[Ennath]

April 24, 1945
Battle of Halbe

On April 16, 1945, the Red Army started the Battle of Berlin with a 3 Front attack across the Oder-Neisse line. By April 21, they had broken through the German front line in 2 places and had started to surround Berlin. German 9th Army (Gen. Theodor Busse) covered the defenses of the Seelow Heights against Marshal Zhukov's 1st Belorussian Front, but its position was unhinged by the successful attack of Marshal Ivan Konev's 1st Ukrainian Front (against Army Group Center) on the Neisse. By April 20, 9th Army retreated southeast of Berlin, opening the way for 1st Belorussian Front. Because of the speed of the advance of Konev's forces, 9th Army was now threatened with envelopment by the 2 Soviet pincers heading for Berlin from the south and east. The southern pincer consisted of 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies which had penetrated the furthest and had already cut through the area behind 9th Army's front lines.

Hitler gave orders which showed that his grasp of military reality had gone. He ordered 9th Army to hold Cottbus and set up a front facing west, then attack into the Soviet columns advancing north. This would allow them to form the northern pincer which would meet with the 4th Panzer Army coming from the south and envelop the 1st Ukrainian Front before destroying it. They were to anticipate an attack south by 3rd Panzer Army and to be ready to be the southern arm of a pincer attack which would envelop the 1st Belorussian Front, which would then be destroyed by SS-general Felix Steiner's III SS Panzer Corps advancing from north of Berlin. Steiner made it plain that he did not have the strength for this effort. Gotthard Heinrici then explained to Hitler's staff that unless 9th Army retreated immediately, it would be trapped. He stressed it was already too late for the unit to move northwest to Berlin and would have to retreat west. Heinrici stated that if Hitler did not allow it to move west, he would ask to be relieved of his command.

At his afternoon situation conference on April 22, Hitler fell into a rage when he realized that his plans were not going to be implemented. He declared that the war was lost, blamed the generals and announced that he would stay in Berlin to the end. Chief of Staff of OKW, Gen. Alfred Jodl, speculated that 12th Army, which was facing the Americans, could move to Berlin because the Americans already on the Elbe were unlikely to move further east. Hitler seized on the idea and the army's commander, Gen. Walther Wenck, was ordered to disengage from the American and move 12th Army northeast to support Berlin. It was then realized that if 9th Army moved west, it could link up with 12th Army. In the evening, Heinrici was given permission to make the linkup. Hitler intended that the combined force would save Berlin, but the generals involved agreed that they would attack west so as to surrender to the Americans.

9th Army’s pocket was a region of lakes and forest in the Spree Forest south-east of Fürstenwalde. The Soviet forces, having surrounded Berlin, turned to mopping up these forces. On the afternoon of April 25, Soviet 3rd, 33rd and 69th Armies, as well as 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps, attacked the pocket from the northeast. Konev knew that to break out to the west, 9th Army would have to cross the Berlin–Dresden Autobahn south of a chain of lakes starting at Teupitz and running northeast. On the same day of his attack in the northeast, Zhukov sent 3rd Guards Army to support 28th Army, which was ready to close the likely breakout route over the Berlin–Dresden Autobahn.

The relief attempt by 12th Army began on April 24 with Gen. Wenck's XX Corps attacking east and north. Next day, the Scharnhorst Division caught 6th Guards Mechanized Corps' open flank, overrunning rear-area units. While the Ulrich von Hutten Division tried to reach Potsdam, with the Scharnhorst Division on its eastern flank, to open a corridor into Berlin, other elements of 12th Army pushed east to meet 9th Army.

The final army conference took place at 1500 on April 25. It found that the only possible breakout route had to lead through Halbe. This was not difficult for the Soviet commanders to deduce as well, while, on the other hand, Ninth Army had virtually no information about the Soviet force. From this conference onward, command and control within 9th Army collapsed. There was almost no contact between 9th Army HQ and Army Group Vistula, and little contact with formations under 9th Army command.

