The Military History Thread

[danton]

Quote: "The military Levellers supported the Agreement of the People, which was discussed at the Putney Debates of October-November 1647 between the Levellers and the Grandees." Unquote.

Americans in particular might wish to read further concerning the Putney Debates. 'The Declaration of St George's Hill' (1649) written by Gerrard Winstanley, known as a Digger, another revolutionary faction crushed by force, was also seminal in forming ideas that later turn up again in 1776. However, none of the Levellers or Diggers believed in slavery.

[Ennath]

May 15, 1917
Battle of Otranto Straits

The Adriatic is 45 miles wide at the Otranto Straits. In 1915, the Allies established the Otranto Barrage to prevent Austro-Hungarian naval sorties out into the Mediterranean. This consisted mainly of a fleet of drifters, most of them British, and usually armed with a 6-pounder gun and depth charges. At first, 2 divisions of 20 would be on patrol at a time, equipped with steel nets intended to trap submarines or at least alert surface vessels to their presence. A 3rd division would be at Brindisi. The drifters were supported by destroyers and aircraft. However, the demands of the Gallipoli Campaign and other naval operations left the Otranto Barrage with insufficient resources to deter the U-boats, and only the Austro-Hungarian U-6 was caught by the nets during the course of the war. It was later considered that the straits had simply been too wide to be netted, mined or patrolled effectively.

The Austrians mounted a number of nighttime raids against the barrage, 5 in 1915, 9 in 1916 and 10 in 1917. After a raid by four Huszar-class destroyers in December 1916, a conference in London concluded that the drifters were insufficiently defended. The barrage was placed under the command of a single British officer, Commodore Algernon Heneage, who was able to call upon all Allied ships not in use elsewhere. His task was complicated by Italian insistence that all naval operations in the Adriatic must be under Italian control.

In the spring of 1917, the Austro-Hungarian navy planned a major raid on the Otranto Barrage with a force of 3 light cruisers and 2 destroyers under the command of Commander (later Admiral) Miklos Horthy, in an attempt to break the barrier to allow U-boats freer access to the Mediterranean, and Allied shipping.

The cruisers Novara, Saida, and Helgoland, modified to resemble large British destroyers, were to attack the drifters on the night of May 14-15 and attempt to destroy as many as possible before daybreak. The destroyers Csepel and Balaton were to mount a diversionary raid off the Albanian coast in order to confuse any Allied counterattack. 2 U-boats, U-4 and U-27, along with the German UC-25, were to participate as well. A supporting force composed of the armored cruiser Sankt Georg, 2 destroyers, and 4 large torpedo boats was on standby if the raiders ran into trouble. The pre-dreadnought battleship Budapest and three more large torpedo boats were also available if necessary.

An Allied destroyer patrol was in the area that night, to the north of the Barrage. The Italian flotilla leader Mirabello was accompanied by the French destroyers Commandant Rivière, Bisson, and Cimeterre. The Italian destroyer Borea was also in the area, escorting a small convoy to Valona. A support force was based in the port of Brindisi, under the Italian Rear Adm. Alfredo Acton, consisting of the British light cruisers Dartmouth and Bristoland several French and Italian destroyers.

The Italian convoy escorted by Borea was attacked by the Austro-Hungarian destroyers at approximately 0324 on May 15. The Austrians sank Borea and a munitions ship, and a second was set on fire and abandoned.

The three cruisers were able to pass through the line of drifters, and at 0330 began attacking the small barrage ships. The Austrians frequently gave the drifter crews warning to abandon ship before opening fire. In some instances, the crews chose to fight: Gowan Lee returned fire; she was heavily damaged, but remained afloat and her captain, Joseph Watt, was later awarded the Victoria Cross for his actions during the battle. There were 47 drifters in Barrage that night; the Austro-Hungarians managed to sink 14 and damage 4 more. The lack of sufficient Allied escorts forced the withdrawal of the remaining blockading ships, although only for a short time.

By this time, Allied naval forces in the area were aware of the raid, and were in a position to block the Austrian retreat. Acton ordered Mirabello’s group southward at 0435, while he embarked on the Dartmouth. By 0645, the Dartmouth and Bristol, along with the Italian destroyers Mosto, Pilo, Schiaffino, Acerbi, and Aquila, were sailing north in an attempt to cut off the Austrian cruisers. The Italian light cruiser Marsala, the flotilla leader Racchia, and the destroyers Insidioso, Indomito, and Impavido were readying to sail in support as well.

The Mirabello group engaged the Austrian cruisers at 0700, but was heavily outgunned, and instead attempted to shadow the fleeing cruisers. At 0745, Acton’s ships encountered the Csepel and Balaton. After 20 minutes, the Italian destroyers were able to close the distance; the two groups engaged in a short artillery duel before a shot from Csepel struck Aquila and disabled the ship's boilers. By this time, the Austrian destroyers were under the cover of the coastal batteries at Durazzo, and were able to make good their escape.

At 0900, Bristol’s lookouts spotted the smoke from the Austrian cruisers to the south of her position. The Allied ships turned to engage; they had superiority both in numbers and in firepower. Unfortunately for the Allies, their numerical superiority was quickly lost, as their destroyers were either occupied with mechanical problems, or protecting those destroyers suffering from breakdowns. The support forces of both sides, the Sankt Georg group for the Austro-Hungarians, and the Marsala group for the Allies, were quickly dispatched to the battle.

Dartmouth, faster than Bristol, closed to effective engagement range and opened fire. A shell struck Novara, at which point the Austrian ships laid a smoke screen. Dartmouth was struck several times, and by 1100, Acton ordered the ship to reduce speed to allow Bristol to catch up. Novarawas hit several more times, and her main feed pumps and starboard auxiliary steam pipe had been damaged, which caused the ship to begin losing speed. At 1105, Acton turned away in an attempt to separate Saida from Novara and Helgoland. At this point, Sankt Georg was approaching the scene, which prompted Acton to temporarily withdraw to consolidate his forces. This break in the action was enough time for the Austrians to save the crippled Novara; Saida took the ship under tow while Helgoland covered them.

Unaware that Novara had been disabled, and fearing that his ships would be drawn too close to the Austrian naval base at Cattaro, Acton broke off the pursuit. The destroyer Acerbi misread the signal, and attempted to launch a torpedo attack, but was driven off by the combined fire of the Austrian cruisers. At 1205, Acton realized the dire situation Novara was in, but by this time, the Sankt Georg group was too close. The two Austrian groups united, and were soon joined by the 2 destroyers. The entire group returned to Cattaro together.

