The Military History Thread

[Reclaimedwg]

Originally Posted by bubbs999

February 19th, 1943
US Marines launch invasion of Japanese island of Iwo Jima

1943 or 1945?

[bubbs999]

Originally Posted by wildtig2013

1943 or 1945?

1945 - typo - corrected : my bad

[Ennath]

February 19, 1915
Attack on the Dardanelles

In October 1914, the Ottomans closed the Dardanelles to Allied shipping. This decision seems to have been taken by German military advisors stationed in the Dardanelles without reference to the Ottoman government. On October 28, the Ottoman fleet attacked Russian bases in the Black Sea (see posting, Black Sea Raid). Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire on November 2, and the British followed suit on November 6. An unsuccessful Ottoman attack on Russia through the Caucasus Mountains was launched in December (see posting, Battle of Sarikamish), leading the Russians to call for aid from Britain.

Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, had entertained plans of capturing the Dardanelles as early as September 1914. In a new year review submitted to Prime Minister Asquith, he had outlined 2 possible new fronts, intended to break the stalemate that had settled over France. The first was an invasion of Schleswig-Holstein by sea, prompting Denmark to join the allies and give Russia a supply route via the Baltic sea. The other was an attack on the Dardanelles, which again would give Russia a supply route and might encourage Bulgaria and Romania to join the allies. The Russian plea for assistance, coupled with a perception of the Ottomans as a weak enemy, made the prospect of a campaign in the Dardanelles seem appealing.

On November 3, 1914, even before the declaration of war, 2 British battlecruisers under Vice-Adm. Sackville Carden, commander of the Mediterranean Fleet, accompanied by 2 French pre-dreadnoughts, tested the Ottoman defenses. The results were deceptively encouraging. In a 20-minute bombardment, a single shell struck the magazine of the fort at Sedd el Bahr at the tip of the Gallipoli peninsula, displacing 10 guns and killing 86 soldiers. The most significant consequence was that the attention of the Ottomans was drawn to strengthening their defenses, and they set about expanding the mine fields.

A purely naval bombardment of the Straits had long been recognized in naval circles as a difficult undertaking. In 1907, a British study had concluded that an attack was feasible only by a combined naval/ground undertaking. However Churchill, impatient for action, demanded that Carden provide him with a proposal for a naval-only offensive. Carden obliged - although without appending a personal endorsement - and it was this plan that Churchill brought to the British War Cabinet in mid-January 1915.

Carden's recognized that simple bombardment of the Turkish fortresses was impractical. For one thing, naval guns could not be expected to achieve the necessary steep trajectory required to knock out the forts. He proposed instead that the outer guns should first be neutralized via long-range fire, the battleships out of effective range of the fortresses. This accomplished, an Allied fleet would progress further up the Straits (to the Narrows) to enable medium-range guns to destroy shore batteries while minesweepers cleared minefields. The final phase envisaged the destruction of the inner forts. Success would provide a path to Constantinople, knocking Turkey out of war. Grave problems remained. Even should the naval bombardment be successful the absence of ground troops would keep the British from command of the shorelines - and in the absence of supplies from shore the fleet would necessarily have to return home to refuel and restock. Nevertheless the plan was approved by the War Cabinet at the end of January.

Meanwhile the French government was reluctant to cede the possibility of a purely British success in the Mediterranean. Ignoring professional advice Navy Minister Jean Augagneur committed 4 French pre-dreadnoughts to the British fleet. He further came to an understanding with Churchill that should the expedition give signs of failure the ‘demonstration’ would be abandoned without loss of prestige.

The combined fleet consisted of the new battleship Queen Elizabeth, 3 battlecruisers, 16 pre-dreadnoughts (including 4 French), 4 cruisers, 18 destroyers, 6 submarines, 21 trawlers plus the seaplane carrier Ark Royal. Overseeing the effort was Carden. The Dardanelles were defended by a system of fortified and mobile artillery arranged as the Outer, Intermediate and Inner defenses. While the outer defenses lay at the entrance to the straits and would prove vulnerable to bombardment and raiding, the other defenses covered the Narrows, the narrowest point of the straits near Çanakkale. Beyond the inner defenses, the straits were virtually undefended. However, the foundation of the straits defenses was a series of 10 minefields near the Narrows and containing a total of 370 mines.

The attack began at 0730 on February 19, 1915. 2 destroyers were sent in to probe the straits. The pre-dreadnoughts Cornwallis and Vengeance moved in to engage the forts. The day's bombardment lacked the spectacular results of the November 3 test. Pounding the outer fortresses at Cape Helles and Kum Kale from long-range the attack proved ineffective in the face of an efficient defensive system and poor Allied gunnery, although greater damage was inflicted than the bombarding forces realized. Unbeknown to the Allies the Turkish defenders were also critically short of ammunition.

A renewed bombardment from closer range (following a pause for bad weather), on February 25, was similarly unsuccessful. This time the Ottomans evacuated the outer defenses and the fleet entered the straits to engage the intermediate defenses. Demolition parties of Royal Marines raided the Sedd el Bahr and Kum Kale forts, meeting little opposition. However, the Allied force could not effective silence the 24 mobile batteries that poured shellfire from the heights and served as highly effective protection for the elaborate minefield defenses. There was a further bombardment on March 1.

