The Military History Thread

[Ennath]

May 31, 1862
Battle of Seven Pines

By the end of May 1862, George McClellan’s Army of the Potomac was menacing the Confederate capital at Richmond. Confederate Gen. Joseph Johnston had successfully slowed McClellan’s advance, in part by skillfully playing for time at the siege of Yorktown until the Confederate evacuation on May 3. Johnston continued his withdrawal up the Peninsula, and no substantial fighting took place apart from a sharp skirmish at Williamsburg on May 4. Confederate President Jefferson Davis, as well as his military advisor, Gen. Robert E. Lee, demanded action from Johnston.

The deployment of McClellan’s army suggested a possible avenue of attack. 2 of his corps lay south of the Chickahominy River, separated from the remainder of the Union army. Of these, 4th Corps (Erasmus Keyes) had moved on May 24 to the village of Seven Pines, several miles from the nearest supporting Union troops. Three major roads led to the town - Nine Mile Road, Williamsburg Road, and Charles City Road. Johnston prepared a plan of attack: first, he would envelop the lone 4th Corps and then, once it had been shattered, attack 3rd Corps (Samuel Heintzelman). The Chickahominy, swollen by heavy rains, would prevent reinforcement from Union troops north of the river, who relied on a lone, rickety structure known as the Grapevine Bridge to get across. Confederate troops, moving along the three roads, would encircle Keyes. Johnston initially planned the attack for May 29, but delays by subordinate Gustavus Woodson Smith pushed it back to May 31.

Johnston's plan ran into trouble from the start. He could not coordinate his command effectively; Confederate regulations made no allowance for the organization of troops into corps, so Johnston had to divide his army into ad hoc “wings”. This unwieldy command structure, coupled with the plan to move along 3 different thoroughfares, spelled trouble. Johnston’s most trusted subordinate, James Longstreet, created additional difficulties. Longstreet, thirsty for additional authority and acclaim, changed the plan of attack without informing Johnston so that his troops could enjoy a more prominent role in the assault. Finally, the weather contributed to Confederate difficulties, as wet and muddy roads slowed troop movement.

Johnston’s plan called for D. H. Hill to open the battle at 8:00 AM, but Longstreet’s meddling resulted in a traffic jam, delaying Hill’s assault. Meanwhile, Union division commander Silas Casey observed Confederate activity along the roads throughout the morning. Suspecting an attack rather than a probe, Casey ordered some of his troops under arms.

About 1:00 PM, the pugnacious and combative Hill launched the attack with his division despite the fact that he had no idea whether any of the other Confederate elements had reached their assigned positions. Casey, while leery of a Confederate attack, had failed to inform his men that he suspected one was imminent, and thus Hill’s men shattered the first line of Casey’s division. The Union forces subsequently put up a strong fight and fell back to a line of rifle pits, but by 3:00 the Confederates had broken that position as well. Exhausted by the fighting, Hill’s division, in the parlance of the time, was “played out”. Union troops from 3rd Corps under Philip Kearny began to arrive on the field, bolstering the Union line.

Meanwhile, Union Gen. Edwin Sumner of 2nd Corps, under orders to remain in readiness to move but having received no direct instructions, moved his divisions south, across the Chickahominy, after hearing the firing. Despite fears that it might fail, the Grapevine Bridge held as Union soldiers tramped across. Confederate Gen. G. W. Smith, receiving word from Hill that his attack had run out of steam, advanced his wing, intending to strike 4th Corps in the flank. W. H. C. Whiting’s division led the advance. Proceeding along Nine Mile Road, Whiting’s men encountered Darius Couch’s division of Union 2nd Corps, and swung into battle at Fair Oaks Station at 4:00. Union Gen. John Sedgwick’s division of Sumner's corps had reached Couch at around 3:00, and they too aligned for battle. Jefferson Davis, Robert E. Lee, Postmaster General John Reagan, and Joseph Johnston all supervised Smith and Whiting’s advance. Fighting raged, but the Confederates could gain no solid advantage despite the fact that Whiting kept feeding more troops into action. As fighting petered out toward nightfall, the Union line at Fair Oaks had extended its flank to rest on the Chickahominy River, protecting the Grapevine Bridge and thus ending the isolation of 4th Corps.

Near nightfall, while riding behind Confederate lines near Fair Oaks, Johnston inspected the lines personally. Warned by a staff officer that he was riding dangerously close to the front lines, Johnston replied, “Colonel, there is no use dodging; when you hear them they have passed.” Almost immediately thereafter, a spent bullet hit him in the shoulder. Moments after that, a Union artillery shell burst in the air, throwing fragments into Johnston’s chest and thigh. Gravely injured, he relinquished command. Next in line stood G. W. Smith, who temporarily assumed command, but relinquished it because of ill health. The Confederate attack had not gone well.

The next morning, June 1, at 6:45, Hill’s division renewed attacks in its sector, but, failing to make much headway, ended the effort by 11:30. Equally exhausted and disorganized by the fighting, the Union troops also settled into their positions. The Battle of Seven Pines–Fair Oaks had ended.

Both sides claimed victory, but neither side’s accomplishment was impressive. McClellan’s advance on Richmond stalled and the Army of Northern Virginia fell back into the Richmond defensive works. Union casualties were 790 killed, 3594 wounded and 647 captured or missing out of 34,000 men engaged. Confederate losses were 980 killed, 4749 wounded, 405 captured or missing out of 39,000.

Despite claiming victory, McClellan was shaken by the experience. He wrote to his wife, “I am tired of the sickening sight of the battlefield, with its mangled corpses & poor suffering wounded! Victory has no charms for me when purchased at such cost.” He redeployed all of his army except for 5th Corps south of the river, and although he continued to plan for a siege and the capture of Richmond, he lost the strategic initiative.

At 1:30 PM on June 1, Davis arrived at Confederate headquarters and informed Smith that Robert E. Lee would take command of the army. At 2:00, Lee, out on an inspection of the Confederate lines, arrived and received the command he would retain for the remainder of the war.

