Register on the forum now to remove ALL ads + popups + get access to tons of hidden content for members only!
vintage erotica forum vintage erotica forum vintage erotica forum
vintage erotica forum
Home
Go Back   Vintage Erotica Forums > Discussion & Talk Forum > General Discussion & News
Best Porn Sites Live Sex Register FAQ Members List Calendar

Notices
General Discussion & News Want to speak your mind about something ... do it here.


Reply
 
Thread Tools Display Modes
Old September 10th, 2014, 11:18 AM   #2651
Ennath
Vintage Member
 
Join Date: Jun 2011
Posts: 6,816
Thanks: 26,925
Thanked 80,782 Times in 6,815 Posts
Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+
Default

September 10, 1813
Battle of Lake Erie, Part 1

When the War of 1812 broke out, the British immediately seized control of Lake Erie. They already had a small force of warships there: the sloop Queen Charlotte and the brig General Hunter. The brig Lady Prevost was under construction and was put into service a few weeks after the outbreak of war. These vessels were controlled by the Provincial Marine, which was a military transport service and not a naval service. Nevertheless, the Americans lacked any counter to the British vessels. The only American warship on Lake Erie, the brig USS Adams, was not ready for service at the start of the war, and when the American army of Brigadier General William Hull abandoned its invasion of Canada, the Adams was pinned in Detroit by the British batteries at Sandwich on the Canadian side of the Detroit River. British Major-General Isaac Brock used his control of the lake to defeat Hull at Detroit, by cutting American supply lines and rapidly transferring himself and some reinforcements to Amherstburg from where they launched a successful landing on the American side of the Detroit River.

The British took the Adams when Detroit was surrendered, renaming her Detroit. Together with the brig Caledonia, which had been commandeered from the North West Company, she was boarded and captured near Fort Erie on October 9, by American sailors and soldiers led by Lieutenant Jesse Elliot. The Detroit ran aground on an island in the middle of the Niagara River and was set on fire to prevent her being recaptured. The Caledonia was taken to the navy yard at Black Rock and commissioned into the US Navy. Also present at Black Rock were the schooners Somers and Ohio and the sloop-rigged Trippe, which had all been purchased by the Navy and were being converted into gunboats. While the British held Fort Erie and the nearby batteries which dominated the Niagara River, all these vessels were pinned down and unable to leave Black Rock.

Late in 1812, Paul Hamilton, the Secretary of the Navy received long-time lake mariner Daniel Dobbins, who had escaped capture at Detroit and brought information on the British forces on Lake Erie. Dobbins recommended the bay of Presque Isle in Erie, Pennsylvania as a naval base on the lake. He was dispatched to build four gunboats there, although Lieutenant Elliot objected to the lack of facilities. In January 1813, William Jones (who had replaced Hamilton) ordered the construction of two brig-rigged corvettes at Presque Isle. Other than their rig and crude construction (such as using wooden pegs instead of nails because of shortages), the two brigs were close copies of the contemporary USS Hornet. The heaviest armament for the ships came from foundries on Chesapeake Bay, and were moved to Presque Isle only with great difficulty. (The Americans were fortunate in that some of their largest cannon had been dispatched shortly before raiding parties under Rear-Admiral George Cockburn destroyed a foundry at Frenchtown on the eastern seaboard.) However, the Americans could get other materials and fittings from Pittsburgh, which was expanding as a manufacturing center, and smaller guns were borrowed from the Army.

Master Commandant Oliver Hazard Perry was appointed to command on Lake Erie, supplanting Lieutenant Elliot, and arrived at Presque Isle to take command at the end of March. Having arranged for the defense of the base, he proceeded to Lake Ontario to obtain reinforcements of seamen from Commodore Isaac Chauncey. After commanding the American schooners and gunboats at the Battle of Fort George, he then went to Black Rock where the American vessels had been released when the British abandoned Fort Erie at the end of May. Perry had them towed by draft oxen up the Niagara, an operation which took six days, and sailed with them along the shore to Presque Isle.

Meanwhile, Commander Robert Heriot Barclay was appointed to command the British squadron on Lake Erie. Another British officer had already endangered his career by refusing the appointment as success appeared unlikely. Barclay missed a rendezvous with the Queen Charlotte at Point Abino and was forced to make the tedious journey to Amherstburg overland, arriving on June 10. He brought with him only a handful of officers and seamen. When he took command of his squadron, the crews of his vessels numbered only 7 British seamen, 108 officers and men of the Provincial Marine (whose quality Barclay disparaged), 54 men of the Royal Newfoundland Fencibles and 106 soldiers from the 41st Foot. Nevertheless he immediately set out in the Queen Charlotte and the Lady Prevost. He first reconnoitred Perry's base at Presque Isle and determined that it was defended by 2000 Pennsylvania militia, with batteries and redoubts. He then cruised the eastern end of Lake Erie, hoping to intercept the American vessels from Black Rock. The weather was hazy, and he missed them.

During July and August, Barclay received two small vessels, the schooner Chippeway and the sloop Little Belt, which had been reconstructed at Chatham on the Thames River and attempted to complete the ship-rigged corvette HMS Detroit at Amherstburg. Because the Americans controlled Lake Ontario and occupied the Niagara Peninsula in early 1813, supplies for Barclay had to be carried overland from York. The American victory earlier in the year at the Battle of York resulted in the guns intended for the Detroit falling into American hands. The Detroit had to be completed with a miscellany of guns from the fortifications of Amherstburg. Barclay claimed at his court martial that these guns lacked flintlock firing mechanisms and matches, and that they could be fired only by snapping flintlock pistols over powder piled in the vent holes.

Barclay repeatedly requested men and supplies from Commodore James Lucas Yeo, commanding on Lake Ontario, but received very little. The commander of the British troops on the Detroit frontier, Major-General Henry Procter, was similarly starved of soldiers and munitions by his superiors. He declined to make an attack on Presque Isle unless reinforced, and instead he incurred heavy losses in an unsuccessful attack on Fort Stephenson, which he mounted at the urgings of some of his Indian warriors.

By mid-July, the American squadron was almost complete, although not yet fully manned. The British squadron maintained a blockade of Presque Isle from July 20 to 29. The harbor had a sandbar across its mouth, with only 5 feet of water over it, which prevented Barclay sailing in to attack the American ships (although Barclay briefly skirmished with the defending batteries on the 21st), but also prevented the Americans leaving in fighting order. Barclay had to lift the blockade on July 29 because of supply shortages and bad weather. Perry immediately began to move his vessels across the sandbar. This was an exhausting task. The guns had to be removed from all the boats, and the largest of them had to be raised between "camels" (barges which were then emptied of ballast, lifting all the ships higher in the water). When Barclay returned 4 days later, he found that Perry had nearly completed the task. Perry's two largest brigs were not ready for action, but the gunboats and smaller brigs formed a line so confidently that Barclay withdrew to await the completion of the Detroit.

Chauncey had dispatched 130 extra sailors under Lieutenant Jesse Elliot to Presque Isle. Although Perry described some of them as "wretched", at least 50 of them were experienced sailors drafted from the USS Constitution, then undergoing a refit in Boston. Perry also had a few volunteers from the Pennsylvania militia. His vessels first proceeded to Sandusky, where they received further contingents of volunteers from Major General William Henry Harrison's Army of the Northwest. After twice appearing off Amherstburg, Perry established an anchorage at Put-in-Bay, Ohio. For the next 5 weeks, Barclay was effectively blockaded and unable to move supplies to Amherstburg. His sailors, Procter's troops, and the large numbers of Indian warriors and their families quickly ran out of supplies. After receiving a last-minute reinforcement of 2 naval officers, 3 warrant officers and 36 sailors from a transport temporarily laid up in Quebec under Lieutenant George Bignall, Barclay had no choice but to put out again and seek battle with Perry.
Ennath is offline   Reply With Quote
The Following 11 Users Say Thank You to Ennath For This Useful Post:
Old September 10th, 2014, 11:21 AM   #2652
Ennath
Vintage Member
 
Join Date: Jun 2011
Posts: 6,816
Thanks: 26,925
Thanked 80,782 Times in 6,815 Posts
Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+
Default

September 10, 1813
Battle of Lake Erie, Part 2

On the morning of September 10, the Americans saw Barclay's vessels heading for them, and got under way from their anchorage at Put-in-Bay. The British squadron numbered 6 ships carrying 61 guns of 804 pounds of shot. The US squadron had 9 ships with 55 heavier guns, firing 1536 pounds of shot, mostly from carronades, powerful, but short ranged.

