The Military History Thread

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May 21, 1592
Battle of Craon

In 1590, Philippe Emmanuel, Duke of Mercoeur, Governor of Brittany, rebelled against the accession to the throne of Henry of Navarre (King Henry IV) and became the head of the Catholic League of Brittany, aiming to restore the autonomy of the former Duchy, and was proclaimed protector of the Catholic Church in the region of Brittany. He ordered his chief lieutenant, Urbain de Laval Boisdauphin, to strengthen Craon. Mercoeur had the support of the Catholic King, Philip II of Spain, who sent him 7000 Spanish soldiers who landed at Blavet under the command of Don Juan del Aguila.

On February 8, 1592, Henry IV decided to take the city of Craon. His cousins, the Duke of Montpensier and Francois de Bourbon, Prince de Conti, secretly assembled at Laval to organize the attack. Montpensier arrived with his army on April 14, aided by 1200 English troops and 800 German mercenaries under Sir John Norreys, and laid siege to the town. The defense was fierce and the progress of the siege was slow.

Then on May 21, the Spanish-Catholic League army reached Craon under Don Juan del Aguila and Mercoeur. The Spanish-Catholic troops went straight into action and charged the left flank of the Royalist-English army, taking it by surprise. At the same time the besieged garrison angrily attacked the right flank, finally achieving a brilliant victory. Under cover of night, Montpensier retired to Laval and Rennes, leaving behind 1500 dead and hundreds of prisoners. The Catholic army lost 24 men. The Spaniards captured all the Anglo-Royalist artillery, ammunition carts, flags, equipment and supplies. The English prisoners were given no quarter and were all executed, in part in retaliation for the cruelty dealt to the survivors of the wrecks of the Spanish Armada.

Just a few days later, Laval fell to the Catholic League. On May 23, 1592, the Prince of Conti retreated into the Chateau-Gontier, but was captured when Mercoeur and the Marquis of Sablé entered Laval and took the Chateau.

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May 22, 853
Sack of Damietta

During the 820s, the Byzantine Empire had suffered two great losses that destroyed their naval supremacy in the Mediterranean: the beginning of the Muslim conquest of Sicily and the fall of Crete to Andalusian exiles. These losses ushered in an era where Saracen pirates raided the Christian northern shores of the Mediterranean almost at will. The establishment of the Emirate of Crete, which became a haven for Muslim ships, opened the Aegean Sea for raids, while their - albeit partial - control of Sicily allowed the Arabs to raid and even settle in Italy and the Adriatic shores. Several Byzantine attempts to retake Crete in the immediate aftermath of the conquest, as well as a large-scale invasion in 842-43, failed with heavy losses.

In 853, the Byzantine government tried a new approach: instead of attacking Crete directly, they tried to sever the island’s lines of supply, principally to Egypt, which was “the arsenal of the Cretan pirates”. The Arab historian al-Tabari reports that 3 fleets, totaling almost 300 ships, were prepared and sent on simultaneous raids of Muslim naval bases in the Eastern Mediterranean. The precise targets of 2 of the fleets are unknown, but the 3rd, comprising 85 ships and 5000 men under a commander known from Arab sources only as “Ibn Qaṭuna”, headed for the Egyptian coast.

Egyptian naval defenses were weak. The Egyptian fleet had declined from its Umayyad-era peak and was mostly employed in the Nile rather than in the Mediterranean. Fortifications along the coastal marshes, which had been manned by volunteer garrisons, had been abandoned in the later 8th century. The Byzantines had exploited this in 811-12 and again in ca. 815 launching raids against the coasts of Egypt. The Byzantine fleet arrived at Damietta on May 22, 853. The city garrison was absent at a feast for the Day of Arafah organized by the governor Anbasah ibn Ishaq al-Dabbi in Fustat. Damietta’s inhabitants fled the undefended city, which was plundered for two days and then torched by the Byzantines. The Byzantines carried off some 600 Arab and Coptic women as well as large quantities of arms and other supplies intended for Crete. The fleet then sailed east and attacked the strong fortress of Ushtun. Upon taking it, they burned the many siege engines found there before returning home.

Although “one of the brightest military operations” (Christides) undertaken by the Byzantine military, the raid is completely ignored in Byzantine sources, probably because most accounts are warped by their hostile attitude to Michael III (r. 842-67) and his reign. As a result, the raid is referred to only through 2 Arab accounts, by al-Tabari and Ya’qubi. The Byzantines returned and raided Damietta again in 854. Another raid possibly took place in 855, as the Arabic sources indicate that the arrival of a Byzantine fleet in Egypt was anticipated by the Abbasid authorities. In 859, the Byzantine fleet attacked Farama. Despite these successes, Saracen piracy in the Aegean continued unabated, and reached its height in the early 900s, with the sack of Thessalonica, the Byzantine Empire’s second city, in 904, and the activities of the renegades Leo of Tripoli and Damian of Tarsus. It would not be until 961 that the Byzantines reconquered Crete, and secured control of the Aegean.

According to the Arab chroniclers, the realization of Egypt's vulnerability from the sea led, after a long period of neglect, to the urgent strengthening of Egypt’s maritime defenses. Within 9 months of the raid, Damietta was refortified along with Tinnis and Alexandria. Ships were constructed and new crews raised. Most seamen were forcibly conscripted from among the Copts and the Arabs of the interior, earning Governor Anbasah a bad reputation in contemporary sources. Complaints against him were directed to Caliph al-Mutawakkil. The new fleet was used in raids against the Byzantines in subsequent years, although no details are recorded. This activity is generally held to have marked the rebirth of the Egyptian navy.

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May 23, 1793
Battle of Famars

Following the defeat of the French Republican armies at Neerwinden (see posting), the Allied army under the Prince of Coburg recovered much of the Austrian Netherlands. The French Republican army in the Low Countries was in a desperate situation. Dispirited after the death of its former commander Augustin-Marie Picot de Dampierre, it was tired and disorganized. In addition it was further weakened by detachments taken from each battalion to serve in the war in the Vendée (see posting). Although new recruits were being allocated from the levy of 300,000, many of these deserted or were otherwise unfit for service. The new temporary commander Francois Lamarche realized that all that could be done for the moment was to draw back to an entrenched camp at Famars and the fortress of Valenciennes.

