The Military History Thread

[scoundrel]

Originally Posted by rupertramjet

The death of the SAS solider in this operation was to have far reaching affects on the social attitudes of the government and Ministry of Defence, the soldier who died, and I will respect the tradition of anonymity, left a daughter and partner behind, the Ministry of Defence refused a pension to either, they refused as the couple were not married legaly. There was never a dispute about the paternity of the child or the legitimacy of the relationship.

The issue was raised by the Regimental Association with the Labour Minister, who stood firmly behind the rule book. The Regiment then approached the local Conservative MP, who took up the case with gusto, bringing it up firstly in the commons, with the interest of the press raised, he mercilessly pursued the case in the press and within weeks the rules had been rewritten, a marriage certificate is no longer needed for the dependents of service personnel killed in action, they and their children now receive the full benefits payable, the MOD has come into the twenty first century! Kicking, screaming and crying copiously, but here at last!

I agree with the change in the rules and I devoutly hope it was applied to all people previously refused pensions because they were not legally married. The MoD were totally in the wrong and were acting without conscience or humanity.

And yet I still quite strongly think that if you plan and intend to have children, or if you are committed to one another for life, you should marry. To chose not to marry denies the children by choice something which they need; it implies a lack of commitment. I have seen many successful families where the parents did not marry - and also single parent families - but I still think that if you are planning to raise children, you should marry. As with a cavalry officer the rule is:

1. The horses.
2. The men.
3. Yourself.

When you are a parent, or going to be one, the rule is:

1. The children
2. Your partner
3. Yourself.

[Ennath]

September 16, 1940
Halt at Sidi Barrani

On June 10, 1940, Italy declared war on Britain and France. In response, on June 13, the Egyptian Parliament broke diplomatic relations with Italy but also announced that they would not enter the war unless attacked. However, while Egypt remained neutral, it had signed the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, which allowed British military forces to occupy Egypt when and if the Suez Canal was threatened.

When Italy declared war, it had 2 armies in Libya: the 5th (9 divisions) and the 10th (5 divisions). 5th Army in Tripolitania faced the French in Tunisia. The 10th in Cyrenaica faced the British in Egypt. When France was defeated, divisions and material from 5th Army were redeployed to reinforce and strengthen 10th Army. By the time of the invasion, 10th Army included 10 divisions and 5th Army had 4. Even with a larger force in Cyrenaica, the Italians were still hampered by a lack of transport, low level of training among officers, and the weak state of its supporting arms. The morale of the artillery and tank branches was the best, but the guns were old and generally of light caliber with ammunition of poor lethality. Italian armor in Libya was represented by hundreds of L3 machine-gun tankettes. Only recently had 70 M11 medium tanks arrived.

On June 17, using the headquarters of British 6th Infantry Division, the headquarters of Western Desert Force (WDF) was formed. Under the command of Richard O’Connor, the WDF included all troops directly facing the Italians in Cyrenaica. O'Connor, promoted to Lt-General, had some 10,000 men; his remit was to engage in aggressive patrolling along the frontier. He set out to dominate no-man’s land by creating “jock columns”, mobile formations based on units of 7th Armored Division, which combined tanks, infantry and artillery. These small well-trained forces launched raids on Italian convoys and fortified positions across the border. Within a week of Italy’s declaration of war, the British had seized Ft. Capuzzo in Libya. In an ambush east of Bardia, the British captured 10th Army's Engineer-in-Chief, Gen. Lastucci.

On June 28, Marshal Italo Balbo, the Italian commander and Governor-General of Libya, was killed by "friendly fire" while landing in Tobruk. Balbo had been seen as a man who appreciated better than his contemporaries the effect of modern technology on warfare. He also saw that Italy's one chance of success in North Africa was a quick offensive based on surprise. Yet, even before war was declared, Balbo expressed his doubts to Mussolini: "It is not the number of men which causes me anxiety but their weapons ... equipped with limited and very old pieces of artillery, almost lacking anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons ... it is useless to send more thousands of men if we cannot supply them with the indispensable requirements to move and fight." In response came airy promises from Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Chief-of-Staff in Rome. Prior to his death, Balbo was making preparations for a strike into Egypt starting on July 15.

Mussolini replaced Balbo with Marshal Rodolfo Graziani and ordered Graziani to launch an attack into Egypt by August 8. Graziani informed Mussolini that 10th Army was not properly equipped for such an operation. He further reported that an attack could not possibly succeed. Mussolini ordered Graziani to attack anyway. Graziani, who had no confidence in an offensive, delayed. On September 8 (after being threatened with dismissal), he agreed to advance into Egypt.

10th Army contained 5 corps under Gen. Mario Berti. Most of the mobile troops were concentrated in the Maletti Group, part of the Libyan Corps. This was an ad hoc unit composed of six Libyan battalions transported in trucks and commanded by Pietro Maletti. This "mechanized" group included much of the available armor and almost all of the M11/39 medium tanks. Graziani commanded the overall invasion with the rest of his staff located many miles away in Tobruk. Berti planned a 2-pronged advance, with 21st Corps (a metropolitan unit with scant desert experience) along the coast road, while the Libyan Corps would advance inland. In essence, Berti was to use his artillery and tanks as escorts to his infantry. However, the Libyan divisions did not have sufficient transport to coordinate with Maletti group; thus the latter would go it alone inland, while both corps would advance along the coast. Air strength numbered some 300 aircraft. Berti could expect little support from the Italian Royal Navy. Ten submarines had already been lost since Italy declared war and the fleet was too important to risk at this juncture. In addition, the navy was already suffering from a serious shortage of fuel.