The wind was light. Barclay initially held the weather gauge, but the wind shifted and allowed Perry to close the range. Both squadrons were in line of battle, with their heaviest vessels near the center. Perry hoped to get his two largest brigs, his flagship Lawrence and Niagara, into carronade range quickly, but in the light wind his vessels were making very little speed and the Lawrence was battered by the assortment of long guns mounted in the Detroit for at least 20 minutes before being able to reply effectively. When Lawrence was finally within range at 12:45, her fire was not as effective as Perry hoped, her gunners apparently having overloaded.

Astern of the Lawrence, the Niagara, under Elliot, was slow to come into action and remained far out of effective carronade range. It is possible that Elliott was under orders to engage his opposite number, the Queen Charlotte, and that the Niagara was obstructed by the Caledonia, but Elliot's actions would become a matter of dispute between him and Perry for many years. Aboard the Queen Charlotte, the British ship opposed to the Niagara, the commander and First Lieutenant were both killed. The next most senior officer, Lieutenant Irvine of the Provincial Marine, found that both the Niagara and the American gunboats were far out of range, and passed the brig General Hunter to engage Lawrence at close range.

Although the American gunboats at the rear of the line of battle steadily pounded the British ships in the center of the action with raking shots from their long guns from a distance, Lawrence was reduced to a wreck, four-fifths of her crew killed or wounded. When the last gun on the Lawrence became unusable, Perry decided to transfer his flag. He was rowed a half mile through heavy gunfire to the Niagara while the Lawrence was surrendered.

When the Lawrence surrendered, firing died away briefly. The Detroit collided with Queen Charlotte, both ships being almost unmanageable with damaged rigging and almost every officer killed or severely wounded. Barclay was severely wounded and his first lieutenant was killed, leaving Lieutenant Inglis in command. Most of the smaller British vessels were also disabled and drifting to leeward. The British nevertheless expected the Niagara to lead the American schooners away in retreat. Instead, once aboard Niagara, Perry dispatched Elliot to bring the schooners into closer action, while he steered Niagara at Barclay's damaged ships, helped by the strengthening wind.

Niagara broke through the British line ahead of the Detroit and Queen Charlotte and luffed up to fire raking broadsides from ahead of them, while the Caledonia and the American gunboats fired from astern. Although the crews of Detroit and Queen Charlotte managed to untangle the two ships they could no longer offer effective resistance. Both ships surrendered at about 3:00. The smaller British vessels tried to flee but were overtaken and also surrendered.

Although Perry won the battle on the Niagara, he received the British surrender on the deck of the recaptured Lawrence to allow the British to see the terrible price his men had paid.

The British lost 41 killed and 94 wounded. The surviving crews, including the wounded, numbered 306. Captain Barclay, who had previously lost his right arm in 1809, lost a leg and part of his thigh in the action while his remaining arm was rendered "permanently motionless". The Americans lost 27 killed and 96 wounded, of whom 2 later died.

Of the vessels involved, the three most battered (the American brig Lawrence and the British ships Detroit and Queen Charlotte) were converted into hospital ships. A gale swept the lake on September 13 and dismasted the Detroit and Queen Charlotte, further shattering the already battered ships. Once the wounded had been ferried to Erie, the Lawrence was restored to service for 1814, but the two British ships were effectively reduced to hulks.

Once his usable vessels and prizes were patched up, Perry ferried 2500 soldiers to Amherstburg, which was captured without opposition on September 27. Meanwhile, 1000 mounted troops led by Richard Mentor Johnson moved by land to Detroit, which also was recaptured without fighting on about the same day. In spite of exhortations from Tecumseh, who led the confederation of Native tribes allied to Britain, Procter had already abandoned Amherstburg and Detroit and began to retreat up the Thames River. Lacking supplies, Tecumseh's natives had no option but to accompany him. Harrison caught up with Procter's retreating force and defeated them on October 5 at the Battle of the Thames, where Tecumseh was killed.

Although the naval engagement was small compared to Napoleonic struggles, the victory on Lake Erie had disproportionate strategic impact. The Americans controlled Lake Erie for the remainder of the war. This accounted for much of the Americans' successes on the Niagara peninsula in 1814 and also removed the threat of a British attack on Ohio, Pennsylvania, or western New York.

Barclay was cleared by a court martial. The disabled captain offered to end his engagement to his cousin Agnes Cosser, but she replied that so long as his soul was undamaged, the marriage would proceed. He petitioned the Admiralty for further employment for several years, but received only command of a bomb ketch in 1822. From 1824, he held no more position until his death in 1837.

After the war, there was a bitter quarrel between Perry and Elliot over their respective parts in the action, mostly fought at second hand in the press. Officers took sides and the service was split over the issue for years. Elliot served as second to James Barron in his 1820 duel with Stephen Decatur, in which the latter was killed and was finally suspended from duty in 1838, but was reinstated in 1844 and died the following year. Perry received further commands. Dispatched to consult Bolivar about piracy in the Caribbean, he contracted Yellow Fever and died in 1819.
Ennath is offline   Reply With Quote
The Following 13 Users Say Thank You to Ennath For This Useful Post:
Old September 11th, 2014, 11:21 AM   #2653
Ennath
Vintage Member
 
Join Date: Jun 2011
Posts: 6,816
Thanks: 26,925
Thanked 80,782 Times in 6,815 Posts
Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+
Default

September 11, 1709
Battle of Malplaquet

In the spring of 1709, the War of the Spanish Succession was going poorly for France and the country was in danger of being forced to sue for peace. Defeats in Italy and the Low Countries had brought Allied troops to the French border. King Louis XIV informally approached the Duke of Marlborough with a view to ending the disastrous war, but the terms Marlborough was instructed to put to Louis were unacceptable even with French fortunes at a low ebb and the war continued.

After a late start to the campaigning season owing to the unusually harsh winter, the allied campaign of 1709 began in mid June. Unable to bring the French army under Marshal Claude-Louis-Hector, Duc de Villars to battle owing to strong French defensive lines and the Marshal's orders from Versailles not to risk battle, the Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugen concentrated instead on taking the fortresses of Tournai and Ypres. Tournai fell after an unusually long siege of almost 70 days, by which time it was early September, and rather than run the risk of disease spreading in his army in the poorly drained land around Ypres, Marlborough instead moved eastwards towards the lesser fortress of Mons, hoping by taking it to outflank the French defensive lines in the west. Villars moved after him, under new orders from Louis XIV to prevent the fall of Mons at all costs – effectively an order for the aggressive Marshal to give battle. After several complicated manoeuvres, the two armies faced each other across the gap of Malplaquet, south-west of Mons.

On August 29, the allied and Franco-Bavarian armies lay within striking distance of each other. Marlborough was for an immediate attack, but was held back by a consensus among the senior allied generals and the Dutch deputies, who wielded so much influence, that the army should await the further detachments that were hurrying to join it. Villars was actively fortifying his position and used the additional time to good effect. The arrival in camp of the old Marshal, the Duc de Boufflers, boosted the morale of the French troops.