At 1330, UC-25 torpedoed Dartmouth, causing serious damage. The escorting destroyers forced UC-25 from the area, but Dartmouth had to be abandoned for a period of time, before it could be towed back to port. The French destroyer Boutefeu attempted to pursue the German submarine, but struck a mine laid by UC-25 that morning and sank rapidly.

As a result of the raid, it was decided by the British naval command that unless sufficient destroyers were available to protect the barrage, the drifters would have to be withdrawn at night. The drifters would only be operating for less than 12 hours a day, and would have to leave their positions by 1500 every day.

Austria-Hungary’s greatest naval triumph, the battle had little strategic impact on the war. The barrage was never particularly effective at preventing the U-boat operations of Germany and Austria-Hungary in the first place. The system was being called in Allied naval circles “a large sieve through which U-boats could pass with impunity”. The raid risked some of the most advanced units of the Austro-Hungarian fleet on an operation that offered minimal strategic returns.

In 1917–1918, reinforcements from the Australian and American navies brought the blockading force up to 35 destroyers, 52 drifters and more than 100 other vessels. But submarines continued to slip through until the end of the war, while only the introduction of the convoy system and better coordination amongst the Allies helped to cut the losses they were causing.

[Ennath]

May 16, 1648
Decision at Zolte Wody

With the death of Hetman Stanislaw Koniecpolski, Polish King Wladyslaw IV Vasa, established direct relations with the Cossacks, concerning the “wrongs and injustices that they were suffering”, delivering a letter to Cossack leaders. He then began mustering Cossack troops for a campaign against the Crimean Khanate. He chose Lvov as the mustering point. His extensive preparations raised concerns in the Polish Diet that he was planning to impose royal power and in July 1646 they ordered preparations to cease. This increased the King’s reliance on the Cossacks.

Some of the Cossack leaders refused to go against the Diet’s decision, but Bohdan Khmelnytsky decided to proceed. He was able to gain control of the King’s letter and decided to take the Cossack recruiting onto himself, arousing some suspicion. In May 1647, the Diet met to discuss the King’s war plans. Sometime by the end of May, Khmelnytsky appeared in Warsaw, seeking to reassure himself of the King’s stance. During this time, his foes accused him of inciting a Cossack revolt. This would prove true.

An important gathering took place in October 1647 near Chyhyryn, where Khmelnytsky reminded the public of the King’s hopes for war with the Tatars and how the magnates had frustrated those hopes. He announced that it was a good time for a rising, with the Poles so divided. His listeners, however, were not yet ready to rise. Some time after this, Khmelnytsky was arrested, but was released on bond. Khmelnytsky "set out" for the Lower Dnieper River “to others who had been similarly mistreated”. Traveling with an escort of 250 men, he suddenly made for the Zaporizhian Sich, arriving in late December.

At the end of January, Khmelnytsky led a surprise attack on the Polish garrison at Khortytsia. Most of the registered Cossacks in the garrison joined him and Polish Col. Gorski retreated to Kryliv. After expelling the Polish garrison from the Zaporizhian Sich Khmelnytsky sent out several letters calling for a general rising. By the end of February, he had at least 5000 men. During that time Cossacks continued to strengthen their fortifications on Butsk (Butska) Island.

On March 15, 1648, Khmelnytsky arrived in the Tatar capital Bakhchisaray on a diplomatic mission. He presented to Khan Giray the King's letter and proposed an alliance. After few days of thinking Giray decided to send Tugay Beg with a force to aid the Cossacks. Khmelnytsky then returned to Sich, leaving his son with the Khan as “insurance”. On April 19, a General Council unanimously expressed their will for the war against Poland and an immediate expedition. Khmelnytsky was solemnly elected Hetman.

The main force of Crown Hetman Mikołaj Potocki was quartered in Cherkasy, while the Kalinowski regiment was in Korsun, with others in the estates of Alexander Koniecpolski in Kaniv. The whole Crown force designated to suppress the uprising, accounted for less than 7000 soldiers. Before departing the Sich, Khmelnytsky sent out Tugay with part of his unit (500 cavalry), to secure a safe passage to the Sich for other volunteers. After receiving intelligence that the Polish Army was heading for the Kodak fortress, Khmelnytsky decided to march on April 22 towards Kryliv and Chyhyryn.

Meanwhile, word of a rising had spread through the Commonwealth. Either because they underestimated the size of the uprising, or because they needed to act quickly to prevent it from spreading, Grand Crown Hetman Mikołaj Potocki and Field Crown Hetman Marcin Kalinowski sent a vanguard of 3000 soldiers under the command of Potocki's son, Stefan (in fact, commanded by Commissioner Szemberg and Lt. Czarniecki) deep into Cossack territory, without waiting for additional forces from Prince Jeremi Wisniowiecki. A force of 5000 remained with Mikołaj Potocki while he attempted to gather local reinforcements from the various private armies of the local magnates. Stefan's force arrived first at the rendezvous point.

On April 28, Stefan Potocki’s forces came upon Khmelnytsky's army in an area near the modern city of Zhovti Vody. The 3000 Commonwealth troops were greatly outnumbered at this point in comparison with Tatar-Cossack troops of 7-8000 (800 Cossacks and 6-7000 Crimean Tatars under Tugay). After the first small clashes between the Polish vanguard and Tatar scouts (April 27-29) Stefan Potocki arrived at Zhovti Vody and ordered his force to establish a wagon fort (tabor), which allowed for a messenger to be sent to Mikołaj Potocki, while they defended themselves over the next two weeks. The presence of the Tatars was a surprise to the Crown army, as they did not know of the Cossack-Tatar alliance. On the 29th, the Allies attacked the tabor and, after a short struggle, forced them to withdraw. However, the Poles were reinforced by loyal Cossacks and counterattacked; the Tatars were defeated with heavy loss and withdrew from the fight.

From prisoners, the Poles heard that the Tatars were 12,000 strong, with more to come. Decided that an open-field fight against such a large force was too risky, the Polish commanders decided to remain within their tabor and wait for their main force to arrive. Under the leadership of Jan Fryderyk Sapieha, the Poles began to fortify a camp near the water. On April 30, the main Tatar force had returned and 4 hours later the Cossack force joined them, investing the camp. On May 1, an assault was launched on 2 sides, but the Tatars were late and attacked only after the Cossack attack had already failed. 4 of 5 more attempts met a similar fate in the coming days. The Allies then settled for a blockade.