By this time, the WDF comprised the understrength 4th Indian Infantry Division and 7th Armored Division (the "Desert Rats"). There were 205 aircraft, many obsolete. By the end of July, the British Royal Navy had won mastery over the Eastern Mediterranean. So complete was British control, they were able to bombard Italian coastal positions and to transport an almost uninterrupted flow of supplies along the coast to Mersa Matruh and beyond. In anticipation of an Italian thrust toward Mersa Matruh, the British had withdrawn the bulk of their armored units to concentrate near Mersa Matruh, leaving 7th Division's Support Group to take over the front. The Support Group (3 motorized battalions with supporting arms) was ordered to harass the enemy and if attacked, to impose delay without getting seriously involved, and fall back in successive stages on Mersa Matruh. There, a strong infantry force would await the Italian attack, while from the escarpment on the desert flank, the bulk of the 7th Division would be ready to counterattack.

On September 9, Italian aircraft began attacking British airfields. The British responded with raids on Tobruk and other staging areas in the Italian rear. The advance on the ground proved to be a struggle. One division got lost and many engines over-heated. The British, greatly outnumbered, left mines and retreated. However, Maletti Group had become lost moving up to its pre-battle staging position at Sidi Omar near the border. As a result, the Italian invasion got off to a slow start. The Italians themselves, through intercepted radio broadcasts, provided this information to the rest of the world. It was not until September 10 that armored cars of 11th Hussars spotted Maletti Group. A heavy mist shielded the British and allowed them to shadow the slow Italian build-up. By 13 September, the 1st "23 March" Blackshirt Division retook Ft. Capuzzo. The Italians then crossed the border. Four days after it began, the "invasion of Egypt" reached Egypt.

On the same day, a single platoon of Coldstream Guards at Sollum found themselves the object of attention of the entire 1st Libyan Division. A bombardment of hurricane-like force was unleashed on the British outposts on the plateau. But by the time the barrage commenced, the occupants of the outposts had already withdrawn down the Halfaya Pass. The roar of the guns did, however, hearten the Italian soldiers who had already come under harrying fire from the light British force that seemed to be invisible and just over the horizon. Slowly, the mass of four Italian divisions marched through the pass with little incident. The Italians suffered some losses from mines left behind as the British withdrew. Rarely was an enemy soldier seen or taken. Broken and abandoned British vehicles bore silent witness to them having been there.

On September 16, the Coldstream Guards were almost cut off when a large group of Italian tanks moved inland from the coastal road in the region of Alam el Dab. A timely radio call to the 11th Hussars summoned assistance and kept the trap from closing. By the end of the day, most of the covering forces had successfully withdrawn to the vicinity of Mersa Matruh. By this time, the Italian advance had progressed about as far as it was going to go. 1st Blackshirt Division occupied Sidi Barrani.

The Italians advanced to Maktila, 10 miles beyond; at that point, Graziani halted, citing supply problems. He laid out his troubles to Mussolini and Badoglio as thick as he dared. In doing so, he declared that the approach march to Mersa Matruh would take 6 days since his forces would all be on foot. Among other things, the list of items he required now included something new: 600 mules. It seems he had given up hope of receiving more transport vehicles.

Despite urgings from Mussolini to continue the advance, Graziani dug in at Sidi Barrani. In addition, he established 9 fortified camps at Maktila, Tummar (2), Nibeiwa and on top of the escarpment at Sofafi (4). To his rear, he positioned Italian divisions at Buq Buq, Sidi Omar, and the Halfaya Pass. The Italians were now about 80 miles west of the main British defensive positions at Mersa Matruh.

Mussolini asked of Graziani on October 26: “Forty days after the capture of Sidi Barrani I ask myself the question, to whom has this long halt been any use - to us or to the enemy? I do not hesitate to answer, it has been of much use, indeed, more to the enemy... It is time to ask whether you feel you wish to continue to command.” Two days later, the Italian Army invaded Greece and the focus was off both Egypt and Graziani. He was allowed to continue his planning at a leisurely pace. An Italian advance to Mersa Matruh was scheduled to start on December 15. But the British were to strike first.

[rupertramjet]

Originally Posted by scoundrel

I agree with the change in the rules and I devoutly hope it was applied to all people previously refused pensions because they were not legally married. The MoD were totally in the wrong and were acting without conscience or humanity.

And yet I still quite strongly think that if you plan and intend to have children, or if you are committed to one another for life, you should marry.:

As soldiers, and I am sure all of us on here who are, or have been, would agree. We live in a kind of bubble, at home with the family, with friends who are non service we are in a different place, the reality of our job, the call to action, and the risk of death, is far from our thoughts . Even in Garrison, it is kind of forgotten, it is only when the bugles blow and the drums begin to beat, that we switch to 'Oh Shit!' mode.

In my case complications have always prevented me from actually getting married, my first partner was stuck in a situation which prevented it. My two daughters always new I am there for them, and love them very much, but they also knew at an early age the situation. There are usually a few weddings when the bikini state changes! In the above case, marriage was certainly planned and the squadron was deployed at very short notice. Thus it did not happen.

I do agree with your comments, but in front line units plans often get put on ice!

[scoundrel]

Of course - the Ancient Greeks used to say that the way to make the Gods laugh is to make plans.