The French and Bavarian army lay with its right flank embedded in the Forest of Lagnieres. The lines, covered by log abatis fronted with redoubts, stretched for some three miles into the Forest of Taisnieres. At the left end of the line a fortification jutted forward of the French main line onto a hill in the forest. It was here that the decisive fighting on the left wing would take place. Villars massed his cavalry behind the fortified lines.

Breaking through such a strongly fortified line presented the allies a daunting task, but the defender’s ability to maneuver and shift forces from one place to another was severely restricted and the French and Bavarian cavalry could take no part in the battle until the line was pierced. In the center and on the left, woods gave the opportunity for allied troops to approach the defenses unseen.

Marlborough and Eugen resolved to make use of the inflexibility of Villars’ position by making a feint attack on the French right and threatening the center, but delivering the true attack on the French left and enveloping it. It was decided to divert a force commanded by General Withers that was hastening up to reinforce the army to march straight around the French left and assault the village of La Folie. Once the French line had been pierced the Allied cavalry would sweep through and break up the French army.

The Allied army consisted of 86,000 men and 100 guns, mostly Austrian and Dutch, but with sizeable British and Prussian contingents. Villars had 75,000 men and 80 guns, mostly French, but with some Bavarians. Boufflers was officially Villars' superior but voluntarily serving under him.

September 11, 1709 dawned with a thick mist concealing the opposing armies from each other. Heavy batteries of allied guns were brought up to bombard the flanks of the French army. The rest of the guns were distributed along the line. Generals Lottum, Schulenburg and Lord Orkney commanded a substantial force of German and British foot for the assault on the French fortified position in the Forest of Taisnieres. General Withers with five British battalions, fourteen foreign battalions and several regiments of cavalry moved around the French left towards La Folie. Thirty one mainly Dutch battalions commanded by the Prince of Orange formed up for the feint towards the French right. The Prince was specifically commanded not to make a full assault unless ordered to. The allied cavalry was distributed in support of these various forces.

At 7.30 AM, the mist cleared and the battle began with an artillery bombardment. The two columns of foot moved forward towards each of the French flanks. The Prince of Orange halted and that of General Schulenburg moved on to begin the attack on the fortifications in the Forest of Taisnieres.

It took much bitter fighting for the Allied foot to force the French infantry back from the first line of abatis: the regiments of Picardy and Champagne particularly distinguishing themselves. At this point Villars called for reinforcements from the right flank commanded by Boufflers, but Boufflers was unable to comply as he was under heavy attack.

The Prince of Orange had failed to comply with his orders. Instead of presenting a threat to the French right, the Prince launched an all-out assault on the French positions in and around the Forest of Lagnieres. The initial attack, led by the Prince, comprised Scottish regiments in Dutch service, Tullibardine’s and Hepburn’s and the Dutch Blue Guards. Other regiments pressed forward, supported by Hanoverian battalions. The assault was met with heavy artillery fire and a resolute defense directed by Boufflers. Determined though the Prince of Orange’s attack was, it was repelled with some 6000 casualties.

Disastrous though it was, Orange’s assault ensured that Boufflers was unable to release reinforcements to Villars’ left flank. Schulenburg’s assault with his Prussian, Austrian and British foot was pressing the French hard, pushing them out of their fortifications in the forest, with Withers moving around the French flank, attacking La Folie.

Villars called the Irish Brigade up from the French center and launched it in reckless assault on the Prussian foot. After initial success, the Irish became dispersed in the woods and the allied advance resumed. During the desperate hand to hand fighting Prince Eugen was wounded in the head but continued in action. Marshal Villars was badly wounded by a musket ball which smashed his knee, and left the field, incapacitated. The French foot continued to resist but without guidance much guidance from Boufflers, who was distracted by the events on his front. It was about 1:00 PM.

The allied battery moved forward and began a heavy bombardment of the main line of redoubts which was now assaulted by Lord Orkney’s British reserve. The Prince of Orange renewed his attack and took the abatis that faced the allied left.

Allied cavalry poured through the broken French line to be met by Boufflers leading the French Household cavalry and driven back. Six times, the French horse drove its Allied counterparts back, only to be halted in turn by infantry fire. Orkney’s foot fought off the Gens D’Armes and Marlborough brought up the Prussian cavalry from the right. More French regiments joined the fray, but so did the Dutch horse, the struggle continuing until Boufflers was forced to draw off the French Cavalry and retreat, joining the already withdrawing French foot. The battle ended about 3:00. The allied army had forced the French positions and won the battle, but at terrible cost and with the Franco-Bavarian army leaving the field in good order.

The Allies had suffered so many casualties in their attack that they could not pursue. By this time they had lost over 21,000 men, to French losses of 11,000. Villars himself remarked on the enemy's Pyrrhic victory "If it please God to give Your Majesty's enemies another such victory, they are ruined." Mons fell on October 20, but that was the sole gain for the Allies.

News of Malplaquet, considered the bloodiest battle of the 18th century, stunned Europe. Marlborough received no personal letter of thanks from Queen Anne. He was heavily criticized for the terrible casualties at the battle. His enemies said he was more concerned with his own advancement than with the lives of his soldiers. The Tory party to begin agitating for a withdrawal from the alliance as soon as they formed a government the next year. Although a tactical defeat for the French, the battle probably saved France from a greater defeat.
Ennath is offline   Reply With Quote
The Following 15 Users Say Thank You to Ennath For This Useful Post:
Old September 12th, 2014, 11:14 AM   #2654
Ennath
Vintage Member
 
Join Date: Jun 2011
Posts: 6,816
Thanks: 26,925
Thanked 80,782 Times in 6,815 Posts
Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+
Default

September 12, 490 BC
Battle of Marathon, Part 1

In 510 BC, with the aid of Cleomenes I, King of Sparta, the Athenian people had expelled Hippias, the tyrant ruler of Athens. Hippias fled to Sardis to the court of the Persian satrap, Artaphernes and promised control of Athens to the Persians if they were to help restore him. In the meantime, Cleomenes helped install a pro-Spartan tyranny under Isagoras in Athens. His rival Cleisthenes decided to change the rules of the game by appealing to the demos (the people), in effect making them a new faction in the political arena. This tactic succeeded, but Cleomenes returned at the request of Isagoras. When Isagoras attempted to create a narrow oligarchic government, the Athenian people, in a spontaneous and unprecedented move, expelled Cleomenes and Isagoras. Cleisthenes was thus restored to Athens (507 BC), and at breakneck speed began to reform the state with the aim of securing his position. The result was not actually a democracy or a real civic state, but he enabled the development of a democratic government, which would emerge in the next generation as the demos realized its power. The new-found freedom and self-governance of the Athenians meant that they were thereafter exceptionally hostile to the return of the tyranny of Hippias, or any form of outside subjugation; by Sparta, Persia or anyone else.

Cleomenes's attempts to restore Isagoras ended in debacle, but fearing the worst, the Athenians had by this point already sent an embassy to Artaphernes in Sardis, to request aid from the Persian Empire. Artaphernes requested that the Athenians give him “earth and water”, a traditional token of submission, which the Athenian ambassadors acquiesced to. However, they were severely censured for this when they returned to Athens. At some point later Cleomenes instigated a plot to restore Hippias. This failed and Hippias again fled to Sardis and tried to persuade the Persians to subjugate Athens. The Athenians dispatched ambassadors to Artaphernes to dissuade him from action, but Artaphernes merely instructed the Athenians to take Hippias back as tyrant. Needless to say, the Athenians balked, and resolved instead to be openly hostile to Persia. Having thus become the enemy of Persia, Athens was already in a position to support the Ionian cities when they began their revolt in 499 BC. The fact that the Ionian democracies were inspired by the example of Athens no doubt further persuaded the Athenians to support them; especially since the cities of Ionia were originally Athenian colonies.