[Ennath]

554
Battle of Casilinum

During the later stages of the Gothic War, after the defeat and death of Totlia at Taginae (552, see posting), the new Gothic king Teia called upon the Franks for help against the Byzantine army under the eunuch Narses. Although king Theudebald refused to send aid, he allowed two of his subjects, the Alemanni chieftains Leutharis and Butilinus, to cross into Italy. According to the historian Agathias, the two brothers gathered a host of 75,000 Franks and Alemanni. It seems the Frankish-Alamannic force was intent on two objectives that would not have met with the approval of either Goths or the Byzantines. Those aims were: 1) acquisition of loot from the residents of Italy, and 2) the expansion of the Frankish kingdom into the completely helpless, dazed political situation on the Italian peninsula.

The Alamanni nobles and their army crossed the Alps into northern Italy in the spring of 553. They captured the city of Parma, and shortly afterwards defeated a Heruli army (fighting on behalf of Byzantium). Soon, Ostrogothic soldiers began joining the Frankish horde. In addition, the Franks decided to winter over in northern Italy. To counter any possible attack on the newly acquired Byzantine portions of Italy, Narses dispersed his army among the major cities, while he and his personal retinue wintered in Rome.

In the spring of 554, the brothers invaded central Italy, plundering as they descended southwards, until they came to Samnium. There they divided their forces, with Butilinus, with the larger part of the army, marching south towards Campania and the Strait of Messina, while Leutharis led the remainder towards Apulia and Otranto. Leutharis, however, soon turned back home, laden with spoils. Leutheris’ army marched along the Adriatic coast; his vanguard, however, was heavily defeated by the Armenian Byzantine Artabanes at Fanum, leaving most of the booty behind. After an arduous march through the Apennines, Leutheris and his Franks reached the town of Centa in Venetia, where they stopped to rest. Unfortunately, a virulent plague broke out in the barbarian camp, and many of the Frankish-Alamanni warriors died, including their leader. The remainder managed to cross the Alps into Frankish territory.

Butilinus, on the other hand, more ambitious and possibly persuaded by the Goths to restore their kingdom with himself as king, resolved to remain. His army was infected by dysentery, so that it was reduced from its original size of 30,000 to a size close to that of Narses’ forces. He began marching through Campania, Lucania, and Bruttium, marching southwest down to the Strait of Messina. Finding no way to cross the strait to continue raiding in Sicily, Butilinus reversed course in the early summer and began retracing his march. When the Franks reached the town of Casilinum (near Naples), they crossed the Volturnus River, using the Appian Way, a Roman road constructed in the mid-3rd century BC and still in use today, and built a strong camp on the north bank. The other three sides of the camp were covered by an earthen rampart and a number of supply wagons. A bridge over the river was fortified by a wooden tower, heavily garrisoned by the Franks.

When he received word of the return march of Butilinus’ army, Narses ordered many of his units to meet in Rome, then began marching toward Casilinum. Arriving in the neighborhood of Capua, Narses sent a force of cavalry toward the Frankish camp in an attempt to cut off their supplies. A number of the Franks’ supply wagons were captured, and the wooden watchtower at the bridge was set ablaze. This last act goaded the two commanders into action.

The Byzantine army numbered about 18,000 men, and consisted of heavy infantry, some heavy cavalry, and light horse archers. In addition to East Romans, it likely included a few Heruli, and perhaps some Lombards; these last 2 groups were foederati. Narses placed his heavy infantry in the center of his line athwart the Appian Way. On his right and left wings he positioned some of his heavy cavalry, and placed himself among the horsemen on the right wing. There were woods on either side of his position, so Narses hid his horse archers in these woods with orders to remain hidden until orders were given.

During the positioning of his forces, Narses received a report of a Heruli mercenary captain who had killed his slave for some reason. When summoned before the Byzantine commander for an explanation, the Herul was unrepentant, and said he would do it again. Reluctantly, Narses ordered the man executed. This caused all the Heruli foederati to desert. The Herul commander, Sindual, told Narses to proceed with his plans, and he would convince his men to fight. Anticipating the return of the Heruli, Narses left a gap in the middle of his infantry line.

The barbarian army was only slightly larger than the Byzantine army (20,000 perhaps). It is described as being entirely infantry. The Frankish-Alamanni army is described as lining up in either a “deep column” or a wedge. This was a tactical formation designed to concentrate the head of the wedge on a single point in the enemy line and exert maximum pressure. Then the wedge would open the enemy line and allow the rest of its troops to penetrate, hopefully scattering the opposing army. During the pre-battle activities, two Herul warriors deserted to the Franks and told them of the temporary desertion of the Heruli foederati. The men also told Butilinus of the gap in the Byzantine line. The Alammani commander quickly made his plans, and ordered his wedge to aim for the center of the Byzantine line.

It is quite likely that the Byzantine line began shifting to meet the barbarian threat to their center, trying desperately to close the gap where the Heruli should have been. Before long, the Frankish-Alammani formation slammed into the Byzantine infantry, but the Byzantines held firm. The Franks in the rear ranks of the wedge split up and began attacking the rest of the enemy line (apparently unaware of the cavalry hidden in the woods).

The fighting continued for several hours, with Frankish pressure on the Byzantine center increasing. Finally, Narses gave the order for which his horsemen had been waiting. All of his cavalry, even the heavy cavalry, were bow-armed, and their general directed them to fire into the rear of the Frankish army. Before long, the Frankish attacks lost some of their fanaticism, as the warriors began wondering where the attacks to their flanks and rear were coming from.

Realizing that this was the time, Narses directed his hidden cavalry units to attack the flanks and rear of the Frankish horde, which was beginning to waver from the storm of arrow fire that was thinning their ranks. Then, as if on cue, a shout came from the rear of the Byzantine army: the Heruls, finally deciding they wanted to be involved in a good fight, came streaming toward the battle, and contacted the Franks still trying to break through the Byzantine infantry. In the words of historian J.B. Bury, “The defeat of the Franks was already certain; now it was to be annihilation.” Narses ordered a general advance of his entire army, and the Frankish-Alamanni force was ground up and destroyed. Butilinus likely died in this final stage of the fight.