On the evening of April 25, Busse ordered the two battlegroups - KG von Luck (21st Panzer Division) and KG Pipkorn (35th SS and Police Grenadier Divisions) - to attempt a breakout in the direction of the road center of Baruth. Von Luck's orders were to open a corridor and keep it open for the sole use of 9th Army; no civilians were to be allowed to use it. He made good progress across the Berlin–Dresden Autobahn until he hit 50th Guards Rifle Division at Baruth, which had been reinforced by dug-in Stalin tanks. Pipkorn ran into the defenses of 329th Rifle Division early on, and the battlegroup was scattered. A pitched battle developed at Baruth. Busse ordered Luck to stay near Baruth, but discontinue the attack. However, Luck disobeyed the order and disbanded his battlegroup, allowing soldiers to try to attempt to breakout individually.

On the following day, the battle continued around Baruth, and tank-hunting teams blew up some of the dug-in Soviet tanks. Some supply canisters were delivered by air, but the strength of the battlegroup was insufficient to hold off a Soviet counterattack. Under heavy air attack, the forces of the 2 battlegroups were destroyed. These forces and weapons were severely missed during later breakout attempts. Pipkorn was killed and Luck taken prisoner. Few survivors of the battle reached the Elbe.

The next morning, the German vanguard found a weak point between 2 Soviet armies and many German troops were able to cross the Autobahn before Soviet forces plugged the gap. The Germans found that they could not use their armor as well as they had hoped, because it was vulnerable to destruction on the roads and could not get a good grip on the sandy soil of the pine forests in the region. The vanguard managed to reach and cross Reichsstrasse 96, between Zossen and Baruth. Hitler was furious when he realized that Busse was attempting to break out west and not to come to his aid in Berlin. His command sent several messages demanding that the army turn towards Berlin, but received no answer. During the night and the next day (April 27), the German forces renewed their attack along two axes south from the village of Halbe towards Baruth, and in the north from Teupitz. This attack failed to produce a mass breakout although, like the day before, some groups were able to slip through the Soviet lines.

The front lines were not continuous because the dense forest meant that visibility was limited, so there was danger of sudden assault for both sides. Smoke from forest shielded the Wehrmacht from aerial reconnaissance and attack. On the other hand, it hindered many groups because, without a compass and no sun, it was difficult to judge which direction to go. The sandy soil precluded the digging of foxholes and there was no time to construct anything more elaborate.

On the night of April 28, the Germans tried another mass breakout from around Halbe. They broke through 50th Guards Rifle Division and created a corridor from Halbe to the west, but paid a high price. On April 28-29, the Soviets reinforced the flanks and attacked from the south, pouring in fire. By this time, the Germans were spread out over a wide area. The rearguard was at Storkow and the vanguard had linked up with 12th Army at Beelitz. There were large groups around Halbe. The Soviet plan was to split the caterpillar into segments and then destroy each segment individually. The German battle plan was to continue moving west as fast as possible, keeping the corridor open.

The situation in Halbe was desperate. Formations were by now all mixed up. There was considerable tension between SS and Wehrmacht troops, with both accusing the other of helping their own while ignoring the plight of the other. In Halbe itself, some of the civilians took pity on very young soldiers ("Kindersoldaten") and allowed them to change out of their uniforms into civilian clothes. The fighting became more and more confused. If the Germans came into contact with Soviet forces and overran a Soviet position, the Soviets counterattacked not only with ground forces, but with artillery and aircraft. Losses on both sides were very high. By the time the fighting was over on May 1, about 25,000 German soldiers had escaped to join up with 12th Army.

Although this was the end of the Battle of Halbe, it was not the end of the breakout. Some 9th Army forces were again surrounded west of Luckenwalde by 4th Guards Tank Army. The combined 12th and 9th Army remnants retreated west towards the Elbe so as to surrender to the Americans, who had halted on the west bank. The bulk of the fleeing Germans, along with several thousand civilians, reached and crossed the Elbe using the partially destroyed bridge at Tangermünde between May 4 and 7, surrendering to elements of US 102nd Infantry Division, until Soviet forces reached the eastern bridgehead and halted further crossings.

The casualties on both sides were high. There are about 15,000 Germans buried in the cemetery at Halbe, making it the largest war cemetery in Germany from World War II. The Red army claimed to have killed 60,000 German soldiers and taken 120,000 as prisoners. The number of prisoners is confirmed by German official sources, while other sources consider it to be exaggerated. Almost 20,000 Red Army soldiers died trying to stop the breakout. . These are the known dead, but the remains of more who died in the battle are found every year, so the total will never be known. Nobody knows how many civilians died, but it could have been as high as 10,000.