The Military History Thread

[Dr Pepper]

Originally Posted by Ennath

And he would have run right into the German minefields. 1916 was not 1805. That's why Jellicoe (rightly) opted for a distant blockade rather than a close one. (In fact, in 1914, German naval plans were dependent on a close blockade, so they could wear the British fleet down with mines, submarines and light forces.)

And that was the strategic aim of the Kriegsmarine raids on the various east coast towns-to entice a portion of the British fleet out where it could be defeated piecemeal in a local engagement with superior German forces and gradually achieve naval parity over a period.

history records that as a strategy it failed.....

[Ennath]

June 2, 1183
Battle of Kurikara

In 1180, the struggle between the Minamoto and Taira clans for dominance in Japan was renewed when Minamoto Yoshinaka invaded Taira lands in Shinano, Echigo, Etchu, Kaga and Echizen. The war was put on hold in 1181 on account of two years of famine. As conditions improved in 1183, the Taira sought retribution against Yoshinaka. Taira Koremori took charge of this operation, backed by Taira Michimori, Taira Tadanori, Taira Tomonori, Taira Tsunemasa and Taira Kiyofusa. Their forces severely reduced by battle and famine, the Taira sought to recruit warriors from the surrounding lands and did so at the risk of further famine, since many of these warriors were farmers leaving their lands. The Taira army departed from Kyoto on May 10, 1183.

Minamoto Yoritomo, Yoshinaka's cousin, moved to challenge him for dominance of the clan in March 1183, but was convinced to stand down and withdraw by Yoshinaka, who argued that they should be united against the Taira. To ensure his intentions, Yoshinaka also sent his son to Kamakura as a hostage. Shortly afterwards, Yoshinaka received news of Koremori's army, and moved to engage him, along with his uncle Minamoto Yukiie, and Tomoe Gozen.

Approaching the mountain passes which connect western Honshu to the east, Koremori split his forces in two, one part taking the Kurikara Pass up to Tonamiyama, the other entering Etchu Province through Noto Province to the north. Minamoto Yoshinaka, seeing the Taira forces coming up the pass, displayed 30 white banners on Kurosaka Hill a couple of miles away to trick his enemies into believing that his force was larger than it really was. This was a delaying tactic, aimed at keeping the Taira atop the pass until night fell, so that the second part of his plan could fall into place.

He divided his own forces into 3 parts, sending one group to attack the Taira from the rear, a second beneath the Pass, as an ambush party; the third he accompanied and held centrally. In order to conceal these movements, Yoshinaka sought to distract his enemy with a highly formal battle, beginning with archery exchanges using whistling-bulb arrows. (The sound was created by a specially carved or perforated bulb of deer horn or wood attached to the tip.) This was followed by individual duels amongst 100 samurai, to which the Taira gladly indulged, in the hopes of earning their individual places in the chronicles and epic poetry which were sure to follow such a war.

Meanwhile, Yoshinaka's other forces moved into position, and as the sun set, the Taira turned to find behind them a Minamoto detachment, holding far more flags than a single detachment should merit, giving the illusion of greater numbers. Yoshinaka's central force, having gathered a herd of oxen, now released them down the pass directly into the Taira army, with lit torches tied to their horns. Many of the Taira warriors were simply knocked off the path. Yoshinaka's soldiers then charged down the north slope forcing the Taira down into the Kairaka Valley and the ambush detachment. The surviving Taira, confused, demoralized, and having suffered heavy losses, fled.

This was a major victory for the Minamoto, leading to the Taira abandoning Kyoto. They also lost the initiative in the war, which climaxed in the Minamoto victory at the Battle of Dannoura (see posting), 2 years later.

[Ennath]

1897
Sudanese Mutiny

In 1897, an expedition under Major J.R.L. Macdonald was sent from the coast to prevent a possible French move into the southern Sudan. It comprised 10 European officers, 50 Sikhs, 2 companies of Swahili askaris and 7 Maxim guns. 3 companies of Sudanese (4th, 7th and 9th) were dispatched from Uganda to meet Macdonald in the Rift Valley. These were already exhausted from several campaigns and their NCOs had been punished merely for requesting their arrears of pay. They now requested a meeting with Macdonald, but were brusquely dismissed.

Believing that they had a genuine grievance, the Sudanese troops complained to the Commissioner at Eldama Station. This was technically insubordination, but it was the overreaction of one of Macdonald’s officers, Captain Kirkpatrick, which provoked open mutiny. He ordered the men to lay down their arms and, when they refused, ordered a Maxim gun to open fire on them. The official account states that the gun jammed, but there is strong and plausible rumor that the crew pretended a jam to avoid firing on their comrades. Kirkpatrick then ordered the garrison of the station to open fire with their rifles, but they all fired high.

The Sudanese companies then marched off to a small station called Lubwa’s, 80 miles away, which they reached on October 16; they persuaded the Sudanese garrison to join them, increasing their numbers to 500, and imprisoned 3 British officers. Macdonald led a column of 18 Sikhs and 2 companies of Swahilis, caught up with the mutineers and blockaded the post, but was almost taken by surprise on the 19th by a dawn break-out attempt.

