The Second World War.

[Historian]

Originally Posted by MaxJoker

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On June 2, 1944, just before D-Day, driver Benjamin Gimbert and his fireman, James Nightall, were in charge of a freight train delivering bombs to the USAF in White Colne, Essex, UK. As they approached the village of Soham in Cambridgeshire, Benjamin realized that the wagon coupled directly behind the locomotive was on fire. That’s never a good thing, but this fire was particularly dangerous, given that the train was carrying tons of explosives.

To give an idea of the scale of the disaster that Gimbert and Nightall prevented, the leading wagon which caught fire contained 44 500lb bombs- that's a touch under 10 tons.

The complete train consisted of 51 wagons- 7 containing various bomb tail fins and associated kit, while the other 44 were packed with HE- a total of about 400 tons in all....

In addition to the memorials at Soham, both men were commemorated by British Rail naming a pair of diesel locomotives after them in the early 1980s- the names being transferred to more modern locomotives in the early 2000s after the originals were retired from service

[scoundrel]

On 3 June 1944 Field Marshal Albert Kesselring declared Rome to be an open city. The town of Frascati was in the process of being captured by American forces of the 85th Infantry Division and they were busily clearing out the Alban Hills around Frascati, about 20kms southwest of Rome. Meanwhile Canadian forces were entering Agnani, only 20kms southeast of Rome. By attempting any serious defence of Rome itself, Kesselring would have guaranteed the encirclement of a very substantial force, as well committing a cultural crime against the Ancient City, a consideration he certainly did take seriously.

Until August 1943 Rome had been a leading enemy capital city. It was declared an open city in August 1943 when Italy changed sides, and was occupied by the Germans. The oppressive and vindictive character of the German occupation is vividly portrayed in the Roberto Rossalini film Rome, Open City; but the Germans at least did not commit any wanton destruction. Leaving Rome as an open city on 3 June 1944 was partly to save civilian lives but also to avoid needless cultural vandalism.

Albert Kesselring was nicknamed "Smiling Albert" by his own men. He was not a nice fellow; that smile wasn't actually a good sign. But he was not lost to reason or all sense of decency, and he took strenuous measures to protect Italy's art and buildings, even in some cases executing German soldiers who looted churches. He was bitterly angry when he learned that Herman Goering had taken the paintings of Monte Cassino after they were stored safely away from the front line on Kesselring's own orders. Kesselring had promised the monks he would protect their art, so by stealing it, Goering had also made a liar of Kesselring, and Kesselring hated Goering for that. He smiled directly at Goering when giving evidence against him at Nuremburg. He gave evidence against no other German or Italian in any other war crimes trial, though he offered to testify against Allied commanders if asked. He gave evidence against Goering specifically to get even for the theft of the Monte Cassino paintings and to redeem his own honour by stating the facts under oath, so no one would think afterwards that he had ever intended to steal the paintings. So we can be reasonably confident that he declared Rome an open city to protect the city itself as well as innocent civilians.

Kesselring very nearly got executed himself for war crimes and was fortunate it didn't happen. He actually was sentenced to death for involvement as commander in chief with the Ardeatine massacre in March 1944. He wasn't there and he didn't order it, but he didn't act to stop it and under the Yamashita Standard, this is command responsibility. He did various other naughty things, such as brutal reprisals in the field against Italian partisans. Notably, he used Rome's Jewish community as forced labour to build fortifications.

Yet he was an ambiguous figure and did have good points. For example when ordered to deport the Rome Jews, the very people he himself treated like scum, he wouldn't do it...go figure. He told Berlin that he was too busy to waste time on things like that and certainly couldn't spare any transport. The SS did deport about 2,000 Jewish people from Rome but with no help from Kesselring. Also, whether Kesselring had intended this or not, Kesselring's refusal had bought time, and most of Rome's 12,000 Jews had used the time wisely, going into hiding. Many were concealed by the Catholic Church in various churches and monastic establishments.

Kesselring also went on to declare open cities in Chieti, Sienna, Florence and also continued to act energetically to keep Italian art treasures out of harms way. He was also scrupulous when dealing with Allied POWs and completely ignored the Commando order, same as Rommel used to do. He was not a stereotypical Nazi, but clearly wasn't innocent of crime.

His own trial, in Venice in 1947, sentenced him to death by firing squad; an unusual sentence which had a subtle meaning. When Keitel requested death by firing squad he was refused, and it was explained to him that soldiers are shot, but criminal scum is hanged. Kesselring was being granted the minor consolation of being shot like a soldier, not hanged like scum. His British tribunal considered him to be guilty, but to still be a soldier, not mere scum.

In fact, mainly because he had fought within the laws of war against Allied forces, senior allied commanders, including Churchill, pleaded for clemency to Attlee and Attlee accepted their pleas. Kesselring was spared and sentenced to life imprisonment. They let him out in 1952 when he developed throat cancer. He managed to live until 1960.

I am still not sure whether I agree or disagree with the decision to spare his life. He wasn't all bad, I would endorse that view, and he played fair with POWs taken on his watch. He also showed some rudiments of understanding that he had a duty of care to civilians caught in battlefield areas. He treated Romes Jews pretty badly but drew the line at deporting them, refusing to play any part in that, although he was a bad man, he had standards. He was still a pretty nasty piece of work though. I reckon the decision to shoot and not hang him was just about right; he was at least worthy to be shot rather than hanged, because he was a man, not a monster. If I had been the last appeal and senior Allied commanders were directly asking me to please spare him, I would have respected and deferred to them - the case for executing him wasn't 100% watertight, and after all, justice must be tempered with mercy.