Without neutralizing the minefield the fleet could not move forward: and without destroying the mobile batteries the minefields were adequately protected. The minesweepers, commanded by Carden’s chief of staff, Roger Keyes, were merely un-armored trawlers manned by civilian crews unwilling to work under fire. The strong current in the straits further hampered the sweeping process. This lack of progress strengthened Ottoman resolve which had wavered at the start of the offensive. On March 4, raids on the outer defenses were resisted, leaving 23 marines dead.

Queen Elizabeth was called on to engage the inner defenses, at first from the Aegean coast near Gaba Tepe, firing across the peninsula, and later from within the straits. On the night of March 13, the cruiser Amethyst led 6 minesweepers in an attempt to clear the mines; 4 of the trawlers were hit and Amethyst badly damaged. On March 15, Carden was taken ill (perhaps a nervous breakdown) and had to be replaced by John de Robeck. De Robeck had already expressed misgivings with the likelihood of being able to silence the Ottoman guns by bombardment. Churchill, however, was losing patience and urged one more effort.

The event that decided the battle took place on the night of March 8 when the Ottoman minelayer Nusret laid a new line of mines in Eren Köy Bay, a wide bay along the Asian shore just inside the entrance to the straits. The Ottomans had noticed the British ships turned to starboard into the bay when withdrawing. The clear water meant that the mines could have been seen through the water by spotter planes.

The British plan for March 18 was to silence the defenses guarding the first 5 minefields, which would be cleared overnight by the minesweepers. The next day the remaining defenses around the Narrows would be defeated and the last minefields would be cleared. The operation went ahead without the allies being aware of the recent additions to the Ottoman minefields.

The battleships were arranged in 3 lines, 2 British and 1 French, with supporting ships on the flanks and 2 ships in reserve. The first line opened fire about 1100. Shortly after noon, de Robeck ordered the 2nd (French) line to pass through and close on the Narrows forts. The Ottoman fire began to take its toll with Gaulois, Suffren, Agamemnon and Inflexible all suffering hits. While the naval fire had not destroyed the Ottoman batteries, it had succeeded in temporarily reducing their fire. By 1325, the Ottoman defenses were mostly silent so de Robeck decided to withdraw the French line and bring forward the 3rd line.

But the Allied forces had failed to properly reconnoiter and sweep the area. Aerial reconnaissance from Ark Royal had discovered a number of mines but failed to spot the line laid by Nusret. Trawlers sweeping in front of line A discovered and destroyed 3 mines in an area thought to be clear, before the crews withdrew under fire. This information was not passed on to de Robeck. At 1354, Bouvet, having made a turn to starboard into Eren Köy Bay, struck a mine, capsized and sank within a couple of minutes, killing 639 crew. Around 1600, Inflexible began to withdraw and struck a mine near where Bouvet went down, killing 30. The battlecruiser remained afloat and eventually reached Tenedos. Irresistible was the next to be mined. As she began to drift helplessly, the crew were taken off. De Robeck told Ocean to take Irresistible under tow but the water was deemed too shallow to make an approach. Finally at 1805, Ocean struck a mine which jammed the steering gear leaving her likewise helpless. The abandoned battleships were still floating when the British withdrew. A destroyer commanded by Commodore Roger Keyes returned later to attempt either to tow away or sink the stricken vessels but despite searching for four hours, there was no sign of them.

De Robeck advised on March 20 that he was reorganizing his minesweepers, suggesting he intended to resume the attack, and Churchill responded that he was sending 4 replacement ships. With the exception of Inflexible, the ships that were lost or damaged were old, ill-equipped for modern combat and had been chosen for the expedition precisely because they were expendable. The crews of the sunken ships replaced the civilians aboard the sweeping trawlers. The US Ambassador to Constantinople, Henry Morgenthau, reported that the Ottomans felt they could only hold out for a few hours if the attack had resumed. Further, he thought that Turkey itself might well disintegrate once the capital fell. However, the main minefields at the Narrows were still fully intact and well protected by the smaller shore guns that had not seen any action on March 18. These and other defenses further in the strait had not exhausted their ammunition and resources yet. It was not a given that one more push by the fleet would have resulted in a passage to the Sea of Marmara.

With the failure of the naval assault, the idea that land forces could advance around the backs of the Dardanelles forts and capture Constantinople gained support as an alternative. On April 25, the army launched the Gallipoli Campaign.

[Ennath]

February 20, 1945
Battles of Meiktila & Mandalay

On September 1, 1944, Lt-Gen. Hyotaro Kimura was appointed commander of the Burma Area Army. Japanese losses in Burma in 1944 had been catastrophic. They were replaced with conscripts, many not of the best physical categories, They lacked anti-tank weapons. To face Allied armor, they would be forced to deploy their field artillery at the front, which would affect their ability to give fire support to the infantry. Expedients such as lunge mines (an explosive charge on the end of a long pole) or suicide attacks by men wearing explosive charges were not effective if enemy tanks were supported by infantry. 5th Air Division had been reduced to only a few dozen aircraft to face 1200 Allied aircraft. 14th Tank Regiment possessed only 20 tanks. Kimura therefore intended that while 28th Army defended coastal Arakan, relying on the difficult terrain to slow the Allies, and 33rd Army continued to fight rearguards in the north, 15th Army would withdraw behind the Irrawaddy River. He hoped that the Allies would be overstretched trying to overcome this obstacle, perhaps to the point where the Japanese might even attempt a counteroffensive.