On May 4, near Kamianyi Zaton, 3500 registered Cossacks mutinied, killing all officers and loyal Cossacks. The mutineers joined Khmelnytsky on May 13. The next day, Stefan Potocki saw his already undermanned force dwindle to 1000 men, when the 1200 registered Cossacks and some dragoons also joined the uprising. This created a gap in the Polish defenses, but an Allied attack was repulsed and the line re-established. Khmelnytsky’s army had now swelled to more than 11,000. Despite the overwhelming numerical superiority, gaining the Polish ramparts was not an easy task, especially in the absence of heavy artillery. Therefore, the Allies decided to resort to guile. Tugay proposed negotiations.

On May 13, Khmelnytsky met with representatives of Stefan Potocki, who debated turning over his superior artillery in exchange for safe passage. Khmelnytsky set tough terms; the Poles were to turn over all cannons, banners and Commissioner Szemberg, Potocki agreed on all save Szemberg. Finally, an agreement was made. However, as soon as the guns were turned over, Khmelnytsky broke the agreement and imprisoned the Polish negotiators.

The next day there was an attempt to break out of the encirclement; the Poles and their tabor began to move towards the small fortified town of Kryliv. They were, however, stopped, with hundreds of soldiers captured by the Tatars. The Cossacks launched 2 assaults, but were repulsed. The Poles now decided to make their break through to Kryliv, starting at 1:00 AM on May 16.

The Poles managed to break through, but the Tatars began a pursuit of the marching Poles. Tugay tried all night to break into the column, but without success. At dawn, the Polish wagons moved on to Kniazhi Bairaky. The Cossacks arrived soon after and opened an artillery fire; however, the Tatars halted this as they wanted as many captives as possible. Another assault followed; Potocki was wounded and Sapieha took command, but the attack failed. However, a second attack which followed quickly on the heels of the first succeeded. The tabor was overwhelmed and the fugitives destroyed. Both Potocki and Sapieha were captured, but Potocki died of his wounds 3 days later.

Mikołaj Potocki, who had received word on May 3 of his son's plight, could not move his forces in time to reinforce the Commonwealth position. Bolstered by their victory, the Cossack and Tatar forces turned on him and defeated him at Korsun (May 26).

[Ennath]

May 17, 1900
Relief of Mafeking

Shortly before the outbreak of the 2nd Boer War, Lord Wolseley, Commander-in-Chief of the British Army, sent Col. Robert Baden-Powell, with a handful of officers, to Cape Colony to raise 2 Regiments of Mounted Rifles from Rhodesia. Although the regiments were raised in Rhodesia, Baden-Powell chose Mafeking to store supplies for his force due to its location - both near the border and on the railway between Bulawayo and Kimberley - and because of it was a local administrative center. The town had good stocks of food and other necessities. However, Mafeking was isolated, exposed and close to Boer-controlled areas.

Baden-Powell, whose orders were for a mobile field force of cavalry, made the mistake of allowing his accumulation of stores at Mafeking to dictate his actions. Consequently, he chose to immobilize half his force to hold it against a Boer attack. Mafeking’s defenders numbered around 2000, including the Protectorate Regiment (500 men), around 300 from the Bechuanaland Rifles and Cape Police and a further 300 men from the town. The garrison armed 300 African natives with rifles. nicknamed the “Black Watch” and used to guard the perimeter. Prior to the siege, Lord Edward Cecil formed the Mafeking Cadet Corps of boys aged 12 to 15 (claimed to be one of the inspirations for the Boy Scouts) who acted as messengers and orderlies and released men to fight. Work to build defenses around the 6-mile perimeter started on September 19; the town would eventually be equipped with an extensive network of trenches and gun emplacements.

President Kruger of the Boer South African Republic declared war on October 12, 1899. Under orders of Gen. Piet Cronje, the Mafeking railway and telegraph lines were cut the same day, and the town was under siege from October 13. Mafeking was first shelled on the 16th after ignoring Cronje’s 9:00 deadline to surrender. Gen. J. P. Snyman commanded the siege.

Although outnumbered, the garrison withstood siege for 217 days, defying the predictions of the politicians on both sides. In reality, the Boers risked little to tie up Baden-Powell’s force and stores and for most of the time the number of Boers actively engaged in the siege were few. While at one time the Boer troops numbered over 8000 and more artillery was briefly brought up, most of these were merely moving through the siege camp. The Boers were able to take control of the railway and roads and used the siege camp as a staging post. Baden-Powell remained invested in the town despite repeated orders and, until he ate his own horses, had the capacity to break out. As the siege drew on, it became apparent to the Boers that mounting public pressure in Britain would force attempted relief of Mafeking, tying up far more British forces. With few soldiers, no modern artillery and little risk, the Boers tied up much greater British forces.

Meanwhile, the garrison resorted to deception. Fake landmines were laid around the town in view of the Boers and their spies in the town, and soldiers were ordered to simulate avoiding barbed wire (non-existent) when moving between trenches; guns and a searchlight (improvised from an acetylene lamp and a biscuit tin) were moved around the town to increase their apparent number. A howitzer was built in Mafeking’s railway workshops, and even an old cannon (dated 1770) was pressed into service. Noticing the Boers had failed to remove any of the rails, the British commanders had an armored train from the railyard loaded with sharpshooters, sent up the rail line in a daring attack right into the heart of the Boer camp, followed by a return to Mafeking. However, the casualties made this Baden-Powell’s only attempt at such an attack. Often British soldiers had to dress as women just to undertake normal activities such as fetching water and sewing to deceive the enemy.

The morale of the civilian population was given attention, and Sunday ceasefires were negotiated so that sports, competitions and theatrical performances could be held. Notable were the cricket matches held on Sunday. Among the personalities in besieged Mafeking was Lady Sarah Wilson, aunt of Winston Churchill, in South Africa with her army officer husband. Lady Sarah is said to have been conducting spying activities against the Boers until arrested by General Snyman and exchanged for General Viljoen, held prisoner by Baden-Powell. For the rest of the siege Lady Sarah’s bunker was the social focus of the besieged town and she herself an active member of the garrison.

As in the case of the nearby Siege of Kimberley, the Boers decided that the town was too heavily defended to take. On November 19, 4000 Boers were redeployed elsewhere, although the siege remained and shelling continued.

On December 26, Baden-Powell launched an attack on Game Tree Fort, a Boer strongpoint north of Mafeking. Unknown to the garrison the fort had been significantly strengthened and the attack was an expensive failure.

From January 1900 food stocks in Mafeking fell low. Baden-Powell remedied this difficulty by withholding rations from the sizeable Baralong town in the south west corner of Mafeking.