The focus of the war now moved onto the borders of France, where the Allies decided to conduct a series of sieges of the main French fortifications, amongst them Valenciennes, but first they needed to drive Lamarche from Famars to clear the way and prevent any intervention from the French field armies. The fortified camp here protected French communications with Valenciennes. The camp at Famars was built on two parallel plateaux, separated by the river Rhonelle. The western plateau ran from Famars south to Artres. Its steep western and southern slopes and smoother northern slopes were defended by a series of detached strong points and redoubts, while the eastern slope was protected by the deep but narrow River Rhonelle, which cut a steep sided but shallow valley between the two positions. The eastern plateau was defended by a mile long entrenchment with three strong redoubts. The entire position was defended by around 25,000 men. The French also had a string of fortified positions running north-west from Valenciennes, through Anzin, Hasnon, Orchiers and Turcoing. Coburg's forces had recently been augmented to a strength of 53,000 by the newly arrived Anglo-Hanoverian contingent commanded by the 26-year-old Frederick, Duke of York; it was decided they would spearhead the main attack. This is perhaps surprising, as for many of the British troops it would be their first taste of action against Republican France.

An attack was drawn up by Austrian staff planner Karl Mack von Leiberich, and was to consist of direct assaults on the eastern side of the camp by 2 main columns, supported by holding attacks on both flanks from 2 smaller corps. On the other side of the Scheldt Clerfayt was to launch a consecutive attack against the entrenched camp at Mont Anzin.

The 1st Main Column of 16 battalions and 18 squadrons was led by the Duke of York and included the British Guards brigade under Gerard Lake. Mack's instructions were for York to cross the Rhonelle by trestle bridges in the neighborhood of Artres and then launch an attack on the camp by its right flank. In other words, no resistance was expected until the attack on the French camp. Austrian Feldzeugmeister Joseph de Ferraris commanded the 2nd Main Column (12 battalions, 12 squadrons), which included Abercromby's Brigade of the British 14th and 53rd Foot. It was to attack from the village of Saultain against entrenchments on the East bank of the Rhonelle. Feldmarschall-Leutnant Nikolaus Colloredo-Mels led the 1st Small Column against the northeastern side of Valenciennes, while General-Major Rudolf Ritter von Otto directed the 2nd Small Column, threatening Le Quesnoy.

Soon after 2:00 AM, York’s column moved off from its assembly point 2 miles behind Artres, but thick fog slowed their progress and the Rhonelle was only reached at 7.00. York was accompanied by both Mack and Coburg’s Chief-of-Staff Hohenlohe, the latter appointed by Coburg to ensure the untested York didn't do anything too rash. As the fog lifted dawn revealed their intended crossing point bristling with enemy infantry and artillery, which immediately opened fire. Mack was wounded right at the beginning of the action, so the untried Duke of York was left to make up his own mind as to his next course of action. His decision was to turn and counter-march his column towards Maresches 2 miles away to the southeast, leaving behind some Austrian guns and the troops already engaged to focus the attention of the French. Fording the stream there unopposed, York’s light cavalry ascended the low ridge south of the village to probe the French flank towards Querenaing. Unfortunately there were several delays and congestion at Maresches so it was 3.00 PM before he was clear of the village, giving the French ample time to turn and face the threat, and 5.00 before he reached Querenaing by a somewhat roundabout route. However the British cavalry moved behind the unprotected backs of the southern French open redoubts, their left patrol reaching almost as far as the Abbey of Fontanelle to the rear of the French position. The Allied cavalry had some success when they entered the open redoubts via gorges and cut down the defenders. The French cavalry attempted to retake the redoubts but were beaten off.

Meanwhile, further north, Ferraris’ column had stormed the long entrenchment on the east bank ridge of the Famars position and driven the French back to the west of the Rhonelle. Earlier in the day several squadrons of French cavalry had been seen threatening his flank, whereby they were charged by the Hanoverian Life Guards and routed after a stiff fight. Finally York was ready to launch his attack, but at that point the cautious Hohenlohe stepped in and objected that the men were fatigued, York was obliged to postpone the assault until the next morning.

Although the French held their ground to the north, Lamarche realized he was in danger of being cut off. Leaving Ferrand to defend Valenciennes, during the night the Republicans withdrew towards Bouchain, Caesar's Camp and Paillencourt. The next morning, York attacked, but the French had gone. Colloredo’s column from the north were the first to enter the camp. Clerfayt had also been successful in his attack, although experiencing tougher resistance at Mont Anzin.

Of 27,000 men engaged, the French lost 3000 killed and wounded. The Allies captured 300 soldiers, 17 guns and 3 colors. Allied casualties totaled 1100, mostly Austrians.

Having neutralized Famars Camp, Coburg was now free to open the Siege of Valenciennes. Command of the besieging force was offered to the Duke of York. The British Cabinet was concerned that this would prevent him from attacking Dunkirk, the main British target, but eventually decided to accept the offer. The Duke was given command of the 25,000 men who actually conducted the siege, amongst them 14,000 Austrians and a large number of British troops, but Coburg also appointed Gen. Ferraris to the duke's staff. Another 30,000 men formed a covering army. Meanwhile, Lamarche was replaced in command by Adam Custine.

Ferraris insisted on a slow regular siege, instead of the immediate assault favored by the Duke’s chief engineer, Col. Moncrieff. The construction of the siege works progressed slowly. The main Allied attack was to be made on greater and lesser horn-works on the east side of the town, but the ground was not broken in front of these defenses until June 13. Over the next month tunnels were dug under the walls, and on the night of July 25, the mines were exploded. On the following day, 3 columns attacked and by the end of the day the Allies had gained a lodgment. The Duke of York summoned the city to surrender, and announced that this would be the last such summons. Gen. Ferrand asked for a 24 hour truce, and after negotiations, the garrison surrendered. The French were allowed to march out of Valenciennes with honors of war and return home, as long as they agreed not to serve against the Allies for the rest of the war.

The Allies now separated, The British moved north to besiege Dunkirk, while the Austrians attacked Quesnoy and Maubeuge. The slow pace of the Allied campaign had given the French a chance to recover from the blows of the spring. By the end of the year the French were once again in the ascendancy.

[Ennath]

May 24, 1809
Siege of Gerona, Part 1

Gerona was situated at a key point on the road from France to Barcelona. While in Spanish hands the French in Catalonia were always in danger of being cut off, and so the capture of the city had been a key French objective during 1808. The first (June 20-21) and second (July 24-August 16) sieges had both ended in Spanish victories, but by May 1809 the Spanish armies in Catalonia had either been defeated, or moved west under Gen. Blake in an attempt to recapture Saragossa. The time was right for a third French attempt to capture the city.