South East Asia Command had begun making plans to reconquer Burma as early as June 1944. After rejecting options in the north and Arakan, the plan adopted was for an offensive into Central Burma by British 14th Army under Lt-Gen. William Slim, to reconquer Burma from the north. In support of this offensive, Indian XV Corps would advance in Arakan. The American-led Northern Combat Area Command, mainly Chinese troops, would continue its advance to link up with Chinese armies attacking from Yunnan province and thus complete the Ledo Road linking China and India.

The advancing troops would need to be supplied over crude roads stretching for far greater distances than encountered in Europe. Although expedients such as locally constructed river transport and temporary all-weather coverings for roads (made from coarse hessian sacking impregnated with bitumen and diesel oil) were to be used, transport aircraft were to be vital for supplying the forward units. 14th Army required 7000 transport sorties every day during the maximum intensity of the fighting.

At this stage of the war, few British infantry reinforcements were available. In spite of expedients such as drafting AA gunners into infantry units, the strength of British units was dropping, and Indian and Gurkha units were increasingly to bear the brunt of the actions which followed.

As the monsoon season ended in late 1944, 14th Army had established 2 bridgeheads across the Chindwin River. Based on past Japanese actions, Slim assumed that the Japanese would fight in the Shwebo Plain, as far forward as possible between the Chindwin and Irrawaddy. On November 29, British IV Corps opened its advance from the northern bridgehead at Sittaung and on December 4, Indian XXXIII Corps attacked out of the southern bridgehead at Kalewa. Both corps made rapid progress, with little opposition. Slim realized that his earlier assumption that the Japanese would fight forward of the Irrawaddy was incorrect. As only one of IV Corps’ divisions had been committed, he was able to make major changes to his plan. IV Corps, strengthened by the army’s reserve divisions, was switched from the left flank to its right. Its task was to advance down the Gangaw Valley, cross the Irrawaddy near Pakokku and seize the vital logistic and communication center of Meiktila by a rapid armored thrust. During January, Indian 19th and British 2nd Divisions cleared Shwebo, while Indian 20th Division had a hard battle to take Monywa, a major river port on the east bank of the Chindwin. The Japanese rearguards were largely destroyed. Meanwhile, IV Corps began its advance down the Gangaw Valley. To conceal as long as possible the advance of 7th Indian Division, which was to launch the assault across the Irrawaddy, was screened by the East African 28th Brigade and the improvised Lushai Brigade.

19th Indian Division had slipped units across narrow stretches of the Irrawaddy at Thabeikkyin on January 14 and Kyaukmyaung 20 miles south (40 miles north of Mandalay) the next day. They faced a stiff fight for some weeks against attempts by the reinforced Japanese 15th Division to eliminate their bridgeheads. The crossings downstream, where the river was much wider, would require more preparation. The assault boats, ferries and other equipment for the task were in short supply and much of this equipment was worn out, having already seen service in other theaters.

Slim planned for 20th Division of XXXIII Corps and 7th Division of IV Corps to cross simultaneously on February 13, so as to further mask his intentions. 20th Division crossed 20 miles west of Mandalay. It successfully established small bridgeheads, but these were counterattacked nightly for almost 2 weeks by Japanese 31st Division. Eventually 20th Division expanded its footholds into a single firmly-held bridgehead.

In IV Corps sector, it was vital for 7th Division to seize the area around Pakokku and establish a firm bridgehead quickly. The area was defended by Japanese 72nd Mixed Brigade and units of the 2nd Division of the Indian National Army (INA). Japanese 214th Regiment held a bridgehead at Pakokku. The crossing by 7th Division (delayed for 24 hours to repair the assault boats), was made on a wide front. 28th East African Brigade made a feint towards Yenangyaung. However, both the main attack at Nyaungu and a secondary crossing at Pagan were initially disastrous. These were defended by 2 battalions of the INA 4th Guerrilla Regiment. Eventually, support from tanks firing across the river and massed artillery allowed reinforcements to cross. The next day, the remaining defenders were sealed into a network of tunnels. The defenders surrendered. The bridgehead was strengthened. 17th Division sallied from the Nyaungu bridgehead on February 20 and reached Taungtha, halfway to Meiktila, by the 24th. To further distract Japanese attention from this area, British 2nd Division began crossing the Irrawaddy only 10 miles west of Mandalay on February 23. This crossing also threatened to be a disaster due to leaky boats and faulty engines, but one brigade crossed successfully and the other brigades crossed into its bridgehead.