One column under 2 Sudanese officers, Mbarak and Bilal, attacked frontally up the hill containing the British camp, while another group, led by Suliman, climbed the ridge to the left and attacked from the flank. The tactic nearly succeeded. Although the frontal attack was held, the flank attack got into position and charged, Suliman yelling, “The Swahilis are women, and will run!” But they held firm and Macdonald ordered them to hold their fire until the enemy was within 50 yards. Their first volley killed Suliman and broke the attack to a halt. In the next few hours, several more attacks were launched, joined by 200 Baganda Muslims. Macdonald’s men were down to their last few rounds when the last attacks faltered, and the major ordered a bayonet attack, which drove the enemy back inside the fort with a loss of about 100 men. The mutineers then ended all hope of a negotiated settlement by murdering their 3 British prisoners.

Macdonald then besieged Lubwa’s for nearly 3 months, with the aid of 1600 loyal Baganda under Apolo Kaggwa. In Uganda itself, meanwhile, other Baganda factions rose in revolt, and although the remaining Sudanese there remained loyal they were disarmed as a precaution. Luckily for the British, serious trouble in Uganda was avoided by astute diplomacy, but Macdonald was forced to take 200 men to pacify the province of Buddu, leaving a weakened blockade under Captain Woodward.

On October 28 and November 24, the mutineers defeated attempts to storm the fort. Then, on January 9, 1898, they succeeded in breaking out. They then marched northwest to Lake Kioga, where they hoped to link up with sympathizers from Buganda and Bunyoro. These included 2400 musketeers led by King Mwanga, who had returned from exile and was now in revolt. Meanwhile, contingents from the East African Rifles had been sent west to reinforce Macdonald; 80 askaris under Captain Harrison made a march of 360 miles in 19 days, while several more detachments, including Indian troops, were sent up from the coast on the partially completed Uganda Railway.

Macdonald finally cornered the Sudanese at Kabagambe, in the marches near Lake Kioga, on February 18. He then returned to Kampala, leaving Captain Harrison in command. Harrison had the Sikhs and Swahilis from Lubwa’s, less a few detachments, plus an unknown number of Apolo Kaggwa’s surviving Baganda levies, a single Maxim gun and a newly-arrived reinforcement of 150 Indian troops. The rebels were an estimated 600 Sudanese and 200 Baganda Muslims. They had breech-loading rifles and a captured Maxim gun, which was not use, either because it malfunctioned or was abandoned on the march.

The mutineers had built a well-fortified position with the approaches guarded by what they believed were impassible swamps, but on the 24th Harrison led his men across a wide stretch of this swamp in a grueling 17-hour forced march, and attacked from an unexpected direction. The mutineers launched a bayonet charge, but the British stood firm, drove them back with volley fire, and then counterattacked. The mutineers fell back into their stockade, where they became mixed with a panic-stricken crowd of their own women. Harrison brought up his Maxim, but did not use it, due to the presence of the women. The position was therefore taken by the bayonet; over 100 mutineers were killed and the rest dispersed into the swamps. The rising was broken. The last pockets of resistance were not finally subdued until 1901, but the Battle of Kabagambe put an end to the threat to British rule in Uganda.

[Ennath]

June 3, 1852
Battle of Shwemawdaw Pagoda

Relations between Britain and Burma remained tense after their first war in 1823-25, and by the end of the 1840s many observers on both sides were resigned to the inevitability of another war. The 2nd Anglo-Burmese War finally broke out in 1852, the result of a legal dispute in which 2 British merchant captains had been seized and imprisoned without trial on allegedly trumped-up charges. Unfortunately, the British naval officer sent to investigate, Commodore G. Rowley Lambert, was tactless, short-tempered and apparently determined to cause a war. Wantonly misinterpreting Burmese diplomatic protocol as an affront to the British delegation’s dignity, he seized the king’s yacht at anchor in Rangoon, declared a blockade and demanded that the governor of Rangoon come aboard his ship and apologize. The governor countered with a demand to release the yacht and on January 9 there was a brisk exchange of fire between his shore batteries and war-boats and the British squadron.

War was not declared immediately, however. The Burmese still sought a diplomatic solution, while the Governor-General of India, Lord Dalhousie, issued an ultimatum demanding 10 lakhs of rupees compensation, the temporary cession of Rangoon and Martaban as surety for the indemnity, an apology from King Pagan Min and the installation of a British representative in Rangoon. Cynically calculating that these terms would be unacceptable, the British meanwhile assembled and dispatched an expeditionary force of 6000 men and 35 guns under Lt. Gen. Henry Godwin and Rear Adm. Charles Austen (brother of the author Jane Austen), which arrived off the Burmese coast on April, the ultimatum having expired on the 1st. The Burmese had not been idle, either, and had already assembled 28,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry at Rangoon.

The first action of the war was the British capture of Martaban on the 5th, as the garrison of 1200 men was driven out with only a handful of British casualties. Rangoon was attacked next. It was subjected to a heavy naval bombardment on April 11-12, by the end of which its guns had been silenced and much of the town was in flames. Troops landing under cover of the barrage took the fort at Dalla and the “White House Picket” - a strong stockade which formed a key part of the city’s defenses - on the 12th. This was followed on the 14th by the capture of the Shwedagon Pagoda, which ended resistance around the city. The conquest had cost the British 22 dead and 163 wounded, compared to several hundred Burmese casualties.

After receiving reinforcements, Godwin embarked a detachment of just 800 men and steamed downriver and round the coast to Bassein. On May 19, he arrived and launched an immediate attack; despite a garrison of 7000, the city fell in just 2 hours, with 800 Burmese dead, to 2 British dead and 25 wounded. A week later, a counterattack at Martaban by 10-12,000 Burmese was beaten off without difficulty.