Aware of the approaching British relief columns, the Boers mounted a final major attack at 4:00 AM on May 12, 1900. A force of 240 Boers, covered by a feint attack east of the town, slipped between the Hidden Hollow and Limestone Forts; guided by a British deserter, they followed a path beside the Molopo River to where it enters the Stadt, the village where the native Africans lived. They burst in unopposed and set fire to the huts in order to signal the attack’s progress. By about 5:30, the Boers seized the police barracks on the outskirts of Mafeking, killing 1 and wounding 30. However, the garrison was now alerted. The African police (of the Baralong tribe) cut off the Boer escape route. Snyman failed to support the spearhead, which was forced to surrender by the end of the day.

The siege was finally lifted on May 17, when a flying column of some 2000 British troops, relieved the town after fighting their way in. Among the relieving force was Major Baden Baden-Powell, brother of the garrison commander.

Until reinforcements arrived in February 1900, the war had gone poorly for the British. The resistance to the siege was seen as one of the positive highlights in the media, and it and the eventual relief of the town excited the liveliest sympathy in Britain. There were immense celebrations in the country at the news of its relief. Promoted to the youngest major-general in the army, and awarded the CB, Baden-Powell was also treated as a hero when he finally returned to Britain in 1903. He later founded the Boy Scouts.

The remaining stores that Baden-Powell had amassed in Mafeking were so great that they were able to re-supply the relief force and operations in the area for some time. While a sorely needed publicity victory, British commanders believed Baden-Powell had been foolish to risk so many supplies and allow himself to be besieged. For Baden-Powell and in the British media, the siege was a victory but for the more practical Boers it had been a practical and strategic victory. For no significant achievement, the townspeople and garrison suffered 212 killed and over 600 wounded. For the British Army commanders, it was a distraction and nuisance and, soon after, Baden-Powell's further poor combat performance in completely abandoning the mostly Rhodesian and Australian soldiers and at Elands River, led to his removal from any combat command.

[Ennath]

331 BC
Battle of Megalopolis

While Alexander was besting Darius at Gaugamela (see posting), problems were mounting for his rule back home. Memnon, who was governor in Thrace, had decided to break away from Macedonia and carve out his own kingdom. Antipater, Alexander’s governor for the home provinces, marched against him with his entire army, but had to settle for a negotiated resolution, keeping Memnon in his position in return for a renewed pledge of loyalty. This lenient settlement was prompted on Antipater’s part by his urgent need to address an uprising in southern Greece.

Sparta had not been present at the defeat of the Greeks at Chaeronea (338 BC, see posting) and had not recognized Macedonian overlordship. In the autumn of 333 BC, the Spartan King Agis III had met with the Persian commanders Pharnabazus and Autophradates, somewhere in the Aegean Sea, and revealed to them his plans for a war against Macedon. The Persians agreed to support Agis; however, they could only spare him 30 talents and 10 ships. Agis also recruited Greek mercenary survivors of Issus (see posting) - who had served in the Persian army.

Antipater had garrisoned the Peloponnese under the general Corrhagus, who was perhaps headquartered at the center for Alexander’s Greek league in Corinth. Agis led a force of mercenaries against him during the summer of 331. Agis’ troops probably numbered 8000, Diodorus having recorded that he used that many on Crete 2 years earlier. The Spartan army likely included 6000 hoplites and 2000 skirmishers, the latter mostly peltasts (though a few Cretan archers might have followed Agis home as well). Corrhagus would also have had a largely mercenary force, maybe 4000 of it heavy-armed in line with detachments often used in the past for minor Macedonian expeditions. Corhagus’ spearmen likely enjoyed support from 1000-1500 light infantry. Agis thus had an edge in manpower, but not so overwhelming as to entirely discourage his enemy from accepting battle. Still, he used his greater numbers to carry the action either with deeper files pushing through at a critical point or longer ranks wrapping around a flank. The latter, being a typically Spartan approach, is more likely. At any rate, Agis gained a crushing victory and killed Corrhagus. Macedonian losses were 20-30% and those of Agis 3-5%.

The Spartans now became champions of Greek independence and attracted troops from other discontented poleis. Diodorus put the uprising’s total strength at 20,000 infantry and 2000 horsemen. The foot soldiers probably broke down into 4000 light infantry and 16,000 hoplites. Among the spearmen there were some 6000 mercenaries and 4500 Spartans (their entire muster) with the rest being allies from Elis, Achaea and Arcadia. Cavalry primarily came from Sparta and Elis, though some renegades from Phocis and Thessaly might have been present as well. (Demosthenes boasted of having brought some Thessalians into revolt) Agis led this coalition army and took it into Messenia. Megalopolis had remained openly loyal to Alexander there and the Spartan king put that city under siege.

Antipater was delayed by the situation in Thrace, but by summer’s end had returned to regroup and lead out his entire homeland force to deal with the Greek revolt. He collected some still loyal allies on the way south until he had 40,000 men in all. About a quarter of his troops were Macedonians: 3000 hypaspists, 9000 phalangites, 3000 foot skirmishers, 600 light lancers and only 400 Companions, Antipater having just sent off a third of his native horsemen to reinforce Alexander. His other soldiers numbered 15,000 hoplites, 5000 light infantry and 4000 cavalry. The allied cavalry was Thracian, Thessalian and Boeotian, while the infantry came from Boeotia, the Peloponnese (especially the northeast) and mercenaries (maybe up to a third). Therefore, it was a powerful army that arrived with Antipater to disrupt Agis’ siege of Megalopolis; one that, in fact, reversed the manpower advantage that the Spartan had held over Corrhagus.

Caught in open country by an enemy much superior in both numbers and quality of cavalry, Agis had no real option for escape and formed up for a pitched battle. He faced an opposing heavy infantry formation that likely stretched across more than 1.6 miles of the plain before Megalopolis, forcing him to file thinly if he was to avoid a dangerous enemy overlap. His phalanx probably had the picked men from Elis (the Three Hundred and the Four Hundred) on the far left with their other countrymen and the Achaeans and the Arcadians next in that order across the center. Agis and his Spartans took the post of honor on the right wing. Antipater set up his phalangites at either 10 or 16-deep. The former had been common under Philip, but the latter, thicker array had likely become standard practice under Alexander; moreover, even in files of 16, Antipater could still compel the enemy to stretch out at non-optimum depth. These pikemen would have held the far left to anchor the battle line on that end. As for his spearmen, the Macedonian deployed them in 8-man files. He and his hypaspists no doubt took their customary station on the right, with the mercenaries next in line and allied militia spearmen filling in down to where the phalangites stood.