The Athenians and Eretrians sent a task force of 25 triremes to aid the revolt. Despite the fact that their actions were ultimately fruitless, the Eretrians and in particular the Athenians earned Great King Darius's lasting enmity and he vowed to punish both cities. The Persian naval victory at the Battle of Lade (494 BC) all but ended the Ionian Revolt, and by 493 BC, the last hold-outs were vanquished. The revolt was used as an opportunity by Darius to extend the empire's border to the islands of the eastern Aegean and the Propontis, which had not been part of the Persian dominions before. The completion of the pacification of Ionia allowed the Persians to begin planning their next moves; to extinguish the threat to the empire from Greece, and to punish Athens and Eretria.

In 492 BC, once the Ionian Revolt had finally been crushed, Darius dispatched an expedition to Greece under the command of his son-in-law, Mardonius. Mardonius subdued Thrace and compelled Alexander I of Macedon to make his state a client kingdom before the wrecking of his fleet brought a premature end to the campaign. However in 490 BC, following up on this campaign, Darius decided to send a maritime expedition led by Artaphernes, (son of the satrap to whom Hippias had fled) and Datis, a Median admiral. Mardonius had been injured in the prior campaign and had fallen out of favor. The expedition was intended to bring the Cyclades into the Persian empire, to punish Naxos (which had resisted a Persian assault in 499 BC) and then to head to Greece to force Eretria and Athens to submit or be destroyed. After island-hopping across the Aegean, including successfully attacking Naxos, the Persian task force arrived off Euboea in mid summer. The Persians then proceeded to besiege, capture and burn Eretria. They then headed south down the coast of Attica, en route to complete the final objective of the campaign—to punish Athens.

The Persians sailed down the coast of Attica, and landed at the bay of Marathon, roughly 26 miles from Athens, on the advice of the exiled Hippias (who had accompanied the expedition). They had about 25,000 foot and 1000 cavalry. Under the guidance of Miltiades, the Athenian general with the greatest experience of fighting the Persians, the Athenian army of 9000 hoplites marched quickly to block the two exits from the plain of Marathon, and prevent the Persians moving inland. At the same time, Athens's greatest runner, Pheidippides had been sent to Sparta to request aid. Pheidippides arrived during the festival of Carneia, a sacrosanct period of peace, and was informed that the Spartan army could not march to war until the full moon rose; Athens could not expect reinforcement for at least ten days. The Athenians would have to hold out at Marathon for the time being, although they were reinforced by the full muster of 1000 hoplites from the small city of Plataea; a gesture which did much to steady the nerves of the Athenians, and won unending Athenian gratitude to Plataea.

For approximately five days the armies confronted each other across the plain of Marathon, in stalemate. The flanks of the Athenian camp were protected either by a grove of trees, or an abatis of stakes (depending on the exact reading). Since every day brought the arrival of the Spartans closer, the delay worked in favor of the Athenians. There were ten Athenian strategoi (generals) at Marathon, elected by each of the ten tribes of Athens; Miltiades was one of these. In addition, in overall charge, was the War-Archon (polemarch), Callimachus, who had been elected by the whole citizen body. Herodotus suggests that command rotated between the strategoi, each taking in turn a day to command the army.He further suggests that each strategos, on his day in command, instead deferred to Miltiades. In Herodotus's account, Miltiades is keen to attack the Persians (despite knowing that the Spartans are coming to aid the Athenians), but strangely, chooses to wait until his actual day of command to attack. This passage is problematic; the Athenians had little to gain by attacking before the Spartans arrived, and there is no real evidence of this rotating generalship. There does, however, seem to have been a delay between the Athenian arrival at Marathon, and the battle; Herodotus, who evidently believed that Miltiades was eager to attack, may have made a mistake whilst seeking to explain this delay.

There are two main theories to explain the Greek attack. The first is that the Persian cavalry left Marathon for an unspecified reason, and that the Greeks moved to take advantage of this by attacking. This theory is based on the absence of any mention of cavalry in Herodotus' account of the battle, and an entry in the Suda dictionary: The cavalry left. When Datis was ready for retreat, the Ionians climbed the trees and gave the Athenians the signal that the cavalry had left. And when Miltiades realized that, he attacked and thus won. Perhaps the cavalry was reembarked on the ships, and was to be sent by sea to attack undefended Athens in the rear, whilst the rest of the Persians pinned down the Athenian army at Marathon.

The second theory is simply that the battle occurred because the Persians finally moved to attack the Athenians. Although this theory has the Persians moving to the strategic offensive, this can be reconciled with the traditional account of the Athenians attacking the Persians by assuming that, seeing the Persians advancing, the Athenians took the tactical offensive, and attacked them.
Ennath is offline   Reply With Quote
The Following 12 Users Say Thank You to Ennath For This Useful Post:
Old September 12th, 2014, 11:16 AM   #2655
Ennath
Vintage Member
 
Join Date: Jun 2011
Posts: 6,816
Thanks: 26,925
Thanked 80,782 Times in 6,815 Posts
Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+
Default

September 12, 490 BC
Battle of Marathon, Part 2

The distance between the two armies at the point of battle had narrowed to "a distance not less than 8 stadia" or about 1500 yards. Miltiades ordered the two tribes that were forming the center of the Greek formation to be arranged in four ranks while the rest of the tribes at their flanks were in ranks of eight. Some modern commentators have suggested this was a deliberate ploy to encourage a double envelopment. However, this supposes a level of training that the Greeks did not possess. There is little evidence for any such tactical thinking in Greek battles until Leuctra in 371 BC. It is therefore probable that this arrangement was made, possibly at the last moment, so that the Athenian line was as long as the Persian line, and would not therefore be outflanked.

When the Athenian line was ready, according to one source, the simple signal to advance was given by Miltiades: "At them". Herodotus implies the Athenians ran the whole distance to the Persian lines, but this is doubtful; in full armor this would be very difficult. More likely, they marched until they reached the limit of the archers' effectiveness (roughly 200 yards), and then broke into a run. Another possibility is that they ran up to the 200 yard mark in broken ranks, and then reformed for the march into battle from there. Herodotus suggests that this was the first time a Greek army ran into battle in this way; this was probably because it was the first time that a mainland Greek army had faced an enemy composed primarily of missile troops. All this was evidently to the surprise of the Persians; “... in their minds they charged the Athenians with madness which must be fatal, seeing that they were few and yet were pressing forwards at a run, having neither cavalry nor archers”. Indeed, based on their previous experience of the Greeks, the Persians might be excused for this; Herodotus tells us that the Athenians at Marathon were “first to endure looking at Median dress and men wearing it, for up until then just hearing the name of the Medes caused the Hellenes to panic”. Passing through the hail of arrows launched by the Persian army, protected for the most part by their armor, the Greek line collided with the enemy army.

The Athenian wings quickly routed the inferior Persian levies on the flanks, before turning inwards to surround the Persian center, which had been more successful against the thin Greek center. The battle ended when the Persian center broke in panic towards their ships, pursued by the Greeks. Some, unaware of the local terrain, ran towards the swamps where unknown numbers drowned. The Athenians pursued the Persians back to the ships, and managed to capture seven of them, though the majority were able to launch successfully.

Herodotus records that 6400 Persian bodies were counted on the battlefield, and it is unknown how many more perished in the swamps. The Athenians lost 192 men and the Plataeans 11. Among the dead was Callimachus.

In the immediate aftermath of the battle, Herodotus says that the Persian fleet sailed around Cape Sounion to attack Athens directly. The Athenians evidently realized that their city was still under threat, and marched as quickly as possible back to Athens. The two tribes which had been in the center of the Athenian line stayed to guard the battlefield under the command of Aristides. The Athenians arrived in time to prevent the Persians from securing a landing, and seeing that the opportunity was lost, the Persians turned about and returned to Asia. On the next day, the Spartan army arrived at Marathon, having covered the 140 miles in only three days. The Spartans toured the battlefield at Marathon, and agreed that the Athenians had won a great victory.