[Ennath]

September 17, 1939
Soviet Invasion of Poland

In March 1939, Hitler occupied Czechoslovakia; on the 31st the British and French guaranteed Poland against further German aggression. Talks began in April with the Soviets to strengthen this guarantee. Stalin, however, was leery after Munich and also suspected that Britain and France would remain on the sidelines of any Nazi-Soviet conflict. In reality Stalin had been conducting secret talks with Germany since 1936 and a deal with Hitler remained his first diplomatic choice. The Soviets sought an ironclad guarantee of its sphere of influence, and insisted on stretching the so-called buffer zone from Finland to Romania, in the event of an attack. They demanded the right to enter these countries in the event of a security threat. Negotiations quickly stalled as Polish officials bluntly refused to allow Soviet troops in Poland. They believed that once the Red Army entered it might never leave. The Soviets suggested that Poland's wishes be ignored. The Allies refused, fearing that such a move would push Poland into stronger relations with Germany.

In late July and early August Soviet and German officials agreed on most of the details for an economic agreement, and addressed a potential political agreement. On August 19, they concluded a Commercial Agreement, to exchange Soviet raw materials in exchange for German weapons, military technology and civilian machinery. Two days later, the Soviets suspended the talks with the West. On August 24, the Soviet sand Germans signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. This non-aggression pact contained secret protocols dividing the states of northern and eastern Europe. The Soviet sphere initially included Latvia, Estonia and Finland. The two would partition Poland. The pact provided the Soviets with the opportunity to regain territories ceded in the Peace of Riga of 1921. The Soviets would enlarge the Ukrainian and Belarusian republics to include the entire eastern half of Poland without the threat of disagreement with Hitler.

The Germans invaded Poland at 0445 on September 1. The Allies declared war on Germany on the 3rd, but failed to provide Poland with any meaningful support. German technical, operational and numerical superiority forced the Polish armies to retreat from the borders towards Warsaw and Lvov. On September 10, the Polish commander-in-chief, Marshal Edward Rydz-Smigły, ordered a general retreat. Soon after they began their invasion, the Nazi leaders began urging the Soviets to play their agreed part and attack Poland from the east. Diplomatic messages on the matter were exchanged but the Soviets delayed their invasion, distracted by events relating to their border dispute with Japan. They needed time to mobilize and also saw advantage in waiting until Poland had disintegrated before making their move.

On September 14, with Poland’s collapse near, the Soviet press began making ominous statements about Poland. The undeclared war with Japan (see posting, Battle of Khalkin Gol) ended with the Molotov–Tojo Treaty on September 15. On September 17, Foreign Minister Molotov delivered a declaration of war to the Polish Ambassador in Moscow. Molotov declared on the radio that all treaties between the Soviet Union and Poland were now void; the Polish government had abandoned its people and effectively ceased to exist. On the same day, the Red Army crossed the border into Poland.

The Red Army entered the eastern regions of Poland with 7 field armies, containing about 600,000 troops, in 2 fronts, Belarusian Front (Mikhail Kovalyov) and Ukrainian Front (Semyon Timoshenko). Poland had assumed that the Soviet Union would remain neutral during a conflict with Germany. As a result, Polish commanders deployed most of their troops west, to face the German invasion. By this time, no more than 20 under-strength battalions, about 20,000 troops of the Border Protection Corps, defended the eastern border. When the Red Army invaded, the Polish military was in the midst of a fighting retreat towards the Romanian Bridgehead whereupon they would regroup and await British and French relief.

When the Soviets invaded, Rydz-Smigły was initially inclined to order the border forces to resist, but was dissuaded by the government. At 0400 on September 17, he ordered the troops to fall back, stipulating that they only engage Soviet troops in self-defense. However, the German invasion had severely damaged the Polish communication systems, causing command and control problems for the Polish forces. In the resulting confusion, clashes between Polish and Soviet forces occurred along the border. Gen. Wilhelm Orlik-Rückemann, in command of the Border Protection Corps, received no official directives. As a result, he and his subordinates continued to engage Soviet forces proactively, before dissolving the group on October 1.

The Polish government refused to surrender or negotiate a peace and instead ordered all units to evacuate Poland and reorganize in France. The day after the Soviet invasion started, the Polish government crossed into Romania. Polish units proceeded to move towards the Romanian bridgehead area, sustaining German attacks on one flank and occasionally clashing with Soviet troops on the other.

Soviet units often met their German counterparts advancing from the opposite direction. The Wehrmacht passed Brest Fortress to Soviet 29th Tank Brigade. Gens. Heinz Guderian and Semyon Krivoshein held a joint parade in the town on September 22. Lvov surrendered that day, after the Germans had handed the siege operations over to the Soviets. Soviet forces had taken Wilno (Vilnius) on September 19 after a 2-day battle, and Grodno on the 24th after a 4-day battle. By September 28, the Red Army had reached the line formed by the Narew, Western Bug, Vistula and San rivers, the border agreed in advance with the Germans.

Despite a tactical Polish victory at the Battle of Szack (September 28), the outcome was never in doubt. On October 1, Soviet troops drove Polish units into the forests in the Battle of Wytyczno, one of the last direct confrontations of the campaign. The last Polish resistance was overcome by the Germans at the 4-day Battle of Kock, ending on October 6. On October 31, Molotov reported to the Supreme Soviet: “A short blow by the German army, and subsequently by the Red Army, was enough for nothing to be left of this bastard of the Treaty of Versailles”.