In late May, the British supported a Mon rebellion against the Burmese at Pegu by sending a small naval expedition. On June 3, the British river expedition captured the town, after the sharpest fighting of the war, around Shwemawdaw Pagoda. With the rainy season, the British returned to the coast, and the Mons were defeated, restoring Burmese control.

Contrary to expectations, the Burmese refused to capitulate to Britain’s demands, despite having been beaten soundly in every engagement. Lord Dalhousie visited Rangoon in July and August, and discussed the whole situation with the civil, military and naval authorities. He decided to dictate terms to the Court of Ava by annexing the whole of Pegu province, thus denying Ava access to the sea.

Austen died on October 7 and was replaced by Lambert; Godwin resented having to deal with a mere commodore. Nevertheless, the expedition, now 20,000 strong, captured Prome on October 10, after only scattered resistance. Pegu town was the next objective; Godwin and 1000 men stormed the town on November 22 for the loss of 35-40 men wounded. Though some 11,000 Burmese mounted counterattacks in the vicinity on December 5-14, they were obliged to withdraw when a British relief column arrived on the 19th.

On December 20, the British formally announced their annexation of Pegu province and dispatched 40000 men to the new northern frontier to evict any remaining Burmese troops. There was little further fighting. On February 18, 1853, King Pagan Min, who favored continuing the struggle, was deposed by his brother Mindon Min, who, after prolonged negotiations, finally agreed to a cease-fire on June 30, leaving the whole of Pegu province in British hands. No formal peace treaty was ever signed, and disorganized resistance (put up by what William Laurie called “the dissatisfied portion of the dispersed Burmese army”) sputtered on in the jungles of Lower Burma for several years.

[Ennath]

June 4, 1942
Battle of Midway, Part 1

After Japan’s early victories in the Pacific, there were strategic disagreements and bureaucratic infighting between the Army and Navy, and a follow-up strategy was not formed until April 1942. Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto finally succeeded in winning the bureaucratic struggle with a thinly veiled threat to resign, after which his plan for the Central Pacific was adopted.

Yamamoto's primary goal was the elimination of America's carrier force, which he regarded as the principal threat to Japan’s victory. This concern was heightened by the Doolittle Raid (see posting). The raid, while militarily insignificant, was a shock to the Japanese and showed the existence of a gap in the defenses around the home islands as well as the accessibility of Japanese territory to American bombers. This, and other hit-and-run raids by American carriers in the South Pacific, showed that they were still a threat, although seemingly reluctant to be drawn into an all-out battle. Yamamoto reasoned that another a threat to the base at Pearl Harbor would induce the American fleet to sail out to fight, including the carriers. However, considering the increased strength of American land-based air power in Hawaii since December, he judged that it was now too risky to attack Pearl Harbor directly. Instead, Yamamoto selected Midway atoll at the extreme west end of the Hawaiian Islands, approximately 1300 miles from Oahu. In addition to serving as a seaplane base, Midway's airstrips also served as a forward staging point for bomber attacks on Wake Island.

Typical of Japanese naval planning, Yamamoto's plan (Operation MI) was over complex. It required the careful and timely coordination of multiple battle groups over hundreds of miles of open sea. His design was also predicated on optimistic intelligence suggesting that USS Enterprise and Hornet, forming Task Force 16, were the only carriers available to the US Pacific Fleet. During the Battle of the Coral Sea one month earlier (see posting), USS Lexington had been sunk and Yorktown suffered considerable damage such that the Japanese believed she too had been lost. Finally, much of Yamamoto's planning, coinciding with the general feeling among the Japanese leadership at the time, was based on a gross misjudgment of American morale, which was believed to be debilitated from the string of Japanese victories in the preceding months.

Yamamoto felt deception would be required to lure the US fleet. To this end, he dispersed his forces so that their full extent would be concealed prior to battle. Critically, his supporting battleships and cruisers trailed Vice Adm. Chuichi Nagumo's carrier force by several hundred miles. They were intended to come up and destroy whatever elements of the US fleet might come to Midway's defense once Nagumo's carriers had weakened them sufficiently for a daylight gun battle. His emphasis on dispersal meant none of his formations were in a position to support each other. For instance, despite the fact that Nagumo's 4 carriers were expected to carry out strikes against Midway and bear the brunt of American counterattacks, the only warships in his fleet larger than the screening force of 12 destroyers were 2 battlecruisers and 3 cruisers. By contrast, Yamamoto and Nobutake Kondo had between them 2 light carriers, 5 battleships, and 7 cruisers, none of which would see action at Midway. The fleet was wastefully dispersed. The 4 light carriers, for example, could carry 140 aircraft and the survivors of the air groups from the Coral Sea could have brought the main force up to full strength - there was room for 50 more planes.

Japanese scouting arrangements prior to the battle were in disarray. A picket line of submarines was late getting into position, which let the American carriers reach their assembly point northeast of Midway ("Point Luck") without being detected. A second attempt at reconnaissance, using 4-engine H8K "Emily" flying boats to scout Pearl Harbor was thwarted when Japanese submarines assigned to refuel the search aircraft discovered that the intended refueling point - a hitherto deserted bay off French Frigate Shoals - was now occupied by American warships, because the Japanese had carried out an identical mission in March.