According to Herodotus, Pheidippides had run to Sparta before the battle. He ran a distance of over 140 miles, arriving in Sparta the day after he left. Then, following the battle, the Athenian army marched back to Athens at a very high pace (considering the armor and the fatigue), in order to head off the Persians sailing around Cape Sounion. Later, in popular imagination, these two events became confused with each other, leading to a legendary but inaccurate story. This myth has Pheidippides running from Marathon to Athens after the battle, to announce “We triumph!”, after which de died of exhaustion. Most accounts incorrectly attribute this story to Herodotus; actually, the story first appears in Plutarch's On the Glory of Athens in the 1st century AD. It did, however, provide the basis for the distance race named for the battle.

The defeat at Marathon barely touched the vast resources of the Persian empire, yet for the Greeks it was an enormously significant victory. It was the first time the Greeks had beaten the Persians, proving that the Persians were not invincible, and that resistance, rather than subjugation, was possible. The battle was a defining moment for the young Athenian democracy, showing what might be achieved through unity and self-belief; indeed, the battle effectively marks the start of a “golden age” for Athens, giving birth to Western culture.

Darius began raising a huge new army with which he meant to completely subjugate Greece; however, in 486 BC, his Egyptian subjects revolted, indefinitely postponing any Greek expedition. Darius then died while preparing to march on Egypt, and the throne passed to his son Xerxes. Xerxes crushed the Egyptian revolt, and very quickly restarted the preparations for the invasion of Greece. The epic second invasion of Greece finally began in 480 BC.
Ennath is offline   Reply With Quote
The Following 12 Users Say Thank You to Ennath For This Useful Post:
Old September 13th, 2014, 11:30 AM   #2656
Ennath
Vintage Member
 
Join Date: Jun 2011
Posts: 6,816
Thanks: 26,925
Thanked 80,782 Times in 6,815 Posts
Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+
Default

September 13, 413 BC
Retreat from Syracuse, Part 1

To small Sicilian cities, Athens was a potential counter to the powerful city of Syracuse, which was strong enough to potentially dominate the island. (Syracuse, like Sparta and its allies, was a Dorian city, while most of Athens' allies on the island were Ionian.) To the Athenians, Sicily was a threat—an unencumbered Syracuse might send grain or other aid to the Peloponnesians. In 427 BC, Athens had sent 20 ships in response to an appeal for help from Leontini. That expedition, operating from a base at Rhegium (Reggio Calabria), remained in the area for several years, fighting alongside Athens' local allies against the Syracusans, without achieving any dramatic success. In 425, the Athenians planned to reinforce their contingent with an additional 40 triremes, but that fleet never reached Sicily, as it became caught up in the Battle of Pylos on the way there. By the time the fleet reached Sicily in late summer, Athens' Sicilian allies had grown weary of stalemate and agreed to negotiate with Syracuse. At the Congress of Gela, the Sicilian cities made peace on the basis of "Sicily for the Sicilians", and the Athenian fleet left for home.

In 415, Athens and Sparta had been formally at peace since 421, when the Peace of Nicias had brought the Archidamian War to a close. The terms of that peace, however, had never been fulfilled; Sparta had never returned Amphipolis to Athens, as required by the treaty, and in return the Athenians held Pylos. More recently, Athenian and Spartan troops had fought at the Battle of Mantinea in 418, with Athens supporting Argos, Mantinea, and other Peloponnesian cities in an attempt to establish a stable anti-Spartan alliance in the Peloponnese. That attempt, largely orchestrated by the Athenian nobleman Alcibiades, would have destroyed Sparta's control over the Peloponnesian League had it succeeded. Alcibiades rebounded politically from this defeat, and was elected as a general in the spring of 417. Control of Athens' foreign policy remained divided between a "peace party" led by Nicias, and a "war party" led by Alcibiades.

The peace in Sicily did not last long. Shortly after the Congress, Syracuse intervened in civil strife between democratic and oligarchic parties in Leontini, supporting the oligarchs. Before long, the prospect of foreign domination had united the Leontinians, and the two parties united against Syracuse. In 416, the Sicilian conflict provided Athens an opportunity. The city of Segesta—an Athenian ally in the 420s—went to war against Selinus and, after losing an initial battle, sent to Athens for help. In order to win the Athenians' support, the Segestaeans claimed that they were capable of funding much of the cost of sending a fleet, offering 60 talents of uncoined silver up front, and tricking Athenian ambassadors into believing that the city was more prosperous than it actually was, by making sure that the ambassadors saw all their golden and other valuable objects as if these were just part of what they had.

At Athens, the Segestan ambassadors presented their case for intervention to the assembly, where debate over the proposal quickly divided along traditional factional lines. The assembly eventually approved an expedition of 60 triremes, without hoplite accompaniment, commanded by Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus. Thucydides reports that Nicias had been appointed against his preference, but offers no further detail regarding that debate. Five days later, a second assembly was held to arrange the logistics of the expedition. There, Nicias attempted to persuade the assembly to overturn its decision to send an expedition at all. He reminded the Athenians that they would be leaving powerful enemies behind if they sent a force to Sicily, and warned that they would be opening hostilities with enemies too difficult and numerous to conquer and rule. He also attacked Alcibiades' credibility, claiming that he and his allies were inexperienced and self-aggrandizing young men eager to lead Athens into war for their own ends. In response, Alcibiades dismissed the attack on himself by pointing to the good he had done for Athens as a private citizen and public leader. He reminded Athenians of their obligation to their Sicilian allies, and pointing out that many states on Sicily would support Athens in her operations there.

Nicias now tried a different tack. He described the wealth and power of the Sicilian cities Athens would be challenging, and stated that a larger expedition would be required, expecting that the prospect of approving such a massive expenditure would prove unappealing to the citizenry. However, the assembly enthusiastically embraced his proposal, and passed a motion allowing the generals to arrange for a force of over 100 ships and 5000 hoplites. Nicias's ploy had failed badly. His misreading of the assembly had altered the strategic situation; whereas the loss of 60 ships would have been painful but bearable, the loss of the larger force would be catastrophic.

After lengthy preparations, the fleet was ready to sail. The night before they were to leave, someone destroyed many of the hermai, the stone markers representing Hermes, placed around the city for good luck. This event was taken very seriously by the Athenians as it was considered a bad omen for the expedition, as well as evidence of a conspiracy to overthrow the government. Androcles, a political enemy of Alcibiades, manufactured claims that Alcibiades and his friends were responsible. Alcibiades volunteered to be tried under penalty of death in order to prove his innocence. However, his request was denied. He was otherwise extremely popular and had the support of the entire army; he had also gained the support of Argos and Mantinea. He was not charged, and the fleet sailed the next day. His opponents, however, waited for Alcibiades to leave before they leveled the charges against him. This was because the army, his main source of support, would be absent, and his supporters would be outnumbered when the votes were cast.

The Athenians named Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus as commanders. Alcibiades was the expedition's leading proponent, and the leader of the war party, Nicias its leading critic and the leader of the peace party. Lamachus, meanwhile, was a fifty-year-old career soldier. The reasons for the choice are not recorded, but the assembly may have been seeking to balance the aggressive young leader with a more conservative older figure, with Lamachus added for his military expertise.

Many people in Syracuse, the richest and most powerful city of Sicily, felt that the Athenians were in fact coming to attack them under the pretense of aiding Segesta in a minor war. The Syracusan general Hermocrates suggested that they ask for help from other Sicilian cities, and from Carthage. He also wanted to meet the Athenian fleet in the Ionian Sea before they arrived. Others argued that Athens was no threat, and some people did not believe there was a fleet at all, because Athens would not be so foolish as to attack them while they were still at war with Sparta. Athenagoras accused Hermocrates and others of attempting to instill fear among the population and trying to overthrow the government.

