[Ennath]

February 15, 1945
Operation Solstice

Launched January 12, 1945, the Soviet Vistula-Oder Offensive ripped a huge gap in the German defensive lines, and the Soviets had subsequently pushed from the Vistula River to the Oder River. As the Soviet advance west reached its farthest point, its apex narrowed, leaving long northern and southern flanks into which retreating German formations had moved and along which the Germans were attempting to reestablish a cohesive defensive line.

Gen. Heinz Guderian, chief of the German General Staff, had originally planned to execute a major offensive against the 1st Belorussian Front, cutting off the leading elements of Georgi Zhukov’s forces east of the Oder. The Soviets were to be attacked from Stargard (Pomerania) in the north as well as from Glogau (Silesia) and Guben (Brandenburg) in the south. In order to carry out these plans, he requested that the Courland Pocket (see posting) be evacuated to make available the divisions trapped there, removed troops from Italy and Norway, and involved Sepp Dietrich’s 6th Panzer Army which had been intended for counter-attacks in Hungary. In a meeting with Guderian, Hitler insisted that Courland be held and that the army continue with its planned attacks in Hungary; the meeting rapidly degenerated into a heated and farcical argument. After agreeing on a more limited counteroffensive, Hitler and Guderian then proceeded to have an even more heated argument when Guderian insisted that Walther Wenck direct the offensive rather than Heinrich Himmler (the commander of Army Group Vistula). Hitler, despite “almost screaming”, according to Guderian’s account, gave in on this point.

In its final form, Operation Solstice consisted of a more limited attack than had been originally planned by the 3 corps of 11th SS Panzer Army, which was being assembled in Pomerania, against the spearheads of the 1st Belorussian Front. The German forces would first attack along a 30-mile front around Stargard southeastwards towards Arnswalde, where a small garrison had been encircled, with their ultimate objective being the relief of Küstrin. Over 300 tanks were allocated to the offensive, but no trains were available to transport them. In addition, due to serious shortages, only 3 days’ ammunition and fuel were immediately available. German forces had also suffered heavy losses during the January combat in East Prussia and Poland. While the Germans were able to make good some of the losses through measures such as the mass mobilization of Volkssturm, the German forces in the east had clearly suffered both significant quantitative and qualitative losses as a result of the two Soviet major offensives in January 1945.

Zhukov had been made aware of a buildup of German forces opposing his 61st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies, but did not have information as to the exact timing and nature of the attack. STAVKA had noted with concern that while the Germans had moved 13 divisions between the main Soviet forces and Berlin, 33 divisions had concentrated in Pomerania, lending credence to the possibility of a German strike from Pomerania into the exposed northern flank of the 1st Belorussian Front. While the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts were impressively large formations, the Soviet forces had also suffered serious losses in the Vistula-Oder Offensive. Soviet army strength was further weakened by the need to besiege encircled German “fortress cities” in Elbing, Poznan, Deutsch-Krone, and Schneidemühl. Armored strength was also weakened by the recent offensive operations; 2nd BRF fielded only 297 well-worn tanks early in February 1945. To compound their difficulties, the Soviets faced supply bottlenecks as well as increased German air activity, resulting in increased unit requests for anti-aircraft weapons.

Not all of the German units, which had to be reinforced across the bridges at Stettin were ready on the planned start date of February 15. Nevertheless, a part of the central corps, the SS Division Nordland, attacked towards Arnswalde that day. Initially the offensive was successful; the opposing forces of 61st Army were taken by surprise and the German spearhead reached the besieged outpost of Arnswalde and relieved its garrison.

The general attack opened the following day. The central corridor to Arnswalde was widened by III SS Panzer Corps, pushing part of the Soviet front back 5-7 miles. However, the attack by XXXIX Panzer Corps was unable to reach the Plöne Lake due to resistance by the Soviet 2nd Guards Tank Army, stalling 43 miles from Küstrin after pushing the Soviets out of Sallenthin and Muscherin, reoccupying some land on the eastern shore of Lake Madü, and recapturing Pyritz. Gruppe Munzel pushed some 2.5 miles to Liebenow, while III SS Panzer Corps advanced about half a mile to Reetz. Numbers of Soviet tanks and AT guns were destroyed by German Tiger II heavy tanks, but the German heavy tanks also took losses. In general, German progress was hindered due to strong Soviet resistance. On February 17, Gen. Wenck, commander of the offensive, was seriously injured in a car accident. While being driven back from a briefing in Berlin, he took over driving from his driver (who had been on duty and awake for 48 hours) and then himself fell asleep at the wheel. He was replaced by Hans Krebs, but command initiative had already been lost. Later that day, Zhukov threw the 3rd Shock Army, which had redeployed from the area of Jastrow, into a counterattack and the German offensive stalled.

Army Group Vistula halted Solstice on February 18. On February 19, Zhukov initiated a counteroffensive aimed at the capture of Stettin using 61st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies as well as 7th Guards Cavalry Corps. However, it stalled in heavy street fighting during the recapture of Arnswalde. There was no immediate German withdrawal, but the German command decided on February 21 to withdraw the headquarters of the XXXIX Panzer Corps as well as the Führer-Grenadier, Führer-Begleit, Holstein, and 10th SS Panzer Divisions westward behind Army Group Center, practically ensuring that eastern Pomerania would fall to the Soviets. Zhukov’s commitment of 70th Army into an attack on February 23 spurred a retreat with the German forces losing or abandoning many tanks. On February 24, Marshal Rokossovsky’s 2nd Belorussian Front renewed the offensive into Pomerania, opening a 37-mile wide gap in German lines west of Grudziadz and advancing almost 31 miles, further reducing the cohesion of German defenses.

Despite the initial gains, the operation was a complete failure. However, the operation convinced the Soviets to postpone their attack on Berlin while Pomerania was cleared.