To do battle with an enemy expected to muster 4-5 carriers, Adm. Chester Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, needed every available US flight deck. He already had Vice Adm. William Halsey's 2 carriers (Enterprise and Hornet) at hand, though Halsey was stricken with severe dermatitis and had to be replaced by Rear Adm. Raymond Spruance. Nimitz also hurriedly recalled Rear Adm. Frank Fletcher's task force, including the damaged Yorktown, from the South West Pacific Area. The Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard worked around the clock, and in 72 hours she was restored to a battle-ready state, judged good enough for two or three weeks of operations, as Nimitz required. Repairs continued even as she sortied, with work crews still aboard. Despite efforts to get Saratoga (which had been undergoing repairs on the American West Coast) ready for the coming engagement, the need to resupply and assemble sufficient escorts meant she was not able to reach Midway until after the battle. In addition, there were 126 aircraft based on Midway.

Nimitz had one priceless advantage: US cryptanalysts had partially broken the Japanese Navy's JN-25b code. Since early 1942, they had been decoding messages stating that there would soon be an operation at objective AF. It was not known where AF was, but Cmdr. Joseph Rochefort’s team had a hunch. The base a Midway was told to send an uncoded radio message that Midway's water purification system had broken down. Within 24 hours, the code breakers picked up a Japanese message that AF was short on water. No Japanese seemed suspicious that the Americans were broadcasting uncoded that close to the Japanese threat. As a result, the Americans entered the battle with a very good picture of where, when, and in what strength the Japanese would appear. Nimitz knew that the Japanese had negated their numerical advantage by dividing their ships into 4 task groups, all too widely separated to be able to support each other. He calculated that the aircraft on his 3 carriers, plus those on Midway, gave the US rough parity in air strength, as American carrier air groups were larger than Japanese ones.

At about 0900 on June 3, a PBY-5 flying boat spotted the Kondo’s Occupation Force 500 nautical miles west-southwest of Midway. He mistakenly reported this group as the Main Force. Nine B-17s took off from Midway at 1230 for the first air attack. Three hours later, they found Tanaka's transport group, but failed to score a hit. Early the following morning, the Japanese oiler Akebono Maru sustained the first hit when a torpedo from a PBY struck her around 0100. This was the only successful air-launched torpedo attack by the US during the entire battle.

At 0430 on June 4, Nagumo launched his initial attack on Midway, 72 bombers, escorted by 36 Zeroes. At the same time, he launched 8 search aircraft. Japanese reconnaissance was flimsy, with too few aircraft to adequately cover the assigned search areas, laboring under poor weather conditions. As Nagumo's bombers and fighters were taking off, 11 PBYs were leaving Midway to run their search patterns. At 0534, a PBY reported sighting 2 Japanese carriers and another spotted the inbound airstrike 10 minutes later.

Midway's radar picked up the enemy and interceptors were scrambled. Unescorted bombers headed off to attack the Japanese carriers, their fighter escorts remaining behind to defend Midway. At 0620, Japanese aircraft bombed and heavily damaged the base. Marine fighters (7 F4Fs and 21 F2As) intercepted and suffered heavy losses, though they managed to destroy 7 aircraft. 16 US aircraft were destroyed, while most of the surviving planes were damaged, with only 2 remaining airworthy. American AA fire was intense, destroying 4 additional Japanese aircraft and damaging many more. Of the 108 Japanese aircraft involved, 11 were destroyed, 14 heavily damaged, and 29 damaged to some degree. The attack did not succeed in neutralizing Midway: bombers could still use the airbase to refuel and attack the invasion force, and most of its defenses were intact. Japanese pilots reported to Nagumo that a second attack would be necessary if troops were to go ashore by June 7.

Having taken off prior to the Japanese attack, American bombers based on Midway made several attacks on the Japanese carrier force. These included 8 TBF Avengers (the type’s combat debut), 11 SB2U Vindicators, 16 TBD Devastators, 4 B-26s armed with torpedoes and 15 B-17s. The Japanese repelled these attacks, losing 2 fighters while destroying 17 US aircraft. The first Marine aviator to perish in the battle, Major Lofton Henderson was killed while leading his inexperienced Dauntless squadron into action. The main airfield at Guadalcanal was named after him in August 1942.

In accordance with Japanese carrier doctrine, Nagumo had kept half of his aircraft in reserve. These comprised 2 squadrons each of dive bombers and torpedo bombers. The dive bombers were as yet unarmed. The torpedo bombers were armed with torpedoes should any American warships be located. At 0715, Nagumo ordered his reserve planes to be re-armed with general purpose bombs for a second strike against Midway. Re-arming had been under way for about 30 minutes when a scout plane signaled that it had sighted a sizable American naval force to the east, but neglected to describe its composition. Later evidence suggests Nagumo did not receive the sighting report until 0800. He now reversed his order to re-arm the bombers with general purpose bombs and demanded that the scout plane ascertain the composition of the American force. Another 20-40 minutes elapsed before the scout finally radioed the presence of a single carrier.

[Ennath]

June 4, 1942
Battle of Midway, Part 2

Nagumo was now in a quandary. His opportunity to hit the American ships was limited by the imminent return of his Midway strike force. The returning strike needed to land promptly or it would have to ditch. Because of the constant flight deck activity, the Japanese never had an opportunity to position their reserve planes on the flight deck for launch. Furthermore, by spotting and launching immediately, Nagumo would be committing some of his reserve without proper anti-ship armament; he had just witnessed how easily unescorted American bombers had been shot down. Japanese doctrine preferred the launching of fully constituted strikes rather than piecemeal attacks. Nagumo's reaction was doctrinaire. In addition, the arrival of another land-based American air strike at 0753 gave weight to the need to attack the island again. In the end, Nagumo decided to wait for his first strike force to land, then launch the reserve, which would by then be properly armed with torpedoes. In the final analysis, it made no difference; Fletcher's carriers had launched their planes beginning at 0700 (with Enterprise and Hornet having completed launching by 0755, but Yorktown not until 0908). Even if Nagumo had not strictly followed carrier doctrine, he could not have prevented the launch of the American attack.