Gerona in 1809 was built on the low ground alongside the River Oña, as it flowed north into the Ter, with the suburb of Mercadel on the west bank. Mercadel was protected by a circuit of 5 bastions, but without the required outer defenses. The city itself was surrounded its medieval wall, not wide enough to carry heavy guns. The only modern parts of the walls were the bastions of Santa Maria at the northern tip of the town and La Merced at the south. Some efforts had also been made to fortify the river bank, as the Spanish were aware that the Oña could easily be forded if the French captured the suburbs. The city was built on the lower slopes of a series of hills, each of which had been heavily fortified. To the south east were the Capuchin heights, crowned by the Capuchin, Queen Anne and Constable Forts, with the City, Chapter and Calvary redoubts at their northern end. The hills were then interrupted by the deep, steep sided Galligan Ravine, before rising again to form the hill of Monjuich, topped by the fort of the same name. This was protected by four outer-works - the redoubt of San Juan, St. Luis, St. Daniel and St. Narciso. As long as the Spanish held this line of forts, the French couldn’t even see most of the medieval wall, and even an attack on the western suburb was felt to be exposed to fire from the hilltop forts.

The third siege began at a time when the French command structure in Catalonia was in flux. At the start of May, Napoleon had decided to replace Marshal St. Cyr with Marshal Augereau. This news reached St. Cyr before the siege began, but Augereau himself suffered an attack of gout, and was forced to take to his bed at Perpignan, delaying his arrival for some weeks. At the same time command of the troops that would actually conduct the siege was transferred from General Reille to General Verdier. He had previously commanded the during the first French siege of Saragossa of 1808, and his experiences there are said to have made him overly timid. Verdier had 10,000 men and immediately complained that this would not be enough to besiege Gerona. St. Cyr sent him Lecchi’s Italian division, giving him a total of 16,000 men at the start of the siege.

Verdier was faced by 5700 Spanish regulars, and 1100 irregulars from the local levy, all under the command of the able Mariano Alvarez de Castro. Alvarez would receive very little help from the outside for most of the siege, and by August would be complaining that he only had 1500 able bodied men left from his original force of regulars, but he would conduct an active, determined defense.

Although the first French troops had reached Gerona early in May, Verdier did not impose a blockade until May 24. He posted the Italians to the west of the city, with the main part of the French army to the east and northeast. St. Cyr with the main French army of Catalonia remained close by at Vich, to shield the besieging force against any Spanish intervention. Verdier decided to concentrate his efforts against Monjuich, the strongest part of the defenses, in the belief that its fall would inevitably be followed by the surrender of Gerona. This logical point of view would turn out to be false.

The French opened their trenches on June 6. Their job was made more difficult by the rocky ground, which meant that they were often forced to build up from the rock rather than dig down into it, but they were soon able to open fire on the redoubts of St. Luis, St. Daniel and St. Narciso. By June 19, the French had reduced St. Luis and St. Narciso to ruins, and an assault that day captured them both at the cost of only 78 casualties. An attack on the St. Daniel redoubt failed, but the entrance to that redoubt was now commanded by the new French positions, and so on the night of June 20 the garrison was withdrawn.

This left the Monjuich exposed to short range artillery fire. On the night of July 2, the French built an enormous battery out of sandbags (the Batterie Impériale), only 400 yards from the fort, and on the morning of the 3rd opened fire and quickly opened a breach. Verdier made his first attempt to capture the Monjuich on the night of July 7-8. On that night the fort was defended by 787 men. Verdier made his attack with 2500 men. They were able to cross the open ground in front of the fort without any problems, but when they attempted to climb up the breach came under very heavy fire. Although a small number reached the top of the breach, none entered the fort. Verdier ordered a 2nd and 3rd attack before admitting failure. The French suffered 1079 casualties in the 3 assaults.

The defeat demoralized Verdier’s army, and so he decided to conduct a very long bombardment, from July 9 to August 4. By the end of this, the interior of the fort had been reduced to ruins. The garrison were forced to live in the casemates or burrow out shelters in the ruins. On August 4, the French captured the outer defenses, but even then Verdier moved slowly. On the night of August 8-9, the French exploded 23 mines under the lip of the glacis, opening a massive breach. Alvarez responded with a sortie, at midday on August 9. The Spanish captured 2 of the advanced French batteries, spiked their guns and burnt the gabions. This gained them at least a day, and Alvarez used the time to plant his own mines under the remaining fortifications. On the evening of August 11, while the French were preparing for a 2nd major assault, the Spanish evacuated the fort and exploded the mines. The French occupied a pile of ruins.

During this period 3 attempts were made to throw reinforcements into Gerona. The first 2 ended in disaster. On July 10, 3 battalions ran into Pino’s division at Castellar; 938 were forced to surrender while the remaining 700 escaped. On August 4, 300 miqueletes managed to slip past the French and approach from the east, but were unaware that the convent of St. Daniel had just fallen into French hands, and tamely walked into captivity. 6 days after the fall of the Monjuich, 800 miqueletes successfully reached Gerona from the west, slipping past the Italians guarding that front.

[Ennath]

May 24, 1809
Siege of Gerona, Part 2

From the hill of Monjuich the French could now attack the northeast corner of Gerona. Here the city was defended by its original medieval wall, unprotected by any moat or ditch, and too thin for heavy guns. This wall was reinforced by the bastion of Santa Maria, at the northern tip of the town and the redoubt of the Gironella, on the southern side of the Galligan Ravine, while two guns platforms (San Pedro and San Cristobal) had been built up where the ravine reached the walls.

The French concentrated their attack on the Gironella, the curtain wall around the tower of Santa Lucia (the point nearest the Monjuich) and the San Cristobal platform. Although by August 30 the French guns were able to create 4 separate breaches, they were not yet in a position to take advantage of this success. As they built trenches down the front of the Monjuich hill, the French came under heavy fire from the unconquered forts on the hills to the south, especially from the Calvary Redoubt, overlooking the Galligan Ravine. The French were also suffering heavily from exposure and disease. Summer floods were followed by an outbreak of malaria in the French camps. Verdier had already lost 5000 men to illness. To add to his woes, the Spanish finally made a serious attempt to help the defenders of Gerona.

The only force available to the Spanish at this point was the army of General Blake. This had been badly mauled at Belchite on June 18. Although by August Blake had 14,000 men, most were inexperienced recent recruits. Blake was determined to avoid a battle, and instead to use his forces to distract the French for long enough for a major supply convoy to reach the city. He would be helped in this by the French - St. Cyr, who was still in command in Catalonia, was equally determined to fight a pitched battle, had 12,000 men in his covering army, and would be joined by 4000 of Verdier’s men. Even without those reinforcements Blake could be fairly sure that St. Cyr’s 12,000 could defeat his own inexperienced 14,000.

