantry began retreating, Tissaphernes kept his horsemen under control, and in fact slipped around the Greek flank. This unit headed for the rear of the rebel army, fought a sharp battle with the Greek peltasts, made a beeline for the rebel camp, and began to loot it.

At the same time, King Artaxerxes ordered his bodyguard cavalry forward, seeing an opportunity to skirt the rebel right flank and attack the Greeks in the rear. At the same moment, Prince Cyrus saw his brother's advance, took his own retinue and charged into the king's personal entourage. Even though Cyrus was outnumbered 10 to 1, he felt his only real chance to win was to personally kill his brother. A short, bloody fight ensued. Cyrus's horsemen fought desperately, penetrating the king's bodyguards and giving the prince a chance. During this fight, a member of Artaxerxes's unit named Mithradates mortally wounded Cyrus with a javelin. With the death of their leader, the prince's cavalry scattered and routed to the rear. Rather than follow the fleeing rebels, Artaxerxes and his cavalry charged into the rebel camp and joined Tissaphernes. Shortly after this, the Greek camp guards attacked the Imperial horse, limiting the looting and temporarily driving the enemy away.

It was now about 4:30 and Artaxerxes and his escort began riding back toward the battle. However, the Persian king saw that his army was still in flight, so he ordered his own horse and those under Tissaphernes to ride back to the fighting. When the Imperial infantry saw their monarch returning to the fight, they immediately began to reform.

Meanwhile, the Greek hoplite phalanx continued its forward movement, by this point probably breaking into a faster pace. Soon, the Greek heavy infantry impacted the Imperial left, with devastating force. Very soon, all Persian resistance collapsed a second time, with the entire Imperial army fleeing. This included King Artaxerxes and his cavalry.

The king and Tissaphernes moved southward and took temporary refuge on a small hill. Recognizing the Imperial standard, Clearchos ordered a pursuit. The hoplites arrived at the base of the hill, debating on whether to attack or to try and surround the hill. By this point, it was nearing sundown and most of the Greeks were tired. Artaxerxes saw his opening, and ordered a retreat.

Casualty figures for this conflict are non-existent. The only parts of the rebel army which suffered losses were likely the Greeks and Prince Cyrus's mounted guards. The Imperial army likely suffered equally minimal casualties, considering that most of their infantry ran from the fight – twice.

The Greeks were convinced that they had won the battle. It wasn't until the next day that they learned that Prince Cyrus was dead and the rest of the rebel army scattered. Realizing they were without supplies, and stranded deep in enemy territory, the Greek leaders sought a new plan of action. Shortly afterwards, Clearchos and his senior officers were invited to a feast hosted by Tissaphernes. Thinking that they might be offered either employment with the Persian army or passage back to Greece, the officers went to the meeting. Unfortunately, it was a trap. The Greek officers were seized and executed. This left the mercenaries without their leadership. Upon learning the fate of their superiors, the junior officers – among them Xenophon – decided they would march out of the Persian Empire and take ships to their homes. Their march through deserts and mountains, fighting almost the entire way, from the heart of the Achaemenid lands to the Black Sea was the basis for Xenophon's classic work, Anabasis.