A Japanese high-level staff meeting took place in Meiktila to discuss the possibility of a counterattack north of the Irrawaddy. The Japanese command was undoubtedly surprised by the attack. An agitated officer on Mount Popa signaled that 2000 vehicles were moving on Meiktila. Staff at Burma Area Army assumed this to be a mistake and deleted one of the zeroes, thinking that the attack was merely a raid. Burma Area Army had also ignored an earlier air reconnaissance report of a vast column of vehicles moving down the Gangaw Valley. By the 26th, the size of threat was clearer and the Japanese began preparing Meiktila for defense. The town lay between lakes, constricting any attackers' front. The defenders numbered about 4000 and consisted of the bulk of Japanese 168th Regiment, and line of communication troops. While they attempted to dig-in, 17th Division captured an airstrip 20 miles to the northwest at Thabutkon. The air-portable Indian 99th Brigade was flown in and fuel was dropped by parachute for the armored brigade. On February 28, 17th Division attacked Meiktila from 3 sides. In spite of desperate resistance, the town fell in less than 4 days. Although the Japanese had plenty of artillery, they were unable to concentrate their fire sufficiently to stop any single attacking brigade. Japanese communications to the south were now threatened.

The Japanese troops hastening to reinforce Meiktila were dismayed to find that they now had to recapture the town. They comprised 18th and 49th Divisions, 4th Regiment, and Mori Special Force, a battalion-sized raider group. Many of the Japanese regiments were already weak after heavy combat. They numbered perhaps 12,000 men in total, with 70 guns. The divisions had no contact with each other, and lacked information, and even proper maps. In Meiktila, Indian 17th Division mustered 15,000 men, about 100 tanks and 70 guns, and were to be further reinforced during the battle. Even as the Japanese arrived, columns of motorized Indian infantry and tanks sallied out of Meiktila and attacked concentrations of Japanese troops, while attempting to clear a land route back to Nyaungu. There was hard fighting for several villages and other strong points. The attempt to clear the roads failed, and 17th Division withdrew into Meiktila.

The first attacks by 18th Division from the north and west failed, with heavy losses. From March 12 onwards, they attacked the airfields east of the town, through which the defenders were supplied by air. 9th Indian Brigade was flown in from the 15th to reinforce the defenders. The Japanese fought their way steadily closer to the airfields and from March 18, landings were suspended and supplies were dropped by parachute. Meanwhile, on March 12, Kimura had ordered Lt-Gen. Masaki Honda, commanding 33rd Army, to take command of the battle for Meiktila. Honda’s HQ staff took control on March 18, but without their signal units, they could not coordinate the attacking divisions properly.

While Meiktila was besieged, Indian 7th Division was engaged in battles to maintain its own bridgehead, capture the important river port of Myingyan, and assist 28th East African Brigade against counterattacks on the west bank of the Irrawaddy. 7th Division also faced the task of reopening the lines of communication to the besieged 17th Division through the 2 roads that ran through the region and was forced to call off the attack on Myingyan. Around the middle of March, the leading motorized brigade of Indian 5th Division reinforced them, and began clearing the Japanese and INA from their strongholds in and around Mt Popa to clear the land route to Meiktila. Once contact was established with Meiktila, 7th Division resumed the attack on Myingyan, which was captured in heavy fighting on March 18-22. As soon as it was captured, the port and the Myingyan-Meiktila railway were brought back into use for supply vessels using the Chindwin.

During late January, Indian 19th Division had cleared the west bank of the Irrawaddy, and transferred its entire strength into its bridgeheads on the east bank. By the middle of February, Japanese 15th Division opposed to them was very weak and thinly spread, and the division attacked southwards from the bridgeheads in mid-February. By March 7, leading units were within sight of Mandalay Hill. Lt-Gen. Seiei Yamamoto, commanding 15th Division, was opposed to defending the city, but received uncompromising orders to defend Mandalay to the death. Kimura was concerned about the loss of prestige should the city be abandoned. Also, there were still large supply dumps south of the city, which could not be moved but which the Japanese could not afford to abandon. 4/4th Gurkha Rifles stormed Mandalay Hill on the night of March 8. Several Japanese held out in tunnels and bunkers underneath the pagodas, and were eliminated over the next few days, although most of the buildings survived substantially intact. Fighting its way further into the city, 19th Division was stopped by the thick walls of Ft Dufferin (as the ancient citadel was named by the British), ringed by a moat. Medium artillery and bombs dropped from low altitude failed to make much impression and an assault via a railway tunnel near the the north and west walls was driven back. An attempt was made to breach the walls by “skip bombing”, using 2000 lb bombs, but this created a breach only 15 feet wide. 19th Division prepared to make another assault via the sewers on March 21, but before the assault could be made, the Japanese abandoned the fort.

Elsewhere, 20th Indian Division launched an attack south from its bridgehead. Japanese 31st Division facing them had been weakened by casualties and detachments to the fighting elsewhere and was thrown into disorder. A tank regiment and a recon regiment from 20th Division, grouped as Claudecol, drove almost as far south as Meiktila, before turning north against the rear of the Japanese facing the bridgeheads. British 2nd Division also broke out of its bridgehead and attacked Mandalay from the west. By the end of March, Japanese 15th Army had been reduced to uncoordinated remnants trying to move south to regroup in the Shan States.