At the end of August, Blake approached from the south, St. Cyr responded by ordering Verdier to bring his 4000 troops from the siege lines, and on September 1, the 2 armies faced off south of the city. While St. Cyr was preparing for battle, Blake detached Garcia Conde’s division and sent it far around St. Cyr’s right flank. Garcia Conde smashed his way through the Italian division west of Gerona, and entered the city with a supply convoy of 1000 mules and a herd of cattle. That night the Spanish reoccupied a number of their outlying positions, only to be forced to abandon them when the French returned. Garcia Conde soon left Gerona, leaving behind enough men to restore the garrison to its original strength.

On September 2, St. Cyr was forced to send 4000 men back to Gerona. The armies were now equal in size, but Blake was still not interested in risking another defeat, and as the French advanced the Spanish retreated. After 2 days Blake reached Hostalrich, where a lack of food forced him to disperse his army. St. Cyr was also forced to disperse his troops for the same reason. Blake’s intervention would greatly extend the length of the siege, but he was unable to alter its final result.

The siege was reopened on September 11, when the French bombardment was resumed. In the intervening days the defenders had repaired much of the damage done earlier, and had destroyed the most advanced French trenches. Even so, by September 19, Verdier was ready to make an assault on the town, although he was concerned that he did not have enough men. After 4 months of siege he only had 6000 infantry left, but despite this St. Cyr refused to provide any reinforcements.

On the afternoon of September 19, 3000 French troops launched an assault on the breaches in the walls. The French and Germans attacking the 2 breaches at La Gironella managed to get through, but came under heavy fire from a 2nd line of defenses inside the walls. The Italians attacking the St. Lucia breach reached the top of the breach only to discover a 12 foot drop into the town, and despite holding their position for some time were eventually forced to retire. In the aftermath of this failure the morale of the French army collapsed. Over the next 2 weeks 1200 men entered the hospitals, while Verdier, Lecchi and Morio all abandoned the army and returned to France, Verdier after writing 3 letters to Napoleon blaming St. Cyr for the failure.

This forced St. Cyr to take command in person. He decided not to make any more assaults, and instead to rely on starvation. He merged his covering army with the surviving 4000 men of Verdier’s army, and surrounded the city with 16,000 men. St. Cyr’s plan would end in success. The supply convoy of September 1 had only contained 8 days worth of food for the 5000 troops and 10,000 civilians of Gerona, and food soon began to run short. Blake made a 2nd attempt to run a supply convoy into the city. On September 26, the head of the convoy managed to break into the city, but most of the supplies were captured by the French.

St. Cyr soon followed Verdier back to France. He had decided to visit Perpignan, in an attempt to recover some of the 4000 convalescents believed to be fit to march. On his arrival, he discovered that Marshal Augereau, appointed to succeed him in May, had recovered from his gout some time ago, but had preferred not to take up his command until Gerona fell. Having discovered this, St. Cyr declared himself to be unfit, and returned home.

Augereau finally reached Gerona on October 12, somewhat ironically at the head of the convalescents (amongst them Verdier). On his arrival Augereau realized that he would have to continue St. Cyr’s policy of starvation, although he did initiate a more active bombardment. In mid October, Blake reappeared with more supplies, but was unable to find a way into the town, and at the start of November, Augereau launched an attack on his supply depot at Hostalrich, easily capturing and destroying it. After this setback Blake retreated to the plain of Vich, where he began to gather supplies for a 4th try. This would take so long that the siege would be over before he was ready to move again.

As winter set in the defenders were reduced to a desperate condition. By mid-November things were so bad that 8 Spanish officers deserted to the French. This encouraged Augereau to begin active operations again. On December 2, he attacked and captured the southern suburb of La Marina, and at midnight of December 6, Pino’s division captured the redoubt between the city and the Capuchin heights. Alvarez responded with his last sortie, but this ended in disaster when the Calvary and Chapter redoubts fell to the French. This failure drained Alvarez’s last strength. He was so ill that on the morning of December 9, he received his last rites. The command passed to Gen. Juliano Bolivar. He called a council of war, which decided to seek terms. On the morning of December 11, the 3000 remaining able bodied men in the garrison marched into captivity (another 1200 invalids remained in the city).

The French somewhat disgraced themselves in the aftermath of their victory. Alvarez recovered from his illness, and was taken as a prisoner to Narbonne. Napoleon decided that he should be tried as a traitor against King Joseph, and returned to Figueras, dying in a cellar on the day after his arrival.

Both sides suffered very heavy casualties during the siege. Of the 9000 men involved in the defense, only 4248 survived. The French did even worse, losing around 13,000 men, mostly to disease. Although they had cleared a major obstacle on the road from Barcelona to Perpignan, very little of Catalonia was in French hands.

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May 25, 1734
Battle of Bitonto

King Philip V of Spain had always aimed to reconquer Naples and Sicily, which Spain lost to the Habsburgs as a consequence of the War of the Spanish Succession. In 1714 he married Elisabeth Farnese, who had dynastic interests in Italy. Under her influence he had attempted without success to recover the Italian holdings in the War of the Quadruple Alliance. When the War of the Polish Succession broke out in 1733, he saw an opportunity to act against the Habsburgs, who had no military support among western European powers (Great Britain and the Dutch Republic opting to remain neutral), with active opposition by France and Charles Emmanuel III of Sardinia. In the fall of 1733 Spain and France signed the Treaty of the Escorial, the first of several Bourbon Family Compacts. The treaty pledged mutual protection and aid, and provided for the allies to work together for the conquest of Habsburg territories on the Italian peninsula.

The Spanish fleet under Luis de Cordova y Cordova landed a Spanish army in Genoa, which joined forces with the troops of Charles, Duke of Parma, eldest son of Philip and Elisabeth. From there, 21,000 men marched unopposed through the Papal States towards Naples, where Charles entered the city virtually uncontested, and proclaimed himself king of the Two Sicilies on May 7, 1734. Austrian garrisons in the fortresses at Gaeta and Capua were blockaded by 6000 men, and José Carrillo de Albornoz y Montiel, Count of Montemar led 12,000 Spanish troops after the retreating Austrian viceroy.

The Habsburg Viceroy, Guido Visconti, first fled to Bari in Apulia before the advancing Spanish, and then fled by ship on May 21, leaving Giuseppe Antonio, Prince of Belmonte in command of the Austrian forces. The retreating Austrians were reinforced by troops that arrived from the island of Sicily, and a shipload of recruits that arrived at Taranto, bringing his total strength to 10,500 men. Belmonte, aware that the Spanish were likely to get reinforcements from their fleet, moved to Bitonto on May 24 to force an action with Montemar before that army grew even larger. Placing inexperienced troops in the town itself, he adapted low walls and 2 monasteries as a defensive line and awaited the Spanish. Montemar was, according to reports Belmonte received later, reinforced, raising his troop count to about 14,000 experienced and well-equipped troops.