With cavalry and light infantry screening their flanks, the phalanxes closed into shock combat to initiate what was to prove a long, grinding fight. Agis and his Spartan spearmen had not been able to outflank the phalangites on their end of the line nor could they gain sufficient penetration into the bristling hedge of pike-points to do telling damage. As for the Macedonian pikemen, they patiently fixed their foes in place, jabbing away with their ungainly weapons to do whatever harm they could against men whose armor and large, overlapping shields offered precious few targets of opportunity. It was slow, strenuous work and not destined (indeed, not even designed) to be decisive. Nonetheless, it exacted a price from the enemy as, here and there over time, the pikes found rare openings and laid a few Spartan front-fighters low. And at some point, Agis, who stood somewhere in the forward ranks, became one of those victims, going down with a wound serious enough to keep him from regaining his feet.

The Spartans kept on fighting with equal measures of fury and frustration as their king was carried to the rear. The battle remained hopelessly stalemated along one wing while the light-armed fray was apparently no more decisive off either flank, making the action on the other wing critical. Here, on the Macedonian right, it was hoplite against hoplite with part-time militiamen for the Greeks (albeit some of them elite) against fulltime soldiers, whether they be Macedonian or mercenary. This was a contest of endurance and willpower in which Antipater’s well-seasoned and more deeply filed professionals finally prevailed. Unable to resist any longer, the allies on Agis’ left wing lost heart at last and broke in flight, forcing the still game Spartans to also give way, lest they be surrounded.

Antipater’s large cadres of horse and foot skirmishers may have underperformed during the main action, but they now executed a thorough and deadly chase. As a result, the rebel death toll rose to nearly 25% (5300 per Diodorus). It was at this stage that Agis actually met his end when a group of pursuing peltasts caught up with the men trying to carry him to safety. The king ordered that his comrades flee to fight another day; then, rising to his knees, he made a solitary last stand. Diodorus claimed that Agis managed to kill a number of his lighter-armed attackers before a thrown javelin took him down for good. The stubborn battle had been costly for Antipater. He lost 3500 men (almost 9%), which was very high for a victorious force in this period. However, Megalopolis was even more devastating for his opponents as, having taken horrific casualties and with a king dead, the Spartans were broken and their uprising finished. Sparta, like the other Greek states, was now forced into the Macedonian-dominated League of Corinth.

[Dr Pepper]

Originally Posted by VintageWomble

Also, something which is often forgotten, the Germans used en masse captured Czechoslovakian tanks such as the LT Vz. 35 and especially the LT Vz.38, which was at the start of the 2nd World War one of the best tanks (if not THE best tank).

But you're right about the Char Somua. C'etait une bete de se- uhhh de guerre.

And the chassis of the LT Vz 38 in 1943 formed the basis of the extremely successful light Jagdpanzer 'Hetzer' one of the better performing tank killers in the German inventory-so successful that postwar the czech produced a couple of hundred for their own use-and the Swiss kept theirs in service till 1970...!

[Ennath]

May 18, 1190
Battle of Iconium

After the disastrous Battle of Hattin and the Siege of Jerusalem, much of the Crusader states had been seized by Saladin’s forces. Pope Gregory VIII called for a new crusade to restore the city to Christian hands and help the remaining crusader strongholds. German Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa responded to the call almost immediately. He took up the Cross at Mainz Cathedral on March 27, 1188 and was the first to set out for the Holy Land in May 1189 with an army traditionally given as 100,000 men (probably about 15,000, including 3000 cavalry). He was also joined by a contingent of 2000 men from the Hungarian prince Géza, the younger brother of King, Béla III.

After passing through Hungary, Serbia, Bulgaria and territories not always friendly, such as the Byzantine Empire, the Crusader force under the Emperor arrived in Anatolia, at that time under the control of the Seljuq Sultan of Rum, Qijili Arslan. The Turks offered to let Barbarossa and his army pass through their territory for the price of 300 pounds of gold and “the lands of the Armenians”. Barbarossa refused, supposedly saying “Rather than making a royal highway with gold and silver, with the help of our Lord Jesus Christ, whose knights we are, the road will have to be opened with iron”. As a result, the Turks, continually harassed the Germans with a series of ambushes and small raids. The Germans, in turn, launched attacks against whatever Turkish forces they could find. On May 7, 1190, a Turkish army was destroyed by a Crusader detachment under the Duke of Swabia and the Duke of Dalmatia near Philomelium, supposedly resulting in 4174 deaths for the Turks.

More important than the battles was the logistical situation; supplies were running out, and morale was low. Desertion was frequent among the foot soldiers, as was death from dehydration. Despite this, the crusaders continued their march until they reached Iconium on May 13. This city, once Roman and Byzantine, was located on the road that connected Constantinople to Antioch. Frederick decided to take the city and use it to rest and resupply his army before plunging ahead to the Holy Land. So it was that on May 17 that the German army encamped in the so-called “pleasure garden of the sultan”, just outside the city. Meanwhile, Sultan Qijili Arslan regrouped and rebuilt his forces after the first defeat, and returned the next day.

On the morning of May 18, Barbarossa divided his army into two groups: one under the Duke Frederick VI of Swabia, his son, with the task of attacking the city, while the other part remained under his personal command to fend off the Seljuq field army.

Soon after he moved to attack the city, Duke Frederick met a German ambassador, Geoffrey of Wiesbach, who had previously attempted to negotiate with the Sultan, and told him that the Muslim commander, with much of his army, just after spotting the crusading army, had taken refuge in the fortified citadel in Iconium, along with almost all the inhabitants and with treasure and the abundant food supplies so coveted by the Germans. The duke then immediately took the city with his troops, and on the first attempt, he managed to shoot down one of the city gates, overcoming Seljuq resistance and penetrating just in front of the walls of the citadel. The demoralized garrison surrendered.

Meanwhile, Barbarossa was attacked just outside of Iconium, by the Seljuq army of Qijili Arslan, probably about 65,000 strong. The strength of the Turkish force and suddenness of their attack threw the Germans back on their heels. At this point, the Emperor rallied his men, calling out, “But why do we tarry, of what are we afraid? Christ reigns. Christ conquers. Christ commands”. He then led a fierce charge that broke the Turkish line. The fragmented Seljuqs were surrounded piecemeal and overcome. The survivors fled, leaving the city to the Germans.