The Athenian fleet first sailed to Corcyra to meet up with their allies. Three ships were sent ahead to look for allies in Sicily. The fleet at this point consisted of 134 triremes (100 of them from Athens), 5100 hoplites (2200 Athenian), 480 archers, 700 slingers, 120 other light troops, and 30 cavalry, as well as 130 other supply ships and all the crews of the triremes and other non-combatants. They had little luck finding allies in southern Italy and, when the three other ships returned, they learned that Segesta did not have the money they promised. Nicias had expected this, but the other commanders were dismayed. Nicias suggested they make a show of force and then return home, while Alcibiades said they should encourage revolts against Syracuse, and then attack Syracuse and Selinus. Lamachus said they should attack Syracuse by surprise right away, as it was the predominate city-state in Sicily. Eventually, however, Lamachus settled the division of opinion by endorsing Alcibiades' plan.

The fleet proceeded to Catania, where an Athenian ship arrived to inform Alcibiades that he was under arrest, not only for the destruction of the hermai, but also for supposedly profaning the Eleusinian Mysteries. Alcibiades agreed to return in his ship, but when they stopped in southern Italy, he escaped and sailed to the Peloponnese, where he sought refuge in Sparta. Athens passed a death sentence in absentia, his guilt seemingly proven. In Sparta, Alcibiades gave the members of the Peloponnesian League critical information on the Athenian Empire.

In Sicily, the fleet was divided into two parts. The army landed and joined with the cavalry of Segesta. They did not immediately attack Syracuse and, as the Athenians wintered their camp at Catana, the Syracusans prepared to attack. When the Syracusans marched out to Catana, they learned the Athenians had reboarded their ships and sailed into the harbor at Syracuse. The Syracusans quickly hurried back and prepared for battle.
Ennath is offline   Reply With Quote
The Following 12 Users Say Thank You to Ennath For This Useful Post:
Old September 13th, 2014, 11:32 AM   #2657
Ennath
Vintage Member
 
Join Date: Jun 2011
Posts: 6,816
Thanks: 26,925
Thanked 80,782 Times in 6,815 Posts
Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+
Default

September 13, 413 BC
Retreat from Syracuse, Part 2

The Athenians landed outside Syracuse and lined up eight men deep, with the Argives and Mantineans on the right, the rest of the allies on the left, and the Athenians themselves in the center. The Syracusans were deployed sixteen deep, in order to offset the Athenian edge in experience. They also had 1200 cavalry, vastly outnumbering the Athenian horse, although the total numbers were about the same. The Athenians attacked first, and after some unexpectedly strong resistance, the Argives pushed back the Syracusan left, causing the rest to flee. The Syracusan cavalry prevented the Athenians from pursuing, thereby averting a catastrophe, The Syracusans lost about 260 men, and the Athenians about 50. The Athenians then sailed back to Catana for the winter.

During the winter the Athenians sent for more money and cavalry, while the Syracusans built some forts, and a wall extending the territory of the city. Hermocrates reorganized the Syracusan army and sent for help from Corinth and Sparta. Both sides courted the city of Camarina, which reomained officially neutral, but quietly sent aid to Syracuse, fearing their powerful neighbor more than the Athenians. Athens then sent for help from the Carthaginians and Etruscans, and both sides tried to gain assistance from the Greek cities in Italy. In Corinth, representatives from Syracuse met with Alcibiades, who was working with Sparta. He recommended aid to Syracuse and the fortification of Decelea near Athens. The Athenians, he said, feared nothing more than the occupation of Decelea. The Spartans took this advice into consideration, and appointed Gylippus to command their fleet.

In the spring of 414 BC, reinforcements arrived from Athens (250 cavalry, 30 mounted archers, and 300 talents of silver, which was used to pay for 400 more cavalry from their Sicilian allies). In the summer, they landed on the Epipolae, the cliff above Syracuse, which was defended by Diomilus and 600 Syracusans; Diomilus and 300 of his men were killed.

Both sides then began building a series of walls. The Athenian circumvallation, known as "the Circle", was meant to blockade Syracuse from the rest of the island, while the Syracusans built a number of counter-walls from the city to their various forts. A force of 300 Athenians destroyed part of the first counter-wall, but the Syracusans began to build another, this time with a ditch, blocking the Athenians from extending their wall to the sea. Another 300 Athenians attacked this wall and captured it, but were driven off by a Syracusan counterattack in which Lamachus was killed, leaving only Nicias of the three original commanders. The Syracusans destroyed 1000 feet of Athenian wall, but could not destroy the Circle, which was defended by Nicias. After Nicias defeated the attack, the Athenians finally extended their wall to the sea, completely blockading Syracuse by land, and their fleet entered the harbor to blockade them from sea. The Syracusans responded by removing Hermocrates and Sicanus as generals and replacing them with Heraclides, Eucles, and Tellias.

Soon after this, Gylippus landed at Himera. He marched towards Syracuse with 700 marines, 1000 hoplites, 100 cavalry, and 1000 Sicilians. They built another counter-wall on the Epipolae, but were driven back by the Athenians; in a second battle, however, Gylippus defeated the Athenians by making better use of his cavalry and javelinmrn. The Syracusans completed their counter-wall, making the Athenian wall useless. The Corinthian fleet also arrived, under the command of Erasinides.

Nicias, exhausted and ill, now believed it would be impossible to capture Syracuse. He wrote a letter to Athens and suggested that they either recall the expedition or send out massive reinforcements. He hoped they would choose to recall him, if not the whole expedition, but instead they chose to send reinforcements, under Demosthenes and Eurymedon. Meanwhile, in early 413 BC Sparta acted on Alcibiades' advice to fortify Decelea, and the Athenian force sent to relieve it was destroyed.

While Eurymedon was sailing, Gylippus's 80 Syracusan ships attacked 60 Athenian ships (in the harbor. Gylippus commanded a simultaneous attack on the Athenian land forces. In the harbor, the Athenians were successful, losing only 3 ships while the Syracusans lost 11. However, Gylippus defeated the Athenians on land and captured two forts. Afterwards, Gylippus succeeded in convincing all the neutral cities on Sicily to join him, but Athens’ allies killed 800 Corinthians.

Demosthenes and Eurymedon then arrived with 73 ships and 5000 hoplites. Demosthenes landed and attacked the Syracusan counter-wall on Epipolae in a risky night engagement. He succeeded in breaching the wall, but was defeated by a force of Boeotians in the Spartan contingent. Many Athenians fell off the cliff to their death, and some of the rest were killed as they fled down the slope.

Demosthenes' arrival provided little relief to the other Athenians. Their camp was located near a marsh and many of them fell ill, including Nicias. Seeing this, Demosthenes thought they should all return to Athens to defend against the Spartan invasion. Nicias, who had opposed the expedition at first, now did not want to show any weakness either to the enemy or to the Athenians at home who would likely put him on trial for failure. He hoped the Syracusans would soon run out of money, and he had also been informed that there were pro-Athenian factions in Syracuse ready to turn the city over to him. Demosthenes and Eurymedon reluctantly agreed, but when reinforcements from the Peloponnese arrived, Nicias agreed that they should leave.

Just as the Athenians were preparing to sail, on August 28, there was a lunar eclipse, and Nicias, a particularly superstitious man, asked the priests what he should do. They suggested waiting another 27 days and Nicias agreed. The Syracusans took advantage of this, and 76 of their ships attacked 86 Athenians in the harbor. The Athenians were defeated and Eurymedon killed. Many of the ships were pushed on to the shore, where Gylippus was waiting. He killed some of the crews and captured 18 beached ships, but a force of Athenians and Etruscans forced Gylippus back.