When the Spanish arrived on the scene at daybreak on May 25, Montemar lined his troops up to face the Austrians, infantry facing infantry, cavalry facing cavalry; as the Spanish cavalry significantly outnumbered the Austrian, some were held in reserve on the right flank. After a few feints in which the Spanish attempted to draw the Austrians out of their defenses, the attack commenced. Around 10 AM, the Austrian cavalry finally gave way, most of it beginning a disorganized retreat toward Bari, followed shortly after by Belmonte. The rest of the Austrian line collapsed, with some companies following the cavalry and others trying to escape to the north and into Bitonto. Defenders in the monasteries held their ground, and those defenses were taken by storm. The garrison in the city surrendered the next day, owing to a shortage of ammunition and provisions. The Austrians lost 1000 men killed, another 1000 wounded and 2500 captured. Spanish losses were 99 dead and 196 wounded.

Belmonte attempted to reorganize his remaining forces at Bari, but opposition from the local population, which was mobilizing in favor of the Spanish, made this virtually impossible. He ended up surrendering 3800 men to the local authorities. Several hundred troops that escaped the battle to the north managed to reach Pescara, which had not yet been taken by the Spanish. Other cities in the kingdom recognized Spanish rule, with only 2 Austrian-held fortresses continuing resistance until autumn. Gaeta, blockaded early in the conflict, was placed under siege and held out until August. Traun defended Capua until November 30; when he finally surrendered, his garrison marched out with full honors of war.

The return of the Two Sicilies to Spain was confirmed by the Treaty of Vienna in 1738, which ended the war. Charles named Montemar Duke of Bitonto and commissioned Giovanni Antonio Medrano to erect an obelisk on the battlefield to commemorate the battle.

[Ennath]

86 BC
Battle of Chaeronea

During 88 B.C. a large Pontic army under the command of the general Archelaus had sailed to Athens, and had briefly taken control of much of southern Greece. This success was short lived, and ended when the consul Lucius Sulla landed in Greece at the head of 5 legions early in 87 B.C. Archelaus and his Greek allies found themselves besieged in Athens and Piraeus until the spring of 86 BC (see posting). Finally, on March 1, 86 BC, the Romans took Athens. Although the Acropolis held out for a few more weeks, it soon became clear to Archelaus that there was no point defending Piraeus any longer, and he escaped north with his army, to join a second Pontic army that was advancing through Thessaly.

For some time, the Romans had had a detachment posted northwest of Athens under the command of Hortensius, watching the Pontic troops at Chalcis. There was now a real danger that this detachment might be cut off and defeated by Archelaus’ newly combined army. Sulla was also running short of supplies in Attica, and so he decided to move northwest into Boeotia, where he could find fresh supplies and also rescue Hortensius.

The Romans were badly outnumbered during this campaign. Most sources give Archelaus 120,000 men. Appian states that the Romans were outnumbered 3-1, giving them around 40,000 men. Sulla himself claimed to only have had 15,000 infantry and 1500 cavalry, but this was probably pure propaganda. He had 5 legions present in Greece. Part of this army was still at Athens, besieging the Acropolis, but Hortensius had 6000 men, and is seems unlikely that Sulla would have risked moving towards Archelaus with less than 10,000 of his own men. We do know that Archelaus was far superior in cavalry, and had a force of at least 60 scythed chariots, seen as something of a terror weapon, especially when used against infantry.

Hortensius quickly extracted himself from danger, crossing a mountain pass to rejoin Sulla. The combined army then took up a position on the hill of Philoboeotus, at the southern edge of the plain of Elatea, with the Pontic army camped to their north. The 2 armies must have been separated by the river Cephisus, which runs across the middle of the plain, flowing from west to east. Sulla’s position on the hill was strong enough to allow him to refuse battle in such a good area for cavalry, but his biggest problem was that his best line of communication followed the Cephisus as it ran southeast out of the plains through a narrow pass towards Chaeronea. The entrance to this pass was guarded by the acropolis of Parapotamii, which stood on the northern (left) bank of the river, at the western tip of Mt. Hedylium. Both sides appear to have attempted to capture this acropolis, although who moved first is unclear. Sulla’s men won the race, blocking the northern entrance to the pass. Archelaus then made a serious error. He decided to try and block Sulla’s lines of communication by seizing the city of Chaeronea. Sulla’s men on Parapotamii blocked the direct route to Chaeronea, so Archelaus was forced to move around the back of the mountain, approaching Chaeronea from the north.

The course of the battle was dominated by the geography around Chaeronea. The city is located on the southern banks of the Cephisus on a narrow plain, 1-2 miles wide. To the south of the town is Mt. Thurium, a hilly area that reaches a maximum height of just over 1640 feet. To the north of the town, on the bank of the river, is Mt. Acontium, which runs from west to east alongside the river. A narrow rocky valley separated Mt. Acontium from Mt. Hedylium, a little further to the north.

The people of Chaeronea soon discovered that Archelaus was approaching, and called for help from Sulla. He responded by send a legion under the legate Gabinius which arrived in Chaeronea in time to stop Archelaus from occupying the town. Archelaus took up a position in the valley between Mts. Acontium and Hedylium, and also posted a detachment on the northern slopes of Thurium.

Sulla’s main force followed Gabinius down the Cephisus valley, eventually taking up a position west of the Pontic camp, on the southern slopes of Hedylium. Sulla waited there for a day, and then moved south onto the plain, leaving a legion and two cohorts under his legate Murena to watch the Pontic camp. Another detachment was sent south, using local guides to reach a position south of the Pontic detachment on Mt. Thurium. The two armies were soon drawn up across the river valley. The Roman left under Murena was north of the river, facing the Pontic right. The visible Roman right, under Sulla, was south of the river, facing the Pontic left.

The battle began when the Roman detachment that had been sent around Mt. Thurium appeared over the top of the hill. The Pontic detachment on the hill panicked and fled down into the river valley, disrupting Archelaus’ lines. Archelaus responded with a cavalry charge, which achieved very little, and then by sending his scythed chariots to attack the Roman line. When these chariots attacked at speed they were a real threat, but on this occasion they did not have the room to build up any speed, and the Romans let the slow moving chariots pass through gaps in their lines and then killed the crews from behind.

These unsuccessful attacks did at least give Archelaus time to bring his phalanx into line. A period of intense infantry combat followed in the center, while the result of the battle was decided on the flanks. Archelaus decided to make a flanking attack with his cavalry against Murena on the Roman left. Sulla responded by sending Hortensius, with 5 cohorts from the reserve to help Murena, but Archelaus was able to isolate Hortensius, and there was a real danger that the Roman left would crumble.