After the victory, the crusaders rested for 5 days in the city, and continued their march on May 23, taking Turkish hostages to safeguard themselves. The success of the Imperial army greatly alarmed Saladin, who even dismantled the walls of the Syrian ports lest they be used by the crusaders against him. But this proved unnecessary as, on June 10, Barbarossa suffered a sudden heart attack while crossing the Saleph River, fell from his horse and drowned. With the death of the emperor, most of his army disbanded. Frederick of Swabia carried on with the remnants of the German army, along with the Hungarians of prince Géza, with the aim of burying the Emperor in Jerusalem, but efforts to conserve his body in vinegar failed. Hence, his flesh was interred in the Church of St Peter in Antioch, his bones in the cathedral of Tyre, and his heart and inner organs in Tarsus.

[Ennath]

May 19, 1985
War of the Camps

Beginning in the late 1960s, Palestinian factions gradually turned the Jabal Amel region of Southern Lebanon into a de facto state of their own, using it as a base for launching attacks on Israel. Some of these groups would raise roadblocks where regular Lebanese would be made to pay “tolls”, which alienated important sectors of the native population, in particular the Maronite Christian and Shi'a communities. Although in time the Shi'ite community would support the Palestinians against Israel, the PLO and the more radical Rejectionist Front in Southern Lebanon led many Lebanese Shi'ites to resent the Palestinian presence.

Israel's incursion into Lebanon in June 1982 succeeded in driving thousands of Palestinian fighters out of Southern Lebanon and West Beirut. Under international auspices, PLO forces were evacuated to northern Lebanon and resettled in the port city of Tripoli. By this time, however, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad proceeded to expel Arafat and the Palestinian factions allied to him from Lebanon.

Assad himself sought to control both the PLO and Lebanon. His anxieties were caused by a worry that Palestinian activities would invite another Israeli invasion and that his minority Alawite regime would be endangered by the Sunni Palestinians. Initially, Syria encouraged its own Palestinian groups, facilitating the entrance of as-Sa'iqa, PFLP-GC, and the pro-Syrian dissident Fatah faction of Abu Musa. However, Syria’s allies were only powerful in areas controlled by the Syrian Army, such as the Beqaa valley. In areas beyond Syrian control, it soon became apparent that the independent Palestinian organizations Fatah, PFLP and DFLP had far stronger support.

Thus, Assad recruited Col. Said al-Muragha (Abu Musa), to drive Arafat out of Lebanon. Musa, an ex-member of Fatah, used Arafat’s public “willingness” to negotiate with Israel as a pretext for war. In November 1983, Musa’s Fatah al-Intifada faction fought the Arafat-controlled Fatah for a month in Tripoli, until Arafat was on his way to Tunisia by December. Unfortunately for Assad, Arafat’s Fatah forces crept back over the next 2 years, ensconcing themselves in the refugee camps in Beirut and the South. As more Palestinians regrouped in the South, Assad’s anxiety grew. This time, he recruited the more powerful Shi’ite Amal Movement militia headed by Nabih Berri to dislodge Arafat’s loyalists. The benefit for Assad of this alliance was more complete control of Lebanon through his local Lebanese allies. The benefit for Amal was revenge for decades of Palestinian arrogance and further control over Shia-populated areas of Lebanon.

By mid-1985, Amal was also in conflict with the Druze Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) and its militia, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), led by Walid Jumblatt in the Chouf Mountains region. As Amal-PSP relations severely deteriorated, the Palestinian alliance with the PSP began to be reestablished. Unlike the majority of other Lebanese leftist militias, the Communist Action Organization in Lebanon (OCAL), led by Muhsin Ibrahim, refused to cooperate with Syria. This support for Arafat incurred strong opposition from Syria, forcing the OCAL to operate underground beginning in 1987.

After the Multinational Force (MNF) withdrew from Beirut in February 1984, Amal took control of West Beirut, establishing a number of outposts and checkpoints around the camps (in Beirut, but also in the south). On April 15, 1985, an alliance gathering Amal, PSP and the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) militia, the Popular Guard, attacked Al-Mourabitoun, the main Lebanese Sunni Nasserite militia and the closest ally of the PLO in Lebanon. Al-Mourabitoun was vanquished after a week of street-fighting and their leader, Ibrahim Kulaylat sent into exile.

On May 19, 1985, heavy fighting erupted between Amal and Palestinian camp militias for the control of Sabra and Shatila and Burj el-Barajneh camps in Beirut. Amal was supported by the predominantly Shia 6th Brigade of the Lebanese Army under Gen. Abd al-Halim Kanj and by the 87th Infantry Battalion from the predominantly Christian 8th Brigade loyal to Gen. Michel Aoun stationed in East Beirut. In terms of sheer numbers, the Shi’ites outnumbered the Palestinians 5:1. Amal was heavily backed by Syria, whereas the PLO did not enjoy much outside support. Amal also had the advantage over the PLO in terms of equipment, especially armored vehicles. Virtually all the houses in the camps were reduced to rubble.

Although the PSP/PLA and LCP/Popular Guard joined forces with Amal in defeating Al-Mourabitoun, they remained neutral in the fight against the PLO. Despite prodding from Syria, these parties contributed nothing more than verbal support for Amal, demanding that Arafat step down. The PSP/PLA even allowed the PLO to station artillery in Druze-controlled areas. This left Amal to do the work of dislodging the Arafat loyalists, with some help from Syria’s Palestinian allies, such as As-Sa'iqa, PFLP-GC and Fatah al-Intifada. The alliance between Amal and most of the pro-Syrian groups eventually soured, however, and clashes would later break out between them. While some dissident Palestinian commanders such as Ahmed Jibril and Abu Musa still supported Amal against the PLO, many anti-Arafat fighters battled Amal in defense of the camps.

On May 30, much of Sabra fell. Amid Arab and Soviet political pressure on Syria and an emergency meeting of Arab League foreign ministers, Amal declared a unilateral ceasefire the next day. Despite this, lower-scale fighting continued. In Shatila, the Palestinians only retained the part of the camp around the mosque. Burj al-Barajneh remained under siege as Amal prevented supplies from entering or its population from leaving. The death toll remains uncertain, but is likely to have been high. International pressure led to a ceasefire on June 17. Sporadic clashes erupted again in September and for a week after March 29, 1986. In Sidon, Amal issued a stern warning to Palestinian factions who tried to reorganize in southern Lebanon. Exactly one year after the first battle, on May 19, 1986, heavy fighting erupted again. Bolstered by newly received heavy weaponry (including Soviet-made artillery and tanks loaned by Syria), Amal tightened its siege. Many ceasefires were announced, but most did not last more than a few days.