The Athenians were now in a desperate situation. On September 3, the Syracusans began to completely blockade the entrance to the port, trapping the Athenians inside. Outside Syracuse, the Athenians built a smaller walled enclosure for their sick and injured, and put everyone else (including many of the soldiers remaining on land) on their ships for one last battle, on September 9. Each side had about 100 ships participating. The Athenian ships were extremely cramped and had no room to maneuver. The Syracusans eventually pushed the Athenian ships toward the coast, and the Athenian crews fled to the camp behind their wall. Demosthenes suggested that they man the ships again and attempt to force their way out, as now both fleets had lost about half their ships. The men themselves, however, refused. They then decided to retreat by land. Hermocrates sent some supposed informers to the Athenians to falsely report that there were spies and roadblocks further inland, so the Athenians would be safer if they did not march away. Gylippus used this delay to build roadblocks, and the Syracusans burned or towed away the Athenian ships on the beach, so that they had no way off the island.

On September 13, the Athenians left camp leaving their wounded behind and their dead unburied. The survivors, including all the non-combatants, numbered 40,000, and some of the wounded crawled after them as far as they could go. As they marched they defeated a small Syracusan force guarding the river Anapus, but Syracusan cavalry and light troops continually harassed them. Near the Erineus river, Demosthenes and Nicias became separated, and Demosthenes was forced to surrender his 6000 troops. The rest of the Syracusans followed Nicias to the Assinarus river, where they became disorganized in the rush to find drinking water. Many were trampled to death and others were killed fighting fellow Athenians. On the other side of the river a Syracusan force was waiting, and the Athenians were almost completely massacred, by far the worst defeat of the entire expedition. Nicias personally surrendered to Gylippus, hoping the Spartan would remember his role in the peace treaty of 421. The few who escaped found refuge in Catana.

The prisoners, now numbering only 7000, were held in the stone quarries near Syracuse, as there was no other room for them. Demosthenes and Nicias were executed, against the orders of Gylippus. The rest spent 10 weeks in horrible conditions in their makeshift prison, until all but the Athenians, Italians, and Sicilians were sold as slaves. The remaining Athenians were left to die slowly of disease and starvation in the quarry. In the end some of the very last survivors managed to escape and eventually trickled to Athens, bringing first-hand news of the disaster.

When the magnitude of the disaster became evident, there was a general panic. Attica seemed free for the taking, as the Spartans were so close by in Decelea. The defeat caused a great shift in policy for many other states. States which had until now been neutral joined Sparta, assuming that Athens' defeat was imminent. Many of Athens' allies in the Delian League also revolted, and although the city immediately began to rebuild its fleet, there was little they could do about the revolts for the time being. The expedition and consequent disaster left Athens reeling. Some 10,000 hoplites had perished and, though this was a blow, the real concern was the loss of the huge fleet dispatched to Sicily. Triremes could be replaced, but the 30,000 experienced oarsmen lost in Sicily were irreplaceable and Athens had to rely on ill-trained slaves to form the backbone of her new fleet. The defeat of the Sicilian expedition was essentially the beginning of the end for Athens. In 404 BC they were defeated and occupied by Sparta.
Ennath is offline   Reply With Quote
The Following 14 Users Say Thank You to Ennath For This Useful Post:
Old September 14th, 2014, 12:01 PM   #2658
Ennath
Vintage Member
 
Join Date: Jun 2011
Posts: 6,816
Thanks: 26,925
Thanked 80,782 Times in 6,815 Posts
Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+
Default

September 14, 1862
Battle of South Mountain

In September 1862, Robert E. Lee began moving his Army of Northern Virginia north into Maryland with the goal of severing the rail lines to Washington and securing supplies for his men. Dividing his army, he sent Stonewall Jackson to capture Harper's Ferry, while James Longstreet occupied Hagerstown. Pursuing Lee north, George McClellan was alerted on September 13, that a copy of Lee's plans had been found by soldiers from the 27th Indiana Infantry. Known as Special Order 191, the document was found in an envelope with three cigars wrapped in a piece of paper near a campsite recently used by Daniel H. Hill's Confederate division. Reading the orders, McClellan learned Lee's marching routes and that the Confederates were spread out. Moving with uncharacteristic speed, McClellan began putting his troops in motion with the goal of defeating the Confederates before they could unite. To reach Lee, McClellan had to move across South Mountain. Lee learned of McClellan's intelligence coup and quickly sent forces to reinforce the passes to block his advance.

McClellan temporarily organized his army into three wings for the attacks on the passes. Ambrose Burnside, the Right Wing, commanded the I Corps (Hooker) and IX Corps (Reno). The Right Wing was sent to Turner's Gap and Fox's Gap in the north. The Left Wing, commanded by William Franklin, consisting of his own VI Corps and Couch's division of the IV Corps, was sent to Crampton's Gap in the south. The Center Wing (II Corps and XII Corps), under Edwin Sumner, was in reserve. He had 28,000 men in position against 18,000 Confederates.

At the southernmost point of the battle, near Burkittsville, Confederate cavalry and a small portion of McLaws's division defended Brownsville Pass and Crampton's Gap. McLaws was unaware of the approach of the 12,000 Federals of the Left Wing and had only 500 deployed behind a three ¾ mile long stone wall at the eastern base of Crampton's Gap. Franklin spent three hours deploying his forces. A Confederate later wrote of a "lion making exceedingly careful preparations to spring on a plucky little mouse." Franklin eventually attacked and seized the gap, taking 400 prisoners, mostly men who were arriving as late reinforcements.

To the north, the defense of Turner's and Fox's Gaps was tasked to the 5000 men of Daniel H. Hill's division. Spread over a two mile front, they faced Burnside’s Right Wing. Around 9:00 AM, Burnside ordered Major General Jesse Reno's IX Corps to attack Fox's Gap. Led by the Kanawha Division, this assault secured much of land south of the gap. Pressing the attack, Reno's men were able to drive Confederate troops from a stone wall along the crest of the ridge. Exhausted from their efforts, they failed to follow up this success and the Confederates formed a new defense near the Daniel Wise farm. This position was reinforced when Hood's Texas Brigade arrived. Re-commencing the attack, Reno was unable to take the farm and was killed in the fighting.

To the north, at Turner's Gap, Burnside sent Gibbon's Iron Brigade up the National Road to attack Colquitt's Confederate brigade. Overrunning the Confederates, Gibbon's men drove them back up into the gap, where it rallied. Widening the assault, Burnside had Hooker commit the bulk of I Corps to the attack. Pressing forward, they were able to drive the Confederates back, but were prevented from taking the gap by the arrival of enemy reinforcements, failing daylight, and rough terrain. As night fell, Lee assessed his situation. With Crampton's Gap lost and his position at Fox's and Turner's Gaps precarious, Lee ordered his forces to withdraw from South Mountain.

McClellan suffered 443 killed, 1807 wounded, and 75 missing. Fighting on the defensive, Confederate losses were lighter and numbered 325 killed, 1560 wounded, and 800 missing. The Battle of South Mountain was an important morale booster for the defeat-stricken Army of the Potomac. Having taken the gaps, McClellan was in prime position to achieve his goal of attacking the elements of Lee's army before they could unite. Unfortunately, McClellan reverted to the slow, cautious behavior which had been his hallmark. Lingering on September 15, he provided time for Lee to reconcentrate behind Antietam Creek. Finally moving forward, McClellan engaged Lee two days later at the Battle of Antietam.
Ennath is offline   Reply With Quote
The Following 13 Users Say Thank You to Ennath For This Useful Post:
Old September 15th, 2014, 11:12 AM   #2659
Ennath
Vintage Member
 
Join Date: Jun 2011
Posts: 6,816
Thanks: 26,925
Thanked 80,782 Times in 6,815 Posts
Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+
Default

September 15, 1589
Battle of Arques

At the death of Henri III of France, the Huguenot Henry of Navarre succeeded to the French throne as Henri IV. Although he quickly declared his intention to "maintain and preserve the Catholic, apostolic and Roman religion" of the country, the major French cities sided with the Catholic League and its leader, the Duc de Mayenne.