Fletcher, in overall command aboard Yorktown, ordered Spruance to launch as soon as was practical, while initially holding Yorktown in reserve in case any other Japanese carriers were found. Spruance judged that, though the range was extreme, a strike could succeed and gave the order to launch the attack. The first plane took off from Spruance's carriers a few minutes after 0700. Fletcher, upon completing his own scouting flights, followed suit at 0800 from Yorktown. Spruance ordered the strike aircraft to proceed to target immediately, rather than waste time waiting for the whole force to assemble, since neutralizing enemy carriers was the key to the survival of his own task force. While the Japanese were able to launch 108 aircraft in just 7 minutes, it took Enterprise and Hornet over an hour to launch 117. Spruance judged that the need to throw something at the enemy as soon as possible was greater than the need to coordinate the attack by aircraft of different types and speeds. Accordingly, American squadrons were launched piecemeal and proceeded to the target in several different groups. It was accepted that the lack of coordination would diminish the impact of the American attacks and increase their casualties, but Spruance gambled that he would find Nagumo with his flight decks at their most vulnerable.

American aircraft had difficulty locating the target. The strike from Hornet followed an incorrect heading and its dive bombers missed the Japanese carriers. The torpedo bombers followed the correct heading. The 10 F4Fs from Hornet ran out of fuel and had to ditch. The torpedo bombers began their attack at 0920, followed by those from Enterprise, whose fighters also had to turn back for lack of fuel. Yorktown’s torpedo bombers arrived some time after. Without fighter escort, 37 of 41 aircraft were shot down, scoring no hits. Despite their failure, the American torpedo attacks achieved 3 important results. First, they kept the Japanese carriers off balance and unable to prepare or launch their counterstrike. Their tight cruising formation was disrupted, weakening their AA defense. Second, the poor control of the Japanese combat air patrol (CAP) meant they were out of position for subsequent attacks. Third, many of the Zeroes ran low on ammunition and fuel.

Just as the Japanese were out of position, 3 squadrons of dive bombers from Enterprise and Yorktown were approaching from the southwest and northeast. The 2 squadrons from Enterprise were running low on fuel because of the time spent looking for the enemy. Squadron commander C. Wade McClusky, Jr. decided to continue, and by good fortune spotted the wake of the Japanese destroyer Arashi, steaming at full speed to rejoin Nagumo's carriers after having unsuccessfully attacked the submarine Nautilus. Some bombers were lost from fuel exhaustion. McClusky's decision, in the opinion of Adm. Nimitz, "decided the fate of our carrier task force and our forces at Midway ..." All 3 American squadrons arrived almost simultaneously at the perfect time, locations and altitudes to attack. Most of the Japanese CAP was focusing on the torpedo planes and was at low altitude and out of position, armed aircraft filled the hangar decks, fuel hoses snaked across the decks as refueling operations were hastily being completed, and the repeated change of ordnance meant that bombs and torpedoes were stacked around the hangars.

Coming under an onslaught of bombs from almost two full squadrons, Kaga sustained 4-5 direct hits, which caused heavy damage and started multiple fires. Although Akagi sustained only one direct hit, it proved to be a fatal blow: the bomb struck the edge of the mid-ship deck elevator and penetrated to the upper hangar deck, where it exploded among the armed and fueled aircraft in the vicinity. Another bomb exploded underwater very close astern; the resulting geyser bent the flight deck upward and caused crucial rudder damage. Simultaneously, Yorktown's dive bombers went for Soryu, scoring at least 3 hits and causing extensive damage. Gasoline ignited, creating an inferno, while stacked bombs and ammunition detonated. They also targeted Hiryu, but achieved no hits.

Within 6 minutes, Soryu and Kaga were ablaze from stem to stern. Akagi, having been struck by only one bomb, took longer to burn, but the resulting fires quickly expanded and soon proved impossible to extinguish; she too was eventually consumed by flames and had to be abandoned. All 3 carriers remained temporarily afloat. Despite initial hopes that Akagi could be saved or at least towed back to Japan, all were eventually abandoned and scuttled.

Hiryu wasted little time in counterattacking. Its strike followed the retreating American aircraft and attacked the first carrier they encountered, Yorktown, hitting her with 3 bombs, which blew a hole in the deck, snuffed out her boilers, and destroyed an AA mount. Repair teams were able to temporarily patch the flight deck and restore power to several boilers within an hour, giving her a speed of 19 knots and enabling her to resume air operations. About an hour later, Hiryu's 2nd attack wave arrived, crippling Yorktown with 2 torpedoes; she lost all power and developed a 23-degree list to port.

Late in the afternoon, a Yorktown scout aircraft located Hiryu, prompting Enterprise to launch a final strike. 4-5 bombs hit Hiryu, leaving her ablaze and unable to operate aircraft. After futile attempts at controlling the blaze, most of the crew were evacuated and the remainder of the fleet continued sailing northeast in an attempt to intercept the American carriers. Despite a scuttling attempt, Hiryu stayed afloat for several more hours, being discovered early the next morning by an aircraft from the escort carrier Hosho and prompting hopes she could be saved, or at least towed back to Japan. Soon after being spotted, Hiryu sank.