Meanwhile, throughout West Beirut, Amal continued to suppress the remaining predominately Sunni, pro-Palestinian militias such as the small 6th of February Movement in June 1986. The PLO was aided by fighters from the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) who lived alongside the Palestinians in the refugee camps. The situation began to cool on June 24, when the Syrians deployed some Commandos, assisted by a special task force of 800 Lebanese Army soldiers and Gendarmes from the Internal Security Forces.

Conflict was also occurred in the South, where the presence of Palestinian guerrillas in predominantly Shia areas led to frequent clashes. The third and deadliest battle began on September 29, 1986, when fighting occurred at the Rashidiyye camp in Tyre between Amal and local PLO groups. The conflict immediately spread to Sidon and Beirut. Palestinian forces in Sidon managed to occupy the Christian town of Maghdouché in the eastern hills of Sidon, in order to re-open the road to Rashidiyye. In Sidon, Israeli aircraft launched several strikes against Palestinian positions around the city. As before, the Arab League pressured both parties to halt the fighting. A cease-fire was negotiated on December 15, but was rejected by Arafat’s Fatah, who tried to ease the situation by giving some of its positions to Al-Mourabitoun militia in exchange for supplies to the camps.

Despite the cease-fire, shelling of the camps continued. In Beirut, the ongoing blockade led to dramatic food and medicine shortages in the camps. In February 1987, the fighting spread throughout West Beirut, with Hezbollah and the PSP/PLA supporting the Palestinians. The LCP/Popular Guard and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) aligned with the PSP/PLA in attacking Amal positions. Amal was overpowered as the PSP/PLA quickly seized large portions of West Beirut, and the situation could no longer be tolerated by Damascus. Under the command of Syria's military intelligence chief in Lebanon, Gen. Ghazi Kenaan, the Syrian Army began moving into West Beirut on February 21 and attacked the Hezbollah headquarters in the Fathallah barracks. On April 7, Amal finally lifted the siege and handed its positions around the camps over to the Syrian Army. In the summer of 1988, Abu Musa returned to the camps, and another 127 people were killed in the fighting. After this episode, the War of the Camps was considered to be concluded by July 1988.

This fighting inflicted a severe blow in terms of public image for many Muslim militias and destroyed the perception of unity. The main Sunni militia, Al-Mourabitoun, was crushed and their leader Ibrahim Kulaylat sent into exile. The results were mitigated since the PLO retained control of some of the camps.

An official Lebanese government report put the total number of casualties for these battles at 3781 dead and 6787 injured in the fighting between Amal and the Palestinians. Furthermore, the number of Palestinians killed in internal struggles between pro-Syrian and independent organizations was around 2000. The real number is probably higher because thousands were not registered in Lebanon and the blockade meant that no officials could access the camps, so that all the casualties could not be counted.

[Ennath]

May 20, 1813
Battle of Bautzen

Following Napoleon’s victory at Lützen on May 2, 1813 (see posting), Prince Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Russo-Prussian army retreated to Bautzen, where it was reinforced by 13,000 Russians commanded by Prince Mikhail Barclay de Tolly.

Napoleon had received reinforcements from France, including a Young Guard division, 4 Old Guard battalions and 2 cavalry divisions, and also now had the support of the Saxon Army. He replaced the previous division of his force into separate Armies of the Elbe and Main with a single Army of the Elbe. It consisted of two wings. The northern one under Marshal Michel Ney contained 79,500 infantry, 4800 cavalry and 26 artillery batteries. The main body, under the Emperor’s personal command, consisted of 107,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry and 53 artillery batteries; 19,000 of the infantry and 4000 of the cavalry were Guards.. His step-son Prince Eugene, who had performed poorly in this campaign, was sent to command in Italy. Napoleon’s main problem was that his shortage of cavalry meant that he was uncertain of the location and strength of the enemy. He deduced that the bulk of the Allied army would fall back on Bautzen, with a portion covering Berlin. On May 12, the Emperor sent forward a strong reconnaissance force under Marshal Jacques MacDonald in order to find the enemy. Ney’s wing was to prepare to move on Berlin.

Diplomatic negotiations continued. Prince Klemens von Metternich, the Austrian Foreign Minister, offered to mediate, sending delegates to both sides in order to discover what they would offer Austria. Napoleon planned to send Armand Caulaincourt, one of his closest diplomatic advisers, to negotiate directly with Tsar Alexander rather than talking via Austria, but Caulaincourt had not departed by May 16, when MacDonald discovered the enemy at Bautzen.

The Emperor ordered IV (Henri-Gatien Bertrand), VI (Auguste Marmont) and XI (MacDonald) Corps to pin the Allies whilst Marshal Charles Nicolas Oudinot’s XII Corps out-flanked them to the south. Ney was ordered to bring his own III Corps and Jacques Lauriston’s V Corps south. His II and VII Corps were supposed to continue to advance on Berlin, but Ney misunderstood his orders and brought them south; this error may have been to the French advantage, as it meant that more troops were concentrated against the main enemy force.

Ney’s orders were complicated. On May 18, he was told to march on May 20 as if he were joining MacDonald, but on May 21 to move eastwards towards the enemy rear. Napoleon hoped that this would enable him to force the Allies back towards the neutral Austrian frontier, meaning that they would be either destroyed or forced to surrender.

Napoleon spent May 19 reconnoitering the enemy. They were in a strong defensive position, but he overestimated their strength, thinking that they had 150,000 men rather than the actual 96,000. As Ney was not in position, he decided to fight a battle of attrition on May 20, before enveloping the enemy the next day. The Allies intended to stand on the defensive at first, before counterattacking on their right. They expected the French to attack their left, in order to force them away from Austria.

The French artillery bombardment began at noon on May 20, with the main infantry attack starting at 3 PM. By 6:00, they had captured the city of Bautzen and the Allied front line. The Allies continued to reinforce their left. They knew that Ney was approaching from the north, but greatly underestimated his strength, so ignored him. David Chandler says that ‘Napoleon could hardly have hoped for anything better.’ Napoleon’s plan for May 21 was that VI, XI and XII Corps would pin the enemy, Ney’s III Corps would attack the Allied right and Lauriston’s V Corps would block their retreat. This should force them to strip their center to strengthen their right flank. Bertrand’s IV Corps would deliver the main attack under the supervision of Marshal Nicolas Soult, who had carried out a similar maneuver on the Pratzen Heights at Austerlitz in 1805 (see posting). A reserve consisting of 3 infantry divisions, one of them Old Guard and the others Young Guard, and 3 cavalry division, including a Guard one, supported by 80 guns was established.