On March 28, Kimura's Chief of Staff conferred with Honda. Honda's staff told him that the army had destroyed about 50 British and Indian tanks. In doing so, the army had suffered 2500 casualties and lost 50 guns, and had only 20 artillery pieces left. The chief of staff accepted the responsibility of ordering Honda's army to break off the siege of Meiktila and prepare to resist further Allied advances south. It was already too late. The defeat of the Japanese at Meiktila and Mandalay was decisive, with the Japanese suffering heavy casualties and losing valuable heavy equipment. Politically, the defeat also dealt the Japanese great damage. The fall of Mandalay, a cultural center of Burma, turned Burmese national opinion against the Japanese, while losing the river and road network north of Meiktila meant that Japanese forces in northern Burma were now effectively cut off from the sources of supply generally coming from the Rangoon area. The number of attacks by Burmese guerilla on Japanese troops surged. Shortly, even the Burmese regulars of the Japanese-sponsored puppet republic would turn their guns on the Japanese.

[Ennath]

816
Battle of Pancorbo

The Umayyad Emirate of Cordoba was engulfed in conflict as Al-Hakam I (r. 796-822) fought against the pretensions of his uncles Sulayman and Abd-Allah ibn Abd-ar-Rahman who had rebelled on the death of Hisham I. The disorder was exploited by the Franks who in 798, convened an assembly under William of Gellone for the purpose of assisting Alfonso II of Asturias and Bahlul ibn Marzuq, a rebel in Zaragosa. Their goal was to coordinate operations to take the Upper March (roughly the Ebro Valley) in the name of King Louis the Pious. However, for some reason it did not come off, and the Kingdom of Asturias launched attacks on Lisbon in 797. Velasco, a Basque leader, rebelled and took over Pamplona in 798, but William of Orange and Louis the Pious launched an expedition to conquer Barcelona later in 801.

The Andalusians, commanded by Muawiya ibn al-Hakam, son of the emir, attacked Castile in 801, crossing the Ebro and the pass of Las Conchas. They were surprised by Velasco, possibly sent by Sancho I of Gascony. This surprise attack at La Puebla de Arganzon resulted in a complete rout of the Muawiya, who was obliged to return to Cordoba (Qurtuba) after most of his best commanders and a large part of his army were wiped out.

In 803, Basque troops and members of the Banu Qasi, ruler of the Ebro region, attacked and took control of Tutila, capturing Yusuf ibn Amrus, although the city and its municipality were later retaken for Cordoba by his father, Amrus ibn Yusuf. By 806, Pamplona and the western Basque territories fell again into the hands of Velasco, now a Frankish vassal. However, soon after the spread of news of Charlemagne’s death in 814, the Basques stirred.

Abd al-Karim ibn Abd al-Wahid ibn Mugit directed the incursion of 816 into Carolingian-allied Pamplona. There the Umayyad forces pillaged the valley of Oron. Velasco begged for assistance from the Kingdom of Asturias and put together an army to face the Moors. The forces met near Pancorbo, where the battle lasted for 13 days during which the Basques planned their defense in the rough fords of rivers and ravines, blocking access with logs, trenches and pits dug with their own weapons, so that the Cordobans could not get through. Finally, the Christian forces took the offensive and tried to cross the river but the Cordobans had sealed off the crossing and massacred them. The majority of the casualties died falling from the cliffs surrounding the battleground. Velasco was killed, along with 3 other leaders of the Basque-Asturians, Garcia ibn Lubb, who was Alfonso’s maternal uncle, Sancho, “the best knight of Pamplona”, and the pagan warrior Shaltan. However, the Córdobans were also in difficulties and despite the victory, much of their army deserted.

The defeat sparked a general revolt by the Basques against the Frankish crown and established Íñigo Arista of Pamplona as a major Basque power player in the region.

[Ennath]

February 21, 1824
Chumash Revolt

The Chumash of Alta California were first encountered by Europeans in 1542, but their territory wasn't colonized by the Spaniards until 1772 when Mission San Luis Obispo de Tolosa was established. Other missions followed. Like many native peoples who lived near the missions, some converted to Christianity, some merely used the missions as a survival tool, and some did not accept the Spanish at all. Spanish supplies and payments for soldiers and missionaries stopped after 1810. The presidios pressed the missions for more supplies, and the missionaries pressed the mission natives to work longer hours. In addition, the independence of Mexico in 1821 brought economic depression to the region.

The Mexican declaration of independence of 1821 “abolished all distinctions among Europeans, Africans, and Indians”. A commissioner was appointed by the Mexican government to spread the word of the new policy throughout California and to run government bodies responsible for carrying out the policy in 1822. The Chumash had heard both the Spanish and Mexicans promise them equal treatment under the law; being mistreated by the soldiers of the presidios or the Franciscans of the missions could now incite more outrage than previously, since persons wronging the Chumash were breaking their own nation’s laws.

The Franciscans increased their efforts to suppress Chumash culture after 1820, leading to increased resentment of the missionaries, and by the early 1820s, the Chumash were preparing an uprising. They were aided by having been armed with bows, spears, and machetes and trained in European military tactics to be able to defend the missions against a pirate who attacked Alta California in 1818. The Chumash reached out diplomatically to the neighboring Yokuts, and some Yokut villages sent men to assist with the insurrection.

On February 21, 1824, a young Chumash boy from Mission La Purisima was severely beaten by a Mexican soldier. This caused the Chumash neophytes in the mission to begin the rebellion early, attacking the soldiers with arrows and setting multiple buildings on fire. 554 Natives participated in the revolt at Santa Ines. After a heated battle and the arrival of Chumash reinforcements, the mission’s priest and soldiers barricaded themselves inside a building, where they waited until the next day to be rescued by a detachment of troops from Santa Barbara. The soldiers forced the rebels into the neophyte housing of the mission, which they promptly burnt down to flush the Chumash out.