It was a magnificent victory for Narses, and signaled the final triumph of the Byzantine reconquest of Italy. Despite this, the war was not quite finished. 7000 Goths held out at Campsa, near Naples until they capitulated in the spring of 555. The lands and cities across the River Po were still held by Franks and Goths, and it was not until 562 that their last strongholds, the cities of Verona and Brixia were subjugated. The Byzantines inherited an Italy that was nearly depopulated, lacked a strong economy, and was no longer the vibrant community it had once been. In 568, the Lombards invaded Italy.

[Ennath]

June 1, 1813
Shannon vs. Chesapeake

Admiral Sir John Warren took command of Royal Navy forces in North America and the Caribbean in September 1812. By the end of March 1813 he had blockaded the Chesapeake and the Delaware. On March 23, the Admiralty sent him orders to expand the blockade to cover all the American coast. The British objectives were to defend their trade and to end the war by economic means. Warren would soon have ten 74 gun ships of the line, 30 frigates and 80 smaller ships, which the Admiralty believed would allow him to carry out these tasks, allowing for a third of his ships being under repair and refit at any time. An attack on New Orleans would have made strategic sense, but Warren had only 2 battalions of Royal Marines. The British did carry out limited amphibious operations; an attack on the Delaware in May resulted in the capture of destruction of over 20 ships.

The American 44-gun frigates were more powerful than any of Warren’s frigates, but would have stood no chance against a British 74. This meant that much of the US Navy was trapped in harbor. In April the President and Congress managed to exit Boston in fog, but had taken only a dozen prizes by September, when they returned to Newport; much of British commerce was sailing in well escorted convoys. In late May the United States, Macedonian and Hornet tried and failed to get out of New York

James Lawrence had commanded Hornet when she sailed with USS Constitution in the cruise that resulted in the capture of HMS Java. On February 24, 1813 Hornet encountered the brig HMS Peacock. Both ships were armed principally with carronades, which were very powerful but short range guns, so a short range battle ensued. The more powerful ship won; in this case it was Hornet, which carried 32 pound carronades; the Peacock had 24 pounders. Lawrence was promoted from Master Commandant to Captain. He was initially promised command of the 44-gun frigate Constitution, then under refit, but this was changed to the 38-gun Chesapeake, then at Boston. Lawrence was annoyed at being switched to a smaller ship, but Chesapeake was ready for sea. Lawrence took command on May 20, and spent the next 11 days exercising his gun crews. He also replaced some of the weaker officers. He was aware that there was a British frigate off Boston, so Chesapeake prepared for action on May 31 before sailing the next day.

The British ship was the 38-gun frigate Shannon, commanded by Captain Philip Broke. He had carefully studied naval tactics, realizing the importance of accurate gunnery and skilful maneuver, and his gun crews were trained to a high level of efficiency. He paid for adjustments to the guns with his own money ; the decks were marked to enable every gun to concentrate fire on the same point. Broke had sent a challenge to Lawrence to a single ship contest. Lawrence had himself challenged HMS Bonne Citoyenne to combat whilst commanding Hornet, but did not receive Broke’s letter as he had sailed before it arrived.

The two ships were evenly balanced, so the battle would depend on luck and skill. Shannon had 52 guns, Chesapeake 50. Her crew was 379. The US ship had a slight advantage in nominal weight of fire, but was outgunned by a little if Theodore Roosevelt’s belief that US shot was about 7 per cent lighter than its nominal value is accepted. Either way, the advantage was not decisive. Both had brave captains and experienced crews. The main difference was that Lawrence took over his command 12 days before the action whilst Broke had commanded his ship for 7 years, bringing it to a high level of efficiency.

Chesapeake left Boston at 1 PM on June 1; visibility was excellent, so both ships could see the other clearly. In previous frigate actions the Americans had fired at long range, not closing until the enemy was badly damaged. However, Chesapeake did not have the firepower advantage that the 44-gun frigates enjoyed. Getting in close had worked for Lawrence when Hornet had defeated Peacock.

Broke did not want to fight close to Boston, where US gunboats might join in, so moved further away, stopping once Shannon was 15 miles from Boston and out of sight. Chesapeake was then 4 miles away and closing. At 5:10 Broke spoke to his crew, encouraging them and ordering his gunners to fire into the hull to kill the American gunners and destroy the guns, rather than trying to dismast her.

At 5:30, it appeared that the Chesapeake might try to cross Shannon’s stern, allowing her to rake the British ship. Broke reacted quickly, but Lawrence had loaded his guns with ammunition suitable for destroying the Shannon’s rigging rather firing into her hull. He could then pound the dismasted British ship with minimal risk. At 5:40, the American crew gave 3 cheers, but the British remained silent. Broke believed in fighting as quietly as possible, so that orders could be heard clearly. He brought his ship broadside to broadside with the American, 40-50 yards apart.

The British opened fire at 5:50, devastating the American gun crews; the Americans quickly replied, but many of their gunners were already dead. They scored hits on Shannon, notably on her lower rigging, but were having the worse of the battle. Chesapeake was sailing faster, with the result that she exposed her stern; her wheel was shot away, and she suffered heavy casualties amongst her officers and petty officers. At one stage it seemed as if Chesapeake might escape, but she then lost way. A cartridge box exploded on her deck at 5:58.

A boarding action was risky, but Lawrence realized that it was his last option. However, heavy casualties meant that few men answered his call for boarders. He was then mortally wounded, crying “Don’t give up the ship” as he was carried below.

At 6:00, the ships collided, with one of the British anchors attaching itself to the American port quarter. Broke led a boarding party; the US Marines tried to resist, but 14 out of 44 had been killed and 20 wounded. Lt. George Budd tried to rally the American crew, but was wounded. The fighting was apparently over in a couple of minutes. However, 3 US sailors, perhaps RN deserters who would be executed if taken, attacked Broke, inflicting a severe head wound. The trio were quickly killed. Broke fell into some quicklime, which had leaked from a barrel hit by a cannon ball. It was used by the Americans as a disinfectant, and this probably saved Broke’s life.

The dying Lawrence realized that his ship had been taken and exclaimed “Then blow her up! Blow the ship up!” The ships had now drifted apart. A small British ensign was raised on Chesapeake, but was then lowered, before a larger one was raised. This confused one of Shannon’s gun crews, who re-opened fire, killing George Watt, Shannon’s 1st lieutenant, and killing or wounding 5 other British sailors.