As darkness fell, both sides took stock. Fletcher, obliged to abandon the derelict Yorktown and feeling he could not adequately command from a cruiser, ceded operational command to Spruance. Spruance knew the United States had won a great victory, but he was still unsure of what Japanese forces remained and was determined to safeguard both Midway and his carriers. To aid his aviators, who had launched at extreme range, he had continued to close with Nagumo during the day and persisted as night fell. Finally, fearing a possible night encounter with Japanese surface forces, Spruance changed course and withdrew to the east, turning back west towards the enemy at midnight. For his part, Yamamoto initially decided to continue the engagement and sent his surface forces searching eastward for the American carriers. These failed to make contact and Yamamoto ordered a general withdrawal to the west.

At 0255 on June 5, avoiding a US submarine, the cruisers Mogami and Mikuma collided, inflicting serious damage on Mogami's bow. The less severely damaged Mikuma slowed to 12 knots to keep pace. A submarine reported their position. Over the following 2 days, several strikes were launched against the stragglers. Mikuma was eventually sunk, while Mogami survived further severe damage to return home for repairs.

Meanwhile, salvage efforts on Yorktown were encouraging, and she was taken in tow by USS Vireo. In the late afternoon of June 6, the Japanese submarine I-168 fired a salvo of torpedoes, 2 of which struck Yorktown. There were few casualties aboard, since most of the crew had already been evacuated, but a 3rd torpedo struck the destroyer USS Hammann, which had been providing auxiliary power to Yorktown. Hammann broke in two and sank with the loss of 80 lives, mostly because her own depth charges exploded. With further salvage efforts deemed hopeless, the remaining repair crews were evacuated from Yorktown, which sank just after 0500 on June 7.

The Battle of Midway has often been called "the turning point of the Pacific". It was the Allies' first major naval victory against the Japanese, won against superior force. Although the Japanese continued to try to secure more territory, and the US did not move from a state of naval parity to one of supremacy until after many more months of hard combat, Midway allowed the Allies to switch to the strategic initiative.

[Ennath]

June 5, 1940
Case Red

By the end of May 1940, the best and most modern French armies had been sent north and lost in the resulting encirclement; the French had also lost much of their heavy weaponry and their best armored formations. Overall, the Allies had lost 61 divisions. Gen. Maxime Weygand, the French commander-in-chief, was faced with the prospect of defending a long front (stretching from Sedan to the channel), with a greatly depleted French Army, now lacking significant Allied support. He had only 64 French divisions and the 51st (Highland) Infantry Division available. Weygand lacked the reserves to counter a breakthrough or to replace frontline troops, should they become exhausted from a prolonged battle on a front of 600 miles. The Germans had 142 divisions to use and air supremacy except over the English Channel.

The French also had to deal with millions of civilian refugees fleeing the war in what became known as L'Exode (the Exodus); automobiles and horse-drawn carts carrying possessions clogged roads. As the government had not foreseen such a rapid collapse, there were few plans to cope. Some 6-10 million fled, sometimes so quickly that they left uneaten meals on tables, even while officials stated that there was no need to panic and that civilians should stay. The population of Chartres declined from 23,000 to 800 and Lille from 200,000 to 20,000, while cities in the south such as Pau and Bordeaux rapidly grew in size.

The Germans renewed their offensive on June 5, on the Somme. The French used the period of the Dunkirk battle to make some defensive preparations, including the establishment of some all-around strongpoints known as “hedgehogs” (units in towns and small villages, fortified 360° along their perimeter), but not enough to compensate for the weakness of their forces. These were now organized in Army Groups 3 and 4. Army Group 3, under Gen. Antoine Besson, held the Somme near the coast and Army Group 4, under Gen. Charles Huntziger, the line of the Aisne. The army had fallen back on its interior lines of supply and communications, and had closer access to repair shops, supply dumps and stores. Moreover, 112,000 evacuated French soldiers were repatriated via the Normandy and Brittany ports. It was some substitute for the lost divisions in Flanders. The French were also able to make good a significant amount of their armored losses and raised the 1st and 2nd DCR (heavy armored divisions).

German Army Group B attacked either side of Paris. Of its 47 divisions it had the majority of the mobile units. The tank forces, now organized in 2 Panzer Groups and a Panzer Corps, were given the leading role. The heaviest fighting at first was in the sector between Amiens and the sea where Hoth’s Panzer Corps led the attack. French resistance was determined on this first day and only a few German bridgeheads were successfully established. On the Aisne, XVI Panzerkorps employed over 1000 AFVs. The assault was crude, and Hoepner soon lost 80 out of 500 AFVs in the first attack. At Amiens, the Germans were repeatedly driven back by powerful French artillery concentrations and came to recognize improved French tactics. The hedgehogs in particular proved difficult to overcome and were a sign of what better French preparation might have accomplished.