I wonder if Albert had the last smile on me.

[Mal Hombre]

You can't really judge these people by their actions in the latter years of the war when they were beginning to realize that they might have to answer for their actions.You need to look at their behaviour at the beginning when it seemed that they would be the masters of Europe.

[rupertramjet]

I, like many, used to accept the German excuses, used predominantly by the Wehrmacht, that they were unaware of the death squads and the forced labour battalions, extermination of the Jews and all the other horrors they claim ignorance of.

I learnt very quickly that in a field situation you are fully aware of what is happening, there is no way a unit, of any kind can operate in you area without your full knowledge, whether you be a General or a Private, as a General you need to know the capabilities of every unit under your command, or operating in your area, at the least so you do not order an attack on them, as a Private, like all soldiers the world over, we are bloody nosy and go and find out. So sorry bull.

I agree with Mal, Paris was declared a free city, as were many others, I recall reading a French account of the fall of Paris, in which the writer stated that Choltitz defied Hitler 'Because he knew that to destroy Paris, would condemn him, and History would do the same.' I accept that as the real reason, nothing to do with saving life or history.

Scounds last question I find more intriguing, in the same position what would I have done, the same, because if you had not, then what would prevent future commanders thinking, what the hell and fighting on.

[Mal Hombre]

I have read that Von Choltitz didn't actually have the amount of explosives to do the job anyway...

[Ernesto75]

Originally Posted by Mal Hombre

I have read that Von Choltitz didn't actually have the amount of explosives to do the job anyway...

Yes, Von Choltiz did not have enough explosives to blow Paris like Hitler wanted in his dementia.

But he still had the possibility to do some terrible damages to Paris.
I think he did not do it for cultural reasons and for saving human lives, but simply because he was a clever man.
He well knew the war would be lost for Germany and he was not totally fanatic.

Besides, as he explained to the Swede consul, he worried for his families's lives, he must have felt he was in a difficult situation.
When he was in Russia he was less understanding.
French people are lucky the German commander of the Gross Paris was a man with a good understanding of the present situation.

I think there was nothing moral in his attitude but what matters is the result.

[rupertramjet]

Originally Posted by Mal Hombre

I have read that Von Choltitz didn't actually have the amount of explosives to do the job anyway...

That I was unaware of, but perhaps all was not as it seemed?

[Ernesto75]

Originally Posted by rupertramjet

That I was unaware of, but perhaps all was not as it seemed?

Von Choltiz had not enough explosives to blow all Paris like Hitler wished but he had enough to blow the bridges.
His troops were not elite fighters except a few waffen-SS; most of his soldiers were affected to non fighting duties essentially.

Yet there were real fighters but not the majority.

[scoundrel]

I agree with the point on von Choltiz and Paris, and I think it may have applied to some others, for example General Lothar Rendolic in Finland, who took hostages in October 1944 intending to execute them as a reprisal, but released them unharmed later. The Germans also treated the surviving remnants of the Polish Home Army as POWs after defeating the Warsaw Uprising, also in October 1944.

But on the other hand, plenty of other things they did suggested a lack of compunction, even as the end drew near. This I think applied to Kesselring among others. Kesselring was in hospital for months between October 1944 and March 1945 due to a car accident, but in March 1945 Hitler appointed Kesselring to command the whole western front after sacking von Rundstedt for failing to either hold or destroy the Ludendorf Bridge at Remagen. Hitler had been lucid and rational when he interviewed Kesselring for this last appointment and had persuaded Kesselring that he was going to inflict a major reverse on the Red Army and then transfer forces west to crush the Allied armies and clear them out of the continent. Kesselring had always been of optimistic temprement and bought into this. He also bought into the ferocious anti-deserter line of many senior German commanders in the last weeks. When his staff officers, former von Runstedt's staff, tried to explain the full hopelessness of the western front situation, Kesselring smiled that smile and pointed out that he had driven all the way from Berlin and had not seen one single hanged deserter in the rear area of his new front; they weren't trying hard enough to hold on. What a sweet guy.

If Kesselring had decided to commit an atrocity no fear of consequences to himself as an individual would have deterred him. His willingness to execute deserters in such a situation is indicative. In my own view of him, he did whatever he did, simply because he thought it was his duty, no matter how bizarre and twisted his view of duty was. He was probably a sociopath and he was certainly ruthless, but he was consistent and ran to the same standards from beginning to end. Also, it was very late in the day, only after Hitler's suicide, that Kesselring really engaged with the surrender process; because until very late on he still thought Germany could fight her way out of the corner she was in. Whatever he did, good and bad, was because he chose to do it, and not due to fear of being punished - in fact, I am doubtful whether he was especially afraid to die. Albert Kesselring was ruthless, a cast iron shit; no doubt about it. But I think he was neither a hypocrite nor a coward. Anything he did which was honourable or decent was because he chose to do it, same as anything he did which was wrong and bad. He was a genuinely confusing and ambiguous figure.

[Ernesto75]

Originally Posted by Mal Hombre

You can't really judge these people by their actions in the latter years of the war when they were beginning to realize that they might have to answer for their actions.You need to look at their behaviour at the beginning when it seemed that they would be the masters of Europe.

One good example is Rommel's attitude towards prisoners of war.

Concerning the prisoners he was a decent man yet a convinced nazi (at least in the beginning).
He ignored Hitler's orders to shoot commandos when in Lybia.

Yet he could be ruthless : in 1940 he had a French colonel shot because this colonel refused to go in a German vehicule.
This is a thing which pleased Hitler.