The reaction of France and Britain to the Soviet invasion and annexation of eastern Poland was muted, since neither country expected or wanted a confrontation with the Soviet Union at that time. Under the terms of the Polish-British Common Defense Pact of August 25, the British had promised assistance if a European power attacked Poland. A secret protocol of the pact, however, specified that the European power referred to was Germany. When the Polish Ambassador reminded Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax of the pact, he was bluntly told that it was Britain’s business whether to declare war on the Soviet Union. Neville Chamberlain considered making a public commitment to restore the Polish state but in the end issued only general condemnations. This represented Britain's attempt at balance: its security interests included trade with the Soviets that would support its war effort and the possibility of a future Anglo-Soviet alliance against Germany. Public opinion in Britain was divided between expressions of outrage at the invasion and a perception that Soviet claims to the region were reasonable.

While the French had made promises to Poland, including the provision of air support, these were not honored. The agreements were not strongly supported by the French military leadership, though; the relationship deteriorated during the 1920s and 1930s. In the French view, the German-Soviet alliance was fragile, and overt action against, the Soviets would not serve either France's or Poland's best interests. Once the Soviets moved into Poland, the French and the British decided there was nothing they could do for Poland in the short term and began planning for a long-term victory instead.

Molotov reported to the Supreme Soviet that the Soviets had suffered 737 deaths and 1862 wounded during the campaign, although Polish historians claim up to 3000 deaths and 8-10,000 wounded. 3-7000 Polish soldiers died fighting the Red Army, with up to 450,000 taken prisoner. The Soviets often failed to honor the terms of surrender. In some cases, they promised Polish soldiers their freedom and then arrested them when they laid down their arms.

Soviet censors later suppressed details of the invasion and its aftermath. From the start the Politburo called the operation a “liberation campaign”, and Soviet statements and publications never wavered from that line. Despite the publication of a recovered copy of the secret protocols of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact in the western media, it was the official policy of the Soviet Union to deny the existence of the protocols. Censorship was also applied in the People’s Republic of Poland, in order to preserve the image of Polish-Soviet friendship which was promoted by the 2 Communist governments. Official policy only allowed accounts of the campaign that portrayed it as a reunification of the Belarusian and Ukrainian peoples and a liberation of the Polish people from “oligarchic capitalism.”

In 2009, Vladimir Putin wrote in the Polish daily Gazeta Wyborcza that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was “immoral”. In 2015, as President, he praised the pact as a triumph of Stalin's diplomacy ensuring the security of the USSR. In 2016 the Russian Supreme Court upheld the decision of a lower court, which had found a blogger, Vladimir Luzgin, guilty of the “rehabilitation of Nazism” for reposting a text on social media that described the invasion of Poland in 1939 as a joint effort by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.

[Ennath]

September 18, 1899
Battle of Olongapo

During the Spanish–American War, Olongapo, in Zambales province in central Luzon, was largely ignored by the US Asiatic Squadron, despite the fact that the Spanish had built a naval station there and the Americans had been warned about the presence of Spanish vessels in the area. The reason for this lay in the fact that when Commodore George Dewey’s fleet traversed the area on April 30, they failed to encounter any Spanish ships and, as a result, Dewey had continued on to Manila Bay where he destroyed the Spanish fleet under Admiral Patricio Montojo (see posting, Battle of Manila Bay). After moving to Manila, the Americans focused on capturing the Spanish port in Cavite. After that, Filipino forces occupied the Olongapo area and installed a gun battery at Kalaklan Point, 1000 feet above sea level, consisting of 2 guns: one 6-inch and one 3-inch. By 1899, the Americans realized Olongapo’s potential as a harbor for vessels steaming between Manila and Hong Kong, so the Asiatic Squadron began patrolling the area during the summer.

Despite the fact that hostilities had already begun between US forces and Philippine nationalists, the Filipinos stationed in Olongapo decided at first not to fire at the American patrols. However, on September 18, after noticing the routine patrolling by the squadron, the Filipinos fired at the armed transport Zafiro (2 37mm guns). Undamaged, Zafiro withdrew and reported the incident. From Cavite, the Americans dispatched the protected cruiser Charleston (3730 tons, 2 8-inch guns, 6 6-inch guns and smaller pieces), which seemingly silenced the Philippine battery. She then began to withdraw back to Cavite. As the cruiser moved away, the battery fired a single parting shot, provoking the Americans.

On September 23, the Americans returned to Olongapo with a stronger force, bringing the protected cruiser Baltimore (4400 tons, 4 8-inch guns, 6 6-inch guns and smaller guns) and the gunboat Concord in addition to Zafiro and Charleston. Due to the heavy American bombardment, the Philippine battery was only able to get off a single shot. After the bombardment was lifted, Charleston landed 180 sailors and 70 marines. As the landing party began their advance, the ships stopped firing but they were met by 300 Filipinos from the naval yard. A short battle ensued in the main part of Olongapo, during which one American was wounded. The Americans then raced to the battery at Kalaklan Point, and destroyed it completely with three charges of guncotton. As soon as they achieved their mission, the Americans withdrew to their ships. Olongapo remained under the Filipinos, but the battery - badly damaged in the explosion - no longer posed a threat to American intentions in the area.

With the battery gone, trade vessels as well as American patrols were able to freely use the route past Olongapo. Philippine leader Emilio Aguinaldo effectively disbanded the regular Philippine army due to continuing American advances by November 13, and divided the force into bands of guerrillas. On December 10, 1899, an American force of 90 soldiers under Major Robert Spence captured Olongapo.

[Ennath]

September 19, 1777
Battle of Freeman’s Farm

By August 1777, Maj.-Gen. John Burgoyne’s army had forced its way from Canada down the Lake Champlain route to Ft. Edward on the Hudson River. Gen. Philip Schuyler lay with the American Army to the south, covering the New York State capital, Albany. Burgoyne’s campaign to invade the American Colonies, which had seemed so promising when the army set out, was rapidly souring.

