[Ennath]

February 9, 1917
Operation Alberich

Soon after taking over from Erich von Falkenhayn as Chief of the General Staff in at the end of August 1916, Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff ordered the building of a new defensive line east of the Somme battlefront from Arras to Laon. Ludendorff was unsure as to whether retreating to the Siegfried Line (known to the Allies as the Hindenburg Line) was the best thing to do, since withdrawing might impact morale. An offensive was considered if enough reserves could be assembled in the New Year. A study suggested that 17 divisions might be made available but that this was far too few to have decisive effect in the west. Ludendorff accepted the plan after representations by Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, commander of Army Group Rupprecht (1st, 2nd, 6th and 7th Armies, from the Somme front to the North Sea coast) over the objections of the 1st and 2nd Army commanders.

Other options, such as a shorter withdrawal, were also canvassed but lack of manpower made the decision inevitable, since even with reinforcements from the Eastern Front, the German army in the west numbered only 154 divisions against 190 Allied divisions, many of which were larger. A move back to the Hindenburg Line would shorten the front by 25–28 miles and require 13 fewer divisions. Rupprecht was appalled by the scale and methods proposed for a scorched earth policy and contemplated resignation, then concluded that it might suggest a rift had developed between Bavaria and the rest of Germany.

The operation began on February 9, 1917 throughout the area to be abandoned. Its intention was to destroy anything the Allies might find useful, from electric cables and water pipes to roads, bridges and entire villages. Railways and roads were dug up, trees were felled, water wells were polluted, towns and villages were destroyed and a large number of land mines and other booby-traps were planted. The town of Bapaume was reported as having been destroyed in 45 minutes. It was one of more than 200 places that were completely razed.

Alberich also meant the complete evacuation of the area’s civilian population. Of these, 140,000 people classified as able to work were deported on foot or by rail to elsewhere in the French zone of occupation or to Belgium. It took 18,000 boxcars to haul away the “movable items”, miscellaneous personal and household goods. The 15,000 defined as “unfit” - the sick, the old, and children - were evacuated separately. 2nd Army headquarters at least took some pains to provide cars and ambulances, with attendants instead of guards, for the latter category of deportees. But, however they were implemented, the deportations in particular caused discomfort - even guilt. Rupprecht compared Alberich to the devastation of the Palatinate by Louis XIV in the 17th century, still a trope for evil in Germany, and did not want his name associated with it.

On March 4, Gen. Louis Franchet d’Esperey, commander of the Northern Army Group, advocated an attack, while the Germans were out of their trenches and in the open. Robert Nivelle, Commander-in-Chief of the French armies, approved only a limited attack, to capture the German front positions and a possible opportunity to significantly upset the German withdrawal was lost. The withdrawal took place from March 16-20, with a retirement of about 25 miles, giving up more French territory than that gained by the Allies from September 1914, until the beginning of the operation.

Alberich was a tactical success. The military withdrawal took the Allies by surprise, delayed their advance, and it profoundly shocked not only French and British soldiers, but home fronts and neutrals. Destruction was a familiar aspect of the Great War. The Russians had devastated large swaths of their own territory in the Great Retreat of 1915, justifying it in terms of military necessity. The Germans made the same case - but that made no impression on public opinion in Allied and neutral countries alike. Alberich was executed in the heart of Europe, against what was considered civilized people. Its effects could be filmed, photographed, and reported ad infinitum. The destruction and depopulation were far in excess of obvious military requirements. They were also institutionalized, the work of detailed, systematic planning. It took little effort for Allied propagandists to present Operation Alberich as the pinnacle of “Hun barbarism”, and at Versailles, Alberich was used as a trope for legitimating and justifying claims for punitive reparations.

In an ironic twist, when the Germans launched their 1918 Spring Offensive, they found themselves advancing over the areas abandoned in Alberich, only to find that the devastation in the area hindered their own operations as much as it had those of the Allies.