At that time, the royal army was in a shambles and Henri IV could only count on barely 20,000 men to conquer a rebellious country. In order to accomplish this task, he divided his troops into three commands: Henri I d'Orléans, Duc de Longueville for Picardy, Jean VI d'Aumont for Champagne and Henri himself for Normandy (where he awaited reinforcements from Elizabeth I of England). On August 6, 1589, Henri set up camp with 8000 men at Dieppe.

Mayenne sought to take back this key strategic port and to drive Henri from Normandy. He drew together 35,000 troops, plus Cambrésis militias, Lorraine troops led by the Marquis de Pont-à-Mousson and a contingent of Spanish troops to attack the city. Knowing that an attack against an army of this size would be pointless, and that staying in Dieppe would be suicidal, Henri (after consulting with Longueville Aumont decided to move to the city of Arques and to establish a fortified base there. Mayenne followed.

Arques was fronted by a stretch of ground running from a wood on one side to a marsh on the other, anchoring the king’s flanks. Henri had two trenches dug astride the road from town and placed his infantry, including 1200 Swiss, in the trenches and a chapel in between. The 600 cavalry were divided; Henri with one group between the road and the woods and the Duc de Sully between the road and the marsh.

On the morning of the 15th, under cover of fog, Mayenne attacked, although the narrow front meant that he could not take full advantage of his numerical superiority. His vanguard gained the front-line trench, while Sully’s horse was eventually forced to shelter around the chapel. The royal troops were then forced from this position and things looked distinctly perilous for Henri. The Swiss, however, held firm. Mayenne then attempted to flank the position to the west, but his cavalry floundered in the marsh. He still threatened, however, to swamp the defenders by weight of numbers.

At this point, the fog lifted and the sun broke through, giving the royal gunners in Arques a clear field of fire. Though Henri had only four guns, five point-blank salvos threw Mayenne’s men into disorder and retreat. Losses on both sides had been heavy, but the royal army had gained time.

The respite allowed reinforcements to arrive, not only French, but 4000 English and Scots sent by Elizabeth I. Henri soon had full control of Normandy. He prepared to move on Paris the next year.
Ennath is offline   Reply With Quote
The Following 12 Users Say Thank You to Ennath For This Useful Post:
Old September 16th, 2014, 11:31 AM   #2660
Ennath
Vintage Member
 
Join Date: Jun 2011
Posts: 6,816
Thanks: 26,925
Thanked 80,782 Times in 6,815 Posts
Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+Ennath 350000+
Default

September 16, 1955
Overthrow of Peron

President Juan Peron was first elected in 1946. In 1949, a constitutional amendment introduced the possibility of presidential reelection and he was reelected in 1952. At the time, his administration was widely supported by the labor unions, the military and the Catholic Church. However, economic problems and Peron's own personality cult changed this situation. The opposition criticized his treatment of dissidents, who were harassed and sometimes forced into exile. The government's relationship with the Church also worsened. The government, which had first respected the Church's privileges, now took them away in a distinctly confrontational fashion. By 1954, the Church was openly anti-Peronist, which also influenced some factions of the military.

By 1955, Perón had lost the support of a large part of the military, who conspired with other political actors (members of the Radical and Socialist Parties, as well as conservative groups). There was turmoil in different parts of the country. On June 14, Catholic bishops spoke against Peron during a Corpus Christi procession which turned into an anti-government demonstration.

On June 16, Navy aircraft bombed Plaza de Mayo, wounding or killing hundreds of civilians. In retaliation, extreme Peronist groups attacked and burned several churches that night, allegedly instigated by Vice-President Alberto Teisaire. The only important political support for Peron came from the CGT (the main confederation of labor unions), which called the workers to defend the president.

In the aftermath of the attempted coup, Peron moved to render the Navy impotent. Aviation and the marines were removed from naval control. Navy bombs were confiscated and dumped in the ocean and the marine corps reduced by half and ammunition issued sparingly. Peron also threatened to create labor militias, but held off lest this make him the servant of the labor unions instead of their master.

The naval plotters were not deterred and began planning a new attempt. Some army support was obtained, but practically the entire Air Force sided with Peron. Both sides accepted that the capital was firmly controlled by the president and it was decided to turn Cordoba into the main rebel base while isolating Buenos Aires by blockade.

In September, the navy’s major fleet element, the High Seas Fleet, was scheduled to sail for yearly maneuvers. On the 15th, Admiral Isaac Rojas summoned his senior captains, informed them that a rebellion was imminent and gave them 15 minutes to declare their position. Two remained loyal and were placed under arrest. The ships’ crews were mustered and given the same choice, overwhelmingly supporting the rebellion. By sundown, the rebels controlled key sea- and shore-based units, including the Naval Academy.

Early on September 16, Rojas proclaimed the revolt. Two destroyers were attacked by government Meteors and damaged with numerous casualties. One of the damaged ships put in at Montevideo and was interned. The others pulled back. Realizing that the Naval Academy could not be defended, Rojas evacuated its personnel on LCPs that evening. The next day, he declared a blockade of the Rio de la Plata, but stopped short of total blockade as he did not have the ships to enforce it, an important consideration under international law. On the 18th, two cruisers joined his force and the total blockade was declared. The 9 de Julio was the only major fleet unit not with the High Seas Fleet, undergoing repairs at Puerto Belgrano, 380 miles southwest of the capital. On hearing of the revolt, the crew worked round the clock to prepare her for sea and the cruiser sailed 48 hours later. In the meantime, loyalist forces failed to recapture Peurto Belgrano Naval Base, halting when attacked by naval aircraft.

Also on September 16, General Eduardo Lonardi declared against Peron, but his staff was quickly captured due to carelessness by the civilians involved in the plot. Nevertheless, he won control of the Cordoba garrison after some brief, but fierce, fighting. At Curuzu Cuartia, the plotters failed to win over the armored units and loyalist forces soon advanced against Lonardi supporters. On the 18th, Lonardi radioed Rojas that his position in Cordoba was precarious and requested a demonstration of force by the Navy.

Meanwhile, the rebels waged an intensive propaganda campaign over the radio. The capabilities of the fleet were stressed, workers were requested to stay off the streets and Peron given an ultimatum to resign. Government radio responded by declaring Buenos Aires an open city in an attempt to avoid bombardment, an implicit recognition that the rebels could make good their threats.

On the morning of the 18th, the 9 de Julio and 2 destroyers bombarded the oil storage tanks near the Mar del Plata submarine base, then landed 350 marines and sailors, who captured it after only light resistance. The anti-aircraft school followed in short order. Weather conditions aided the rebels; there was a 1000 foot ceiling and less than 1 mile visibility, hampering the government’s air operations. The ease of the naval operation lent credibility to the threat to bombard Buenos Aires. It also served as General Lonardi’s demonstration of force.

Finally, on the 19th, Lonardi secured control of Cordoba at about the same time as Peron renounced the presidency and entered into negotiations. These were concluded on the 21st. Fearful of his fate, Peron fled to the Paraguayan Embassy and then to the gunboat Paraguay. On October 2, he sailed to Asuncion and into exile. Lonardi and Rojas were sworn in as president and vice president. This did not calm the turmoil Argentina had experienced since 1946 and Peronist revolts persisted into the 1960’s. Peron returned from exile in 1974 to resume power, but died soon after.
Ennath is offline   Reply With Quote
The Following 12 Users Say Thank You to Ennath For This Useful Post:
Reply


Posting Rules
You may not post new threads
You may not post replies
You may not post attachments
You may not edit your posts

BB code is On
Smilies are On
[IMG] code is On
HTML code is Off

Forum Jump




All times are GMT. The time now is 02:12 PM.






vBulletin Optimisation provided by vB Optimise v2.6.1 (Pro) - vBulletin Mods & Addons Copyright © 2024 DragonByte Technologies Ltd.