Col. Baum’s expedition to Bennington in search of supplies and horses was a disaster. The Americans were greatly encouraged by the success of Stark’s New Hampshire Militia in the Battle of Bennington (see posting). Now the main American Northern Army lay north of the junction of the Mohawk and the Hudson Rivers, receiving a constant flow of reinforcements. By contrast, British reinforcements were few and supplies had to be brought the long and difficult route from Canada; down Lake Champlain by boat, along the primitive road from Ft. Anne to the Hudson River for onward transport, again by boat, to the army.

Schuyler established his army in a fortified position on Bemis Heights, on the west bank of the Hudson River. Blamed for the loss of Fort Ticonderoga on July 6 (see posting), Schuyler was removed from his post in August and ordered to Philadelphia, to answer for his conduct. He was replaced by Maj.-Gen. Horatio Gates and Maj.-Gen. Benedict Arnold, mutually antipathetical personalities. Gates was a cautious ex-British officer. Arnold, one of the leaders of the American attack on Quebec in 1775 (see posting), was a mercurial man of action, able to inspire his troops to great feats in battle, constantly aggressive and on the lookout for the tactical advantage.

On September 19, Burgoyne began a movement to encircle the American fortifications on Bemis Heights. His intention was to take possession of the high ground to the west of the American fortifications and use the advantage of greater elevation to bombard the Americans from their flank. Brig. Simon Fraser, with the British right wing, pushed into the woods along the northern side of a deep ravine. Hamilton followed with the center, accompanied by Burgoyne. Baron von Riedesel and his German troops remained on the riverside with the boats and supplies. Once in line the three contingents would advance on the Americans. By the early afternoon, Burgoyne’s army cleared the ravine and was in a position to begin the advance, to be signaled by the discharge of a gun.

Gates had no aggressive plan with which to counter the British move. He planned to await attack in his fortified position on Bemis Heights. His subordinate, Arnold, had no such intention. He was determined to take the fight to the advancing British and use the advantage his men had in forest fighting. Arnold pressed Gates to attack with the whole army. Gates refused, but finally agreed that Arnold could take his own division, a mix of Continentals and militia, forward against the British line.

Daniel Morgan’s riflemen were the first American troops to attack, launching an assault on a small force of Canadians and Indians of Fraser’s wing. Morgan’s men were followed by Arnold’s New Hampshire Continentals. As the Canadians and Indians fell back, Morgan’s riflemen rushed on in pursuit and were dispersed by a British counterattack. The New Hampshire Continentals were repelled by Fraser’s Grenadiers and Light Companies.

Burgoyne’s and Hamilton’s center approached Freeman’s Farm, leaving a substantial gap between themselves and Fraser’s more distant force. Arnold rallied his men and resumed the attack into the gap. More regiments of Arnold’s Division came up and joined the assault. Burgoyne’s flank regiment, the 21st Foot, was forced to fall back to avoid being overwhelmed. This left the 62nd Regiment at the angle of the line and under heavy fire. A desperate battle developed between the attacking Americans and the regiments of the British center. A bayonet charge of the 20th Regiment enabled the 62nd to withdraw and reorganize. Arnold was at the forefront of the fighting, and his attacking spirit helped inspire his men. The British had not been expecting the Americans to put up such a good fight, and as the afternoon drew on, it was the British who began to weaken.

Gates, still in the position on Bemis Heights, refused to commit further formations to the battle. If he had done so, it is generally accepted that the British center would have been overwhelmed. In contrast to Gates’ refusal of requests for assistance from Arnold, Riedesel, on the British left, responded with alacrity to the crisis. Leaving the British 47th to guard the baggage, he marched his regiments up the hill.

Both sides were fighting in isolation. Burgoyne had deliberately split his force, and was now suffering for it. Riedesel's command was struggling to climb up from the river to the battlefield, while Fraser never managed to reach the field. Riedesel arrived to find the British in great difficulty, and, without delay, launched a flank attack on the Americans. The fire of his artillery and foot was sufficient to relieve the pressure on the British regiments and force the Americans to withdraw. By this time night was falling. The Americans fell back to their fortified camp on Bemis Heights.

Burgoyne’s army suffered heavy casualties - 600 killed, wounded and captured. The Americans took 350 casualties

In the American camp, the mutual resentment between Gates and Arnold finally exploded into open hostility. Gates quickly reported the action of September 19 to the Congress and Governor George Clinton of New York, but he failed to mention Arnold at all. Arnold protested, and the dispute escalated into a shouting match that ended with Gates relieving Arnold of his command and giving it to Benjamin Lincoln. Arnold asked for a transfer to Washington's command, which Gates granted, but instead of leaving he remained in his tent. There is no documentary evidence for a commonly recounted anecdote that a petition signed by line officers convinced Arnold to stay in camp.

Burgoyne’s senior subordinates urged that the attack on the American position on Bemis Heights be pressed the next day, while the Americans were in disorder after the failure of Arnold’s attack. However, Burgoyne, his army in poor condition, preferred to wait and see if Gen. Henry Clinton was coming up the Hudson from New York to meet him, before launching a further offensive operation. The opportunity, if there was one, quickly passed.