The British now held the gun deck, but there were only 70 of them, far fewer than the number of Americans below decks. The ships were less than 20 miles off the US coast. Charles Falkiner, Shannon’s 4th lieutenant, told the Americans that there were 300 British on board, and a boat full of Shannon’s marines arrived, making the prize secure.

Roosevelt gives American casualties as 61 killed and 85 wounded and British as 33 killed and 50 wounded. Lambert says that 48 Americans were killed, 99 wounded and 325, including the wounded, captured. Some, probably British deserters, jumped overboard. He gives British casualties as 26 killed and 58 wounded.

The 2 ships, under the command of Provo Wallis, Shannon’s 3rd lieutenant, were repaired before heading for Halifax, arriving on June 4. Lawrence died just before the ships entered harbor and was buried in Halifax with full military honors; he was soon reburied in first Salem and then New York.

USS Chesapeake became HMS Chesapeake, and served in the RN until 1819. Broke was made a Baronet, but did not serve again at sea because of the severity of his wound, which caused him pain for the rest of his life. He was promoted to Rear Admiral on the grounds of seniority in 1830, dying in 1841.

[Ennath]

June 2, 1424
Battle of L’Aquila

Braccio da Montone is the name by which Andrea Fortebracci became known; born to a noble family of Perugia, he became lord of that city in 1416 by means of a victory over Carlo Malatesta. He erected a number of public buildings and drained the Umbrian Plain. He was also now the dominant military force in central Italy. His forces were increasingly made up of Umbrians, rather than mercenaries, as was usual in the era, and took on something of the character of a national army. This army was frequently called upon to resist the forces of Pope Martin V, who wished to remove him.

Taking advantage of a conspiracy hatched in Rome for the papal seat, he occupied the city but was forced out again in 1420. A sort of peace was established and the pope appointed Braccio as vicar of some papal territories. But that was just a truce to the ambitious Braccio.

In 1423 Braccio da Montone was named by Queen Joanna II of Naples as Constable of the Abruzzi for 10 years. He was busy fighting at home at the time and named Ruggero d'Antignola as governor with the task of securing his interests against the royal power of the Kingdom of Naples. After an initial period of good relations, the citizens of L’Aquila rebelled under Antonuccio Camponeschi and expelled Ruggero. The Camponeschi family was related to Giacomo Marzano, Grand Admiral of Naples, and the condottiero Muzio Attendolo, lord of Benevento and Manfredonia, as well as to Pope Martin V, who supported Louis III of Hungary’s claims against Joanna. When the city declared itself under Louis’ suzerainty, Braccio da Montone mobilized his forces to regain it.

In late 1423, Braccio’s strong army started destroying the castles which surrounded the city. In May 1424, the population took refuge in L’Aquila itself and prepared for a siege. After a failed storming attempt, Braccio took position of the crucial Collemaggio hill, and prepared to starve the city into surrender.

In the meantime, a coalition of Florence, Milan and the Pope mustered an army under the condottieri Jacopo Caldora and Francesco Sforza. These joined with Neapolitan troops to raise the siege. At the beginning of June, the armies met on the plain before L’Aquila on a hot late spring day. Braccio had 6000 infantry and 3200 cavalry to face the allied strength of 10,000 infantry (5000 Milanese, 3000 Papal and 2000 Neapolitan) and 3360 cavalry.

The allied army divided in 2 parts. Caldora, who had once served under Braccio, adhered to his mentor’s tactic of rotating cavalry squadrons, so as to always have fresh troops available. Sforza commanded the other half. Braccio, knowing that he was outnumbered, decided to hold against Sforza on the right, while using his left to crush Caldora. However, Caldora knew all his moves and soon got the better of the fighting. Meanwhile, Sforza was steadily gaining ground. Then, Braccio’s 2nd in command, Niccolo Piccinino, who had been given the job of containing the besieged garrison, left his position to try and strengthen to main line. This move not only failed in his objective, but left the Perugian rear exposed and a sortie from the city began plundering Braccio’s camp, just as Sforza launched a fresh assault. Mortally wounded in the neck, Braccio was made prisoner and transported to L'Aquila, where he died 3 days later, after having refused any food and without having ever exchanged words with his captors.

The victory at L'Aquila increased the power of Caldora and brought him fame as a great commander. In Naples, he was tied more firmly to the Caracciolo (in 1428 his son, Anthony, married the daughter of Sergianni Caracciolo, Isabella) and together with him, the Prince of Taranto, Giovanni Antonio del Balzo Orsini, imposed its supremacy in Neapolitan court. Milan, Venice and Florence vied for his services: Caldora was the man of the moment.

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June 3, 1571
Battle of Bankusay Channel

Miguel Lopez de Legazpi was searching for a suitable place to establish the Spanish colonial capital in the Philippines after being forced to leave first Cebu and then Iloilo by Portuguese pirates. In 1570, Martin de Goiti and Captain Juan de Salcedo, with food stocks diminishing, discovered a rich kingdom on Luzon and saw its potential. De Goiti anchored at Cavite, and tried to establish his authority peaceably by sending a message of friendship to the city of Maynila. Rajah Sulayman, its ruler, was willing to accept the friendship that the Spaniards were offering, but did not want to submit to its sovereignty, and declared war. As a result, De Goiti and his army attacked Maynila in June 1570. After a stout fight, Sulayman and his men were forced to flee uphill. After the Spaniards had left, the natives returned.

In 1571, the Spaniards returned with their entire force, consisting of 280 Spaniards and 600 native allies, accompanied by 27 small ships, this time led by Legazpi himself. Seeing the Spanish approaching, the natives set the city on fire and fled to the Kingdom of Tondo. The Spaniards occupied the ruins of Maynila and established a settlement there. On May 19, 1571, Legazpi gave the title of city to the colony of Manila.

A Kapampangan leader of the Macabebe tribe, later identified as Tarik Sulayman, refused to submit to the Spaniards and, after failing to gain the support of the chieftains of Manila (Lakandula and Matanda) and nearby old settlements of the present day Bulacan province, gathered a force composed of roughly 2000 Bulacan and Kapampangan warriors, with 40 ships.