Sulla reacted by gathering together his cavalry and crossing from the Roman right to the left to help Hortensius. When he saw this, Archelaus disengaged his own cavalry, and began to move south to attack to weakened Roman right. Sulla reacted by heading back south, this time with his cavalry, 1 cohort taken from Hortensius and 2 cohorts probably taken from the reserve on the right. Sulla reached the southern part of the battle before Archelaus, and launched a full scale attack while the Pontic line was still disorganized. The Pontic left was pushed back towards the Cephisus. At the same time, Hortensius and Murena, on the Roman left, defeated a final Pontic attack and went onto the offensive.

The Pontic retreat quickly turned into a rout. Archelaus’ army was split into two halves separated by Mt. Acontium. Archelaus attempted to rally his men in front of their camp between Acontium and Hedylium, closing the gates, but all this did was increase the death toll. Eventually he was forced to open the camp, but it was too late for most of his army. Only 10,000 men survived to escape to the coast with Archelaus. Roman casualties are unknown. Sulla claimed to have lost only 14-15 men, 2 of whom later reappeared.

This crushing victory didn't end the war. Sulla made a dash for the coast with his light troops in an attempt to prevent Archelaus escaping across the sea to Chalcis, but without success. On Chalcis Archelaus received 80,000 reinforcements, and was soon able to return to the mainland to seek a second battle. This battle, at Orchomenus, was fought on ideal cavalry ground, but again ended in a major Pontic defeat, which finally ended the war in Greece.

[rupertramjet]

With five Legions that would put the figure around 24000, plus the troops there already, these would have been republican legions, with a strength of about 4500 infantry and 120 cavalry each, plus auxiliary cohorts, so probably about 30000 in all?

[Ennath]

May 26, 1940
Dunkirk Evacuation, Part 1

The purpose of the German “sickle cut” strategy in 1940 was to cut the Allied armies in half by breaking through the French lines in the Ardennes and then dashing for the Somme estuary. The Germans expected the Allies to help them by advancing into Belgium at the start of their offensive. 2 German Army Groups were involved. Army Group B, under Fedor von Bock, was to attack in the north, occupying Holland and northern Belgium, drawing the Allies forward. Army Group A, under Karl Gerd von Rundstedt had the job of breaking the thin French lines on the Meuse and reaching the sea. Rundstedt had 3 armies, and an armored group under Ewald von Kleist to lead the way.

The BEF, under John Vereker, Viscount Gort, was located to the north of the line that Kleist would take to the coast. Just as expected, when the German attack began, the Allied armies advanced into Belgium, hoping to link up with the Belgian army and stop the German advance. The Germans soon broke through the thin French line at Sedan. On May 16, Heinz Guderian, commanding a Panzer corps in Kleist’s armored group, was given a free hand for 24 hours to expand the bridgehead, and instead plunged straight through the Allied lines, reaching the Oise at Ribemont on May 17.

This sudden success began to lay the seeds of the German mistake that would let the BEF reach Dunkirk. Kleist caught up with Guderian on May 17 and criticized him for taking too big a risk. The German High Command was beginning to worry that their panzer spearhead was dangerously exposed to a combined counterattack from north and south. Guderian promptly resigned, but Rundstedt persuaded him to return to his post, and also gave him permission to carry out an armed reconnaissance to the west.

Lord Gort first raised the possibility of an evacuation from Calais, Boulogne and Dunkirk on May 19. The Admiralty appointed Adm. Bertram Ramsey to take command of the planning for this possible evacuation, under the codename “dynamo”. On May 20 he held his first planning meeting at Dover.

Guderian took advantage of his new order, and on May 20 captured Amiens and Abbeville. The Germans had reached the sea and the Allied armies were cut in two. At this point the Germans were indeed vulnerable to a counterattack. Belatedly, Maurice Gamelin, the French supreme commander, issued orders for a breakout to the south, supported by an attack from the south, exactly what the Germans feared would happen, but on May 19, before the plan could be put into place, Gamelin was replaced by Maxime Weygand. The Gamelin plan was suspended while Weygand visited the front; 3 days were lost, and by the time Weygand decided to implement a very similar plan, it was too late.

On May 21 Guderian’s Panzers paused on the line of the Somme. Gen. Hehring, Guderian’s chief-of-staff, believed that the high command had not yet decided which way to move - north towards the channel ports, or south to deal with the larger part of the French army, which was still intact south of the Somme.

On the same day the British launched their one major counterattack of the campaign, the Battle of Arras (see posting). This attack achieved some limited local success before it was repulsed, but it had a much bigger impact on the German High Command. The British attack increased their worries about their vulnerabilities.

Guderian’s panzers finally began the move north on May 22. That day they reached the outskirts of Boulogne, where they encountered serious resistance for the first time. The fighting at Boulogne would last for another 3 days, before the garrison surrendered on May 25. Meanwhile, the bulk of the BEF had pulled back out of Belgium and had returned to the defensive lines east of Lille that it had constructed over the winter of 1939-40. At this point both the British and the Germans were 40 miles from Dunkirk. The British also had a garrison at Calais, and Lord Gort was beginning to place scattered forces on the route back to the coast. On this day, the French made a belated attack around Arras, but were thrown back.

On May 23, Kleist reported that he had lost half of his tanks since the start of the campaign in the west. Accordingly, that evening Rundstedt halted his advance, and ordered him to simply blockade the Allied garrison in Calais. The Army High Command decided to give Army Group B the job of attacking the Allied pocket, while Army Group A would concentrate on guarding the southern flank of the German advance against a possible counterattack.

May 24 was the pivotal day of the campaign. On the northeast flank of the Allied pocket the Belgian army came under heavy attack, and was close to collapse. On the coast the Germans were blockading Calais, and were only 20 miles from Dunkirk, the last port available to the Allies. Meanwhile much of the BEF was still on a line running north from Arras, and attempted to maintain what was left of the front line. The most important event of the day took place when Hitler visited the headquarters of Rundstedt’s Army Group A. Rundstedt suggested halting the tanks where they were and letting the infantry tackle the Allied troops trapped in the north. Hitler agreed, and issued an order forbidding the tanks from crossing the canal running from La Basseé-Béthune-St Omer to Gravelines (10 miles west of Dunkirk). Although the defense here was not especially strong, the ground to the north was not well suited to armored action. The BEF would be left to the infantry and to the Luftwaffe.

The motives for Hitler’s decision can only be guessed. Certainly the armored forces were in need of rest and the battle at Arras made a number of German generals nervous. Equally, Göring was pressing for his Luftwaffe to be given a larger share of the action and the consequent glory. There may also be some truth in the suggestions that Hitler was deliberately being soft on the British in the hope that they could be persuaded to come to terms in the near future.

