[Ennath]

February 12, 1942
The Channel Dash

On March 22, 1941, the battlecruisers Gneisenau and the Scharnhorst had sunk 22 British merchant ships in the Atlantic – totaling 115,000 tons. Such losses simply could not have been sustained and destroying the ships was seen as critical if the British were going to win the Battle of the Atlantic. Both formidable ships returned to Brest harbor for repairs after their triumphs on the 22nd.

Brest was an unusual choice for a refuge as the ships could easily be trapped in by the British Home Fleet if they attempted to sail back to Germany or by the fleet in Gibraltar if they attempted to get the Mediterranean. Brest was also in reach of RAF bombers. When it became known that both ships had berthed in Brest, Bomber Command made them a primary target following an order from Winston Churchill. Several bombing raids had damaged the 2 ships but did not disable them. In June 1941, the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen joined them.

The Royal Navy assumed that Raeder, head of the German Navy, would not tolerate 3 major ships remaining in harbor and not doing anything. The Royal navy therefore assumed that the ships would make a dash. It concluded that the ships would make their dash at night, that this would be done on a cloudy night to give the ships cover and make it impossible for bombers to operate, and that any dash would be as near to the French coast as was possible for such large ships so that fighter cover could be called if the Germans needed it - nighttime or not. Admiral Ramsey’s force at Dover was strengthened in response. The Royal Navy and RAF worked in unison on the plan to destroy the German ships - a plan that involved the Fleet Air Arm, Coastal Command, Bomber Command and Fighter Command. Though Bomber Command would not fly at night, it made plans for any attempt by the ships to make a daylight dash.

In June 1941, Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa - the attack on Russia. While the attack was massively successful in its initial stages, Hitler became more and more obsessed with defending his northern flank - believing that the Allies would launch an attack via Norway or land men and equipment in Murmansk. He therefore ordered that the 3 big ships should return to Germany rather than risk yet more damage from bombing raids in Brest. Hitler had already ordered the massive Tirpitz to Norwegian waters. The addition of the Prinz Eugen, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau would make for an awesome naval presence there. On January 12, 1942, Hitler gave the order for them to return to Germany.

The British quickly became aware of increased Germany activity not only in Brest but also along the French northern coastline. The French Resistance reported that more German aircraft were being deployed to coastal airfields. In response to this, the Royal Navy tried to predict the route the ships might take and laid more mines. A study of weather predictions led the Navy to conclude that the ships would sail between February 10 and 15, as cloud cover would make such a journey much safer. The RAF was put on alert. The submarine Sea Lion had been positioned off of Brest to watch the harbor.

The Germans had put a great deal of thought into Operation Cerberus. British coastal radar had been jammed as a matter of course, but by February 1942, the success of the jamming had become extensive. Vice-Adm. Otto Ciliax, commander of the battlecruisers, could also sail knowing that the Luftwaffe could provide a total of 280 fighters to give air cover for the duration of the journey, under Col. Adolf Galland. From the start of the journey, Ciliax could expect a minimum of 16 fighters covering his force and a maximum of 32. When he got near to the Straits of Dover, this number would increase significantly.

The convoy, which included 6 destroyers, left Brest harbor at 2245 on February 11. The Sea Lion had ended its watch at 2135 as it assumed that the ships would not leave after this time, as they would not get to the Dover Straits in darkness. The Germans left Brest without being seen - a Hudson spotter plane using radar had swept past but faulty radar was common in early 1942 and it saw nothing. Visual contact was impossible due to the cloud cover. Other spotter planes also suffered from radar failure, allowing the convoy to round the Brest peninsula unseen.

By dawn next day, February 12, the convoy was sailing off Barfleur. Fog had assisted in camouflaging its movements. Both Coastal Command and Fighter Command had failed to pass on to Adm. Ramsey the fact that their surveillance had been hindered by faulty equipment. Ramsey still believed that the German convoy had yet to sail and he stood down the forces that had been brought together to attack.

Incredibly, the Germans steamed 3 large warships and 6 escorts up the Channel for 300 miles without detection. However, the weather and faulty radar equipment served the Germans well and gave them 13 hours at sea undetected. Ramsey’s defense force was also in disarray. His MTB force based in Ramsgate had been in action the previous night and was still recovering; Bomber Command would have found it nearly impossible to operate because of the weather conditions and the Bristol Beaufort squadrons based around the coast were forced to use different air strips because the one they wanted to use (North Coates) was snow bound. One patrol pane had flown directly over Ciliax’s force but had not broken radio silence and only passed on its information when the plane had reached its base - by which time the convoy was steaming past Beachy Head in Sussex.

At Dover, the gun batteries engaged the Germans. However, their shells fell short simply because they had to guess the exact whereabouts of the targets due to the poor weather conditions. MTBs from Dover attacked but could not get near enough and had to fire their torpedoes from a distance of 2 miles - none hit. German fighter cover was ferocious. An attack by Swordfish torpedo bombers also failed; all 6 planes were lost and their commander, Lt-Cmdr. Eugene Esmonde, was awarded the Victoria Cross.

As the German convoy continued to steam towards its base, there were more British attacks. Poor weather, poor communications and a curious desire for secrecy even during the attack all played a part in the Germans successfully getting through.

The bad weather (cloud at 700 feet) meant that bombers could not get to the height they needed to drop their armor-piercing bombs if they were to be effective - they simply would not see their targets. Of the 242 bombers involved, only 39 are known to have dropped their bombs, and none of them found their target. Destroyers sent out from Harwich were attacked by the RAF as no one had told the RAF that the destroyers were being sent into action.

At dawn on February 13, the German convoy reached port. The Scharnhorst had hit a mine and 4 of the escorts were damaged, but Ciliax was eager to contact Berlin that their operation had been a great success. The Germans had lost just 17 fighters. The British response to the breakout from Brest had been ineffective. However, there were few recriminations as the Gneisenau, Prinz Eugen and Scharnhorst were now all bottled up east of Britain where they could play no part in the Battle of the Atlantic. Even Adm. Raeder, stated that the Germans had won “a tactical victory (but) had suffered a strategic defeat.”