On June 3, 1571, Tarik Sulayman, supported by Rajah Sulayman, led his troops down the Pampanga River and fought the battle in the bay of Bangkusay, off the port of Tondo. The Spanish ships, led by Martin de Goiti, were ordered to be fastened two-by-two which created a solid mass formation which seemed to be an easy target. The native warships were lured by this deception and surrounded the Spanish. The surrounded Spanish then opened fire and the native fleet was scattered and destroyed. The chief who died at Bankusay is sometimes identified as Rajah Sulayman. However, it is clear in the Spanish records that he was able to escape to Pampanga and it was the Pampango chief, identified as Tarik Sulayman, that fell in the battle.

Legazpi was able to establish a municipal government for Manila on June 24, 1571, which eventually became the capital of the entire Spanish East Indies colony and subsequently the capital of the Philippines. The Manila-Acapulco Galleon Trade between the Philippines and Mexico flourished during the years 1571-1815.

[Ennath]

1047
Battle of Val-ès-Dunes

Duke William of Normandy had succeeded to his title in 1035, as the 7-year-old illegitimate son of the previous Duke, Robert I. Several of William’s kinsmen (including Guy of Burgundy, his cousin) believed themselves to have a better claim to the title, but William had the support of King Henry I of France and other influential nobles.

In 1046, some of William's enemies decided to finally strike. After an ambush near Valognes on the Cotentin Peninsula failed, the rebel nobles - Guy of Burgundy, Nigel of the Cotentin, Rannulf of the Bessin, Ralph Tesson of Thury, Grimoald of Plessis, and Haimo of Creully—raised an army of about 25,000 men.

After escaping the ambush, William rode directly to King Henry’s court in Poissy, and reminded the king that a revolt against his faithful vassal was a revolt against himself. As a result, King Henry raised an army of about 10,000 men to march on Normandy.

In the summer of 1047, King Henry’s army joined Duke William’s much smaller Norman army near Caen, in the heart of rebel territory. During the first part of the battle, Ralph Tesson realized on which side allegiance truly lay, and he and his men then changed sides and joined the royal army, attacking the rebels from the rear. The next day, the armies fought on the plain of Val-ès-Dunes, near the present-day town of Conteville.

The battle consisted mainly of a series of cavalry skirmishes. The rebel army outnumbered the royal army, but it lacked the latter’s coordination and leadership. Haimo of Creully unhorsed King Henry, but was killed before he could injure him. After losing steadily, the rebel army broke apart, panicked, and fled to the west. The royal army pursued closely, slaughtering rebels by the thousands and driving the remnants of their army into the Orne River. An observer recorded that the bodies of rebels who tried to cross the Orne were so numerous that bloated bodies blocked the mill of Barbillon as the river carried them downstream en masse.

While the royal army drove much of the rebel army west, Guy of Burgundy and his surviving forces escaped to his lands in the east and holed up in the strategic castle of Brionne. Despite an energetic siege, William was not able to force the castle into surrender until 1050, and, during that time, he was not able to assert his authority in the eastern third of his duchy, which lay beyond Brionne.

After the Battle of Val-ès-Dunes, there was still strong opposition to William among the Norman nobles, but they were forced to declare a “Truce of God” at Caen in October 1047. This truce, backed by the full endorsement of the Church, stated that private wars or vendettas were prohibited from Wednesday evening to Monday morning. The truce gave William special rights to defend his title and public order; he did not, along with King Henry, have to abide by the order. Even though William’s position was still weak, with Guy of Burgundy still holding out and William having to pardon many of the barons who had opposed him, it would be 5 years before he had to face another major revolt.

[Ennath]

June 4, 1829
The Demologos Burns

On March 9, 1814, Congress authorized the construction of a steam warship to be designed by Robert Fulton, the pioneer of commercial steamers in North America. Construction began on June 20, at the civilian yard of Adam and Noah Brown, in New York, and the ship was launched on October 29. After sea trials she was delivered to the United States Navy in June 1816. The ship was never formally named; Fulton christened it Demologos, though following his death in February 1815, the ship was named Fulton.

Demologos had an entirely unique and innovative design. A catamaran, her paddlewheel was sandwiched between two hulls. Each hull was constructed 5 feet thick for protection against gunfire. The steam engine, mounted below the waterline in one of the hulls, was capable of making 5.5 knots in favorable conditions. Although designed to carry 30 32-pounder guns (24 broadside, 6 fore and aft), the Navy had trouble acquiring sufficient guns, and a varying number were mounted while in actual service. Demologos was also fitted for two 100-pounder Columbiads, one mounted fore and another aft, these weapons were never actually furnished to the vessel.

Fulton’s design solved several of the problems inherent in warships powered by paddlewheels, which led to the adoption of the paddle-steamer as an effective warship in following decades. By placing the paddlewheel centrally, sandwiched between two hulls, Fulton protected it from gunfire; this design also allowed the ship to mount a full broadside of guns. The steam engine offered the prospect of tactical advantage against sail-powered warships. In a calm, sailing ships depended on the manpower of their crews to tow the ship from the boats, or to kedge with anchors. Demologos would have found it easy to outmaneuver a sailing ship in calm weather.

The innovative construction and steam power also fundamentally limited the role Demologos could fill. With an unreliable engine and a hull unsuited to seaways, she was unable to travel on the high seas. The US Navy planned to build a number of similar steam batteries, but none of these plans got off the drawing board until the USS Fulton of 1837. A number of European navies also considered acquiring the Demologos, but these inquiries came to naught.

By the time she was completed, the war for which Demologos had been built had ended. She saw only one day of active service, when she carried President James Monroe on a tour of New York Harbor. A two-masted lateen rig was added by the orders of her first commander, Captain David Porter. In 1821, her armament and machinery were removed. The remainder of her career was spent laid up in reserve; after 1825 she served as the floating barracks for Brooklyn Navy Yard. She came to an end on June 4, 1829 in a gunpowder explosion.