At the start of May 25, Lord Gort was still under orders to attack south to support the French, but it was becoming increasingly clear that this was a forlorn hope, and that to obey would risk losing the entire army. At 6:00 PM, Gort, on his own authority, ordered 5th and 50th Divisions to move from Arras, at the southern end of the British pocket, to the north to reinforce II Corps, as the first step in an attempt to break out to the sea. The reinforced II Corps would have the job of holding the northern flank of the corridor to the sea if the Belgian army surrendered. On the same day Churchill made his final decision not to evacuate the garrison defending Calais, hoping to gain crucial hours to improve the western defenses of the Dunkirk beachhead.

By May 26, the British and French had both decided to form a beachhead around Dunkirk, but for different reasons. While the British hoped to escape from the German trap, the French still hoped to fight on. Lord Gort met with Gen. Maurice Blanchard, commander of 1st Army Group, and together they put plans in place to create a defensive perimeter around Dunkirk, apparently without either side realizing what the other had in mind. The same day finally saw the Germans begin to take notice of the activity at Dunkirk. Hitler lifted the “halt order”, allowing Kleist’s armored group to advance to within artillery range of Dunkirk. On the same day the brave defense of Calais also finally came to an end, after having held the Germans up for a crucial few days.

The evacuation got underway that afternoon, when a number of ships were sent into Dunkirk harbor (these were mostly fast passenger ships that had been used on the cross-channel routes before the war, manned by Merchant Navy crews). Operation Dynamo itself did not start until 6:57 PM, when the Admiralty ordered Adm. Ramsey to start the full evacuation.

He had a number of serious problems to overcome. The shallow waters around Dunkirk meant that the largest ships could not be used. Ramsey had a fleet of destroyers, passenger ferries and Dutch coasters. What he lacked was enough small boats to get men from the beaches to the ships waiting offshore. Dunkirk itself had been under heavy bombardment for some days, and the inner harbor was out of use. Once the ships were loaded they then had to get back to England. Sandbars just off the French coast meant that the ships would have to travel along the coast for some distance to reach a channel into deeper water. The western route (Route Z) was the shortest, at 39 miles, but would soon be vulnerable to attack from Calais. Even once back at Dover the problems did not end. The port of Dover had 8 berths for channel ferries, each of which would soon be used by up to 3 ships at once. Once off the ships the men then needed to be quickly moved away from the dock, fed and housed. With all this in mind, it is perhaps not surprising that when planning began the best Ramsey hoped to achieve was to rescue 45,000 men over 2 days.

On May 27,, the German advance finally brought the port within artillery range, and for the rest of the evacuation the town suffered from a constant heavy bombardment. By now the Allies had defenses in place around Dunkirk. One of the most important aspects of those defenses were the inundations, which flooded large areas of the low lying ground, acting as a very effective AT ditch. Heavy fighting would follow, but the Germans had missed their best chance to cut the BEF off from the coast. The BEF was still not safe. Rearguard elements of I and II Corps did not leave the frontier defenses until that night, and most of the BEF was still outside the Dunkirk perimeter at the end of the day. Worse was to come, for during the day, German 6th Army reported that a Belgian delegation had arrived to request surrender negotiations.

A key figure over the next few days was Captain W. G. Tennant, Senior Naval Officer, Dunkirk, appointed to take charge of the naval shore embarkation parties. At this point, the navy was planning to evacuate most men from the beaches east of Dunkirk. Each British corps was allocated one of three beaches - Malo beach, close to Dunkirk, Bray beach, further along the coast and La Panne beach, just inside Belgium. The inner harbor had been closed by German bombing, and would never be used during the evacuation. The outer harbor was protected by 2 moles. These long concrete constructions had not been designed to have ships dock alongside, but in the evening, Tennant ordered a ship to try, using the east mole. Despite the difficulties, this was a success, and the east mole was used for the rest of the evacuation. This allowed Tennant to make the best use of his destroyers, which would lift the most men. Despite this initial success, by the end of the day Tennant had closed the harbor, and directed all ships to the beach.

This day also saw the navy abandon Route Z, the shortest route between Dover and Dunkirk. For the first 20 miles, this route followed the French coast, and was thus vulnerable to German artillery, especially at Calais. A new route, Route Y, had to be adopted. This avoided the danger of coastal artillery but was 87 miles, reducing the number of trips each ship could make. It also exposed the ships to German aircraft for much longer. Over the first 2 days of the evacuation 7699 men disembarked in England.

[Ennath]

May 26, 1940
Dunkirk Evacuation, Part 2

May 28 was a day of crisis for Lord Gort. On that day Belgium signed an unconditional surrender, which left the northern flank of the Allied pocket dangerously exposed. Gort was only given 1 hour formal notice of the surrender, but over the previous days King Leopold III had indicated that his army was close to collapse, so the armistice didn’t come as a complete surprise, and the Belgian army had played a vital part in the defense of the Allied left since the start of the fighting. During a day of hard fighting, the BEF was able to prevent the Germans from crossing the Yser and reaching the beaches before the Allies. By the end of the day, a large part of the BEF had reached the defended perimeter. A second crisis came during a meeting with Gen. Blanchard. Only now did the French commander realize that the British were planning to evacuate their troops. Gort’s Chief of Staff described Blanchard as having gone “completely off the deep end”. He made it clear that he did not believe any evacuation was possible, and refused to retire in line with the British.

The evacuation from the beaches began to pick up speed, and 1/3 of the 17,804 rescued during the day were taken from the beaches. Tennant re-opened the harbor early in the day, and 6 destroyers all picked up large numbers of men from the mole. The same day also saw the ferries withdrawn from daylight work, after the Queen of the Channel was sunk. These large fast ships were reserved for night work only, and the daylight operations restricted to warships and smaller ships. Fortunately, the same day saw the Dutch coasters begin to operate a continuous run to Ramsgate and Margate. These 40 ships would eventually evacuate 22,698 men, for the loss of only 4 ships.

Despite Blanchard’s attitude, eventually most of French 1st Army would reach Dunkirk. However, the Germans finally managed to cut off the Allied troops fighting around Lille; 4 British divisions had managed to escape the trap, but French V Corps was isolated. However, its defense until June 1 would buy valuable time for the beachhead. By the end of the day, most of the BEF had reached Dunkirk. The ground campaign was effectively over, and the attention turned to the naval evacuation. This was getting up to speed - 3 times as many men were rescued as on the previous day. Also on this day, the French allowed their troops to be evacuated. Despite this, the day was marred by heavy losses. HMS Wakeful was sunk by an S-boat, HMS Grafton by U62 and the ferry Mona’s Queen was sunk by a magnetic mine. The French destroyer Bourrasque and 6 major merchant ships were sunk by bombing in Dunkirk harbor. Despite this, the harbor remained open, but rumors to the contrary reached Dover, and for some time Ramsey ordered all ships to use the beaches.