[Ennath]

340
Battle of Aquileia

Following the death of Emperor Constantine I on May 22, 337, his sons Constantine II, Constans and Constantius II succeeded, along with their cousins, the Caesars Dalmatius and Hannibalianus. This arrangement barely survived Constantine I’s death, as his sons arranged the slaughter of most of the rest of the family by the army. As a result, the 3 brothers gathered together in Pannonia and there, on September 9, 337, divided the Roman world between themselves. Constantine, proclaimed Augustus by the troops, received Gaul, Britannia and Hispania. Constans, the youngest, received Italia, Africa and Illyricum. Constantius got the east.

Constans was initially under the guardianship of Constantine II, and was unhappy with his share, so the brothers met at Viminacium in 338 to revise the boundaries. Constans managed to extract the prefecture of Illyricum and the diocese of Thrace, provinces that were originally to be ruled by his cousin Dalmatius, as per Constantine I’s proposed division.

Constantine soon complained that he had not received the amount of territory that was his due as the eldest son. He demanded that Constans hand over the African provinces, to which he agreed in order to maintain a fragile peace. Soon, however, they began quarreling over which parts of the African provinces belonged to Carthage, and thus Constantine, and which belonged to Italy, and therefore Constans.

Further complications arose when Constans came of age and Constantine, who had grown accustomed to dominating his younger brother, would not relinquish the guardianship. In 340 Constantine marched into Italy at the head of his troops. Constans, at that time in Dacia, detached and sent a select and disciplined body of his Illyrian troops, stating that he would follow them in person with the remainder of his forces. Constantine was eventually trapped in an ambush outside Aquileia, where he died, leaving Constans to inherit all of his brother’s former territories.

[Ennath]

September 20, 1854
Battle of the Alma

The allied fleet left the Ottoman port of Varna on September 7, 1854 with no clear objective or landing point. The allies had been planning to capture Sevastopol in a coup de main, but decided instead to sail to Evpatoria, which a landing party captured on September 13. Prince Alexander Menshikov, Russian commander in the Crimea, was taken by surprise. He had not thought the allies would attack so close to winter, and had only 38,000 soldiers and 18,000 sailors along the southwest coast, and 12,000 more around Kerch and Fyodosia.

Allied forces reached Kalamita Bay on the west coast, 28 miles from Sevastopol, and started disembarking on September 14. The French landed first, and by nightfall 3 divisions were ashore with their artillery. The British landing took much longer to complete, as the infantry was landed first, when the sea was calm, but by the time the British tried to get their cavalry ashore, the wind was up and the horses struggled in the heavy surf. It took 5 days for the British to disembark. Many of the men were sick with cholera and had to be carried off the boats. There were no facilities for moving equipment overland, so parties had to be sent out to collect carts and wagons from the local Tatar farms. No tents or kitbags were offloaded, so the soldiers spent their first nights without shelter.

Despite the plans for a surprise attack on Sevastopol being undermined by the delays, the army started to head south on September 19, with the fleets in support. The French were on the right near the shore, with the Turks following, and the British were on the left further inland. The march involved crossing five rivers, the Bulganak, the Alma, the Kacha, the Belbek and the Chernaya. By midday the allied army reached the Bulganak and had its first sight of the Russians when a Cossack vanguard opened fire on a scouting party. As the Light Brigade prepared to charge the Cossacks, a large Russian infantry force was discovered in a dip in the terrain ahead. The next morning the Allied army marched down the valley to engage the Russians, whose forces were on the other side of the river, on the Alma heights.

Menshikov had decided to make his stand on the high ground south of the river. Although the Russian army was numerically inferior (35,000 troops to 60,000 allied), the heights were a natural defensive position, the last natural barrier on the approach to Sevastopol. Furthermore, the Russians had more than 100 guns on the heights; however, there were none on the cliffs facing the sea, considered too steep to climb.

On the 20th, the allies marched the 4 miles to the Alma, where the ground sloped gently down to the river. The precipitous cliffs running along the south bank were 350 feet high and continued inland for almost 2 miles, where they met a less steep but equally high hill known as Telegraph Hill across the river from the village of Bourliouk. To its east lay Kourgane Hill, a natural strongpoint with fields of fire covering most approaches, and the key to the whole position. Two redoubts had been constructed to protect Kourgane Hill from infantry assault; the Lesser Redoubt on the east slope and the Greater Redoubt on the west. The road to Sevastopol ran between the 2 hills, covered by Russian batteries sited on the hills and in the narrow valley between them.

By mid-morning the allied army was assembling on the plain, the British on the left of the road, the French and the Turks on the right. The 2 armies were to advance simultaneously on a broad front and try to turn the enemy’s flank inland. At the final moment Raglan decided to delay the British advance until the French had broken through on the right; the troops were ordered to lie on the ground, within range of the Russian guns, in a position from which they could scramble to the river when the time was right. They lay there for an hour and a half, as the Russian gunners found their range.

While the British delayed, on the far right Pierre Bosquet's division arrived at the river's mouth and encountered steep cliffs rising above the river. The Russians considered the cliffs so steep that they deemed it unnecessary to place artillery. Leaving their kitbags on the bank, the Zouaves at the division's head started to swim across and rapidly climbed the cliffs using the trees to scale it. Once they had reached the plateau, they hid behind rocks and bushes to engage the defending forces of the Moscow Regiment and held the position until reinforcements could arrive. Following the Zouaves, more soldiers scaled the cliffs and carried 12 guns up a ravine. They arrived just in time to meet the extra infantry and artillery that Menshikov had transferred from the center. The Russian situation became hopeless. Before a counterattack could be made, the whole of Bosquet’s division and many of the Turks had reached the plateau. The Russians had more guns (28 to the French 12), but the French guns were heavier, and Bosquet’s riflemen kept the Russian gunners at a distance where only the heavier French guns could take effect. The guns of the allied fleet also started pounding the Russian positions, undermining the morale of their troops. By the time the first Russian heavy battery arrived it found the remnants of the Moscow Regiment already in retreat. Under heavy fire from the Zouaves the Minsk Regiment also began to retreat.