Demologos was ultimately a dead end in the introduction of steam power. Armed paddle steamers proliferated in the 1830s and 40s as armed tugs and transports. Paddle-wheel propulsion, more usually side-paddle configurations, in military use continued until World War II with the USS Wolverine and USS Sable training aircraft carrier crews. These designs were typically limited to use in the brown-water navy or on large lakes. Steam-powered paddle wheel propulsion would ultimately be eclipsed by the introduction of the screw propeller in the 1840s, enabling steam-powered version of the ship of the line and the frigate before steam power was properly adapted for use in a blue water navy.

[Ennath]

June 5, 1967
Battle of Abu Ageila

The Israeli attack at Abu Ageila was part of the Israeli offensive into the Sinai during the Six-Day War. This attack was led by the Southern Command, consisting of 3 divisions under Major Generals Israel Tal, Avraham Yoffe, and Ariel Sharon. As part of the plan of Southern Command, Sharon was ordered to capture the crucial road junction at Abu Ageila in order to gain access to the central route into the Sinai. The fortified post had resisted Israeli attacks during the 1956 war for several days. The Egyptians had taken considerable preparations to prevent a breach here. The defenses had focused on the Um Katef plateau east of Abu Ageila, roughly 15 miles from the Israeli border. The defenses were an important part of the overall defense plan, called Qahir, in the preparations for the expected war.

Israeli troops numbered about 14,000. Sharon’s division deployed 14th Armored Brigade (Super Shermans), an infantry brigade, a paratroop brigade, an independent tank battalion (Centurions), a mechanized recon battalion, 6 artillery battalions (105mm & 155mm howitzers) and a battalion of engineers.

Egyptian 2nd Division (Abdel Mohsen Kamel Mortaga) prepared defenses in the area between Abu Ageila and Kusseima, with the center placed at the Um Katef Plateau - Ruafa Dam area, with the 12th Infantry Brigade defending Um Katef and the 10th Infantry Brigade Kusseima. Um Katef made a good position, because it was bordered by an area of sand dunes to the north and rocky mountains to the south. On this plateau, the Egyptians constructed three parallel trenches of about 3 miles each, reinforced by concrete bunkers. Every trench was defended by an infantry battalion, with the forward trench reinforced by a dug-in tank squadron. To the rear were two supporting artillery battalions, behind them the balance of 288th Tank Battalion (T-34/85s) ready to counterattack. To the north, blocking the Batur Track at Position 181, were 38th Infantry Battalion, 299th Artillery Battalion and an antitank company of 10 SU-100s. They were to protect the flank of the main position to the southeast.

3 miles west of the Um Katef Plateau perimeter was the Ruafa Dam. Dug in here were the 352nd Infantry Battalion, and the 332nd and 336th Artillery Battalions. 3 miles northwest of Abu Ageila, at the well and logistic center at Awlad Ali, the balance of the 6th Tank Regiment (1 tank battalion) was positioned to block enemy forces coming from the northeast or against the positions of the 12th Brigade to the east or southeast. To the east, in front of the 12th Brigade positions, on the ridge at Umm Tarafa was an outpost manned by an infantry company, a squadron of tanks, and two B-10 recoilless rifles. At Position 239, south of Umm Tafara was a platoon with B-10s and two AT guns. Further east at Tarat Umm Basis near the Israeli border was the 2nd Reconnaissance Battalion, which was to give warning of any Israeli attack.

The Israeli attack plan was based on intelligence gathered 2 days before the war started, which indicated Um Katef was defended by only one infantry battalion. Based on this information, the Israelis planned a frontal attack by their reinforced independent tank battalion. After aerial bombardments, this tank battalion started its attack on Um Katef on June 5, at 0815. The attack came to a halt however, due to resistance from an unknown Egyptian formation and an unknown minefield, causing the loss of 7 Israeli Centurions. New orders for the independent tank battalion were to break off the attack and to attack from the north, through the sand dunes, considered impassible by the Egyptians. Now the 14th Armored Brigade was ordered to attack frontally further south. After a short aerial bombardment, this attack commenced at 1230, but was forced to a halt as well.

Now that strength and positions of the Egyptians were known, Gen. Sharon changed his plans. The independent tank battalion was ordered to drive through the sand dunes following a camel-path and attack the Egyptian armor at the Ruafa Dam. At the same time, 14th Armored Brigade would attack from the East. However, before this could happen, Um Katef would have to be taken, a task given to Sharon’s infantry brigade, held in reserve up till then. This infantry attack was to occur under the cover of darkness, following a secondary approach to Um Katef through the sand dunes. Meanwhile, the Israeli armor would provide support and all Israeli artillery would be used in support of this attack. This meant there would be no suppressing fire on the Egyptian artillery, making the Israeli infantry vulnerable. It was decided that the Egyptian artillery would be taken out of action prior to the attack using the brigade of paratroopers. However, with only 6 helicopters available, only a limited number of troops could be used. Meanwhile, the independent tank battalion was engaged by the Egyptian defenders in the sand dunes by 1600 and were able to continue to their positions near Abu Ageila and the Ruafa Dam at 1800. The infantry brigade was in place at around 2300, while the paratroopers, after being discovered and fired upon by Egyptian artillery, made it to their attack positions at 2300.

The attack started at midnight, after the Israeli artillery had been firing for a half hour, with Israeli tanks moving into position under the noise of the artillery. After heavy fighting, the Israeli infantry broke through the trenches at Um Katef, with 1/3 of them cleared by 0230. Now the engineers started clearing a way through the minefield, which was completed at 0400, allowing 14th Armored Brigade to roll on to the Ruafa Dam. At 0700, the Israelis attacked the Egyptian tank and AT battalions from two sides. After 3 hours of fighting, these Egyptian units were destroyed, after which remnants of Egyptian 12th Brigade were cleared. At around noon, the road junction at Abu Ageila was in Israeli hands and the road to the Sinai was open. The battle ended with 40 KIA and 19 tanks lost for the Israelis, and 4000 KIA and 40 tanks lost on the Egyptian side.