Most of the Chumash fled to the two nearest missions, Santa Barbara and La Purisima, to inform their fellow Chumash of the revolt. Approximately 722 Chumash at La Purisima had joined the rebellion. Mission La Purisima was captured; the soldiers and their families and 2 Franciscans took shelter in a storeroom. As many as 1270 Chumash fortified La Purisima, erecting wooden palisades and cutting gun loops out of the mission's walls, arming themselves with the mission’s muskets. They kept the soldiers and their families for 3 days and then released them without violence. Simultaneously, Mission Santa Barbara was also captured and the mission’s soldiers, clergy and civilians retreated to the nearby Santa Barbara Presidio without bloodshed. Some of the Chumash men escorted the women and children into the hills, taking the mission’s livestock and provisions and other goods with them. The rest of the Chumash men stayed to fight the soldiers coming from the presidio. As they expected, a small force of Mexican troops and priests arrived and a battle left 2 Chumash dead and 3 wounded, with 4 soldiers wounded. The Mexican detachment retreated to the presidio, and the Chumash defenders followed the first group into the hills.

At this point, the Chumash only held Mission La Purisima. More than 1200 natives occupied the mission, though only approximately 400 of those were warriors. The Mexican authorities did not directly respond until March 14, when 109 soldiers, including infantry, cavalry, and a cannon left San Luis Obispo; 2 natives left ahead of the military column to warn those occupying La Purisima. The Mexicans began attacking on the morning of March 16. The battle lasted 2 1/2 hours, during which the soldiers cut off all avenues of retreat. After the natives had suffered 16 killed and a number more wounded, they asked Friar Antonio Rodriguez, who had stayed inside the mission with them, to negotiate a surrender. The Mexicans had only suffered 1 death and 2 wounded in the battle.

The mission had been retaken, but most of the natives were still in the hills, supported by alliances made mostly among the Yokut people through gifting them supplies and goods taken from the missions. Back in control of the developed areas, the Mexicans reacted judicially to the rebellion through military tribunals and having a general travel to 5 missions in the area and give speeches to the natives there, threatening them with death if the revolt did not end.

The first Mexican military expedition against the rebels began on April 11 and marched 5 days to reach Yokut territory. However, the expedition turned back when faced with severe wind and a dust storm.

Food became a problem both in the missions and in the refugee-filled hills. The missions had very few natives present to perform the manual labor necessary to produce food, while the Yokut villages had many more mouths to feed than they were accustomed to supporting.

In May, Friar Ripoll of Mission Santa Barbara wrote an appeal to the governor of California that defended and explained the actions of the Chumash in hopes that the governor would pardon the rebels, on the grounds that the natives were still minors who needed to be taken care of, in the old Franciscan style of viewing themselves as fathers to the Indians who were all children. He ignored the Mexican policy of equality for all. The explanation was accepted by the governor, who issued a general pardon to all who had participated in the revolt, other than those already convicted at military tribunals, and the pardon was announced on May 16.

Three separate military expeditions were sent to inform the Chumash that they had been pardoned, and could come back to the missions in peace. The pardon was explained to the gathered Chumash, who accepted it; a celebratory mass was held on June 13. For the next week, soldiers and native leaders traveled through the area to find more exiles to ask them to return to the missions. By June 28, approximately 816 out of the original population of 1000 had returned.

[Ernesto75]

In your post #5685 you say :

"The Umayyad Emirate of Cordoba was engulfed in conflict as Al-Hakam I (r. 796-822) fought against the pretensions of his uncles Sulayman and Abd-Allah ibn Abd-ar-Rahman who had rebelled on the death of Hisham I. The disorder was exploited by the Franks who in 798, convened an assembly under William of Gellone for the purpose of assisting Alfonso II of Asturias and Bahlul ibn Marzuq, a rebel in Zaragosa. Their goal was to coordinate operations to take the Upper March (roughly the Ebro Valley) in the name of King Louis the Pious."

In 798 the Frankish King was Charlemagne and not Louis the Pious.
I think this is a typographic error.

[Ennath]

According to Wkipedia, Louis was crowned King of Aquitaine as a child in 781. This was created by Charlemagne as a sub-kingdom to watch the Spanish border. He would have been a vassal of his father.

[Ennath]

February 22, 1812
Battle of Pirano

The Treaty of Tilsit in 1807 had resulted in a Russian withdrawal from the Adriatic and the French takeover of the strategic island fortress of Corfu. The Treaty of Schönbrunn with the Austrian Empire in 1809 had further solidified French influence in the area by formalizing their control of the Illyrian Provinces on the Eastern shore. To protect these gains, the French and Italian governments had instigated a shipbuilding program in Venice and other Italian ports in an effort to rebuild their Mediterranean fleet and challenge British hegemony. These efforts were hampered by the poverty of the Italian government and the difficulty that the French Navy had in manning and equipping their ships. As a result, the first ship of the line built in the Adriatic under this program was not launched until 1810 and not completed until early 1812.