The pinning attacks were successful. Oudinot’s XII Corps was forced back a little ways, but this drew the Allies out of their prepared positions. IV Corps began its attack at 2 PM, supported by a Young Guard division and all available artillery. Prince Gebhard von Blücher’s Prussians were forced back, but he skillfully extracted them. The French attack lost momentum because the terrain made it difficult to move the artillery forward. The only explicit order given by Napoleon to Ney was that he should be at the village of Preititz by 11 AM. His chief of staff, Baron Antoine-Henri Jomini, advised him to screen it and advance into the enemy rear, but Ney launched a series of frontal attacks. Lauriston also moved slowly.

The French attacks in the center were held up until by a gallant Russian defense, but increasing casualties induced the Tsar to allow limited withdrawals from 4 PM. Napoleon, noting that the enemy resistance was weakening, committed his Imperial Guard against the Prussians. The Allies were now forced to retreat, but Ney and Lauriston’s failure to advance into their rear meant that they were able to do so safely, extracting all their guns, apart from some that had been disabled. A heavy rain storm stopped any pursuit.

Napoleon had again won a battle, but failed to rout the enemy because of the failure of his subordinates to block the enemy retreat and a lack of cavalry to pursue the defeated foe. Both sides suffered about 20,000 men dead and wounded. To make matters worse, during the battle, Napoleon's close friend and Grand Marshal of the Palace, Gen. Geraud Duroc, was mortally wounded by a cannonball and died hours after the battle.

Following Bautzen, Napoleon agreed to a 9-week truce with the Coalition, requested by the Allies on June 2. The Armistice of Pleischwitz was signed on June 4, and lasted until August 16. During this time he hoped to gather more troops, especially cavalry, and better train his new army. The allies, however, would not be idle, they too would mobilize and better prepare, and after hostilities were resumed, the Austrians joined the ranks of the allies. It is reported that Napoleon later (on Saint Helena) quoted that his agreement to this truce was a bad mistake, because the break was of much more use to the allies than to him.

[Ennath]

224 BC
Battle of Telamon

Rome had been at peace with the Celtic tribes of Cisalpine Gaul (the Po valley in northern Italy) for many years. Indeed, when a force of Transalpine Celts had crossed the Alps into Italy in 230 BC, it had been the Boii of Cisalpine Gaul who had repelled them. The Romans had sent an army but found it was not needed. However, when the Romans partitioned the formerly Celtic territory of Picenum in 234 BC, this created resentment among its neighbors, the Boii and Insubres.

In 225 BC, the Boii and Insubres paid large sums of money to the Gaesatae, mercenaries from Transalpine Celtic territories led by Aneroestes and Concolitanus, to fight with them against Rome. The Romans, alarmed by this Celtic mobilization, made a treaty giving the Carthaginian general Hasdrubal Barca unimpeded control of Hispania so they could concentrate on the threat closer to home.

The Romans called upon their allies in Italy to supply troops. The consul Lucius Aemilius Papus had 4 legions of Roman citizens, 22,000 men, plus 32,000 allied troops, which he stationed the majority of his forces at Ariminum. He placed 54,000 Sabines and Etruscans on the Etruscan border under the command of a praetor, and sent 40,000 Umbrians, Sarsinates, Veneti and Cenomani to attack the home territory of the Boii to distract them. The other consul, Gaius Atilius Regulus, had an army the same size as that of Papus, but was stationed in Sardinia at the time; he received orders to return without delay, and there was a reserve of 21,500 citizens and 32,000 allies in Rome itself, and 2 reserve legions in Sicily and at Tarentum.

The Gauls, wishing to avoid an encounter with Aemilius Papus, marched rapidly through the central passes of the Apennines, and, entering Etruria, passed on unopposed as far as Clusium, plundering and burning as they went. Here they were brought to a stand by the praetor of the army in Etruria, who had made a hasty retrograde movement on perceiving that the enemy had got between him and Rome. That night the Celts, leaving their cavalry and their camp fires as a decoy, withdrew to the town of Faesulae (modern Fiesole) and built defensive obstacles. In the morning the cavalry followed in full view of the Romans, who, thinking the enemy were retreating, pursued; they were drawn into an ambush and suffered a heavy defeat. 6000 Romans died and the rest fell back to a defensible hill. That night Papus arrived and made camp nearby. Aneroestes persuaded the Celts to withdraw along the Etruscan coast with their booty, and renew the war later when unencumbered. Papus pursued and harassed their rear but did not risk a pitched battle.

The other consul, Regulus, had crossed from Sardinia, landed at Pisa, and was marching towards Rome. His scouts met the Celts' advanced foragers head on near Telamon (modern Talamone), in an area called Campo Regio. Both sides were about 70,000 strong. Regulus put his troops in fighting order and advanced, attempting to occupy a hill above the road by which the Celts must pass. The Celts, unaware of Regulus’ arrival, assumed that Papus had sent some of his cavalry ahead, and sent some of their own cavalry and light infantry to contest the hill, but as soon as they knew what they were up against they deployed their infantry facing both front and rear. They placed the Gaesatae and Insubres at the rear against Papus, and the Boii and Taurisci at the front against Regulus, their wings protected by wagons and chariots. A small force guarded the booty on another hill nearby. The battle over the main hill was fierce, and despite Papus sending cavalry to assist, Regulus was killed and his head brought to the Celtic leaders. Eventually, however, the Roman cavalry secured possession of the hill.

The Romans advanced from both directions, their heavy javelins devastating the vulnerable Gaesatae at the rear, who were fighting naked with small shields. Some rushed wildly at the enemy and were slaughtered. Others withdrew into the body of the army, their retreat causing disorder among their allies. The Insubres, Boii and Taurisci held their ground tenaciously, but the Roman shields and thrusting short swords were more effective in close combat than the Celtic smaller shields and slashing long swords, and the Romans gained the upper hand. Finally, the Roman cavalry charged down the hill onto the Celtic flank. Their infantry was slaughtered and their cavalry put to flight. Around 40,000 Celts were killed and 10,000, including Concolitanus, taken prisoner. Aneroestes escaped with a small group of followers, who committed suicide with him.

The overwhelming victory made the Romans determined to expel the Gallic tribes from the Po valley. Next year, the two consuls would combine their normal sized armies (roughly 45,000 strong in total plus around 3000 cavalry) and invade the territory of the Boii, compelling them to submit despite setbacks due to severe rain and a consequent epidemic. Subsequently, with the aid of their ally the Cenomani, the Insubres, too, were subdued, despite them invoking the aid of even more Gaesatae.

By 220 BC, the Romans were masters of the Po valley and started planting colonies. Two years later, Hannibal would arrive and arouse the Gauls against Rome once more.