The victory at Abu Ageila meant the road to Central Sinai was open for the Israelis. Many Egyptian units remained intact and could have tried to prevent the Israelis from reaching the Suez Canal. However, when the Egyptian Minister of Defense, Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer heard about the fall of Abu Ageila, he panicked and ordered all units in the Sinai to retreat to the west bank of the Suez Canal within a single day. There was no plan for the retreat, so the units left behind heavy equipment, and sometimes even outpaced their commanders. This resulted in the Israelis racing to capture abandoned sites, and obtaining significant amounts of abandoned tanks and equipment. So much was captured intact that after the war, 3 mechanized and 2 armored brigades were created from this abandoned equipment. The withdrawal order effectively meant the defeat of Egypt. By June 8, 1967, most of the Sinai had been occupied by Israeli forces.

[Ennath]

June 6, 1513
Battle of Novara

The French had ruled Milan since 1499, when they had expelled Ludovico Sforza. They had defeated him again in 1500 and held the duchy for the next decade. They also managed to repel Swiss attacks early in the War of the Holy League, but in 1512 the duchy fell to the Swiss, who installed Massimiliano Sforza as duke. Power was split between the Duke, the Swiss and representatives of the Emperor Maximilian I. Maximilian also had an Imperial army in northern Italy commanded by Ramon de Cardona.

In 1513, Louis XII of France made a concerted effort to recapture Milan and French forces occupied Genoa, while Imperial forces advanced west to Cremona. In April 1513 a fresh French army of around 12,000 men under Prince Louis de La Trémoille crossed the Alps and threatened Milan from the west. Sforza and the Swiss were clearly unpopular in the duchy, and large areas rose in support of the French. By the end of May the Swiss had been expelled from everywhere, apart from Novara and Como.

On June 3, the French, now about 20,000 strong, arrived outside Novara, where the Swiss had a sizable garrison. La Trémoille launched an attack on the city, but was repulsed. He then pulled back a short distance to Trecate, and prepared for a siege. This gave the Swiss the time to rush 5000 fresh troops to Novara, where they were able to join up with the garrison. Their combined force, about 13,000 men, slept for 3 hours on the night of June 5-6, and then made a night march towards the French.

Once they were close to Trecate the Swiss formed into 3 columns, arranged in echelon. They hit the French at dawn and caught them by surprise. The German Landsknecht mercenaries were able to form up into heavy squares, and the French were able to deploy some of their artillery. Despite this, the Swiss onslaught, sweeping in from multiple directions due to forced marches which achieved an encirclement of the French camp, took the French guns, pushed back the Landsknecht regiments, and finally destroyed the Landsknecht squares. Caught off guard, the French heavy cavalry, their decisive arm, was unable to properly deploy, and played little role in the fight.

The French infantry was shattered, and was said to have suffered around 8000 casualties; Swiss losses were moderate, mostly caused by artillery as they moved into the attack. In addition, the Swiss executed the hundreds of Landsknechts they had captured. (There was a fierce rivalry between Swiss and Landsknechts and quarter was rarely given by either.) The French cavalry managed to escape and this, combined with the complete lack of Swiss cavalry, prevented a pursuit.

La Trémoille’s position in Lombardy was now untenable. While the Swiss went on to recapture Milan, the French retreated back across the Alps. Later in the year the Swiss followed and invaded Burgundy, advancing all the way to Dijon before the French paid them off to leave France. Massimiliano Sforza was restored to power in Milan, although he was widely regarded as the puppet of his Swiss “allies”, who held the real power in Milan.

This was one of the last victories for the Swiss infantry columns. Two years later, at Marignano (September 13-14, 1515, see posting), Swiss columns were unable to break the French lines, giving King Francis I his greatest victory in Italy.

[Ennath]

June 7, 1917
Battle of Messines

Since 1916, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig had been planning an offensive in Flanders to neutralize the U-Boat bases along the coast. The French Army mutinies in the spring of 1917 lent the plan an added urgency, as the British sought to draw German attention away from the French sectors. The attack was to be preceded by an assault on Messines Ridge, along the southern arc of the Ypres salient.

Rising to about 250 feet, Messines Ridge is not spectacular, but in an area where the average height of the terrain is about 150 feet, possession of the hill gave the Germans a wonderful position from which to observe everything that the British did. No advance out of the Ypres salient would be possible whilst the Germans held such a commanding position. However, rather than just being behind the crest, as would normally have been the case, the German front line was in front of it, so the British could at least monitor German movements as well.

Gen. Sir Herbert Plumer, commanding British 2nd Army, had begun plans to take the Ridge in early 1916. Meticulous in manner, Plumer preferred to plan for limited successes rather than gamble all on a significant breakthrough. Plans for the assault were begun in 1915 and it was considered that a possible date would be the summer of 1916 immediately after the advance on the Somme. However, the Somme was not the swift breakthrough envisaged, which put Plumer’s plans on hold. In keeping with his faith that sooner or later the assault would have to be made Plumer continued his preparations. His original plan had been to simply push the Germans off the ridge, but with the coming Ypres offensive, something more aggressive was required by Haig. The Messines operation was therefore extended to include not just the summit of the ridge but also the German defensive lines on the other side of it as well.

Planning was meticulous. To the rear of the British lines near the Scherpenberg an enormous scale model of the objective was constructed. Groups of all ranks from the units involved were given the chance to view the model and to gain an understanding the ground they would be attacking and an adequate knowledge of what was required of them. Over 2000 guns , a third of them heavy or medium batteries, would be used. Zero Hour had been carefully calculated to allow the soldiers just enough light to be able to see where they were going, whilst still making them difficult to see.

The nature of the land had forced both sides to build upwards as opposed to digging into the water sodden ground. All along the horizon concrete German blockhouses could be seen. They were reinforced with steel cabling and could withstand most field artillery shells save a direct hit from one of the heavier howitzers. New methods of dealing with these had been introduced with the intent that infantry would infiltrate rapidly around the pillboxes (so named because to the British that is what they looked like) and thus take them from behind.