On the 6th, the French line along the Somme between Amiens and the coast was broken by the attacks of XV Panzer Corps after a vigorous struggle. Rommel’s 7th Panzer Division made the largest gains. Between Amiens and Peronne, Kleist’s Group was still being held, but farther inland Guderian’s divisions seized bridgeheads over the Aisne. On the 9th, German forces reached the Seine at Rouen and took the city. The defense lines began to unravel. Dieppe and Compiegne both fell. Guderian’s forces were now in full attack around Rheims. They were joined by Kleist’s Panzer Group which had been switched east after being held around Peronne. The French defenders managed to hold most of their positions but took heavy losses. On the 10th, the Germans crossed the Seine west of Paris. Elements of French 10th Army were still fighting around St. Valery along with some British forces. Some of these units were evacuated from the town. Evacuations also began at Le Havre. In the next 3 days, 11,000 British and some French were taken off. German forces began to gain ground south of the Aisne.

The situation in the air had also worsened, the Luftwaffe established air supremacy as the French air arm was on the verge of collapse. The number of sorties flown declined as losses were now becoming impossible to replace. The RAF attempted to divert the attention of the Luftwaffe with 660 sorties flown against targets over the Dunkirk area, but losses were heavy. After June 9, French aerial resistance virtually ceased; some surviving aircraft withdrew to French North Africa. The Luftwaffe now ran riot. Its attacks were focused on the direct and indirect support of the German Army.

On June 11, Paris was declared an open city as the government moved to Tours. Most of what remained of the French forces was retreating in confusion south of the Seine and Marne. German tank forces took Rheims. The next day, St. Valery on the Channel coast was taken. A large part of 51st Highland Division was captured here. Weygand ordered the forces facing Army Group A to retreat south. These troops offered little further effective resistance to the German advance. On the 14th, the Germans marched into Paris.

Meanwhile, to the east, Army Group C was to help encircle the French forces on the Maginot line. The goal of the operation was to envelop the Metz region, with its fortifications, to prevent a French counteroffensive from the Alsace region against the German line on the Somme. Guderian's corps was to advance to the Swiss border and trap the French forces in the Vosges Mountains while XVI Corps attacked the Maginot Line from the west, into its vulnerable rear to take the cities of Verdun, Toul and Metz. The French, meanwhile, had moved 2nd Army Group from Alsace and Lorraine to the threatened sectors further north, leaving only small forces guarding the Maginot Line. After Army Group B had begun its offensive against Paris and into Normandy, Army Group A began its advance into the rear of the Maginot line. On June 15, Army Group C launched Operation Tiger, a frontal assault across the Rhine and into France.

German attempts to break open or into the Maginot line prior to Tiger had failed. On June 15, the last well-equipped French forces, including 4th Army, were preparing to leave as the Germans struck. The French now holding the line were skeletal. Slow progress was made against strong French resistance. However, several forts were overcome. The same day Tiger was launched, Operation Little Bear began. 5 divisions crossed the Rhine into the Colmar area with a view to advancing to the Vosges Mountains. It had 400 artillery pieces bolstered by heavy artillery and mortars. They drove French 104th and 105th Divisions back into the Vosges on June 17. On the same day, Guderian reached the Swiss border and the Maginot defenses were cut off from the rest of France. Most units surrendered on June 25; some forts continued the fight, despite appeals for surrender. The last only capitulated on July 10, after a request from Gen. Georges, and only then under protest. Of the 58 major fortifications on the Maginot Line, just 10 were captured by the Wehrmacht in battle.

While Italy declared war on France and Britain on June 10, it was not prepared for war and made little impact during the last 2 weeks of fighting. Italian dictator Benito Mussolini was aware of this and sought to profit from German successes. Mussolini reportedly said to the Army's Chief-of-Staff, Marshal Badoglio, "I only need a few thousand dead so that I can sit at the peace conference as a man who has fought." The Army of the Alps (Gen. René Olry) defeated the brief Italian invasion (June 21-22).

On June 6, the small 2nd BEF began landing at Cherbourg to protect the evacuation of the remaining British forces and, hopefully, firm up French resolve. By the 15th, it was clear that they would have to leave. As French resistance began to collapse, as many troops as possible were taken off. On June 15-18, 30,600 British and Canadian troops were evacuated from Cherbourg. 21,500 troops were taken from St. Malo on June 16-18 and 35,800 from Brest. 57,200 were taken from St. Nazaire and Nantes on June 16-19, but over 3000 were lost when the liner Lancastria was sunk by German bombers on the 17th (wartime censorship suppressed this news until after the war). On June 19-25, 19,000, mostly Poles, were lifted from Bayonne.

As early as June 12, Minister of Defense Petain had suggested requesting an armistice. Churchill suggested a union of France and Britain to avoid defeat, but without success. French premier Paul Reynaud had urged evacuating as much as possible to North Africa to continue the fight from there, but found almost no support; he resigned on the 16th and was replaced by Petain, who delivered a radio address to the French people announcing his intention to ask for an armistice with Germany.

Hitler selected the Forest of Compiègne as the site for the negotiations. he viewed the choice of location as a supreme moment of revenge for 1918. On June 22, the armistice was signed in the same railway carriage in which the 1918 Armistice was signed (it had been removed from a museum building and placed on the precise spot where it was located in 1918). Hitler sat in the same chair in which Marshal Foch had sat when he faced the defeated German representatives. After listening to the reading of the preamble, Hitler left the carriage in a calculated gesture of disdain for the French delegates, and matters were turned over to Wilhelm Keitel, the Chief of Staff of OKW. This concluded the most humiliating disaster in French military history.

[Mal Hombre]

With a certain level of prescience,The Germans then blew up the railway carriage..

[rupertramjet]

Originally Posted by Mal Hombre

With a certain level of prescience,The Germans then blew up the railway carriage..