By the time this ship, Rivoli (74), was launched, the Royal Navy had achieved dominance over the French in the Adriatic Sea. Not only had the regional commander Bernard Dubourdieu been killed and his squadron destroyed at the Battle of Lissa in March 1811, but French efforts to supply their scattered garrisons were proving increasingly risky. This was demonstrated by the destruction of a well-armed convoy from Corfu to Trieste on November 29, 1811. Rivoli’s completion was therefore seen by the French Navy as an opportunity to reverse these defeats, as the new ship outgunned the British frigates that operated in the Adriatic and would be able to operate without the threat of attack by the frigate squadron based on Lissa.

The Royal Navy was aware of the threat that Rivoli posed to their hegemony and were warned in advance by spies in Venice of the progress of construction. As Rivoli neared completion, HMS Victorious (74) was dispatched from the Mediterranean Fleet to intercept her should she leave port. Victorious was commanded by John Talbot, a successful and popular officer who had distinguished himself with the capture of the French frigate Ville de Milan in 1805 and his service in the Dardanelles Operation of 1807. Talbot was accompanied by the 18-gun brig HMS Weazel under Commander John William Andrew.

Rivoli departed Venice on February 21, 1812 under the command of Commodore Jean-Baptiste Barré, accompanied by 5 smaller ships, the 16-gun brigs Mercure and Iéna, the 8-gun brig Mamelouck and 2 small gunboats, strung out in an improvised line of battle. Barré hoped to make use of a heavy sea fog that had descended to break out from Venice and elude pursuit. Victorious had held off from the land during the fog and by the time Talbot was able to observe Venice harbor at 1430, his opponent had escaped. Searching for Barré, who was sailing to Pula, Talbot spotted one of the French brigs at 1500 and gave chase.

The head-start had enabled Rivoli to gain a substantial distance, and so it was not until 0230 on February 22 that Talbot was able to close. Not wishing to be held up by the escorts, Talbot ordered Weazel ahead to engage them while Victorious fought Barré’s flagship directly. At 0415, Weazel overhauled the rearmost French brig Mercure engaged at close range. Iéna also engaged but the greater range between these ships allowed Commander Andrew to focus his attack on Mercure, which fought hard for 20 minutes before being destroyed in a catastrophic explosion, probably caused by a fire in the magazine. Weazel immediately launched her boats to rescue survivors, but only 3 were saved.

Following the explosion, Iéna and the other French brigs scattered, briefly pursued by Weazel, which was unable to bring them to a decisive action. The loss of the French escorts allowed Victorious to close with Rivoli unopposed and at 0430 the 2 large ships began a close range artillery duel. This continued unabated for the next 3 1/2 hours, both ships being severely damaged. Captain Talbot was struck on the head by a flying splinter and had to quit the deck, temporarily blinded, command passing to Lt. Thomas Peake. Peake recalled Weazel to block the French ship’s attempts to escape, Commander Andrew sailing his ship in front of Rivoli and repeatedly raking her.

At 0845 Rivoli, struggling to reach the harbor of Trieste, lost her mizzenmast. Nearly at the same moment, 2 of her 36-pounder long guns exploded, killing or wounding 60 men, greatly disorganizing and demoralizing the others, and forcing Barré to transfer gunners from the upper gun deck to man his lower battery. 15 minutes later, with his ship unmanageable and battered, Barré surrendered. Rivoli had suffered over 400 killed and wounded from her crew of over 800, who had only assembled for the first time a few days before and had never sailed their ship in open water. Losses aboard Victorious were also heavy, with 26 men killed and 99 wounded (including Captain Talbot).

Losses on Mercure, although unknown exactly, were severe. Weazel, despite being engaged with 3 French ships for a considerable time, had not one man killed or wounded during the engagement. Rivoli’s scattered escorts were not pursued, British efforts being directed instead at bringing the shattered Rivoli back to port as a prize. Rivoli was a new and well-built ship and, following repairs, she and Victorious traveled together to Britain. There they were both repaired, Victorious returning to the fleet under Talbot for service during the War of 1812, and Rivoli commissioned as HMS Rivoli for service in home waters.

The crews of Victorious and Weazel were well rewarded with both promotions and prize money, the junior officers either promoted or advanced and Commander Andrew made a post captain. Captain Talbot was rewarded at the end of the war, becoming Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath. This was the last significant ship-to-ship action in the Adriatic, and its conclusion allowed British raiders to strike against coastal convoys and shore facilities unopposed, seizing isolated islands and garrisons with the aid of an increasingly nationalistic Illyrian population.

[Ennath]

February 23, 1917
Fall of Kut

The fall of Kut in late April 1916, when Sir Charles Townshend surrendered his garrison of 10,000 men to the besieging Khalil Pasha, brought about a reorganization British forces in the area. The shock of the loss of the Kut-al-Amara garrison - considered by many the greatest humiliation ever to befall the British Army - had prompted the British government in London to revise its view of the Mesopotamian Front. Until the fall of Kut the War Office in London had acquiesced in the Indian administration’s management of Mesopotamia, even though the latter’s policy of an aggressive “forward defense” had caused unease among some in London (notably Sir William Robertson). Now, with Khalil’s unequivocal victory - and the consequent serious damage to British prestige in the Middle East - London determined to take over handling of the campaign.