As a result of this, May 30 was the only day when more men were evacuated from the beaches than from the harbor. The loss of destroyers also convinced the Admiralty to withdraw all modern types from the evacuation. Fortunately that morning Rear-Adm. William Wake-Walker arrived to take over at Dunkirk. When he realized that he only had 15 old destroyers at his disposal he contacted Ramsey, who was able to convince the Admiralty to return 7 of the newer destroyers to Dunkirk. Despite the lack of the new destroyers, this was the most successful day yet, as low clouds and burning oil hid the beaches from German attack.

Hundreds of small privately owned boats took part in the evacuation, making their main contribution from May 30 onwards. Anything that could float and could cross the channel made its way to Dunkirk in unknown numbers. Close to 200 of the “little ships” were lost during the evacuation. An examination of Admiralty figures might suggest that they didn’t actually make a big contribution to the evacuation, for fewer than 6000 men are recorded as having been rescued by the small boats. This is entirely misleading. The Admiralty figures record the numbers of men disembarking in England, and most of the small boats were not used to transport men across the channel. Their critically important role was to ferry men from the shallow inshore waters to the larger vessels waiting off the beaches. For around 100,000 men the journey home from Dunkirk began with a short trip on one of the “little ships”.

By May 31, the number of British troops at Dunkirk had been reduced to the point where a Corps commander could take over. At the start of the evacuation it had been decided that Lord Gort must not be captured - the propaganda value to the Germans would have been too high. Gort and Alan Brooke returned to Britain, and command of the troops at Dunkirk was passed to Harold Alexander. The day was not well suited to the evacuation. The wind dispersed the smoke and haze and the shelling and bombardment of the beach reached new heights. For part of the day the beach was unusable, and the harbor difficult. Despite this, the day also saw the highest number of men evacuated - a total of 68,014. By the end of the day the shrinking British forces had been forced to abandon the easternmost beach at La Panne.

One of the most controversial aspects of the evacuation at the time was the role of the RAF. Many troops evacuated from Dunkirk returned to Britain angry at what they felt was the failure of the RAF to protect them from German attacks. The Luftwaffe seemed to be constantly over the beaches, while British fighters were rarely seen. The problem facing the RAF was one of balance. A large number of fighter squadrons had been virtually destroyed in France. Fighter Command had fought to retain enough squadrons in Britain to defend against a German attack, famously keeping the Spitfire squadrons out of the battle. Now those Spitfires had to be thrown into the battle over Dunkirk. Between May 26 and June 4, the RAF flew 4822 sorties over Dunkirk, losing just over 100 aircraft. The problem was that much of the fighting took place away from the beaches. It was preferable to break up German raids before they reached the beaches, not once they were dropping their bombs. The RAF also had to patrol over the sea lanes being used by the evacuation. Despite these difficulties, Dunkirk was the Luftwaffe’s first real setback. The exact number of German aircraft lost is not clear - British claims at the time were massively over-inflated, while some more recent revisions are probably too low. The Luftwaffe almost certainly lost more aircraft than the RAF, but that includes a large number of bombers.

June 1 saw the second highest number of men evacuated, most from the harbor, where a number of ships took off very large numbers of men. The day also saw 4 destroyers sunk, including Wake-Walker’s own flagship, HMS Keith. By the end of the day only part of British I Corps and the French troops guarding the perimeter remained at Dunkirk.

It had been hoped to finish the evacuation by the early morning of June 2, but progress was slower than expected, and so work continued until 7.00 AM. At that point it was estimated that there were 6000 British and 65,000 French troops left in Dunkirk. During the day, the perimeter, now entirely manned by French troops, was driven in, but the Germans still failed to penetrate to the town or beaches. A final effort was planned for the evening and Allied ships began to move across the channel at 5 PM. By midnight the last British rearguard had been rescued from Dunkirk. The effort that began on June 2 successfully evacuated 26,746 men, most from the harbor. Of these, 3/4 were French, but there were still estimated to be 30,000 French troops left. One final effort was made on the night of June 3-4 to rescue these men from the shrinking perimeter.

This last operation continued until 3:40 AM on June 4, when the old destroyer Shikari, carrying 383 troops, became the last ship to leave Dunkirk. 26,175 French troops were rescued from Dunkirk harbor, but as the rearguard was marching down to the ships an enormous crowd of French stragglers began to appear out of cellars and other hiding places. When the last ships left, there were still 40,000 men left for the Germans to capture. As the Shikari left harbor, 2 blockships were sunk in the channel. By now the Germans were only 3 miles from the harbor, and there was no chance of any further evacuations. At 10.30 AM, the fleet of small ships was officially dispersed, and Operation Dynamo officially ended at 2:23 PM.

The official figure for those evacuated was 338,226, of whom 112,000 were French. Almost all heavy equipment was lost and many of the troops were without rifles and basic kit. Only 500 artillery pieces, of all types, remained in Britain and some of these were museum pieces. Against the original expectation that a maximum of perhaps 50,000 men might be saved, it was something of a triumph, but at some cost. The British and French navies lost at least 80 warships and merchantmen as well as many smaller vessels.

One of the most accurate judgments on Dunkirk was made by Winston Churchill during his speech to Parliament on June 4. The tone of his speech was generally upbeat, and concentrated on his confidence that any invasion of Britain would be defeated, but Churchill did strike one note of caution - “We must be very careful not to assign to this deliverance the attributes of a victory. Wars are not won by evacuations.” Operation Dynamo saved the experienced professional core of the British army from total destruction, but it did nothing to prevent the fall of France. Only in the context of a much longer war than was expected in Paris or Berlin by the end of June did the evacuation begin to take on its true significance. The presence of the BEF in the south of England, even without heavy equipment, made it much less likely that the Germans would be able to invade successfully, and made it much more likely that Britain would fight on. Churchill’s speech ended with one of his most famous passages, which would have been pure bombast without Dunkirk: “Even though large tracts of Europe and many old and famous States have fallen or may fall into the grip of the Gestapo and all the odious apparatus of Nazi rule, we shall not flag or fail. We shall go on to the end. We shall fight in France, we shall fight in the seas and oceans, we shall fight with growing confidence and growing strength in the air; we shall defend our Island, whatever the cost may be. We shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender.”