In the meantime on Bousquet's left, Canrobert's 1st and Prince Napoleon's 3rd Divisions, were unable to cross the river in the face of heavy fire coming from Telegraph Hill, and their advance stalled. Prince Napoleon sent word to George de Lacy Evans, 2nd Division commander on his left, calling on the British to take some pressure off the French. Raglan was still waiting for the French attack to succeed, and at first told Evans not to take orders from the French, but under pressure from Evans he relented. At 2:45 he commanded the British Light, 1st and 2nd Divisions to advance, although without further orders. The remaining British troops were held in reserve.

The Light Division had not extended itself far enough left and advanced at an angle. Soon the troops of the Light and 2nd Divisions began merging. The formation of the British line was lost. Once they had crossed the river, all order was gone. Companies and regiments became jumbled and where there had been lines 2 men deep, there was now just a crowd. The Russians, seeing this, began to advance down the hill from either side of the Great Redoubt. Mounted British officers attempted to reform their lines, but were unsuccessful in persuading them to move from the shelter of the riverbank. Some sat down and took out their water cans; others began to eat. Aware of the danger and unable to reorganize, William John Codrington, commanding the Light Division's 1st Brigade, ordered his troops to fix bayonets and advance. The densely packed brigade started to advance uphill in a thick crowd. As Russian artillery opened up, the British continued scrambling upward until some of the advance guard tumbled over the walls of the Greater Redoubt, capturing 2 guns in the confusion. However, realizing their lack of reinforcements, and as the Vladimirsky Regiment poured into the Redoubt, British buglers sounded the withdraw order. Russian infantry charged, driving out the British and firing at them as they retreated down the hill.

By now 1st Division had finally crossed the river and the Russians in the Great Redoubt saw the Guards Brigade advancing. Out of sight on the far left was the Highland Brigade (Sir Colin Campbell). Irritated by the Guards' delay he ordered an immediate advance. A firm believer in the bayonet, Campbell told his men not to fire until they were "within a yard of the Russians". The Scots Fusiliers, by then ahead of the rest of the division, started to move uphill immediately, repeating the Light Division’s mistake, which at that moment was running down from the Redoubt, pursued by Russian infantry. The Light Division crashed into the advancing Scots with such force that the line was broken in many places. The Scots faltered but emerged on the other side with only half their numbers and continued towards the Great Redoubt. At 40 yards, the Russians fired a massive volley. The Scots Guards were forced to retreat, stopping only when they reached the river; they remained in the riverbank shelter for the rest of the battle, ignoring repeated orders to advance. The 2 other Guards' regiments filled the gap left by the Scots Fusiliers, but refused orders to charge with bayonets. Instead, the Grenadiers and the Coldstream formed into line and started firing into the Russian advance parties. This stopped the Russians, and the Grenadiers and the Coldstream were soon able to close the gap; the Russians were again forced back into the Redoubt.

Without entrenchments to protect its infantry and artillery, the Russian army was unable to defend its position against the deadly Minié rifles. Soon the Guards was joined by 2nd Division under Evans, on the British right. Its 30th Regiment could clearly see the gunners of 3 Russian batteries and take them out with their rifles before they could redeploy the guns. The British slowly advanced uphill. By 4:00 the allies were converging on the Russian positions from all directions. With the French in command of the cliffs above the Alma, it was clear that the battle had been virtually decided. The Russians fled down the hill into the valley. Mounted officers tried in vain to stop the flight, but the men had had enough. Many would not be reunited with their regiments for several days. On the hill were abandoned picnics, parasols and field glasses left behind by spectators from Sevastopol.

The battle cost the French 1250 casualties, the British 2000 and the Russians some 5500. The allied commanders had no idea of the heavy losses on the Russian side. Lucan sent the Light Brigade in pursuit but it was recalled by Raglan as the Russians still had some 3000 uncommitted cavalry, some rallied infantry and 30 guns 2 miles on. Raglan asked St Arnaud to take up the pursuit but the Frenchman declined as his troops' supplies had been left on the northern bank of the river, and his artillery was almost out of ammunition. Nevertheless, the way was open to Sevastopol.

[Ennath]

September 21, 1762
Battle of Amöneburg

During the 1762 campaign in western Germany, the French lost Hesse at the end of June after their defeat at Wilhelmsthal. In the last days of August, the Prince de Soubise’s army finally made a junction with the Prince de Condé. The united French armies now vastly outnumbered the Allied army of Ferdinand of Brunswick. In September, the Allied and French armies both marched towards French-held Kassel, Ferdinand intending to besiege and recapture it, the French to block him..

Ferdinand finally managed to intercept the French advance, taking position on the eastern (right) bank of the Ohm and securing every crossing. Amöneburg was located at the extreme left of Ferdinand's positions, where he had neglected to solidly occupy the bridge leading and the mill (the Brücker Mühle) beside it. The castle of Amöneburg, though isolated on the western (left) bank, was a very strong defensive position. The garrison consisted of a single battalion of irregulars. There had been some attempt to secure the bridge itself, and an old redoubt built the year before had been occupied on Ferdinand's side of the river, but the breastwork was not above 3 feet high and 1 yard thick, so that it could be commanded by enemy fire, the more easily since the French bank was higher. An outpost in the court of the mill was occupied by only 13 men. The fortress of Amöneburg was an advanced post against the French left wing and on the enemy side of the river and the possession of the bridge was of vital importance to the Allies. This bridge not only ensured communication with that advanced post but barred the advance of the French across the Ohm and secured to Ferdinand the means of taking the offensive. The carelessness which allowed these points to remain so slenderly guarded is therefore almost inexplicable.