This resulted in the recall of the unpopular George Gorringe in the wake of his failure to relieve Townshend (although by the time of his appointment it was already arguably too late). In his place was appointed the relatively junior Sir Frederick Maude. Maude was appointed commander of the so-called Tigris Corps in July 1916 and, the following month, of the entire front. He immediately set about reorganizing and re-supplying British and Indian forces in the region. British strength was reinforced by an influx of Anglo-Indian troops, although sickness continued to claim an inordinate number of casualties until Maude finally revamped the British system of medical supplies, virtually non-existent to that point. Along with improvements to the medical system great progress was made in improving transport, a constant failing thus far. By October 1916 Maude had 150,000 troops under command, of whom around half were on the front lines. He was determined to launch a renewed offensive against Kut before the arrival of the winter floods common to the region. Satisfied that British preparations were approaching completion Maude requested - and after a pause was granted - permission from London for an advance upon Baghdad.

His plans were not however unknown to the local Turkish commander, Karabekir Bey. Overwhelmingly outnumbered by some 3-1 he nevertheless set about reinforcing Turkish trench positions; his calls for reinforcement were however unheeded by Khalil.

The British attack was eventually launched on the night of December 13-14, 1916 on both banks of the River Tigris. Approximately 50,000 men, in 2 corps, were involved in the advance. Progress was slow however, if sure, on account of heavy rain and an overriding concern to minimize casualties (one of London’s most insistent demands to Maude).

Maude opened with an artillery bombardment of Turkish positions at Sannaiyat. He had no intention of attacking this strong position, however, but merely wished to provide a feint so that during the night his troops could secretly pass it by on the right bank toward their actual objective, the recapture of Kut. The ruse worked. On the 14th, Maude’s troops crossed the Shatt-al-Hai River and arrived at Kala Haji Fahan. From here a cavalry brigade moved on toward the bridge over the Tigris River at Shumran, above Kut, while the rest of the troops prepared for an advance to Kut the next morning. Although the cavalry was repulsed at Shumran, during the night, British aircraft bombed the bridge, rendering it unserviceable. By the 15th, the British were opposite Kut. A crossing was attempted on the 20th, without success. As winter rains set in, Maude paused and dug in.

On January 6, certain that he must secure the right bank of the Tigris before assaulting Kut, Maude issued orders to begin operations against the highly fortified Turkish positions at Khudhaira Bend in the river above Kut, in a loop of the Tigris along the left bank. To distract the Turks’ attention, Maude staged attacks all along his line on the 7th-8th, but at some cost, with serious casualties at Anaya. A 1-hour artillery bombardment of the Turkish lines at Khudhaira Bend began at 7:30 AM on January 9. The troops attacked at 9:00 and took the Turks’ first line, but a fierce counterattack recaptured part of it. As night approached, a British counterattack accompanied by a new barrage, regained the lost ground, giving the British an advance of 1000 yards for the day at a cost of 700 casualties. The next morning the British found that the Turks had abandoned their first line. An attack on the second line on the 11th failed. Shifting their tactics after January 11, Maude’s troops executed small advances supported by artillery for a week. During the night of January 18-19, the Turks finally succumbed, retreating from their trenches across the river. The first phase of Maude’s offensive ended, with the stage set for an attack on the Hai salient.

On January 25, the British assault on the Hai salient began successfully, capturing 1800 yards of Turkish front line on both banks of the river. But 4 Turkish counterattacks retook the lost positions, inflicting 1100 casualties. Creeping forward, the British wore down the defenses and the Turks were cleared from their trenches on February 2. By the 5th, the Turks had withdrawn from the Hai salient and repositioned their defensive line from the “Licorice Factory” at the confluence of the Tigris and Hai Rivers across from Kut northeastward to Yusifiya on the Tigris.

Maude attacked the “Licorice Factory” on February 9, breaking the front line and clearing the position the next day, despite Turkish attacks from Kut to try and distract him.

Persistent pressure leading to widespread surrenders by Turkish troops gave Maude control of the right bank of the Tigris River between Kut and Yusifiya. But as long as the Turks held Sannaiyat, his supply ships could not move upriver, so he temporarily halted the action on the right bank, menaced by heavy rains, and at noon on February 17 sent his troops against the Turkish positions at Sannaiyat. Initially successful, they fell back before a Turkish counterattack. A renewed attack on the 22nd captured a major part of the Turkish second-line trenches, though at a cost of 1300 casualties.

Early the next morning, having decided to cross the Tigris in the Shumran Bend, Maude sent his troops over in ferries, taking the Turks unawares. Although the Turks scraped together a tough resistance, by the end of the day the British secured a bridgehead on the left bank, losing only 350 men in the process. At the same time, the assault at Sannaiyat resumed, but only after noon, giving the beleaguered Turks the opportunity to withdraw. By midnight, Sannaiyat fell to the British. Kut was occupied.

Karabekir Bay was in full retreat as Khalil tried to scrape together enough men to defend Baghdad. British gunboats and cavalry led the pursuit, though Turkish rearguards fought skillfully and local Marsh Arabs attacked both sides at every opportunity. Buoyed by his success at Kut, Maude barely paused before pushing on with the advance to Baghdad, which fell to the British the following month.