They took the carriage to Berlin and exhibited it first, then they destroyed it, but they destroyed the Forest of Compiègne Memorial and the surrounding area, leaving only the statue of Foch standing, 'To honour a wasteland', in Hitlers words.

Thew site was rebuild after the war using German POW labour! Well worth a visit, but do not do as I did, and drag three under sevens with you, cruel daddy!

[Ennath]

June 6, 1944
Pointe-du-Hoc

Pointe du Hoc lies 4 miles west of the center of Omaha Beach. As part of the Atlantic Wall fortifications, the prominent cliff top location was fortified by the Germans. The battery was initially built in 1943 to house 6 captured French First World War vintage GPF 155mm guns positioned in open concrete gun pits. The battery was occupied by the 2nd Battery of Army Coastal Artillery Regiment 1260. To defend the promontory, elements of the 352nd Infantry Division were stationed at the battery. The Germans began to improve the defenses in the spring of 1944, with enclosed concrete casemates. The plan was to build 6 casemates but 2 were unfinished when the location was attacked. Also built was an observation bunker and mounts for 20mm Flak 30 AA guns. The 155mm guns would have threatened the Allied landings on Omaha and Utah beaches when finished, risking heavy casualties to the landing forces.

The location was bombed in April 1944, after which the Germans removed the 155mm guns. This was not discovered by the Allies. During preparation for Operation Overlord it was determined that Pointe du Hoc should be attacked by ground forces. The 2nd and 5th Ranger Battalions were given the task of assaulting the strongpoint early on D-Day. Elements of the 2nd Battalion went in to attack Pointe du Hoc but delays meant the remainder of the 2nd Battalion and the complete 5th Battalion landed at Omaha Beach as their secondary landing position.

The Ranger battalions were commanded by Lt. Col. James Earl Rudder. The plan called for the 3 companies of Rangers to be landed by sea at the foot of the cliffs, scale them using ropes, ladders, and grapples whilst under enemy fire, and engage the enemy at the top of the cliff. This was to be carried out before the main landings. The Rangers trained for the cliff assault on the Isle of Wight, under the direction of British Commandos.

The assault force was carried in 10 assault landing craft (LCAs), with another 2 carrying supplies, and 4 DUKW amphibious trucks carrying the 100 foot ladders requisitioned from the London Fire Brigade. One landing craft carrying troops sank, drowning all but one of its occupants; another was swamped. One supply craft sank and the other put the stores overboard to stay afloat. German fire sank one of the DUKWs. Once within a mile of shore, German mortars and machine guns fired on the craft.

These initial setbacks resulted in a 40-minute delay in landing at the base of the cliffs, but British landing craft carrying the Rangers finally reached the base of the cliffs at 7:10 AM with approximately half the force it started out with. The Rangers headed for the cliffs, but now they found themselves only on the Eastern side of the point when the plan called for landings on both sides. The beach at the base of the cliff was only 30 yards wide and heavily cratered from the bombardment. In order to climb the heights, the LCAs were equipped with rocket-fired grappling hooks. But, because of the shelling, earth had piled up at the base of the cliff and the DUKWs couldn't approach close enough to the cliff to effectively use their ladders. On the other hand, the piling at the base gave the men some cover from enemy fire and also made the height to climb less. As the Rangers scaled the cliffs the destroyers USS Satterlee and HMS Talybont provided fire support and ensured that the Germans above could not fire down on the assaulting troops. After several failed attempts (due to the weight of soaked ropes), the Rangers finally struggled to the top with only 15 casualties.

The original plans had called for additional Rangers to follow the first attack, if successful. Flares from the cliff tops were to signal this second wave to join the attack, but because of the delayed landing, the signal came too late, and the other Rangers landed on Omaha instead of Pointe du Hoc. The added impetus these 500 plus Rangers provided on the stalled Omaha Beach landing was significant, since it was they who carried the assault beyond the beach, into the overlooking bluffs and outflanked the German defenses.

The force at the top of the cliffs also found that their radios were ineffective. Upon reaching the fortifications, most of the Rangers learned for the first time that the main objective of the assault, the artillery battery, had been removed. The Rangers regrouped at the top of the cliffs, and a small patrol went off in search of the guns. By 9:00, 2 different patrols found 5 of the 6 guns nearby (the 6th was being fixed elsewhere) and destroyed their firing mechanisms with thermite grenades.

The costliest part of the battle came after the successful cliff assault. Determined to hold the vital high ground, yet isolated from other Allied forces, the Rangers fended off several counterattacks from the German 914th Grenadier Regiment. 5th Ranger Battalion and elements of 116th Infantry Regiment headed towards Pointe du Hoc from Omaha Beach. However, only 23 Rangers from the 5th were able to link up during the evening of June 6. During the night the Germans forced the Rangers into a smaller enclave along the cliff, and some were taken prisoner. The Rangers had lost 1/3 of their men and ammunition was running low. Despite attempts of 5th Ranger Battalion, the Rangers at the cliff remained under siege. It was not until the morning of June 8 that the Rangers at Pointe du Hoc were finally relieved by the 2nd and 5th Rangers, plus 1st Battalion of the 116th, accompanied by tanks from 743rd Tank Battalion.

At the end of the 2-day action, the initial Ranger landing force of 225+ was reduced to about 90 fighting men. In the aftermath of the battle, some Rangers became convinced that French civilians had taken part in the fighting on the German side. A number of French civilians accused of shooting at American forces or of serving as artillery observers for the Germans were executed.