The French commanders, judging that the positions of their right wing on the Ohm would be threatened as long as the Allies occupied the castle of Amöneburg, resolved to capture it. They committed 18 battalions and 30 guns to the task. On the night of September 20, the French closely invested the castle. Two batteries of heavy artillery were planted on the south side of the castle. Meanwhile Castries, with a force of light troops, drove back the 13 men defending the Brücker Mühle and occupied the court of the mill. This done, thinking that the Allies would surely make an attempt to relieve the garrison of Amöneburg, Castries prepared to block their advance.

On September 21 at 6:00 AM, under cover of a dense mist, the French opened a heavy fire on the castle as well as on the bridge and redoubt. The men in that redoubt, 200 Hanoverians, resisted stoutly, in order to gain time for their supports to come up and for their artillery on the Galgenberg to answer the French batteries. The corps in occupation of the ground immediately before the Brücker Mühle comprised Lt-Gen. Zastrow's group of 7 battalions, 11 squadrons and 6 guns; while Wangenheim's corps of about the same strength lay on his left, and Granby's (3 battalions of British Guards, 3 of British grenadiers, 2 of Highlanders, the Blues, and 1st Dragoon Guards) on the heights of Kirchhain to his right.

By 8:00 AM, the French had brought forward more guns behind the veil of the mist, and their guns were now playing furiously upon the redoubt, while small parties of infantry under cover of the fire renewed their attack on the bridge. Zastrow continued to feed the redoubt with fresh troops, and held his ground. Meanwhile, the Volontaires du Hainaut, under Grandmaison, maintained their positions at the western entry of the bridge. At about the same time, Ferdinand, still at Schönstadt, was informed of the French attack by Adjutant Schlieffen. At 8:30, Ferdinand informed Schlieffen that half of Granby's reserve, along with his artillery, had been ordered to march to Zastrow’s support; and that he was personally coming to the scene. Thinking that the French were attempting to cross the Ohm at the Brücker Mühle, Ferdinand also ordered to Zastrow to hold his position at all cost.

By 10:00, Allied commanders finally realized the full significance of the attack when the mist rolled away. It was now clear, observing the French dispositions that they were bent on carrying the bridge. Then at last Ferdinand ordered up Granby's corps from Kirchhain to Zastrow's assistance. Meanwhile the fight waxed hotter. By noon, the French in artillery superiority had made itself felt: 9 out of Zastrow's 12 guns were dismounted and the rest were silent for want of ammunition. From 2:00 PM, the intensity of the French artillery fire diminished and 5 French battalions tried to storm the breached western wall of the castle, but the two initial assaults were repulsed.

At length, at 4:00, the British Guards and the Highlanders arrived in the area of the Brücker Mühle, and 12 German field-pieces attached to Granby's corps came also into action. The French likewise brought up reinforcements and the combat became livelier than ever. So far the hourly reliefs for the garrison in the redoubt had marched down in regular order, but the fire of the French artillery was now so terrible that the men were ordered to creep down singly and dispersed, as best they could. British Guards replaced Hanoverians, and Hessians replaced British Guards; regiment after regiment taking its turn to send men to undergo the heavy pounding. Surprisingly, during this artillery duel, the French made no massive attempt to cross the bridge.

The artillery duel wore on till after dusk. The Hessians piled up the corpses of the dead into a rampart and fired on. At 7:00, the French by a desperate effort carried the passage of the bridge and fought their way close up to the redoubt, but they were met by the same dogged resistance and repulsed.

At 8:00, after 14 hours of severe fighting, the French finally abandoned their attempt at gaining a bridgehead on the right bank of the Ohm. Zastrow's and Granby’s corps bivouacked about the bridge, and Ferdinand took up his quarters in the Brücker Mühle.

The French then returned their attention to the castle of Amöneburg where a 40 yard breach had been made in the wall. At 11:00, a third attack was launched. Combat lasted till 1:00 AM on September 22 when the defenders finally surrendered due to lack of ammunition. The Allied garrison lost 25 killed and 17 wounded and was allowed, in the morning, to leave the castle with the honors of war and to rejoin the Allied army.

This action is usually considered as an Allied victory. However, the French plan was to capture the castle of Amöneburg, which they successfully accomplished. The artillery duel at the bridge and the deployment of French troops on the western bank of the Ohm was intended to cover the attack on Amöneburg and to prevent the crossing of an Allied relief force. This explains why the French never launched any massive attack against the bridge but contented themselves with cannonading the Allied positions at the Brücker Mühle. In fact, each army expected its opponent to force the passage of the Ohm by the bridge of the Brücker Mühle. Therefore, each claimed victory: the French because they had captured the castle and prevented the Allies from crossing the Ohm; the latter because they thought that they had defeated a French attempt to cross the same river. Thus, it could be argued that the action was a draw.

The Allies lost 745 men killed, wounded or missing, more than a third of whom were British. They also lost 19 horses and 4 guns. French had 1175 casualties. With the French relief armies stopped on the Ohm, Ferdinand could redirect his attention to the siege and recapture the city of Kassel which surrendered on November 1.