Beyond all this were the mines. Plumer had authorized the laying of 22 mine shafts underneath German lines all along the ridge, his plan being to detonate all 22 at zero hour at 0310 on June 7. Learning the lessons of the mines exploded on July 1, 1916, there would be no waiting several minutes before assaulting the resulting craters, giving the dazed Germans time to recover; the attack would go straight in, supported by tanks and gas. Work on laying the mines began some 18 months earlier. In the face of active German counter-mining, 5 miles of tunnel were constructed under German lines. Occasionally the tunnelers would encounter German counterparts engaged in the same task: underground hand to hand fighting would ensue. One mine, at Petite Douve Farm, was discovered by German counter miners on August 24, 1916 and destroyed. A further 2 close to Ploegsteert Wood were not exploded as they were outside the planned attack area.

Three Corps would be used in the attack across a front of about 10 miles. On the right (the southern end) II Anzac Corps would take the village of Messines. In the center was IX Corps who would be attacking Wytschaete (Whitesheet to the British). The left flank to the north was held by X Corps and their task was to take St Eloi and Mont Sorrel. The total depth of the advance at the centre would be about 2 miles and would pinch out the Messines salient.

Some artillery preparation began on April 20 but on a very limited basis. As heavier guns became available after the close of the Battle of Arras in May they were moved north. During the preliminary bombardments which were to commence on May 21, the crews would be rotated, allowing for 1/3 of them to be resting and their guns to be cooling. Practice runs were conducted for the creeping barrage in order to entice German counter-battery fire and large raids were carried out on the German lines to test their strength. What was stressed was that once the ridge and its villages had been taken, the attacking troops would consolidate their position, rather than press on in the hope of a breakthrough.

At 0100 hours on June 7 the British and Anzacs moved up into their jumping off positions. The bombardment ceased at 0250, and the German troops, sensing imminent attack, rushed to their defensive positions, sending up flares to detect British movement towards the ridge. Silence prevailed for 20 minutes, when the assault troops were ordered to lie on the ground.

Then at 0310 about 600 tons of explosives were detonated amongst 19 mines. The effect was a man made earthquake which sent German soldiers in Lille 12 miles away into a panic, and was easily heard in the southeast of England. German soldiers caught by the largest of the mines were simply blown into dust. Advancing British troops found blockhouses containing dead Germans without a mark on them; crushed internally by the blast. Some 10,000 Germans were killed in the initial explosions. Within moments of the mines going off, British artillery was let loose and 700 machine guns poured rounds into the German lines above the heads of the advancing troops as they went over the top.

The assaults achieved quick success against the dazed and confused Germans. Many surrendered without firing a shot. Where resistance occurred, it was isolated and overcome with relatively little effort. Only a few patches of effective resistance slowed the advance.

On the southern end of the attack, 3rd Australian Division had a hard time coming up through Ploegsteert Wood, taking 500 casualties. They arrived at the front line just as the mines at Trenches 122 and 127 detonated and found themselves having to go straight into the attack. Once the German trenches were reached, however, they were cleared easily..

In IX Corps sector, 36th (Ulster) Division faced one of the most heavily defended sectors of the German line and it was for this reason that they were given the greatest concentration of mines. One of these, the massive mine at Spanbroekmolen had only been completed the day before and the engineers had doubts that it would go off. It did, causing the largest crater of the day. Unfortunately as there had been worries that it might not explode, the Ulstermen went over the top on the dot when nothing happened. They were already out of their trenches when the mine exploded a few seconds later causing a number of casualties. With the aid of two tanks the Ulstermen captured an entire German Battalion HQ, before eventually coming up alongside their compatriots.

By 0900, Messines Ridge had been taken and for the first time since 1914 the British could look behind the German lines which stretched out before them. Later in the morning German reinforcements could be seen making their way forward, but it wouldn’t be until 1345, that the Germans were in a position to attempt a counterattack and when delivered it was bloodily beaten off. Casualties by the assaulting British had been comparatively light and the arrival of so many men on the ridge started to cause bunching and an ideal target for the German artillery.

Before moving on and attacking the Oosttaverne Line, Plumer had allotted a 5 hour consolidation period to allow his men to reinforce the positions taken in the first rush. This had proved its value in the swift dispatch of the German counterattack, but was not thought to be long enough, given the current condition of the ground. A further 2 hours was given to get the reserves up and in particular to move the artillery forward. The second part of the assault would begin at 1510. Unfortunately on the extreme right the 12th Australian Brigade was not informed of the delay and arrived on time at its jumping off positions. Here they were forced to lie out under a bombardment for 2 hours. Throughout the day, II Anzac would suffer just over half of all the casualties taken by 2nd Army.

At 1510, the barrage opened up again, and amidst a certain amount of confusion caused by late arrivals and delayed orders, the advance continued. One of the main threats was now coming from the German blockhouses in the Oosttaverne line and these were dealt with by means of grenades at close quarters. Attacking units would work their way around the obstacles and as soon as the defenders realized that they were being surrounded, many gave themselves up. Along the entire front the only points of real resistance were the Spoilbank in front of X Corps and the area immediately in front of the boundary between II Anzac and IX Corps. Spoilbank had resisted all morning and a second bombardment lasting most of the afternoon failed to soften the determination of the defenders. The position opposite the Australians at Blauwepoortbeek was much more serious and confused. At 1730, a requested bombardment against massing Germans fell on Australian 12th Brigade who had overshot their objective by 200 yards. Drop shorts later that evening also caused casualties amongst the men of IX Corps who were preparing to repel a counter attack. By the morning of June 8, the battle was pretty much over, though it would continue for another 6 days as the German counterattacks gradually diminished and they withdrew slightly, so that the entire Oosttaverne line was taken and consolidated.

The Messines battle, which greatly boosted morale among the Allies, signified the first time on the Western Front that defensive casualties actually exceeded attacking losses: 25,000 German against 17,000 Allied.

The operation at Messines was to be the prologue to the great offensive at Ypres, but Haig and Gen. Gough would not be ready with this attack until July 31, giving the Germans plenty of time to recover and prepare their defenses, thus wasting much of the advantage gained at Messines.

Of the 2 mines which remained undetonated on June 7, the details of their precise location were mislaid by the British following the war, to the discomfort of local townspeople. One was detonated in a thunderstorm on June 17, 1955: the only casualty was a dead cow. The second mine remains undetected, although in recent years its location is believed to have been pinpointed. No one has as yet attempted its recovery.